Thompson v Cavalier King Charles Spaniel Rescue (Qld) Inc

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[2019] QCA 110

COURT OF APPEAL

FRASER JA
PHILIPPIDES JA
RYAN J

Appeal No 12173 of 2018
SC No 9148 of 2013

JAMES BOYD THOMPSON  Appellant

v

CAVALIER KING CHARLES SPANIEL RESCUE (QLD) INC  Respondent

BRISBANE

THURSDAY, 6 JUNE 2019

JUDGMENT

FRASER JA: The helpful arguments of Mr Thompson and Mr Templeton allow us to make a decision about one question in this appeal now. The question concerns the construction and effect of r 112(1)(e)(ii) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). That rule provides that:

“If these rules do not require personal service of a document, the following are ways by which the document may be served on the person to be served –

…

(e)If the person has given –

(ii)an email address under these rules – emailing the document to the person.”

In the present case Mr Thompson complied with a requirement under r 17(1)(a)(vi) that he ensure, as one of the details on his originating process, there be his email address. For that reason, r 112(1)(e)(ii) is applicable, because, plainly enough, Mr Thompson has given an email address under the rules. Mr Thompson mentioned that this giving of the email address by him did not amount to a consent to the use of email for service, and he made a number of points in that respect. Nevertheless, r 112(1)(e)(ii) is enlivened for the reason I have given.

Upon the face of that rule, in a case such as the present where personal service of the relevant document was not required, service was affected by it being emailed in accordance with r 112(1)(e)(ii). Mr Thompson argues that that provision is not met by an email to the email address that he ensured was on his originating process, because the rule requires the email to be “to the person”. That is not a tenable construction of the rule. It is, of course, a physical impossibility to email a document to a person. The rule makes sense only if it is given the obvious meaning, that the relevant document may be served by emailing a document to the person at the email address given by that person under the rules.

Mr Thompson referred the Court to a number of decisions concerning other legislative provisions about service, which did not contain a requirement or an authority to serve documents at email addresses. None of those decisions bears upon the present point. Mr Thompson also relied upon provisions in s 39 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 and s 11 of the Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001. Both provisions are facultative. They are not mandatory provisions in a case in which service by email under the rules is specifically authorised by the rules. Neither provision bears upon the proper construction of rule 112(1)(e)(ii).

A further question raised in the argument is when service was affected by emailing the relevant document. There appears to be no ambiguity in the relevant rule that the act of service occurs upon the emailing of…

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Details
Case
[2019] QCA 110
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this appeal, James Boyd Thompson sought to challenge a decision made by the Primary Judge concerning the effect of service of documents by email under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). The Court of Appeal was tasked with determining the proper construction and effect of rule 112(1)(e)(ii) of the Rules, which provides that if personal service of a document is not required, one method of service is by emailing the document to the person at the email address they have provided under the Rules. The appeal also considered the timing of the service in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the email address provided by Mr Thompson on his originating process constituted a valid means of service under rule 112(1)(e)(ii) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. Mr Thompson argued that the rule did not permit service by email and that his provision of an email address did not amount to a consent for such service. The Court had to determine whether the plain language of the rule allowed for service by email and, if so, when service was deemed to have occurred.

The Court of Appeal held that the plain language of rule 112(1)(e)(ii) allowed for service by email to the address provided by the party to be served. The Court rejected Mr Thompson's argument that service by email was impermissible under the Rules, noting that the rule only makes sense if interpreted to permit emailing a document to the person at the email address they have provided. The Court also considered the timing of the service, holding that service occurred upon the emailing of the document to the person at the email address, in line with the relevant provisions of the Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the service of documents by email under rule 112(1)(e)(ii) was effective upon the relevant document being emailed to Mr Thompson's email address, as provided on his originating process. The Court determined that the proper construction of the rule allowed for such service, and that service was deemed to have occurred at the time the document was emailed, irrespective of whether the recipient had access to the appropriate equipment to retrieve it.

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