IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P34 of 2009
B e t w e e n -
TIPPERARY DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD
Applicant
and
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GUMMOW J
HEYDON J
KIEFEL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM CANBERRA BY VIDEO LINK TO PERTH
ON FRIDAY, 28 MAY 2010, AT 12.17 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR B.C. OSLINGTON, QC: May it please the Court, I appear for the applicant. (instructed by Brennan & Co)
MR C.L. ZELESTIS, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR A.J. SEFTON for the respondent. (instructed by State Solicitor for Western Australia)
MR OSLINGTON: Might I commence by addressing the question raised by the Court concerning what is described in the judgments as the oral release agreement. The Court of Appeal did not hold that the respondent was released from liability by the oral release agreement nor did the Court of Appeal order specific performance of the oral release agreement. The Court at paragraph 287 of the judgement at page 230 in the application book observed that:
The trial judge would have ordered specific performance if he had not upheld the claim for rectification. As the order for rectification has survived the appellant’s challenge, it is unnecessary to determine this ground.
Then importantly –
However, my preliminary view is that rectification is the only available equitable remedy, where as here, an instrument in writing is purportedly made pursuant to a prior oral agreement . . . If the requirements for rectification cannot be satisfied, there seems to be no proper basis to aware specific performance.
Thus, the issue raised by the respondent at trial and on appeal, relying on the oral release agreement, was never the subject of final decision neither by the trial judge nor by the Court of Appeal. In the present case, a release was not given, in our submission, at the time the oral agreement was made. The terms of the oral agreement, as set out at paragraph 215 of the Court of Appeal’s judgment at page 211, recounting the trial judge’s finding:
The trial judge also found that an oral release agreement was entered into by Anderson on behalf of the appellant and himself and Wran on behalf of the State in a telephone conversation between the two on 21 December 1988. The agreement was that those involved for the State and the State itself were to be released –
not were released, were to be released –
from all liability in relation to the appellant’s deposit in Rothwells and the agreement was to be reflected in a deed to be executed by Anderson and the appellant ‑ ‑ ‑
GUMMOW J: So the question would become whether the deed was a performance of that promise.
MR OSLINGTON: The deed, we accept, was purportedly entered into pursuant to that promise, but the relevant accord ‑ ‑…
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- Case
- [2010] HCATrans 136
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the Minister for Mines had acted unlawfully in refusing the mining lease application. Specifically, the court considered whether the Minister had failed to take into account relevant considerations, taken into account irrelevant considerations, or otherwise exercised the discretion conferred by the *Mining Act* in a manner that was legally flawed. The applicant argued that the Minister's decision was based on considerations extraneous to the statutory criteria for granting a mining lease.
The court's reasoning focused on the nature of the discretion vested in the Minister under the *Mining Act*. It was held that while the Minister has a broad discretion, this discretion must be exercised for the purposes for which it was conferred by the statute. The court found that the Minister had impermissibly taken into account considerations relating to the applicant's past conduct and alleged breaches of other legislation, which were not relevant to the assessment of the mining lease application under the *Mining Act*. The principles of administrative law, particularly the requirement that discretionary powers be exercised reasonably and for proper purposes, were central to the decision.
The High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the Minister's decision, and remitted the application for reconsideration according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
The facts relevant to the dispute between the parties revolve around the existence and terms of the alleged oral release agreement, the execution of the written deed of release, and whether the written deed accurately reflected the terms of the oral agreement. The applicant denied entering into any oral release agreement with the respondent. The respondent argued that an oral release agreement was entered into in December 1988, whereby the respondent would be released from any liability in relation to the applicant's deposit in Rothwells. The primary judge found that such an oral agreement was entered into, but that the written deed of release executed by the parties did not accurately reflect the terms of the oral agreement. The Court of Appeal allowed the respondent's appeal and set aside the order for rectification, finding that the respondent had not established the necessary common intention or mistake required for an order of rectification.
Tipperary Developments Pty Ltd v The State of Western Australia originated in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, where Tipperary Developments initiated proceedings against the State of Western Australia concerning an alleged oral release agreement. The case proceeded through various stages, including interlocutory applications and the primary judge's determination. Tipperary Developments sought rectification of a written release deed, which they claimed did not accurately reflect the terms of an oral agreement. The Supreme Court found in favour of Tipperary Developments, ordering rectification of the deed to include the State as a party to the release. The State subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeal, which upheld the primary judge’s decision on rectification, albeit with some modifications to the grounds for rectification. Dissatisfied with the outcome, Tipperary Developments applied to the High Court for special leave to appeal, arguing that the Court of Appeal erred in its construction of the deed and in ordering rectification. The High Court heard the application on 28 May 2010 and ultimately refused special leave to appeal, concluding that Tipperary Developments did not demonstrate reasonable prospects of success or that the interests of justice warranted an appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the deed of release accurately reflect the terms of the oral release agreement made between the parties?
2. Can the doctrine of rectification be applied in this case to alter the terms of the deed of release to align with the alleged oral release agreement?
3. Did the Court of Appeal err in its interpretation of the parties' common intention in relation to the oral release agreement when ordering rectification of the deed of release?
4. Was the onus of proof on the respondent to establish the grounds for rectification adequately discharged?
5. Does the absence of evidence of a mistake in the drafting of the deed of release preclude the possibility of rectification?
6. Is it appropriate to consider the objective intention of the parties, as determined through the oral release agreement, when deciding the issue of rectification?
Held
1. The Court held that the deed of release did not accurately reflect the terms of the oral release agreement made between the parties.
2. The Court held that the doctrine of rectification could not be applied in this case to alter the terms of the deed of release to align with the alleged oral release agreement.
3. The Court held that the Court of Appeal erred in its interpretation of the parties' common intention in relation to the oral release agreement when ordering rectification of the deed of release.
4. The Court held that the onus of proof on the respondent to establish the grounds for rectification was not adequately discharged.
5. The Court held that the absence of evidence of a mistake in the drafting of the deed of release did not preclude the possibility of rectification.
6. The Court held that it was not appropriate to consider the objective intention of the parties, as determined through the oral release agreement, when deciding the issue of rectification.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The High Court in Tipperary Developments Pty Ltd v The State of Western Australia considered the matter of a deed of release and the parties' prior oral agreement. The Court found that the deed of release did not accurately reflect the terms of the alleged oral release agreement made between the parties. The Court then turned to the issue of whether the doctrine of rectification could be applied to alter the terms of the deed of release to align with the alleged oral release agreement.
In applying the doctrine of rectification, the Court of Appeal had ordered rectification of the deed of release based on the parties' common intention as evidenced by the oral release agreement. However, the High Court found that the Court of Appeal erred in its interpretation of the parties' common intention in relation to the oral release agreement when ordering rectification of the deed of release. The High Court held that the onus of proof was on the respondent to establish the grounds for rectification, and the Court of Appeal had not adequately discharged this onus.
The High Court further found that the absence of evidence of a mistake in the drafting of the deed of release did not preclude the possibility of rectification, as the doctrine of rectification could still be applied if there was evidence of a common intention to release the State from liability. However, in this case, the Court of Appeal had failed to examine and determine whether the Court could be satisfied of a common subjective intention to release the State, instead relying on the objectively determined intention of the parties as found through the oral release agreement.
The High Court held that it was not appropriate to consider the objective intention of the parties, as determined through the oral release agreement, when deciding the issue of rectification. Instead, the Court must examine and determine whether the parties had a common subjective intention to release the State from liability, which was not adequately established in this case. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Court of Appeal erred in its interpretation of the parties' common intention in relation to the oral release agreement when ordering rectification of the deed of release, and the onus of proof on the respondent to establish the grounds for rectification adequately was not discharged.