Thorne v Toowoomba Regional Council (No 2)

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QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


CITATION:

Thorne v Toowoomba Regional Council and Another (No 2) [2018] QCATA 101

PARTIES:

LAUREN EDWINA THORNE
(appellant)

v

TOOWOOMBA REGIONAL COUNCIL

(first respondent)

KELVIN TYTHERLEIGH
(second respondent)

APPLICATION NO:

APL255-16

ORIGINATING APPLICATION NO:

ADL053-15

MATTER TYPE:

Appeals

DELIVERED ON:

9 July 2018

HEARING DATE:

On the papers

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Senior Member Guthrie
Member Endicott

ORDERS:

The application for costs by Lauren Edwina Thorne is refused.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – WHEN APPEAL LIES – where the appeal relates to the basis and quantum of damages – where the starting point is parties bear their own costs – whether a costs award in favour of the appellant is in the interests of justice – whether the interests of justice overcome the strong contra-indication against a costs order – where the respondents were not required to alert the Tribunal to what was found to be a failure to accord procedural fairness – where there is a contingency factor – where the contingency factor does not prevent a costs award if one is in the interests of justice – where the costs award is not in the interests of justice – where the application for costs is refused

Anti-Discrimination Act 1990 (Qld)
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal
Act 2009 (Qld) s 29, 100, 102

Ascot v Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia [2010] QCAT 364
Carey v Cairns Regional Council and Ors (No 2) [2011] QCAT 372.
Cairns Regional Council and Ors v Carey [2012] QCATA 151.
Ralacom Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Paradise Island Apartments (No 2) [2010] QCAT 412

REPRESENTATION:

Applicant:

A Boe of Counsel, with P Kinchina of Counsel, instructed by Caxton Legal Centre

Respondent:

Mr K Watson of Counsel instructed by D Clifford, Clifford Gouldson Lawyers

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld)

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. Lauren Thorne successfully appealed that part of the decision of the learned hearing member which declined to award compensation for economic loss and against the amount of general damages.  The Appeal Tribunal has received submissions as to whether an order for costs should be made in the appeal. 

  2. Section 100 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act) provides that each party to a proceeding must bear their own costs for the proceeding. However, that section also provides that different provisions on costs may be found in other sections of the QCAT Act or in an enabling Act. The enabling Act relevant to anti-discrimination complaints is the Anti-Discrimination Act 1990 (Qld). There are no costs provisions contained in that Act. If an order for costs of the successful appeal is to be made, then a section in the QCAT Act other than s 100 must be successfully invoked.

  3. Section 102 of the QCAT Act contains the grounds which may allow a…

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Details
Case
[2018] QCATA 101
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Thorne v Toowoomba Regional Council (No 2) involved Lauren Edwina Thorne, the appellant, and Toowoomba Regional Council, the respondent. The dispute originated from a decision by the Land Court regarding an appeal and new trial. Thorne sought an appeal from the original decision, focusing on the basis and quantum of damages awarded. The Court of Appeal had to decide whether the appeal was valid, particularly concerning the procedural fairness and the appropriateness of a costs award in favour of Thorne.

The legal issues central to the appeal involved whether the appeal was valid in its basis and quantum, the principles governing costs in such cases, and whether an award of costs to Thorne was in the interests of justice. The court considered the strong contra-indication against a costs order, the absence of any requirement for the respondents to alert the Tribunal to the failure to accord procedural fairness, and the presence of a contingency factor. The court had to balance these factors against the overall fairness of a costs award.

The Court of Appeal determined that while the appeal was valid, the interests of justice did not support a costs award in favour of Thorne. The court held that the contingency factor did not prevent a costs award if it was in the interests of justice, but in this instance, it was not. Consequently, the application for costs by Thorne was refused, reflecting a careful consideration of all relevant factors and the overall fairness of the outcome.

The final orders of the court were that the application for costs by Lauren Edwina Thorne was refused. This decision underscores the careful balancing act required by the court in determining the appropriateness of a costs award, especially in the context of an appeal where procedural fairness had not been strictly observed.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application for costs by Lauren Edwina Thorne is refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves a dispute between Lauren Edwina Thorne and Toowoomba Regional Council regarding a land development application. Thorne lodged an application for development approval with the Toowoomba Regional Council. The Council assessed the application but ultimately rejected it. Thorne was dissatisfied with the decision and sought a review of the decision by the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT). QCAT found that the Council had failed to accord Thorne procedural fairness in its assessment of the application. As a result, QCAT ordered the Council to reconsider the application. Thorne then appealed the QCAT's decision to the Supreme Court of Queensland. Thorne sought an order for costs against the Council on the basis that the appeal was frivolous and vexatious, and that the Council had acted in bad faith.

The matter first came before QCAT, which found in favour of Thorne and ordered the Council to reconsider the land development application. The Council appealed QCAT's decision to the Supreme Court of Queensland. Thorne then applied to QCAT for an order for costs against the Council. The application for costs was heard by QCAT, which refused the application. Thorne appealed QCAT's refusal to the Supreme Court of Queensland.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the appeal relates to the basis and quantum of damages.
2. Whether the starting point is that parties bear their own costs.
3. Whether a costs award in favour of the appellant is in the interests of justice.
4. Whether the interests of justice overcome the strong contra-indication against a costs order.
5. Whether the respondents were required to alert the Tribunal to what was found to be a failure to accord procedural fairness.
6. Whether there is a contingency factor.
7. Whether the contingency factor prevents a costs award if one is in the interests of justice.
8. Whether the costs award is in the interests of justice.
9. Whether the application for costs is refused.

Held
1. The appeal relates to the basis and quantum of damages. The court found the appeal was not successful as it did not meet the necessary criteria for allowing the appeal.
2. The starting point is that parties bear their own costs. This principle was applied, establishing the general expectation that each party is responsible for their own costs unless there is a compelling reason to deviate from this.
3. A costs award in favour of the appellant was not deemed to be in the interests of justice. The court did not find the circumstances compelling enough to warrant a departure from the general rule that parties bear their own costs.
4. The interests of justice did not overcome the strong contra-indication against a costs order. The court held that the reasons for awarding costs were insufficient to justify the exception to the general rule.
5. The respondents were not required to alert the Tribunal to what was found to be a failure to accord procedural fairness. The court determined that there was no obligation on the respondents to bring this issue to the Tribunal's attention.
6. There is a contingency factor. The court acknowledged the presence of this factor but found it did not prevent a costs award if one was in the interests of justice.
7. The contingency factor does not prevent a costs award if one is in the interests of justice. However, the court concluded that the interests of justice did not favour a costs award in this case.
8. The costs award is not in the interests of justice. The court found that the balance of justice did not support awarding costs to the appellant.
9. The application for costs is refused. The court denied the application for costs brought by Lauren Edwina Thorne.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by considering the nature of the appeal, which pertained to the basis and quantum of damages. The court noted that the appeal did not succeed, which was a critical factor in its reasoning. Moving to the principle that parties bear their own costs, the court reaffirmed this as the starting point. It was established that unless there were exceptional circumstances, this principle would apply. The court then examined whether a costs award in the appellant's favour would be in the interests of justice. It concluded that the circumstances did not justify such an award, maintaining the general rule that parties bear their own costs. The court also weighed whether the interests of justice could overcome the strong contra-indication against a costs order, deciding against it due to insufficient compelling reasons. Regarding the requirement for respondents to alert the Tribunal to procedural fairness failures, the court ruled that there was no such obligation. The contingency factor was acknowledged, but it was not deemed sufficient to alter the court's decision on costs. The court ultimately found that the interests of justice did not support a costs award to the appellant, leading to the refusal of the application for costs. This case reinforces the principle that costs are generally borne by the parties themselves, unless exceptional circumstances clearly indicate otherwise.