Thompson v The Queen

[2001] HCATrans 339

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S17 of 2000

B e t w e e n -

“C”

Applicant

and

CSIRO

First Respondent

DR JOHN WOODFORDE

Second Respondent

Application for leave to reopen

GLEESON CJ
HAYNE J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 10 AUGUST 2001, AT 2.02 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MS C appeared in person.  I am the applicant.  My name is Ms C.  I have a name and surname but I am asking the honourable Court for continuation of suppression of order - - -

GLEESON CJ:   Yes, I do not think anybody is opposing that. 

MR G.M. ELLIOTT:   If the Court pleases I appear for the first respondent.  (instructed by the Australian Government Solicitor)

MR I.G. HARRISON, SC:   If the Court pleases, I appear for the second respondent.  (instructed by United Medical Protection)

GLEESON CJ:   Please go ahead, Ms C.

MS C:   With permission, I can rely only on written affidavits and with permission of the honourable Court, I would wish to continue my address to the Court as in the material for the hearing which I presented in the forum of the affidavit and it is the third affidavit, thank you.

I say I am unable to predict if, on the ground of my first and second affidavit to my notice of motion of 30 April 2001, I qualify for reopening of the case.  I would wish the honourable Court to consider my standing motion and I am asking for acceptance of supportive arguments, evidence and authorities if I still did not display it sufficiently, so I am asking for acceptance of the third affidavit for the hearing today.

Argument 1:  as Dr Woodforde failed to diagnose acute anxiety disorder which was established on ground of testimony of nine witnesses by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and the doctor failed to diagnose pan neurosis which was diagnosed by two doctors and also established by the Tribunal, I submit that Dr Woodforde had fallen short of the required professional standards because of failure to diagnose acute anxiety disorder and pan neurosis and, connected with the fact, inadequate treatment which in the affidavit I am asking the honourable Court to consider as amounting to negligence.

In relation to the above submission, I wish to draw the attention of the honourable Court to the following authorities:  Walton – Taylor v Wilson.  I wish to refer to catchwords, the vocabulary or conditions which help me to understand issues of my case.  On page 6, “difficult diagnosis to make”; page 20, “the difficulty of diagnosing”; page 7, “with specialist help and appropriate investigations”; page 6, “to miss the diagnosis”; page 21, “the law imposes the duty of care:  but the standard of care is a matter of medical judgment.  The Bolam principle as by Lord Scarman.  Annexure 1.

To the second authority, Crisp v Keng, it was a case of the Supreme Court, both the cases were not reported; and I wish to refer to authority of Lord President Clyde in Hunter v Hanley (1955) SLT 213 at 217, but in my material which I presented it is page 35 out of 50 of the second annexure:

In the realm of diagnosis and treatment there is ample scope for genuine difference of opinion and one man clearly is not negligent merely because his conclusion differs from that of other professional men.  The true test for establishing negligence in diagnosis or treatment on the part of a doctor is whether he has been proved to be guilty of such failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would be guilty if acting with ordinary care –

to support that in the case apart from failure to diagnose there was a failure of inadequate treatment amounting to negligence, and the authority is in Annexure 2.

The diagnosis of acute anxiety disorder could not be “difficult” to make because soon after I started treatment by Dr Woodforde and he was a “specialist in psychiatry” and after I returned to work at the CSIRO and my position was changed, I had to be even hospitalised in Ryde Hospital due to anxiety – chest pain which was not cardiac.  In Ryde Hospital I was not seen by a psychiatrist and in the discharge report I was sent back to my “own psychiatrist” by the hospital, and I presented Annexure 3 with clinical notes from the hospital.  After the hospitalisation I was sent for the first month of sick leave by Dr Woodforde so he just must have seen that the anxiety was an acute one.  The diagnosis could not be “missed” but was negligently ignored.  It did not take much time and I started to self-medicate with use of alcohol in order to cope, and it was taking place even in the consulting room of Dr Woodforde and I did not use alcohol even socially until the treatment by Dr Woodforde, as presented in the clinical notes from Ryde Hospital.  I do not think that there could be more “classic sign” for a specialist, as described in the second authority, Krisp v Keng, page 42 out of 50, that the anxiety was an acute one.  From the annexure also can be found that before the hospitalisation I was on Lexotan on 1 mg only.  It is equivalent to 2 mg of Valium.

I understand that in such circumstances there would not be a “doctor of ordinary skills” but no one who would not find out that if Dr Woodforde did not see my anxiety as an acute one, the “medical judgment” of the doctor was grossly negligent; and if Dr Woodforde would present authorities insisting on his medical judgment so it could be considered that at the CSIRO I was injured by anxiety which could be handled or treated with 1 mg of Lexotan or 2 mg of Valium, I wish I would have the problem only today.  This would confirm that the whole liability in the case should be covered by Dr Woodforde and I understand that as Dr Woodforde knowingly prescribed me anti-psychotic and anti-depressant Nardil for a physical condition, and I presented it in the second affidavit, and later the doctor supported my claim for workers’ compensation, so this is a fraud.

Arguments supportive to the first and second affidavit, which I presented earlier to the honourable Court:  with my affidavit sworn on 10 October 1996, on page 7, paragraph 3.3.5, I presented to the Supreme Court the most advanced results of research on how strong feelings and severe stress can change biological function of brain, from Time Magazine dated 31 July 1995, page 56, and in the first case in relation to strong feelings, the change will be such that one will remember where she or he was when John Kennedy was shot, so I would consider such change as not significant.  In the second case in relation to severe stress, if one was traumatised by it, one will be diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder as a sequel and there was no one doctor in the case who would diagnose such a condition and who would acknowledge my breakdown due to stress at the CSIRO.

The conclusion can be only that I was not traumatised by stresses from the CSIRO and this is a ground to fraud I mean the writing, the opinion of Dr Woodforde, as in his second medical report where he wrote the “sequel to the acknowledged breakdown”, so he admitted that I developed “breakdown in her health caused by the acknowledged stress at work at the CSIRO”.  On the ground of the testimony of nine witnesses, only anxiety was accepted as a ground to my workers’ compensation by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 

I was not diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, but with pan neurosis.  It is an old term not used these days.  I was diagnosed with organic cerebral impairment.  I was diagnosed with significant frontal lobe deficit with disconnections and in my first affidavit to the notice of motion I pointed to evidence which is consistent with head injury while on increased dose of Nardil in 1986.

I am presenting evidence to all of the above and I am presenting page 56 from Time Magazine as Annexure 4; page 91 which was before the Supreme Court that after I got a nervous breakdown during treatment by Dr Woodforde, I was not allowed to sign Medicare forms in the office of the Northside Clinic, but in the consulting room of Dr Woodforde only.  I presented too ill to go to the office to sign the forms, but I just simply cannot comment on the fact that in such circumstances I was not hospitalised, I was not given any care.  I was sent home - it lasted two years – to take care of my eight-year-old son then.  I do not know legislation which would apply to the circumstances, but I believe that it is much more than negligence.

In January 1995 I was prescribed 2 mg of Valium and I attach the evidence which was before the Supreme Court as Annexure 6. 

Argument 3:  in their letter dated 2 February 1996 the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital wrote:

neither level –

“psychiatric history” and level of my then consumption of alcohol –

would be considered sufficiently excessive to explain permanent changes in brain function –

The letter of the hospital I also attach as an annexure to the affidavit.

Argument 4:  as presented in my first affidavit, I was injured at the CSIRO, but I was still confident in my abilities and well enough and willing to learn anything at home, even to write in German and I presented such evidence.

My condition after Nardil was such as presented in application book, page 59, paragraph 30.  I could not write down and spell “Darcy Street”; I could not put books on shelves in my son’s school library; the gap between my will and reaction was too great to learn dancing in a special school; and I did not recognise or remember my friend and a neighbour while talking to her on the phone, as in presented in application book page 82, paragraphs 35 to 40.

I attach the pages of the transcript to the affidavit on the ground of DCM documents because my case was run under Differential Case Management.  As before the Supreme Court my case was run under Differential Case Management, I am asking the honourable Court for consideration of speeding of their decision in relation to total liability in the case for economic and non-economic loss for disadvantage of Dr Woodforde.  Thank you.

GLEESON CJ:   Thank you, Ms C.  Take a seat.

We have considered the written material placed before the Court by the applicant including the document headed “THIRD AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE OF MOTION” and the oral arguments that have been presented by the applicant on her behalf today. 

The Court is of the view that the material presented by the applicant does not show reason to reconsider the earlier decision refusing special leave to appeal and the present application is dismissed with costs.

AT 2.20 PM THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED