Tirkot v The Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case

[2018] WASCA 42

4 APRIL 2018

No judgment structure available for this case.

[2018] WASCA 42

JURISDICTION

:   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION

CORAM

:   TIRKOT -v- THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC

PROSECUTIONS (WA) [2018] WASCA 42

:   BUSS P

BEECH JA
HALL J

HEARD

:   22 FEBRUARY 2018

:   4 APRIL 2018

DELIVERED

FILE NO/S

BETWEEN

:   CACV 37 of 2017

:   CANDICE DIANNE TIRKOT

Appellant

AND

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

(WA)

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction

Coram

:   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

:   PARRY DCJ

File Number

:   IND 751 of 2016

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[2018] WASCA 42

Catchwords:

Criminal law and procedure - Drug trafficker declaration under s 32 of the

Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA) - Whether requirements for declaration

satisfied - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Misuse of Drugs Act 1981  (WA), s 32A

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant

:   In person

Respondent   :   Mr L M Fox

Solicitors:

Appellant

:   In person

Respondent   :   Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Reid v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2012] WASCA 190; (2012) 224

A Crim R 100

Tirkot v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 41

Vitou v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2013] WASCA 49

Zuccala v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 129

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[2018] WASCA 42

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:

Introduction

1

Following  her conviction  of  23 drug offences,  the  Director of  Public

Prosecutions  (WA)  (DPP)  applied   for  a  drug  trafficker  declaration

under s 32A of the Misuse of Drugs  Act 1981 (WA) (the Act). Counsel

for the appellant told  the judge that the application for  a drug trafficker

declaration was not opposed.

1

2

3

The   appellant  appeals   against   the  making   of   the  drug   trafficker

declaration  on   the  ground  that   her  conviction   did  not  satisfy   the

requirements for the making of such a declaration.

For the reasons that follow, the appeal must be dismissed.

The statutory provisions

4

Section 32A of the Act provides as follows:

32A.    Drug trafficking

(1)    If a person is convicted of -

(a)

a  serious  drug offence  and  has,  during  the period  of

10 years ending  on the day,  or the  first of the  days, as

the  case  requires, on  which  the  serious  drug  offence

was committed, been convicted of 2 or more -

(i)

serious drug offences; or

(ii)

(iii)

external serious drug offences; or

offences,  one  or  more  of  which  are  serious

drug  offences and  one  or more  of  which  are

external serious drug offences;

or

(b)

a serious drug offence in respect of -

a  prohibited  drug in  a  quantity  which  is not

(i)

less

than

the

quantity

specified

in

Schedule VII in relation to the prohibited drug;

or

1

ts 32.

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[2018] WASCA 42

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

(ii)

or

prohibited plants in a number  which is not less

than the  number specified in  Schedule VIII in

relation  to  the particular  species  or  genus  to

which those prohibited plants belong;

(c)

a   relevant   drug   offence  and,   at   the   time   of   the

commission of the offence, was a member of a declared

criminal organisation,

the court  convicting the person of  the serious drug  offence first

referred to in  paragraph (a), or the serious  drug offence referred

to in  paragraph (b),  or the  relevant drug  offence  referred to  in

paragraph (c), as the case requires, shall on the application of the

Director  of Public  Prosecutions  or a  police  prosecutor declare

the person to be a drug trafficker.

(2)    An  application  for  a declaration  under  subsection (1)  may  be

made at the time of  the conviction giving rise to that application
or at any  time within 6 months  from the day  of that conviction,
and more  than one such  application may  be made in  respect of
that conviction.

(3)    In this section -

declared  criminal organisation  has  the  meaning  given in  the

Criminal Organisations Control Act 2012 section 3(1);

serious drug  offence means a  crime under section 6(1),  7(1) or

33(1)(a) or,  under  section 33(2), conspiring  to commit  a crime

under section 6(1) or 7(1).

Additional evidence in the appeal

5

An  affidavit  of  the  appellant  sworn  13 June  2017  was  admitted  as

additional evidence  in the  appeal by  order of  6 September 2017.

2

By

application dated 12 October 2017, the respondent applied  to adduce an

affidavit of  the prosecutor at  the sentencing hearing,  Ms Sarah Keogh,

as  additional evidence.   On  13 October  2017, it  was ordered  that  the

application  be  referred  to the  hearing  of  the  appeal.

3

The  affidavit

relates to discussions between the prosecutor and defence counsel in the

lead  up  to  the  sentencing  hearing.     The  discussions  concerned  the

prosecution making an  application for a drug  trafficker declaration and

2

3

White AB 3.

Yellow AB 1.

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[2018] WASCA 42

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

the response, on  behalf of the appellant,  to that application.   Given the

nature  of   the  ground   of  appeal,   and  given   the  admission   of  the

appellant's  affidavit  as  additional  evidence,  it  is   in  the  interests  of

justice to admit the  affidavit of Ms Keogh as additional evidence  in the

appeal, and we would so order.

The disposition of the appeal

6

In her submissions, the appellant emphasises that  neither the prosecutor

nor the judge  made it clear whether  the application for  the declaration,

and the  declaration itself,  was being  made under  par (a), (b)  or (c)  of

s 32A(1). It is true that this was never spelled out. That is because it

4

was obvious.    Paragraph (a) had  no application  because  the appellant

had  no  prior convictions.    Paragraph (c)  had  no  application  because

there  was  no  suggestion the  appellant  was  a  member  of  a  declared

criminal  organisation.    It  was  obvious  that  the  application,  and  the

declaration, were made under s 32A(1)(b)(i). In the circumstances of

this  case, that  required  a  finding that  the  appellant had  committed  a

serious drug offence in respect  of a prohibited drug, namely MDMA or

methylamphetamine, in a quantity  which was not less than  the quantity

specified in sch VII of  the Act in relation to  the prohibited drug which,

in each case, was 28 g.

7

Proof of the fact of  a conviction for an offence under s 6(1)(a)  does not

establish, for the purposes of s 32A(1)(b)(i), that the serious drug

offence  in question  was  'in  respect of'  any  particular quantity  of  the

prohibited  drug.

5

In  Zuccala  v  The   State  of  Western  Australia,

6

Buss JA  observed  that,  for  the  purposes  of  a  'serious  drug  offence'

within s 32A(1)(b)(i), the applicant for the drug trafficker declaration

must establish, by evidence,  the sch VII quantity of the prohibited  drug

in question.   This  will be  so wherever  the quantity  of the  drug is  not

admitted to meet the quantity specified in sch VII.

8

As detailed  in Tirkot v  The State of Western  Australia,7

the appellant

was convicted  of a  number of drug  offences, including  21 offences of

offering to sell  or supply a prohibited  drug, contrary to s 6(1)(c)  of the

Act.    An offence  contrary  to  s 6(1)(c)  of  the Act  is  a  'serious  drug

offence' which engages s 32A(1)(b)(i). An offence of offering to sell or

supply a particular quantity of a prohibited drug is an offence 'in respect

4

5

6

7

Appellant's submissions [9], [12].

Zuccala v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 129 [61].

Zuccala v The State of Western Australia [62].

Tirkot v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 41.

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[2018] WASCA 42

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

of' that prohibited drug in that quantity, for the purposes of s 32A. On

8

count 6, the appellant was  convicted of an offence of offering  to sell or

supply 2,000 MDMA pills.   So long as  each of those pills weighed,  on

average, at  least .014 g,  her conviction was  in respect  of MDMA  in a

quantity not less than the 28 g specified in sch VII.

9

The appellant submits  that there is no  evidence capable of  establishing

that  the  weight  of  MDMA  exceeded  28 g.

9

Before  the  sentencing

judge, the  DPP  did not  adduce evidence  to prove  that the  2,000  pills

weighed more  than 28 g.   That was  because, in stating  that he did  not

oppose  the making  of the  drug  trafficker declaration,  counsel  for the

appellant,  in effect,  conceded  the  point.

10

That  concession reflected

earlier discussions  between the  prosecutor and  defence counsel  to the

effect  that  a  drug  trafficker  declaration  application would  be  made,

based  on  there being  at  least  one  count  (count 6)  which  involved a

quantity exceeding 28 g.

11

10

It may  reasonably be  inferred that  the point  was conceded  because to

have  required proof  that  the 2,000  pills  weighed at  least  28 g would

have been entirely futile.  By comparison, count 24 involved possession

of 78 tablets  weighing 21 g.   The price  offered by the  appellant in the

numerous offers to sell  or supply she made was  consistent, subject to a

discount  for  larger  quantities.     It  may  readily  be  inferred  that   the

MDMA tablets in which  she was dealing were reasonably consistent  in

size.  Certainly, it may be inferred that the tablets did not vary in weight

by a factor of about 19, as would be necessary  in order for 2,000 tablets

to have weighed less than 28 g.

11

In any event, the  appellant's ground asserts that her  convictions did not

satisfy the requirements for  the making of a drug trafficker  declaration.

She  has not  demonstrated  that this  was  so.   Her  submissions merely

assert that  there is no  evidence capable  of establishing that  the weight

of MDMA exceeded  28 g.  No  evidence was led before  the sentencing

judge  because  the  point  was effectively  conceded.    The  absence  of

evidence of something does  not establish the converse.   It has not been

shown that  the appellant's case did  not satisfy the  requirements for the

making of  a declaration.   Satisfaction  of one  of the  requirements was

8

Reid v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2012] WASCA 190; (2012) 224 A Crim R 100 [152]; see

also [10], [13] - [16].

Appellant's submissions [34].

9

10

11

ts 32.

Affidavit of Sarah Keogh [4] - [6], yellow AB 4.

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[2018] WASCA 42

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

not formally proved, but that is because it was effectively conceded  and

could anyway be readily inferred.

12

13

For these reasons, the appeal must be dismissed.

The appellant relies on  the decision of this court  in Vitou v Director of

Public   Prosecutions  (WA)     as   demonstrating   that  the   failure   of

12

defence counsel to object  to the making of a drug  trafficker declaration

is  not   in  itself   fatal  to   an  appeal   against  that   declaration.

The

circumstances  in  Vitou  were  fundamentally  different  to  the  present

case.  In Vitou, it  is apparent that the prosecutor and the  court laboured

under the misapprehension that s 32A(1)(a) was engaged because the

appellant had already been  convicted of a serious drug offence and  two

further  convictions were  recorded  before the  sentencing  judge.   That

misapprehension    would    appear   to    have    involved    a    mistaken

construction of s 32A(1)(a). In this case, s 32A(1)(b) was engaged, so

long as  the 2,000  tablets the  subject of  count 6 weighed  not less  than

28 g.  Counsel for the appellant, in effect, admitted that factual question

on behalf  of the appellant.   For the reasons  already given, that  reflects

what would inevitably have been proven.

Conclusion

14

For these reasons, we would make the following orders:

1.

The affidavit  of Sarah Louise Keogh  affirmed 28 June 2017  be

admitted as evidence in the appeal.

2.

The appeal be dismissed.

I certify that  the preceding paragraph(s)  comprise the reasons for  decision of

the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

LW

RESEARCH ASSOCIATE/ORDERLY TO BEECH JA

4 APRIL 2018

12

Vitou v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2013] WASCA 49.

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