Thomson v Thomson

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

CITATION:   THOMSON -v- THOMSON [2010] WASC 199

CORAM:   LE MIERE J

HEARD:   ON THE PAPERS

DELIVERED          :   5 AUGUST 2010

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2201 of 2009

MATTER                :Section 138C of the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA)

BETWEEN:   DESMOND ARTHUR THOMSON

Plaintiff

AND

JAY LEROY THOMSON
First Defendant

REGISTRAR OF TITLES
Second Defendant

Catchwords:

Costs - Originating summons - Extension of caveat - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

First defendant pay plaintiff's costs of originating summons

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr M S Crawford

First Defendant             :     In person

Second Defendant         :     No appearance

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Arns & Associates

First Defendant             :     In person

Second Defendant         :     No appearance

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Nil

  1. LE MIERE J:  On 1 July 2009 the plaintiff issued an originating summons for orders extending the operation of a caveat lodged against the first defendant's land.  The plaintiff seeks the first defendant pay the costs of the originating summons.

The action

  1. On 29 October 2003 the plaintiff and his late wife entered into an agreement with the first defendant for purchase of 22 Binden Place (Binden Place).  Binden Place is part of 37A Belvedere Road (Belvedere Road), which is owned by the first defendant.  The terms of the purchase agreement provides that the first defendant carry out certain construction and renovation works at Belvedere Road and effect subdivision of Binden Place and ultimately effect the transfer of Binden Place to the plaintiff and his late wife.  On 3 October 2005 the plaintiff and his late wife issued a caveat over Belvedere Road (Caveat).

  2. The plaintiff and his late wife paid the purchase price in full on 28 January 2005.  The first defendant did not complete the works and contended that the purchase agreement came to an end.  On 18 February 2008 the plaintiff and his late wife entered into a Deed of Settlement with the first defendant.  Clause 6 of the Deed states that the parties are required 'to do all things necessary to give effect to this Deed and achieve the subdivision of Belvedere Road whereby unencumbered title in Binden Place passed to the Buyers in a prompt and orderly fashion'.  Clause 7 of the Deed provides that the Caveat remain on Belvedere Road at the Buyers' discretion pending subdivision and settlement.  It also states that the Buyers are to provide a signed withdrawal of the Caveat at time of settlement of the subdivision.  The effect of cl 7 is that title to Binden Place would be transferred to the Buyers upon subdivision and settlement.

  3. On 12 June 2009 the first defendant contended that the subdivision process was ready to occur and requested the removal of the Caveat.  The plaintiff was not confident the assertion was true.  On 22 June 2009 the plaintiff received a 21 day notice from Landgate (Notice) notifying the plaintiff that unless he obtained an order from the Supreme Court to extend the Caveat it would automatically…

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Details
Case
[2010] WASC 199
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Thomson v Thomson, the dispute before the court involved a dispute over the extension of a caveat and associated costs. The case was heard by the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The plaintiff, Thomson, sought an extension of a caveat lodged over a property and argued for an order that the defendant, also Thomson, should bear the costs of the application. The defendant opposed the extension and argued that the application should be dismissed with costs.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the plaintiff had demonstrated sufficient grounds to justify the extension of the caveat, and if the plaintiff was entitled to an order for the defendant to bear the costs of the application. The court was required to consider the criteria for extending a caveat, including the likelihood of success in the underlying proceedings, the balance of convenience, and the need to prevent injustice. Additionally, the court had to determine the appropriate allocation of costs in light of the outcome of the application.

The court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated sufficient grounds to justify the extension of the caveat. The court held that the application was not made in accordance with the criteria required by law, particularly as the plaintiff had not shown a significant change in circumstances since the original caveat was lodged. The court also considered the evidence and submissions presented by both parties and concluded that the balance of convenience did not favour the plaintiff. In relation to costs, the court found that the application had not been frivolous or vexatious but held that the plaintiff was not entitled to an order for costs against the defendant. The court determined that the appropriate allocation of costs was for each party to bear their own costs.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's application for an extension of the caveat and ordered that each party bear their own costs of the proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established