Thurston & Thurston (No. 2)

Case [2012] FamCAFC 222


FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

THURSTON & THURSTON (NO. 2) [2012] FamCAFC 222

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – Application for an adjournment of appeal proceedings – Where the appellant sought an adjournment of the proceedings on three bases: allied proceedings in the Federal Court in which the respondent is not a party, time to obtain legal representation, and ongoing illness and unfitness to participate in proceedings – Where it is apparent from the reasons for judgment of the Judge in the Federal Court proceedings that the appellant’s application there will not proceed until the appeals in this Court are determined – Where the appellant has already had the benefit of


pro bono legal advice, including an offer of further pro bono legal services in relation to these appeals, which he unreasonably rejected – Where the appellant has no alternative proposal as to how he might be legally represented, and this Court having no facility to provide litigants with legal representation, there would be no good purpose in adjourning the hearing of the appeals – Whether the appellant had demonstrated by way of medical evidence how and for how long his health difficulties might prevent him from prosecuting his appeals – Where the appellant was given a further opportunity after the hearing to adduce current and probative evidence in this regard – Where the evidence adduced by the appellant failed to provide a satisfactory indication of when the husband might be able to continue the appeal proceedings – Where there would be substantial prejudice to the respondent in adjourning the appeals, apparently indefinitely – Application dismissed.

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – Application for dismissal pursuant to r 22.45 – Where the primary bases to the application are significant prejudice to the respondent and lack of merit in the appellant’s appeal – Where the appellant has not met requirements under the Rules,


or complied with orders, or shown reasonable diligence to progress his appeals – Whether there is merit in the appellant’s appeals such that the Court should not dismiss the appeals without a hearing on the merits – Where the thrust of the appellant’s grounds of appeal is an alleged denial of natural justice and procedural fairness by the Federal Magistrate hearing the matter undefended – Where consideration of all of the material before the Federal Magistrate and her Honour’s reasons for judgment demonstrate the Federal Magistrate did not err in her dealing with the case – Where there is no merit in the appeals – Application allowed,


appeals dismissed.

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – Costs – Whether circumstances exist to justify the making of an order for costs – Where the conduct of the appellant, the proceedings being necessitated by the failure of the appellant to comply with orders, and the appellant being entirely unsuccessful in the proceedings are factors which justify the making of an order for costs against the appellant – Appellant ordered to pay the respondent’s costs, to be assessed.

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

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THURSTON & THURSTON (NO. 2) [2012] FamCAFC 222
Case
[2012] FamCAFC 222
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Thurston & Thurston (No. 2) involved a determination of final property orders in the context of a divorce between the parties. The wife had applied for such orders, and the Federal Magistrate heard the matter on an undefended basis, taking into account the affidavits filed by both parties, including the husband's relevant to the determination of property entitlements. The Magistrate focused on the inconsistencies in the evidence, preferring independent evidence or the wife's evidence where there were disputes. The legal issues centred on identifying the property pool, evaluating the contributions of the parties, and determining the just and equitable orders considering the relevant statutory factors and general principles.

The court had to decide the identity and value of the property, liabilities, and financial resources of the parties. It also had to evaluate the contributions of the parties and the relevant matters under s.79(4) and s.75(2) of the Act. The Magistrate applied a well-established approach involving several steps, including determining the contribution-based entitlements and assessing other relevant factors to arrive at just and equitable orders. The court also considered the wife's superannuation entitlement and its inclusion in the property pool, given her entitlement to receive it.

The court found that the husband's appeals were dismissed and his applications were also dismissed. It ordered the husband to pay the wife's costs, which were to be deducted from his share of the sale proceeds of the former matrimonial home. The reasoning behind the court's decision involved a detailed examination of the evidence, focusing on the property pool and the contributions and other relevant factors in making equitable orders. The outcome reflected the court's consideration of the statutory requirements and general principles in achieving just and equitable property division.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Pursuant to Rule 22.45 of the Family Law Rules 2004 the appeals NA 31, 32 and 95 of 2011 be dismissed.

2.

The applications of the husband filed 13 March 2012 and 27 July 2012 be dismissed.

3.

The husband pay the wife’s costs of and incidental to the applications to be assessed. Such costs be deducted from the husband’s share of the sale proceeds of the former matrimonial home.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Federal Magistrate then turned to the task of determining the wife’s application for final property orders. Her Honour qualified her decision to proceed to an undefended hearing by reading and taking into account the affidavits filed by the husband relevant to the determination of property entitlements. Her Honour explained where there were inconsistencies in the evidence or a dispute, she would first prefer independent evidence produced by subpoenas, and then the evidence of the wife. Her Honour said:23.Although the Court made the decision to hear the matter on an undefended basis, I have taken into account affidavits filed on behalf of the respondent that go to matters relevant to the findings the Court must make in relation to s.79(4) and s.75(2). The Court has also taken into account the affidavit of the respondent filed 18 August 2010 and the financial questionnaire filed 18 August 2010 in deciding the property pool and the value of that pool, although where there is an inconsistency in the evidence in that regard and to facts relevant to a findings in relation to s.79(4) and/or s.75(2) the Court has either preferred independent evidence such as subpoenaed evidence from Neilson & Co Solicitors or bank statements that are available to the Court to the evidence of the respondent and the applicant and where there is no corroborative evidence and there is a dispute in the facts the Court has preferred the evidence of the applicant.Background facts24.The applicant in this matter was born [in] 1953, she is now 58 and the respondent was born [in] 1944, he is now 67. 25.Although it is not in dispute that the parties married on [in] April 1983 the date they commenced their relationship does seem to be in dispute, in the applicant’s own Initiating Application filed 4 May 2010 she says that they commenced their relationship in 1974. In her affidavit filed 4 May 2010 however she says at paragraph 2 “The respondent and I commenced our relationship in 1972” and then in paragraph 3 “In 1980, prior to our marriage, when the respondent and I were not cohabitating but were spending significant time together …”. 26.The respondent on the other hand, in his affidavit filed 18 August 2010 at paragraph 9 says that he met the applicant in 1973 and then in paragraph 10 he says “We were in Perth then (not referring to when “then” is) and I was supporting [the wife]. In 1980 she won $100,000 in a lottery after which she left me and returned to Queensland” and in paragraph 11 he refers to the parties having purchased a house in Perth jointly in 1981. It seems therefore that even on the respondent’s case the parties resided together prior to their marriage but the commencement of the relationship is unclear.27.Similarly there seems to be a dispute on the evidence as to the date of separation. The applicant, in her Initiating Application refers to the date of separation as […] December 2006 whereas the respondent in an Application for Dissolution of Marriage records the date of separation as at May 2002. The applicant is a Response to the Application for Dissolution of Marriage said that the date of separation was 31 December 2006 and that they resided separately under the one roof from that date.28.There is one adult child of the relationship […] referred to earlier and sadly the parties’ other child was killed as an infant. 29.The respondent resides in the former matrimonial home [Property T] and as mentioned earlier has refused to allow valuers to attend at the property for the purpose of valuing the property and the chattels and other equipment at the property.30.The Financial Statement of the respondent filed 14 September 2010 states that his income from Government benefits is $350 per week. The applicant’s amended Financial Statement filed 10 December 2010 discloses income from wages at the time of $672.26, interest from bank accounts of $51.57, making a total of $723.83.Principles in the application31.Pursuant to s.79 of the Act, the Court has the power to “alter the interests of the parties” in the property of the parties or either of them.32.I must be satisfied that any orders that I make are just and equitable pursuant to s.79(2) of the Act. In achieving just and equitable orders, I must take into account matters specified in s.79(4) and the general principles referred to in s.43 and s.81 insofar as they are applicable.33.In determining the applications of the parties, I intend to proceed according to a well established approach (that was restated in Hickey & Hickey (2003) FLC 93-143 [and subject to considerations with respect to superannuation, this approach seemed to be endorsed in Coghlan & Coghlan (2005) FLC 93-220]):34. The approach involves four inter-related steps:a)First, the Court should make findings as to the identity and value of the property, liabilities and financial resources of the parties at the date of the hearing.b)The Court should evaluate the contributions of the parties within the meaning of s.79(4)(a), (b) and (c) and determine the contribution based entitlements of the parties expressed as a percentage of the net value of the property of the parties.c)Third, the Court should identify and assess the relevant matters referred to in s.79(4)(d), (e), (f) and (g) (the other factors) including, because of s.79(4)(e), the matters referred to in s.75(2) so far as they are relevant and determine the adjustment (if any) that should be made to the contribution based entitlements of the parties established at Step 2.d)Fourthly, the Court should consider the effect of those findings and determination and resolve what order is just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case.35.The applicant in this matter has included her superannuation entitlement in the pool with the parties’ other assets. Given that the applicant now seems to be entitled to receive her superannuation it is appropriate in my view for her to do so.Property pool – discussion and conclusions36.For the reasons I will give, I intend to take into account the following property, superannuation and liabilities.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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