Tillman v Attorney General for the State of New South Wales

The case of *Tillman v Attorney General for the State of New South Wales* concerned an appeal to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales regarding the interpretation of the *Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006* (NSW). The central dispute revolved around the meaning of the word "likely" within the context of an application for a continuing detention order under section 17(3) of the Act.

The Court of Appeal was required to determine two primary legal issues. Firstly, it had to construe the term "likely" as used in section 17(3) of the Act, considering the applicable standard of proof and the common law presumption against the infringement of personal liberty. Specifically, the court had to decide whether "likely" meant "more probable than not." Secondly, the court considered the principle of comity, examining whether an intermediate appellate court in one Australian jurisdiction should, as a matter of comity, follow a decision of an intermediate appellate court in another Australian jurisdiction when interpreting identical or substantially similar legislative provisions.

In its reasoning, the Court of Appeal held that the term "likely" in section 17(3) of the *Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006* (NSW) should be interpreted as meaning "more probable than not." The court applied established principles of statutory interpretation, giving weight to the standard of proof required for such orders and the fundamental common law presumption that personal liberty should not be infringed without clear statutory authority. Regarding comity, the court acknowledged its persuasive value but ultimately determined that it was not bound to follow decisions from other intermediate appellate courts, particularly where the interpretation of the legislation was concerned.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but ultimately dismissed the appeal.