Tilmund & Tilmund (No 3)
[2024] FedCFamC1F 673
•26 September 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Tilmund & Tilmund (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC1F 673
File number(s): LEC 78 of 2015 Judgment of: BAUMANN J Date of judgment: 26 September 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Best Interests – Where the operation of interim orders by this Court were interrupted due to State Court proceedings resulting in an Apprehended Violence Order being ordered, naming the father as the Respondent and the children as the aggrieved parties, following an allegation of the children being reported by a third party – Where the children were ordinarily living with the father by consent on an interim basis – Where the State Court proceedings are yet to be finalised – Where the nature of such allegations are yet to be particularised or available to the Court
FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Where the father sought leave to dispense with the Harman undertaking
Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CC and s 68P Cases cited: Tilmund & Tilmund [2023] FedCFamC1F 637
Tilmund & Tilmund (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 353Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 49 Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Date of hearing 26 September 2024 Place: Brisbane Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Smart Solicitor for the Applicant: Paul Denmeade & Co Counsel for the Respondent: Mrs Bassano Solicitor for the Respondent: Michelle Pocheron Lawyers Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Ms Fletcher as solicitor advocate, Universal Law ORDERS
LEC 78 of 2015 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR TILMUND
Applicant
AND: MS TILMUND
Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER
ORDER MADE BY:
BAUMANN J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 SEPTEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS ON AN INTERIM BASIS UNTIL FURTHER ORDER:
1.That the Applicant father be granted leave to proceed with his Oral Application to dispense with the Harman undertaking.
2.That the father’s Oral Application be dismissed.
Living arrangements
3.That the Orders 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the Orders made 4 August 2023 remain in full force and effect.
4.That Order 4 of the Orders made 19 April 2024 remain in full force and effect.
5.That Order 1, 2 and 3 of the Orders made 23 January 2024 be suspended.
6.That Order 3 of the Orders made 19 April 2024 be suspended.
W, X and Z
7.That the children W born in 2009 (“W”), X born in 2011 (“X”) and Z born in 2018 (“Z”) return to the care of the father and thereafter live with the father, until 7 November 2024.
8.That the children W, X and Z spend no physical time with the mother unless otherwise agreed before 7 November 2024.
9.That the mother shall communicate with W, X and Z each Sunday and Wednesday between 6.00pm and 6.30pm (AEDT), with such telephone calls to be unrecorded and initiated by the mother to the father’s mobile telephone number.
10.That the father shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that Z continue to undertake therapeutic counselling/support he was receiving prior to 13 January 2024.
Y
11.That the child Y born in 2012 (“Y”) live with the Respondent mother.
12.That the child Y spend no physical time the father unless otherwise agreed, before 7 November 2024.
13.That the father shall communicate with Y each Thursday between 6.00pm and 6.30pm (AEDT), with such telephone calls to be unrecorded and initiated by the father to the mother’s mobile telephone number.
14.That the mother shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that Y continue to undertake therapeutic counselling/support she was receiving prior to 13 January 2024.
Changeover
15.That pursuant to s 68P(2)(c) of the Family Law Act 1975 the Independent Children’s Lawyer shall explain to the children W, X and Z the Orders made on 26 September 2024 in relation to who the children will live with pending further order.
Other orders
16.That the Applicant father be granted leave to provide a copy of these Orders made 26 September 2024 to the Local Court, New South Wales Police Force and the Department of Communities and Justice.
17.That the Independent Children’s Lawyer be at liberty to apply to have the matter re-listed.
Final hearing
18.That these proceedings be set down for Final Hearing for not more than four (4) days commencing at 10.00am on 21 January 2025 in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) at Brisbane.
19.That the Applicant pay any hearing fee or seek a waiver of the fee no later than 4.00pm on 24 December 2024.
20.That each party file and serve on each other no later than 4.00pm on 31 December 2024:
(a)one (1) consolidated affidavit of further evidence in chief; and
(b)one (1) affidavit of each witness intended to be relied upon at trial.
21.That each party file and serve on each other no later than 4.00pm on 14 January 2024, a case outline setting out:
(a)a precise minute of the final orders sought;
(b)a relevant chronology; and
(c)a list of affidavits and Applications and/or Responses intended to be relied upon at trial.
22.That no party shall be entitled to rely upon any other affidavit material not filed in accordance with these directions without leave of the Court.
23.That in the event that either party wishes to cross examine a single expert at the Final Hearing, that party shall provide written notice to the single expert of such intention as soon as reasonably practicable, but by no later than 4.00pm on 31 December 2024.
24.That the Independent Children’s Lawyer have liberty to provide electronically or otherwise to the parties’ legal representatives a proposed tender bundle of relevant subpoena material, no later than 4.00pm on 18 December 2024.
IT IS NOTED:
A.That Order15 herein was made by consent.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Tilmund & Tilmund has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Settled from the oral reasons delivered)BAUMANN J:
Sadly, the conflict between these parents has in some ways moved from this Court to the Local Court of New South Wales at City P, arising from police intervention, which empowered them under State legislation to seek, as they did, a provisional Apprehended Violence Order (“AVO”), the effect of which caused the children to be removed, contrary to the orders of this Court made previously that they live with the father. In saying that, of course, I acknowledge that those orders did not relate to the child, V.
There was to be a hearing in the Local Court on 23 September 2024, but I am now informed, it seems, as all parties accept, that those proceedings have been listed for some form of interim determination on 3 October 2024. That is, next week.
FATHER’S PROCEDURAL APPLICATION TO FURTHER DISPENSE WITH THE HARMAN UNDERTAKING
When this matter was before me on the last occasion, being 10 September 2024, and when I listed on that occasion the matter for interim hearing before me today, I did, at order 3, order:
That the father be granted leave to provide the Reasons for Judgment dated 19 April 2024 and a Family Report of [Ms G] dated 30 July 2024 to the New South Wales Police Force and, if requested, the Department of Communities and Justice.
I have been told, and the evidence before me today reveals that, in fact, that order was complied with.
As to how the New South Wales Police Force choose to prosecute the AVO is a matter for them. There is a protocol between courts in relation to sensitive information held by other courts. In my view, the order made on 10 September 2024, for the reasons I delivered orally at that time, released the father from the Harman undertaking so as to provide the police and the Department of Communities and Justice (“the Department”) with a copy of those two reports. I would hope that it will not be a matter that the police believe that they can ignore what was the clear intention of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) in an order made that gives them some background to the matter. Ultimately, when they come to prosecute the matter before the magistrate, they will have some duty, perhaps, to inform the magistrate.
However, I do not believe that I should make an order that allows the father to provide a copy of the reports and/or Reasons directly to the magistrate without a formal request in the usual way from the magistrate. I cannot understand why, if relevant to the context of the matters related to the AVO, the prosecution might regard it as proper not to fully disclose material in their possession. But that is a matter that Mr Smart (Counsel for the father) will have to take up with the magistrate.
INTERIM HEARING IN RESPECT OF LIVING ARRANGEMENTS
The context of this urgent interim hearing today is clear from the transcript of proceedings. I do not propose to go through this long history of conflict. The history can be gleaned from at least two published Judgments, one made on 4 August 2023 (see Tilmund & Tilmund [2023] FedCFamC1F 637), where after three days of hearing, I made interim orders that the children would spend time with the father in a graduating regime, whilst remaining living with the mother.
The history will show that the children engaged in this manner – V, who is aged 16 years and lives with the mother; W, who is aged 15 years and was, under my orders, living with the father; X, who is aged 13 years and was, under my orders, living with the father; Y, who is aged 11 years currently, soon to turn 12, who, under my orders, was living with the father; and, Z, the youngest child, who is aged 10 and a half years and was living with the father – are the subject of this conflict.
To say that these parents had totally different parenting styles is to reflect one of the concerns identified by the Court in its Reasons of 4 August 2023. The mother was unable to get the children to school. She was unable to facilitate the children spending time with the father. I do not propose to repeat those Reasons; they are known to the parties. In fact, so much so that Mr Smart was then Counsel for the father as he is today, Mrs Bassano was then Counsel for the mother as she is today, and there is an Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”), Ms Fletcher, who was in the matter then, who briefed another Counsel who is no longer at the bar.
When the matter came back to the Court on 23 January 2024, the mother conceded, as Mrs Bassano again acknowledged today, that it would be in the best interests of the children, on an interim basis, that they live with the father. That is, all four children, excluding V, who was to remain living with the mother.
That was a very difficult concession for the mother to make. After that change occurred before the school term started this year, the matter was further adjourned to determine what sort of time arrangements between the children and the mother would be in their best interest. The Orders of 23 January 2024 were for the children in the father’s care – W, X, Y, and Z – to spend supervised time with the mother. The Reasons of 19 April 2024 dealt with the regime of time that was then to occur (see Tilmund & Tilmund (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 353). They provided that the children would begin unsupervised time with the mother that would ultimately increase, with changeovers in the contact centre because of the chronic, unrelenting conflict between the parents. In particular, commencing Friday, 26 July 2024, and each alternate weekend during New South Wales school terms, the children were to spend time with the mother unsupervised from after school on Friday until 4.00 pm on Sunday.
It was obvious that the family report by Ms G, that had been before the Court in December 2022, needed to be updated. It was updated. By reason of an order made by me on 17 April 2024, the Court Child Expert was engaged to provide an updated report. That report was founded on observations and interviews conducted by her on 28 June 2024. The report was issued on 30 July 2024. I have read the report, and I referred to it during today’s exchanges. I have read, for example, the comments made by the children individually; the observations made by the Court Child Expert of engagement between the children and the father; and the ultimate analysis and recommendations by the report writer, who had the longitudinal benefit of seeing this family on two occasions over a period of nearly two years.
For the reasons that Ms G set out, the recommendation that was made, by which, of course, I am not bound, was that W, X, Y, and Z continue to live with the father.
It is not clear when that report was published or seen by the parents but, certainly, I released it, as the certificate to the report identifies, on 2 August 2024. On 26 August 2024, the father filed an Application in the Proceeding, which is the actual Application before me today, that all children, including V, live with the father.
The evidence at least shows that on or about 30 August 2024, or shortly thereafter, allegations said to have been made by, at least at that stage, Y, and/or two school teachers, caused the father firstly to say he was humiliated at school on 30 August 2024, and were so serious, it would seem, that the police caused intervention in the matter, notwithstanding the orders of this Court, such that on or about 3 September 2024 they proceeded in Local Court of New South Wales to obtain a provisional AVO to protect the mother and the children, and it would seem to be the basis upon which the police say the children could be removed from the father and put in the mother’s care.
To the extent that the police were aware of the earlier orders, at least from 23 January 2024 and then again on 17 April 2024 that the children live with the father, the police officer investigating at that stage is reported as saying that their order will override any Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) order. Of course, at the time, they did. They were put into effect, and since 3 September 2024, the children have not spent time with the father. I note that the mother, on 3 September 2024, which might just be a coincidence, filed a Response to the Application in a Proceeding seeking that the father’s application be dismissed.
The matter came urgently before me on 10 September 2024, and after making various orders, I adjourned the matter until today, 26 September 2024, for interim hearing of the father’s application. It is relevant to note that on 4 September 2024 in chambers, I made orders pursuant to section 67ZBD of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”), directed to the Department and to the New South Wales Police Force, seeking for them to produce information in their possession, power, or control in relation to the children or the parents. The material that has been produced from the Department and police has been shared with the parties. It provides no real particulars beyond the scant particulars that the mother had given in the AVO application that is annexed to her affidavit of 3 September 2024.
Hopeful that the Court’s intervention might assist in clarifying this issue when the matter is before me again, as I say, on 10 September 2024, I ordered the parties to file material by 19 September 2024 that they would rely upon for the interim hearing on 26 September 2024 and, in particular, made order 3 set out at paragraph 3 herein.
To further deal with the context, I had been informed that the provisional AVO was to be heard as to whether an interim order ought to be made on 23 September 2024, which was three days ago. I have been informed by Mr Smart, a local Counsel in the City P area, who appears for the father today, and I accept his submission, that:
(a)On 23 September 2024, the local magistrate did not have sufficient time to deal with the matter and it was adjourned to 3 October 2024;
(b)Although it was adjourned to 3 October 2024, there was no guarantee that it will be heard on that day, particularly in circumstances where it seems the police have been given until the end of October to produce some particulars of the alleged incidents found in their application for an AVO;
(c)In every respect, when I indicated the prospect of this matter being adjourned, Mr Smart says, and I accept for the purpose of today, that the Court will be in no better position on 3 October 2024 than it is today.
Doing the best she could, Mrs Bassano, an experienced Counsel who has now had some dealings with this matter, could not point to any independent evidence of words spoken by the children or the context for any such words that might give details of place and time, or anything of that nature relating to abuse by the father, because, she says, the mother just does not know.
It seems to me, in view of the strong relationship the children have had with the mother, it is difficult to understand – and at trial it may become clearer – why these children, who have been having at least unsupervised time with the mother since April 2024 on a regular basis; have had the opportunity to be observed and interviewed by the experienced Court Child Expert on 28 June 2024; that even as we sit here today, the mother does not know of the nature of the allegations, other than broadly they involve allegations that on two occasions the father had inappropriately and in a sexualised manner touched Y, and at least on two occasions the father has physically assaulted X. Again, nothing in the family report refers to these allegations, and there is no evidence that the mother had received any such disclosures to her by the children at that time.
When inquiring of what triggered the Department and/or police involvement in this matter, all I know is that something caused them to attend the school and to interview, at least Y, if not X. I have no evidence about what was said to teachers, or other people at the school who may have had a mandatory reporting duty. I have no evidence really from the police or the Department.
Now, Mrs Bassano says, and I understand this submission and I do not ignore it, that the Court cannot ignore the very urgent actions taken by the police with the support of the Department, it is suggested, to intervene in the way they did. That is, to disrupt, not just in respect of X and Y, but in respect of the other three children including V, arrangements put in place that have been operating on the strength of the family report well for these children since January 2024.
I wish I could have the required confidence that, without any particulars, I could just accept that the police can never make errors, or have got it right. I would not even suggest that I am that infallible. In courts like this, where these allegations are made, the currency is evidence.
The transcript will reveal that there is much merit in what Mr Smart says has been the lack of evidence. Now, of course, against that it has to be acknowledged that the father, at least initially, says that on advice, he would not submit to an interview with police. There is some suggestion he may have elected to speak with police, but there is no evidence he has done so to date. In circumstances where he has no idea what allegations are made, I can well understand why he may be cautious about entering into a police interview. Nonetheless, by not entering into a police interview, he at least robs the Court of his evidence about what the police put to him as their case. I cannot do anything about that.
The circumstances of the case are so difficult that the experienced ICL, Ms Fletcher, is neither able to support the position of the father or the position of the mother.
The father’s position is that the four children return to his care and spend supervised time with the mother, or as a second option, that the three boys return to his care, Y remaining with the mother, and there be supervised time.
The mother’s position is that the four children, who are now in her care as a result of the intervention by police, should remain in her care, and that the father should have no time with the children. The concern with that proposition is it takes us back to what was the position at the time of the trial, as I have already indicated, where the children were spending no time with the father and the mother demonstrated no capacity to cause that time to occur.
THE STATUTORY PATHWAY
I have, during this summary, tried to identify the issues of agreement and disagreement. There are a few areas of agreement. There is little evidence that helps the Court today. In those circumstances, the Court should be very careful about jumping to suppositions or assumptions, either that the father has committed the offences for which apparently the police may think he is guilty, or that the mother has, in some way, intervened, so as to change the course of these children’s residence, against that which she agreed to effectively in January 2024. These are triable issues, and I propose to list this for trial in the first week I return to sitting in January 2025. I do not think that having a trial is particularly helpful or therapeutic to these parents, but there needs to be finality.
The statutory pathway remains that the Court is to make orders in the best interest of a child. In determining what is in a child’s best interest, s 60CC(1) of the Act requires the Court to consider the matter set out in subsection (2). These children do not identify as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children. Section (2)(a) provides that the Court is to consider:
What arrangements would promote the safety, including safety from family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm of:
(i) the child; or
(ii) each person who has care of the child.
As laboriously dealt with today, the only evidence of the children being the subject of family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm, including sexual harm, since the orders were made in January 2024, is an implication from the actions undertaken by the Department and/or police. There is not sufficient evidence before me for the Court, at any level, to make an assessment of what has been said or how those disclosures, if made and when they were made, are seen within the context of this journey.
I have already indicated that my concern is that the mother and the children did not raise these issues with the report writer in any way, other than, as is apparent from the report, that at times the father’s parenting style is perhaps louder, less passive, more pragmatic, than that which they had been used to having with the mother where, as my earlier reasons indicated, they could basically do as they wish.
I am aware that these children have continued to express fondness and warmth with their mother that would include seeking that they live with her. Nonetheless, they seem, in the report of Ms G, to have acknowledged the benefits they are now obtaining from attending school regularly, and like getting to know their father better and spending time with him, which had been denied to them, despite orders of the Court, for many months before August 2023. I think it would be fair to say that the children could well be comfortable living in the mother’s home.
These children have been at ongoing emotional risk, a matter that needed to be considered by the Court under s 60CC(2)(c). The ongoing and unrelenting conflict; the lack of time promoted by, initially, the mother; and the failure for the mother to be able to obtain any consistent attendance of the children at school, were all matters of great concern when the matter came before me again in January 2024. However, even those risks are now added to by the uncertainties created by the actions of the police – which I have no doubt they were duty-bound, they would say, to undertake – and the ongoing emotional harm to the children that could arise from having no time with their father at all. The father says, of course, as well, that the children were not attending school, although that seems to be in dispute. The report of Ms G identified that, in her view, the father had demonstrated the capacity to care for the children. The mother does not seriously challenge that, although their parenting styles are different.
Section 60CC(2)(e) of the Act requires the Court to consider the benefit of the children of being able to have a relationship with the child’s parents and other people who are significant to the children, where it is safe to do so. Mrs Bassano says that the risk to Y of some imprecise, inappropriate touching of a sexual nature is a risk to all of the children. That is a very broad submission. She says that the physical attacks, as they seem to be alleged, against X, is a risk to all of the children. Again, in the absence of knowing the context for these alleged physical abuses, it is hard to accept that submission.
It has to be acknowledged, as well, in this discussion, that these children, particularly V, who lives with the mother, and W and X, have some additional needs. The evidence of the family report writer identifies that the father has been meeting those needs when the children have been primarily living with him. The mother may dispute that, but her evidence does not demonstrate a great engagement with that issue.
The catch-all provision of s 60CC(2)(f) is that the Court must consider: “Anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the child.”
In my view, this is a significant factor. In August 2023, for reasons delivered, the Court sought to put in place arrangements that would correct what the Court found to be, contrary to the children’s best interests, the failure by the mother to support the children having a relationship with the father and the children’s embracing of that reluctance, if you like, in the way that they treated the father and engaged with him. It was a matter of great concern to the Court, and one earlier identified that the children were not at school.
By January 2024, with, if not the consent, at least little opposition from the mother, who acknowledged her difficulty in having the children attend school, the change of residence occurred and the adjustment to living in the father’s home – a different home, where his parenting style is different – was given some time to settle down by reason of supervised time arrangements. The matter came back in April 2024, and the Court was confident enough, for the reasons articulated, that whilst the children would maintain their stability living in the father’s care, the mother should have time with the children on an unsupervised basis, and that was proceeding.
The relevance is stability. I am concerned that on the trajectory which is now being developed, these children who had gained stability in the father’s care, in my view, will now lose that stability. However, there is a risk, in my view, particularly with Y at her age, that whatever allegation she is making against the father might be repeated to other authorities if the child is returned to the father’s care. I appreciate that is a broad speculation. In saying that, I do not in any way say that I make a finding that the mother has, opportunistically or otherwise, persuaded the children to make allegations in the last month or so that do not appear to have been made to anyone ever before, with the serious context that the police apparently believe they deserve.
The decision, in my view, in the best interests of the children, is for W, X, and Z to return immediately to the care of the father. For the reasons given, I do not propose to order that Y return to the care of the father. I will make an order that Y remains living with the mother on an interim basis.
I already indicated today that I was not prepared to consider a change of residence for V from that which has been the case since separation of these parties, which occurred, sadly, approaching 10 years ago. The fact that these parents are still able to maintain the intensity of their conflict 10 years after their separation is a context which is disturbing in many ways, and to which both parents probably must bear some responsibility.
I am not prepared at the current stage to believe that any orders for supervised time, either the father with Y, or the three boys with the mother, is likely to work without difficulty. Considering the trial that I am granting this matter in January 2025, at this stage, unless further evidence arises in which case the ICL will have liberty to relist, I will suspend all physical contact between Y and the father and between the three boys and the mother on an interim basis. I am aware that the children are probably in the middle of school holidays at the moment in New South Wales, and that we have one more term of school in New South Wales. The parties live proximate to school in such a way that the father can return to the position of taking the three boys to school and collecting them. The mother will need to demonstrate for the trial, at least, but in the interests of Y, that she can get Y to school.
I am, of course, concerned in the absence of evidence that new evidence that might arise could shape this case. However, in my view, the instability that has been created by the actions that have been taken cannot continue. In making this order I am conscious of the Court’s obligation under s 68P of the Act that when a court is making an order that may be inconsistent with a family violence order, it must do certain things, as set out in subsection 68P(2).
In my view, I am aware that the nature of the AVO would be, as it has been, to prevent the children spending any time with the father, particularly the four children to which I have mentioned. I regard my order as inconsistent with that order, but in so doing, I am satisfied the order is in the children’s best interest at this time. I will need to hear further instructions as to how we change over these children in accordance with my order. That is probably something that needs to be considered under s 68P(2)(b).
Whilst it is desirable in these circumstances that the children have this order explained to them, s 68P(2)(a) identifies that an explanation is not required: “If the Court is satisfied it is in the children’s best interest not to receive an explanation of the order or injunction.”
Frankly, I would be happy for the ICL, if she is prepared to do so, to explain the order to the four children who are affected by my order today. That would not be inconsistent with the growing obligation of ICLs under the amendments to the Act. However, if Ms Fletcher, in this matter, does not feel comfortable in doing so, I would not force her to do so. It may be possible for mS g to explain this to the children, but I am not going to hold up the change occurring until someone can be found who might explain this to the children, particularly in circumstances where that person, unlike Ms Fletcher, has not had the benefit of the reasons.
Let it be clear, the reasons why I am making this order in these terms is I believe the stability of these children, which is significant to their care, development, and welfare, should not be disrupted on the current evidence of mere allegations without any context or particulars for the three boys, but must, both to safeguard the father and to consider the nature of the allegations that might be true in some way raised against the father by Y, is why I have left Y in the mother’s care.
I will perfect an order consistent with these Reasons which will be published later today.
I certify that the preceding forty-nine (49) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the ex tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Baumann. Associate:
Dated: 15 January 2025
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