Tirkot v The Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
[2018] WASCA 42
•4 APRIL 2018
| [2018] WASCA 42 |
| JURISDICTION |
| : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA |
| TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) |
| CITATION CORAM |
| : TIRKOT -v- THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (WA) [2018] WASCA 42 |
| : BUSS P BEECH JA |
| HEARD |
| : 22 FEBRUARY 2018 : 4 APRIL 2018 |
| DELIVERED FILE NO/S BETWEEN |
| : CACV 37 of 2017 |
| : CANDICE DIANNE TIRKOT |
| Appellant |
| AND |
| THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (WA) Respondent |
ON APPEAL FROM: |
| Jurisdiction Coram |
| : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA : PARRY DCJ |
| File Number |
| : IND 751 of 2016 |
| Page 1 |
| [2018] WASCA 42 |
Catchwords: |
| Criminal law and procedure - Drug trafficker declaration under s 32 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA) - Whether requirements for declaration satisfied - Turns on own facts |
Legislation: |
| Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 32A Result: |
| Appeal dismissed Category: B |
Representation: Counsel: |
| Appellant |
| : In person |
| Respondent : Mr L M Fox |
Solicitors: |
| Appellant |
| : In person |
| Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s): |
| Reid v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2012] WASCA 190; (2012) 224 A Crim R 100 Tirkot v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 41 Vitou v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2013] WASCA 49 Zuccala v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 129 |
| Page 2 |
| [2018] WASCA 42 |
| JUDGMENT OF THE COURT |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: |
| Introduction |
| 1 |
| Following her conviction of 23 drug offences, the Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (DPP) applied for a drug trafficker declaration under s 32A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA) (the Act). Counsel for the appellant told the judge that the application for a drug trafficker |
| declaration was not opposed. |
| 1 |
| 2 3 |
| The appellant appeals against the making of the drug trafficker declaration on the ground that her conviction did not satisfy the requirements for the making of such a declaration. |
| For the reasons that follow, the appeal must be dismissed. |
| The statutory provisions |
| 4 |
| Section 32A of the Act provides as follows: 32A. Drug trafficking |
| (1) If a person is convicted of - |
| (a) |
| a serious drug offence and has, during the period of |
| 10 years ending on the day, or the first of the days, as the case requires, on which the serious drug offence was committed, been convicted of 2 or more - |
| (i) |
| serious drug offences; or |
| (ii) (iii) |
| external serious drug offences; or |
| offences, one or more of which are serious drug offences and one or more of which are external serious drug offences; |
| or |
| (b) |
| a serious drug offence in respect of - a prohibited drug in a quantity which is not |
| (i) |
| less |
| than |
| the |
| quantity |
| specified |
| in |
| Schedule VII in relation to the prohibited drug; or |
| 1 |
| ts 32. |
| Page 3 |
| [2018] WASCA 42 |
| JUDGMENT OF THE COURT |
| (ii) or |
| prohibited plants in a number which is not less than the number specified in Schedule VIII in relation to the particular species or genus to which those prohibited plants belong; |
| (c) |
| a relevant drug offence and, at the time of the commission of the offence, was a member of a declared criminal organisation, |
| the court convicting the person of the serious drug offence first referred to in paragraph (a), or the serious drug offence referred to in paragraph (b), or the relevant drug offence referred to in paragraph (c), as the case requires, shall on the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions or a police prosecutor declare the person to be a drug trafficker. |
| (2) An application for a declaration under subsection (1) may be made at the time of the conviction giving rise to that application |
| (3) In this section - |
| declared criminal organisation has the meaning given in the Criminal Organisations Control Act 2012 section 3(1); |
| … |
| serious drug offence means a crime under section 6(1), 7(1) or 33(1)(a) or, under section 33(2), conspiring to commit a crime under section 6(1) or 7(1). |
| Additional evidence in the appeal |
| 5 |
| An affidavit of the appellant sworn 13 June 2017 was admitted as additional evidence in the appeal by order of 6 September 2017. |
| 2 |
| By |
| application dated 12 October 2017, the respondent applied to adduce an affidavit of the prosecutor at the sentencing hearing, Ms Sarah Keogh, as additional evidence. On 13 October 2017, it was ordered that the |
| application be referred to the hearing of the appeal. |
| 3 |
| The affidavit |
| relates to discussions between the prosecutor and defence counsel in the lead up to the sentencing hearing. The discussions concerned the prosecution making an application for a drug trafficker declaration and |
| 2 3 |
| White AB 3. Yellow AB 1. |
| Page 4 |
| [2018] WASCA 42 |
| JUDGMENT OF THE COURT |
| the response, on behalf of the appellant, to that application. Given the nature of the ground of appeal, and given the admission of the appellant's affidavit as additional evidence, it is in the interests of justice to admit the affidavit of Ms Keogh as additional evidence in the appeal, and we would so order. |
| The disposition of the appeal |
| 6 |
| In her submissions, the appellant emphasises that neither the prosecutor nor the judge made it clear whether the application for the declaration, and the declaration itself, was being made under par (a), (b) or (c) of |
| s 32A(1). It is true that this was never spelled out. That is because it 4 |
| was obvious. Paragraph (a) had no application because the appellant had no prior convictions. Paragraph (c) had no application because there was no suggestion the appellant was a member of a declared criminal organisation. It was obvious that the application, and the declaration, were made under s 32A(1)(b)(i). In the circumstances of this case, that required a finding that the appellant had committed a serious drug offence in respect of a prohibited drug, namely MDMA or methylamphetamine, in a quantity which was not less than the quantity specified in sch VII of the Act in relation to the prohibited drug which, in each case, was 28 g. |
| 7 |
| Proof of the fact of a conviction for an offence under s 6(1)(a) does not establish, for the purposes of s 32A(1)(b)(i), that the serious drug offence in question was 'in respect of' any particular quantity of the |
| prohibited drug. |
| 5 |
| In Zuccala v The State of Western Australia, 6 |
| Buss JA observed that, for the purposes of a 'serious drug offence' within s 32A(1)(b)(i), the applicant for the drug trafficker declaration must establish, by evidence, the sch VII quantity of the prohibited drug in question. This will be so wherever the quantity of the drug is not admitted to meet the quantity specified in sch VII. |
| 8 |
| As detailed in Tirkot v The State of Western Australia,7 |
| the appellant |
| was convicted of a number of drug offences, including 21 offences of offering to sell or supply a prohibited drug, contrary to s 6(1)(c) of the Act. An offence contrary to s 6(1)(c) of the Act is a 'serious drug offence' which engages s 32A(1)(b)(i). An offence of offering to sell or supply a particular quantity of a prohibited drug is an offence 'in respect |
| 4 5 6 7 |
| Appellant's submissions [9], [12]. Zuccala v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 129 [61]. Zuccala v The State of Western Australia [62]. |
| Tirkot v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 41. |
| Page 5 |
| [2018] WASCA 42 |
| JUDGMENT OF THE COURT |
| of' that prohibited drug in that quantity, for the purposes of s 32A. On 8 |
| count 6, the appellant was convicted of an offence of offering to sell or supply 2,000 MDMA pills. So long as each of those pills weighed, on average, at least .014 g, her conviction was in respect of MDMA in a quantity not less than the 28 g specified in sch VII. |
| 9 |
| The appellant submits that there is no evidence capable of establishing |
| that the weight of MDMA exceeded 28 g. |
| 9 |
| Before the sentencing |
| judge, the DPP did not adduce evidence to prove that the 2,000 pills weighed more than 28 g. That was because, in stating that he did not oppose the making of the drug trafficker declaration, counsel for the |
| appellant, in effect, conceded the point. |
| 10 |
| That concession reflected |
| earlier discussions between the prosecutor and defence counsel to the effect that a drug trafficker declaration application would be made, based on there being at least one count (count 6) which involved a |
| quantity exceeding 28 g. |
| 11 |
| 10 |
| It may reasonably be inferred that the point was conceded because to have required proof that the 2,000 pills weighed at least 28 g would have been entirely futile. By comparison, count 24 involved possession of 78 tablets weighing 21 g. The price offered by the appellant in the numerous offers to sell or supply she made was consistent, subject to a discount for larger quantities. It may readily be inferred that the MDMA tablets in which she was dealing were reasonably consistent in size. Certainly, it may be inferred that the tablets did not vary in weight by a factor of about 19, as would be necessary in order for 2,000 tablets to have weighed less than 28 g. |
| 11 |
| In any event, the appellant's ground asserts that her convictions did not satisfy the requirements for the making of a drug trafficker declaration. She has not demonstrated that this was so. Her submissions merely assert that there is no evidence capable of establishing that the weight of MDMA exceeded 28 g. No evidence was led before the sentencing judge because the point was effectively conceded. The absence of evidence of something does not establish the converse. It has not been shown that the appellant's case did not satisfy the requirements for the making of a declaration. Satisfaction of one of the requirements was |
| 8 |
| Reid v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2012] WASCA 190; (2012) 224 A Crim R 100 [152]; see also [10], [13] - [16]. Appellant's submissions [34]. |
| 9 |
| 10 11 |
| ts 32. Affidavit of Sarah Keogh [4] - [6], yellow AB 4. |
| Page 6 |
| [2018] WASCA 42 |
| JUDGMENT OF THE COURT |
| not formally proved, but that is because it was effectively conceded and could anyway be readily inferred. |
| 12 13 |
| For these reasons, the appeal must be dismissed. |
| The appellant relies on the decision of this court in Vitou v Director of |
| Public Prosecutions (WA) as demonstrating that the failure of 12 defence counsel to object to the making of a drug trafficker declaration is not in itself fatal to an appeal against that declaration. |
| The |
| circumstances in Vitou were fundamentally different to the present case. In Vitou, it is apparent that the prosecutor and the court laboured under the misapprehension that s 32A(1)(a) was engaged because the appellant had already been convicted of a serious drug offence and two further convictions were recorded before the sentencing judge. That misapprehension would appear to have involved a mistaken construction of s 32A(1)(a). In this case, s 32A(1)(b) was engaged, so long as the 2,000 tablets the subject of count 6 weighed not less than 28 g. Counsel for the appellant, in effect, admitted that factual question on behalf of the appellant. For the reasons already given, that reflects what would inevitably have been proven. |
| Conclusion |
| 14 |
| For these reasons, we would make the following orders: |
| 1. |
| The affidavit of Sarah Louise Keogh affirmed 28 June 2017 be admitted as evidence in the appeal. |
| 2. |
| The appeal be dismissed. |
| I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. |
| LW RESEARCH ASSOCIATE/ORDERLY TO BEECH JA |
| 4 APRIL 2018 |
| 12 |
| Vitou v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2013] WASCA 49. |
| Page 7 |
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