Tilecorp Pty Ltd v Sheppard
[2008] NSWWCCPD 97
•4 September 2008
| WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION | |||||
| DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR | |||||
| CITATION: | Tilecorp Pty Ltd v Sheppard [2008] NSWWCCPD 97 | ||||
| APPELLANT: | Tilecorp Pty Ltd | ||||
| RESPONDENT: | Cecil Sheppard | ||||
| INSURER: | QBE Workers Compensation (NSW) Ltd | ||||
| FILE NUMBER: | WCC735-08 | ||||
| DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION: | 6 May 2008 | ||||
| DATE OF APPEAL DECISION: | 4 September 2008 | ||||
| SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION: | Dependency; totally or mainly dependent for support. | ||||
| PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER: | Deputy President Bill Roche | ||||
| HEARING: | On the papers | ||||
| REPRESENTATION: | Appellant: | Curwoods Lawyers | |||
| Respondent: | Stacks | ||||
| ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL: | The Arbitrator’s decision of 6 May 2008 is confirmed. | ||||
| The Appellant Employer is to pay the Respondent Worker’s costs of the appeal. | |||||
INTRODUCTION
This appeal raises two issues. First, whether, in order for a worker to recover additional weekly compensation in a claim under section 40 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (‘the 1987 Act’), an alleged dependent must be “totally or mainly” dependent for support on the worker (section 37(4) of the 1987 Act), or, only “wholly or in part” dependent for support (section 4 Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (‘the 1998 Act’)). Second, whichever test is applied, whether the worker’s children were in fact dependent on him for support from 1 December 2006 to date and continuing.
BACKGROUND
Cecil Sheppard is currently 44 years old. He married Tracy Wornes in 1986 and he has four children as a result of that marriage. One of those children is an adult and is not relevant for the purpose of the current claim. The three children relevant to the claim are:
· Shandel, born on 3 July 1989;
· Dale, born on 21 April 1992, and
· Brendan, born on 14 January 1995.
On dates not revealed in the evidence, Mr Sheppard and Ms Wornes separated and then divorced. Ms Wornes lives with the children at Jimboomba, Queensland and Mr Sheppard lives in Murwillumbah, New South Wales, about one hour and forty minutes drive away. From the time he separated until the present, Mr Sheppard has paid and continues to pay maintenance for the children. The amount paid is the subject of further discussion later in this decision.
On 19 May 2005, Mr Sheppard injured his right knee in the course of his employment with Tilecorp and has been either totally or partially unfit for work as a result of his injury from that time to date. His claim for compensation was accepted and voluntary weekly compensation payments made at various rates under either section 36, 37, 38 and/or 40 of the 1987 Act.
In June 2006 Mr Sheppard commenced suitable employment as a console operator with a service station working 22 hours per week earning $433.88 per week. It is not disputed that, notwithstanding this work, Mr Sheppard remains entitled to weekly compensation at the maximum rate for a worker with three dependent children, assuming that the children are found to be dependent under the legislation.
A dispute arose as to the correct quantum of weekly compensation payable to Mr Sheppard. Mr Sheppard filed an Application to Resolve a Dispute (‘the Application’) in the Commission on 4 February 2008 seeking additional compensation on the basis that he had not been paid the correct quantum of weekly compensation payable under section 38 of the 1987 Act, and had not been paid any compensation in respect of his children whom he alleged were and are dependent on him for support.
At the arbitration, Mr Sheppard conceded that the claim for dependency dates from 1 December 2006 to date and continuing.
A Commission Arbitrator heard the dispute on 7 April 2008, when Mr Sheppard gave brief oral evidence and was cross-examined. In a reserved decision delivered on 6 May 2008, the Arbitrator found in favour of Mr Sheppard on all issues and made the following findings and orders:
“1.From 1 December 2006 to 2 July 2007 the Applicant had three children who were mainly dependant upon him for support.
2.From 3 July 2007 to date and continuing in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the Applicant had two children who were mainly dependant upon him for support.
3.As a result of the findings in paragraphs 1 and 2, the Respondent is to pay the Applicant increased weekly compensation for a worker with three dependant children from 1 December 2006 to 2 July 2007; and for a worker with two dependant children from 3 July 2007 to date and continuing in accordance with the Act. Credit to the Respondent for payments made during these periods.
4.That the Applicant’s compensation pursuant to s.38 of the Act is for a maximum period of 52 weeks, including during the first 26 weeks of incapacity, any period for which the Applicant was paid compensation pursuant to s.36 of the 1987 Act based on total incapacity.
5.The Respondent is to pay the Applicant’s costs as agreed or assessed. The matter is certified as complex and the parties are each entitled to an uplift on costs of 20%.
6.Liberty to the Applicant and Respondent to apply to have the matter re-listed if the appropriate rates of compensation cannot be agreed following the above findings and orders.”
By an appeal filed on 2 June 2008, Tilecorp seeks leave to appeal the Arbitrator’s findings and orders so far as they relate to the issue of dependency.
LEAVE TO APPEAL
Monetary Threshold
It is not disputed that the thresholds in section 352(2) of the 1998 Act are satisfied.
Time
The appeal was lodged within 28 days of the Arbitrator’s decision in compliance with section 352(4) of the 1998 Act.
I grant leave to appeal.
ON THE PAPERS
Section 354(6) of the 1998 Act provides:
“(6)If the Commission is satisfied that sufficient information has been supplied to it in connection with proceedings, the Commission may exercise functions under this Act without holding any conference or formal hearing.”
Having regard to Practice Directions Numbers 1 and 6, the documents that are before me, and the submission by the parties that the appeal can proceed to be determined on the basis of these documents, I am satisfied that I have sufficient information to proceed ‘on the papers’, without holding any conference or formal hearing, and that this is the appropriate course in the circumstances.
ISSUES IN DISPUTE
The issues in dispute in the appeal are whether the Arbitrator erred in:
(a)determining that Mr Sheppard’s children were and are mainly dependent on him from 1 December 2006 to date and continuing, and
(b)failing to give adequate reasons for her determination.
NATURE OF A REVIEW
The Court of Appeal considered the nature of a ‘review’ under section 352 of the 1998 Act in Aluminium Louvres & Ceilings Pty Limited v Zheng [2006] NSWCA 34; (2006) 4 DDCR 358 (‘Zheng’), where Bryson JA said at [38]:
“A review is a different process to an appeal and the matters which may be considered and the manner in which they may be considered are somewhat wider. See Boston Clothing Co Pty Ltd v. Margaronis (1992) 27 NSWLR 580 at 584 (Kirby P). An attack, on review or otherwise, on an Arbitrator's discretionary decision in controlling procedure may be based on the test stated in House v. R (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504 - 505; but that is not the only basis on which the Presidential member may act. The powers of a Presidential member on review are somewhat wider and extend to power to reopen consideration of a matter of which an Arbitrator has disposed; the manner in which the powers of the Presidential member are to be exercised is itself the subject of discretion of the Presidential member.”
McColl JA approved this passage in South Western Sydney Area Health Service v Edmonds (2007) 4 DDCR 421; [2007] NSWCA 16 at [134] (‘Edmonds’). To describe the relative weight and relevance of the expert evidence as “a discretionary decision which could only be disturbed on House v The King principles” was described by McColl JA as “an over-generalisation” (at [133]). Thus, on review, a Presidential member is not bound by an Arbitrator’s discretionary decision, but can reach his or her own conclusion.
The nature of a review was further considered by the Court of Appeal in State Transit Authority of New South Wales v Fritzi Chemler [2007] NSWCA 249; (2007) 5 DDCR 287 (‘Chemler’) where Spigelman CJ said at [28] and [30]:
“28. The concept of a review on the merits is wider than the concept of an appeal in a judicial context. There is a well established line of authority on the use of the terminology of ‘review’ instead of ‘appeal’ with respect to the workers compensation system in this State which establishes the breadth of a review on the merits.
…
30. A Presidential member exercising a power to review a decision must decide whether the original decision is wrong or, as it is often put in the context of administrative appeals on merits, must decide what is the true and correct view. If s/he does so decide then s/he should substitute his or her own views, unless it is an appropriate case to remit. The power to remit is not constrained in the manner for which the Appellant contends.”
I intend to apply the above principles in the matter before me.
EVIDENCE AND SUBMISSIONS
Tilecorp submits:
(a)the Arbitrator misdirected herself by “relying on general notions in respect of dependency relevant to the consideration of that word in the context of section 4 of the 1998 Act”;
(b)at paragraph 26 of her Statement of Reasons for Decision (‘Reasons’) the Arbitrator stated her task was to look at the evidence and determine whether it was sufficient to satisfy her that the children were “totally or mainly” dependent upon Mr Sheppard at any time weekly compensation became payable. She failed to undertake that task;
(c)Mr Sheppard’s entitlement to weekly benefits for his alleged dependents must be assessed on the evidence to determine whether they were totally or mainly dependent upon him at each date the weekly compensation became payable (Ritchie v Wambo Mining Corporation Ltd (1995) 12 NSWCCR 273 (‘Ritchie’) and Spenceley v Deniliquin Shire Council (2001) 22 NSWCCR 7 (‘Spenceley’));
(d)the Arbitrator failed to give any adequate reasons for her decision that the children were and are dependent on Mr Sheppard;
(e)the Arbitrator’s decision was against the weight of the evidence. Unlike the situation in Ritchie and Spenceley, Mr Sheppard and Ms Wornes live separately and apart;
(f)the evidence is that Ms Wornes provided the children with food, clothing and all other material support;
(g)Mr Sheppard only contributed to the children’s maintenance in the period between 1 December 2006 and 6 February 2008 at an average of $57.33 per week. There is no other evidence as to any other potential support provided by Mr Sheppard to the children;
(h)the calculation called for a determination of Ms Wornes’ income. She had an income available to her of $19,065 in the period 15 November 2005 to 31 August 2006, an average of $463.80 per week;
(i)in the alternative, the monthly contributions made by Mr Sheppard as against those made by his wife represent $229.32 as against $1,855.20. The Arbitrator should have come to the more likely conclusion that the children were clearly not mainly dependent upon Mr Sheppard;
(j)the evidence is that Mr Sheppard’s contribution to the children from 6 February 2008 is $400 per month. When this is compared with Ms Wornes’ income of $1,947.96 (after allowing a 5% per annum adjustment between August 2006 and February 2008), the likely outcome is against a finding of mainly dependent, and
(k)Armitage CCJ (at [15]) in Spenceley envisaged a situation where a child may not be dependent upon a worker where the worker’s spouse’s income “exceeded to a much greater degree the income of the worker”. That is the situation in the present matter.
Mr Sheppard submits:
(a)the correct test is not whether the children are “totally or mainly” dependent (section 37(4) of the 1987 Act), but whether they are “wholly or in part” dependent (section 4 of the 1998 Act). Section 37 is prefaced with the words “For the purpose of this section” and it does not apply to Mr Sheppard because, as he is only partially incapacitated, his entitlement is under section 40;
(b)the Court of Appeal expressly criticised the suggestion by Armitage CCJ, at [15] in Spenceley, that a child may not be dependent upon a worker where the worker’s spouse’s income greatly exceeds the worker’s income (see Coles Myer Ltd v Rudzinski [2006] NSWCA 161; (2008) 5 DDCR 36 (‘Rudzinski’);
(c)Rudzinki confirmed that the obligation of each parent is joint and several (per McColl JA at [11], citing McCaffery’s Management Pty Ltd v Pimlott (1995) 12 NSWCCR 360 (‘Pimlott’) and Holdlen Pty Ltd v Walsh (2000) 19 NSWCA 629, [2000] NSWCA 87 (‘Holdlen’). This obligation is confirmed in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth);
(d)children can be totally dependent on a non-custodial parent (Holdlen; Rudzinski; Aafjes v Kearney (1975) 180 CLR 199 (‘Aafjes’));
(e)even if the test is “totally or mainly” dependent, that test is satisfied in the present matter;
(f)the Arbitrator set out the reasons for her decision at paragraphs [26] to [32] of her decision;
(g)there is clear evidence of payments by Mr Sheppard and of additional payments when the children stayed with him;
(h)the level of child support is calculated by reference to Mr Sheppard’s income, which is paid by Tilecorp in the form of workers compensation payments;
(i)a child can be dependent on a parent even though he or she receives support from another source (Aafjes);
(j)there is evidence from which the Arbitrator could have reached her decision, and
(k)the logic in finding that children are mainly dependent on the non-custodial parent is that children are totally dependent on their parents.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
Section 33 of the 1987 Act provides that if total or partial incapacity for work results from an injury, compensation payable by the employer to the worker shall include a weekly payment during the incapacity. The quantum of that weekly payment is determined according to the terms of sections 36, 37, 38 and 40 of the 1987 Act.
Section 37(4) provides:
“4) For the purposes of this section, a person is a dependent wife, husband, de facto spouse or other family member, child, brother or sister in relation to a worker if the person is totally or mainly dependent for support on the worker at the date compensation becomes payable to the worker or (whether married to the worker or born before or after that date) becomes so dependent after that date.”
Neither section 38 nor section 40 make any reference to additional compensation in respect of dependents. However, historically at least, it has been accepted that once injury and incapacity are established, a worker is prima facie entitled to compensation provided for total incapacity unless it appears that the incapacity is only partial. That has happened in the present case: Mr Sheppard’s initial incapacity was total, but is now only partial and his entitlement to weekly compensation from 1 December 2006 is determined under section 40. Section 40(5) provides:
“(5) Maximum rate of compensation. The weekly payment of compensation to an injured worker in respect of any period of partial incapacity for work is not to exceed the weekly payment that would be payable to the worker if it were a period of total incapacity for work.”
If Mr Sheppard had a period of total incapacity outside the first 26 weeks of incapacity (section 37), then his entitlement to claim for any dependents would be determined under section 37(4). The fact that his current entitlement to weekly compensation falls to be determined under section 40 does not render the definition of dependents in section 37(4) irrelevant. The maximum compensation payable under section 40 is determined by reference to the compensation that would have been payable if the worker had been totally incapacitated. Therefore, the definition in section 37(4) remains relevant to a determination of dependency in a claim for weekly compensation under section 40.
The definition of dependants in section 4 of the 1998 Act is:
“ ‘dependants’ of a worker means such of the members of the worker’s family as were wholly or in part dependent for support on the worker at the time of the worker’s death, or would but for the incapacity due to the injury have been so dependent, and includes:
…”
The definition is expressed in terms of dependence at “the time of the worker’s death” and is clearly intended to apply only to cases where death has resulted from the injury. This interpretation is consistent with the death benefit provisions in the 1987 Act (sections 25 and 26) where “dependent child of the worker” is defined to mean “a child of the worker who was wholly or partly dependent for support on the worker” (section 25(5) of the 1987 Act). It is also consistent with the decisions in Ritchie and Spenceley.
It follows that I do not accept Mr Sheppard’s submissions on this issue. The correct test for dependency in a claim for weekly compensation, whether under sections 37, 38 or 40, is that set out in section 37(4), namely, a worker will be entitled to additional weekly compensation for his or her child (or such other person identified in section 37(4)), if that child is “totally or mainly dependent for support on the worker at the date compensation becomes payable”. It would be anomalous and unworkable to apply one test for dependency (“wholly or in part”) when a worker is receiving compensation under sections 38 or 40 and a different test (“totally or mainly”) when the worker is receiving compensation under section 37. Such an approach would lead to dependency being determined on the basis of the nature of the worker’s incapacity, something never intended by the legislation. Dependency is determined from the perspective of the person alleged to be dependent and is not determined by whether the worker’s incapacity is total or partial.
The question to be determined is: were the children “totally or mainly” dependent for support on Mr Sheppard as at 1 December 2006 and have they remained to be so dependent?
Mr Sheppard’s evidence is that he paid to his ex-wife the following amounts for the children, as determined by the Australian Government Child Support Agency (‘the Agency’): $110.08 per month from November 2005 until 31 August 2006, $220 per month from 1 September 2006 until July 2007 and $400 per month from just before Christmas 2007 to the date of the arbitration on 7 April 2008. By letter dated 23 March 2008, the Agency requried Mr Sheppard to pay Child Support of $438.17 per month from 1 July 2008 until 30 November 2008 for the children Dale and Brendon, when, I assume, that amount will be re-assessed. In addition, Mr Sheppard also pays the children’s expenses when they visit him, but there is no evidence of the value of those expenses. Whilst there is some dispute about the quantum paid by Mr Sheppard in the period from September 2006 until July 2007 (it being more than $100 per month but less than $200 per month), it is not disputed that he did pay Child Support in that period.
It is agreed that Shandel ceased to be dependent for support on 2 July 2007.
The issue of dependency is a question of fact to be determined in each case (Aafjes).
Neither party challenges the Arbitrator’s statement (at paragraph 26 of her Reasons), the question of dependency is determined at the time compensation becomes payable. In stating her task in that way the Arbitrator correctly applied the test set out in Ritchie, which has been followed and applied in Spenceley.
The Arbitrator also referred to and applied the following passage in Spenceley where Armitage CCJ said (at [16]):
“16. In this case, however, a monthly income accruing to the wife of $1,536 is relatively insubstantial by today’s standards and the compensation benefits are correspondingly substantial as compared to the wife’s monthly income. It seems to me in those circumstances more realistic to find that the true situation is that at all material times the child Nykita has been totally or mainly dependent upon the worker, notwithstanding that the expression ‘mainly’ may also be applicable to her dependency upon her mother, the worker’s wife. It seems to me that the expression ‘mainly’ is intended to focus not so much on the relative contributions of the worker and other persons to a child’s support but rather upon whether the child has any income of his or her own and the degree to which that interacts with the support received from the worker, although of course the support received from other persons, such as in this case the wife, must also be relevant in that calculus.”
The Arbitrator also noted that a child can be legally dependent upon both parents (Reasons, paragraph 37). I assume that this is the basis for Tilecorp’s complaint that the Arbitrator erred in referring to general notions of dependency.
I do not accept that the Arbitrator misdirected herself. Many of the general principles relating to dependency relevant to section 4 of the 1998 Act are also relevant to determining whether a child is “totally or mainly” dependent for support on the worker under section 37(4) of the 1987 Act. So much is clear from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Rudzinski, where the Court discussed and applied the principles in Pimlott and Holdlen (both death claims where the Court considered dependency under section 4 of the 1998 Act) to a claim involving weekly compensation. Those cases establish that the obligation of each parent to support a child is joint and several, and a child may be totally dependent upon one parent notwithstanding that he or she is totally dependent also upon the other parent (per Meagher JA, Pimlott at 364B) and that “total dependence is not incompatible with the receipt of support from someone else” (per Giles JA Holdlen at 642). After referring to those authorities, McColl JA said, at [11] of Rudzinski, “These observations clearly apply with even greater force where, as here, the question was whether the children were ‘mainly dependent’ upon the respondent”.
The fact that Mr Sheppard and Ms Wornes do not live together is not determinative of the question of dependency. A child can be totally dependent on a non-custodial parent (Holdlen, Rudzinski and Aafjes).
Curtis CCJ expressed a similar view in Campbell v Department of Community Services (2000) 19 NSWCCR 336 (‘Campbell’) where (at [15]) his Honour said:
“A child may in some circumstances be totally dependant upon each of two sources of income, the continuation of which is necessary for the support of that child.”
The decision of So v So [2004] NSWCA 67 is also relevant. Santow JA quoted (at [13]) the following passage from Mason J in Aafjes:
“The dominating consideration here and in the United Kingdom is a strong disinclination, founded on common sense, to attribute to the legislature an intention to deprive an applicant of a claim based on total dependency for support where a legal obligation to provide that support exists which has not been abandoned, merely because the applicant is in receipt of benefits from others, whether proceeding from charity or some other motive.”
After referring to similar comments from Gibbs J (as his Honour then was), Santow JA said (at [16]):
“In any event, as is clear from cases following Aafjes v Kearney the focus is not upon the relative amounts each parent actually paid or provided. Rather it is upon the legal obligation of the deceased parent to have supported the child and the reliance placed by that child upon fulfilment of that parental obligation.”
It follows that the general principles relating to dependency are relevant to determining dependency under section 37(4) of the 1987 Act.
The argument that the Arbitrator failed to undertake the task she set herself at paragraph 26 of her Reasons and failed to give reasons for her conclusions is without foundation. The Arbitrator referred in detail to the relevant authorities, the evidence and the parties’ submissions. After correctly observing that a child can be legally dependent upon both parents, that Mr Sheppard has a legal obligation to support his children and that he has been doing so since December 2006, and that Ms Wornes was not in receipt of any income from paid employment, she found that, as at 1 December 2006, Mr Sheppard had three children who were mainly dependent upon him for support.
To succeed in having the decision set aside on this ground Tilecorp must demonstrate not only that the reasons are inadequate, but that their inadequacy discloses that the Arbitrator has failed to exercise her statutory duty to fairly and lawfully determine the application (YG & GG v Minister for Community Services [2002] NSWCA 247; Absolon v NSW TAFE [1999] NSWCA 311; ADCO Constructions Pty Ltd v Ferguson [2003] NSWWCCPD 21).
The standard by which the adequacy of reasons must be determined is relative to the nature of the decision itself and the decision-maker (Mayne Health Group t/as Nepean Private Hospital v Sandford [2002] NSWWCCPD 6). An Arbitrator’s reasons should be read as a whole and it is not for a Presidential Member on review to comb through the Arbitrator’s findings and reasons in search of error (Beale v GIO (NSW) (1997) 48 NSWLR 430 at 444; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Wu Shu Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259). It is not necessary for an Arbitrator to refer to every piece of evidence (Yates Property Corporation Pty Limited (in Liq) v Darling Harbour Authority (1991) 24 NSWLR 156; Ainger v Coffs Harbour City Council [2005] NSWCA 424).
In Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 (‘Soulemezis’) McHugh JA (as he then was) stated at 280:
“If an obligation to give reasons for a decision exists its discharge does not require lengthy or elaborate reasons: Ex parte Powter; Re Powter (1945) 46 SR (NSW) 1 at 5: 63 WN 34 at 36. But it is necessary that the essential ground or grounds upon which the decision rests should be articulated.”
The Arbitrator identified the essential grounds for her conclusions and I reject this ground of appeal.
The fact that Ms Wornes provides the children with food, clothing and other material support is not determinative of the question of whether the children are totally or mainly dependent for support on Mr Sheppard.
Tilecorp argues that between 1 December 2006 and 6 February 2008, Mr Sheppard only contributed to his children’s maintenance at an average of $57.33 per week. Having made that calculation, it is argued, the Arbitrator should have “performed the requisite calculus to determine what other support the children received”. I do not accept that submission. Even if the children did receive “other support” that fact would not prevent them being “totally or mainly” dependent on Mr Sheppard. As noted above, even total dependence on a worker is not incompatible with the receipt of support from someone else. Dependency is not determined from the worker’s perspective, but from the child’s perspective.
Tilecorp submits that the calculation called for a determination of Ms Wornes’ income and that, because her income from social security payments was greater than Mr Sheppard’s income from workers compensation payments, the Arbitrator should have come to the more likely conclusion that the children were clearly not mainly dependent upon Mr Sheppard. I do not accept this submission, as it is contrary to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Rudzinski. In that case, McColl JA (Beazeley and Tobias JJA, agreeing) referred to the suggestion (at [15]) in Spenceley that the dependency issue might have been decided differently if “the wife’s income exceeded to a much greater degree the income of the worker in weekly payments of compensation”, and said (at [12]):
“Armitage J’s remarks in Spenceley cannot be understood to amount to a proposition of law. If they were so intended, then they were, with respect, incorrect. The question whether a worker’s children are ‘totally or mainly’ dependent is a question of fact. In this case there was evidence from which that conclusion could be drawn.”
The Child Support Agency determined the amount it ordered Mr Sheppard to pay in respect of his children. In the main, he paid that amount, but also made additional payments when the children stayed with him. He has a legal obligation to support his children and that obligation has not been abandoned. Whilst his income was low, so too were his Child Support payments. That did not, however, diminish the fact that his children remained totally or mainly dependent on him for support.
CONCLUSION
Having conducted a review on the merits, I am comfortably satisfied that the nominated children were and are totally or mainly dependent upon Mr Sheppard for support and I agree with the Arbitrator’s decision.
DECISION
The Arbitrator’s decision of 6 May 2008 is confirmed.
COSTS
The Appellant Employer is to pay the Respondent Worker’s costs of the appeal.
Bill Roche
Deputy President
4 September 2008
I, TUYET WALLIS, CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE REASONS FOR DECISION OF BILL ROCHE, DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION.
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