Timothy Ross Reynolds v SDA Schools (North NSW) Ltd

[2016] FWC 1597

[2016] FWC 1597

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

REASONS FOR DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal

Timothy Ross Reynolds
v
SDA Schools (North NSW) Ltd
(U2016/617)

SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT DRAKE SYDNEY, 22 MARCH 2016

Application for relief from unfair dismissal.

[1] This decision arises from an application for an extension of time for lodgement of an application for an unfair dismissal remedy pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act).

[2] The date on which the relationship between Mr Reynolds and the respondent ended is in dispute. Mr Reynolds lodged his application at the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) on 12 February 2016. The respondent submits that the applicant’s employment was terminated in early December 2015. Mr Reynolds contends that his employment was terminated on 31 December 2015. If 31 December 2015 is accepted as the date of termination of Mr Reynolds’ employment his application was lodged 22 days outside the statutory time limit.

[3] When determining this application I had before me the Application for Unfair Dismissal lodged by Mr Reynolds. I wrote to him on 12 February 2016 outlining the matters I was required to consider by the Act and asked him to provide a statement addressing these matters within 14 days. Mr Reynolds provided a comprehensive statement on 29 February 2016. After giving consideration to the material provided in Mr Reynolds’ application and correspondence of 29 February 2016 I refused Mr Reynolds’ application for an extension of time and issued an order dismissing his application on 4 March 2016.

[4] The relevant legislative framework for the exercise of the Commission’s discretion in relation to applications of this kind is set out below:

394 Application for unfair dismissal remedy
...
(3) The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:

(a) the reason for the delay; and
(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and
(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(e) the merits of the application; and
(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.

[5] The meaning of “exceptional circumstances” was considered in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd[2011] FWAFB 975 where the Full Bench said:

“[10]It is convenient to deal first with the meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” in s.366(2). In Cheval Properties Pty Ltd v Smithers a Full Bench of FWA considered the meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” in s.394(3) and held:

“[5] The word “exceptional” is relevantly defined in The Macquarie Dictionary as “forming an exception or unusual instance; unusual; extraordinary.” We can apprehend no reason for giving the word a meaning other than its ordinary meaning for the purposes of s.394(3) of the FW Act.”

[11] Given that s.366(2) is in relevantly identical terms to s.394(3), this statement of principle is equally applicable to s.366(2).

[12] The ordinary meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” was considered by Rares J in Ho v Professional Services Review Committee No 295 a case involving in s.106KA of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth). His Honour observed:

“23. I am of opinion that the expression ‘exceptional circumstances’ requires consideration of all the circumstances. In Griffiths v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 372 at 379 Brennan and Dawson JJ considered a statutory provision which entitled either a parole board or a court to specify a shorter non-parole period than that required under another section only if it determined that the circumstances justified that course. They said of the appellant’s circumstances:

‘Although no one of these factors was exceptional, in combination they may reasonably be regarded as amounting to exceptional circumstances.’

24. Brennan and Dawson JJ held that the failure in that case to evaluate the relevant circumstances in combination was a failure to consider matters which were relevant to the exercise of the discretion under the section (167 CLR at 379). Deane J, (with whom Gaudron and McHugh JJ expressed their concurrence on this point, albeit that they were dissenting) explained that the power under consideration allowed departure from the norm only in the exceptional or special case where the circumstances justified it (167 CLR at 383, 397).

25. And, in Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513 at 573 [173] Callinan J referred with approval to what Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ had said in R v Kelly (Edward) [2000] QB 198 at 208, namely:

‘We must construe “exceptional” as an ordinary, familiar English adjective, and not as a term of art. It describes a circumstance which is such as to form an exception, which is out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon. To be exceptional a circumstance need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare; but it cannot be one that is regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered.’

26. Exceptional circumstances within the meaning of s 106KA(2) can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. Thus, the sun and moon appear in the sky everyday and there is nothing exceptional about seeing them both simultaneously during day time. But an eclipse, whether lunar or solar, is exceptional, even though it can be predicted, because it is outside the usual course of events.

27. It is not correct to construe ‘exceptional circumstances’ as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural ‘circumstances’ as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of ‘exceptional circumstances’ in s 106KA(2) includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon. And, the section is directed to the circumstances of the actual practitioner, not a hypothetical being, when he or she initiates or renders the services.”

[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.” [Endnotes not reproduced]

[6] For exceptional circumstances to arise as contemplated by s.394 of the Act, it is not necessary that the applicant for that extension of time be overtaken by a catastrophic event. Reasons for delay in the category of extreme events are not necessary to meet the test. All of the factors outlined in s.394(3) of the Act must be considered and weighed when deciding whether or not exceptional circumstances, circumstances sufficient to support an exception, exist.

[7] I considered the various criteria to which my attention is directed by s.394(3) of the Act.

reason for the delay-s.394(3)(a)

[8] The reasons Mr Reynolds provided for his delay in lodgement were set out in paragraph 1.4 of his application and in his six-page statement with attachments dated 29 February 2016.

[9] Mr Reynolds relies, amongst other submissions, on the continued interaction he had with the respondent in December 2015, his provision of medical reports, the failure of the respondent to make it clear that his employment was terminated and inconclusive information provided to him when he was paid what subsequently became apparent were his termination payments.

[10] Mr Reynolds lodged an application pursuant to s.739 of the Act on 31 December 2015. That application was listed before Commissioner McKenna for conference by telephone. The respondent did not attend and Mr Reynolds withdrew that application on 13 January 2016. He considered the application was “…interfering with possibly beneficial internal church processes”.

[11] Mr Reynolds was attempting to negotiate and resolve matters directly with the respondent. He did not seek the assistance of his union until February 2016.

[12] I was not persuaded that Mr Reynolds’ difficulties were out of the ordinary, unusual or uncommon. Mr Reynolds engaged in negotiations and attempted to resolve his termination of employment directly with the respondent. He did not attempt to lodge an application for an unfair dismissal remedy until he was well outside the time limits prescribed by the Act.

when the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect-s.394(3)(b)

[13] Despite the interaction which occurred with the respondent in December 2016 Mr Reynolds submitted he became aware of the end of his relationship with the respondent on 31 December 2015.

any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal-s.394(3)(c)

[14] Mr Reynolds disputed his dismissal by lodging this application.

prejudice to the employer-s.394(3)(d)

[15] I was satisfied that there would be no greater prejudice to the respondent caused by Mr Reynolds’ application being listed now than there would have been had it been lodged in time. Prejudice to the respondent was a neutral consideration.

the merits of the application-s.394(3)(e)

[16] Merit was a neutral issue in my consideration of this application.

fairness as between Mr Reynolds and other persons in a similar position-s.394(3)(f)

[17] There was no issue of fairness in relation to any other person in a similar position.

[18] Having considered all of the matters to which my attention is directed by the Act I was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances which would warrant my granting an exception to the statutory time limit and on that basis dismissed the application. Mr Reynolds’ circumstances were not out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.

SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT

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