Thompson & Berg - [2016] FamCAFC 20

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

THOMPSON & BERG

[2016] FamCAFC 20

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – Appeal against orders made for enforcement of final property orders – Further appeal against orders refusing a stay of the enforcement orders made – Appellant seeking to re-litigate issues that have previously been finally determined – Whether trial judge erred in the exercise of the discretion to make enforcement orders – No error demonstrated – Where appeal against refusal of stay of enforcement orders rendered nugatory by reason of there existing no merit in the appeal against enforcement orders – Costs – Where justifying circumstances exist for order for costs in favour of respondent.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)

Harris Re: Banaco Pty Ltd (No 2) (1981) FLC 91-100
Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589
RK & SK (2010) FamCAFC 142
Rieck & Rieck (1981) FLC 91-067
Stowe & Stowe (1981) FLC 91-027
Thompson & Berg [2014] FamCAFC 73

APPELLANT:

Mr Thompson

RESPONDENT:

Ms Berg

FILE NUMBER:

SYC

3691

2011

APPEAL NUMBERS:	EA	91	of	2015
EA	144	of	2015

DATE DELIVERED::

19 February 2016

PLACE DELIVERED:

Sydney

PLACE HEARD:

Sydney

JUDGMENT OF:

May, Ainslie-Wallace & Kent JJ

HEARING DATE:	19 February 2016
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:	Federal Circuit Court of Australia

LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE:	28 May 2015
LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE:	20 August 2015

LOWER COURT MNC:	[2015] FCCA 1398
LOWER COURT MNC:	[2015] FCCA 2250

REPRESENTATION

FOR THE APPELLANT:

In person

FOR THE RESPONDENT:

In person

Orders

The appeals EA 91 of 2015 and EA 144 of 2015 be dismissed.
The husband pay the wife’s costs of and incidental to the appeals, in the sum of $1,500 or such greater sum to be assessed. Such sum to be paid from the husband’s share of any sale proceeds of the property in the NSW Highlands (the subject of the order made on 28 May 2015) and if not satisfied from those proceeds, then to be paid to the wife 28 days after the settlement of the sale of the property in the NSW Highlands.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Thompson & Berg has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

THE FULL COURT OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY

Appeal Numbers: EA 91 of 2015 and EA 144 of 2015
File Number: SYC 3691 of 2011

Mr Thompson

Appellant

And

Ms Berg

Respondent

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Kent J

In my opinion these appeals ought be dismissed for the reasons which follow.
Whilst the divorce of the parties to these appeals became final on 3 September 2011, it is convenient to refer to them individually in these Reasons where necessary as “the husband” and “the wife” respectively.
As long ago as September 2008 the parties finally separated after a marriage of some 28 years which produced three now adult children.
As long ago as 26 September 2013 Judge Walker in the Federal Circuit Court made final orders in property settlement proceedings between the parties pursuant to s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) following a three day trial of those proceedings (“the final property orders”).
Her Honour found that the assets of the parties or either of them (including superannuation) were worth a combined total of $1,046,584 but that the liabilities of the parties’ or either of them totalled $1,097,175, a deficit of liabilities over assets of approximately $50,000.
Her Honour found that the parties’ jointly owned real property in the New South Wales Highlands (“the NSW Highlands property”) was to be taken in at its agreed value of $950,000. The NSW Highlands property thus constituted the vast majority, in terms of value, of the parties’ assets. Her Honour found that the secured liabilities over that asset in the form of a mortgage debt and a line of credit totalled, combined, something in excess of $600,000. Her Honour found that unless the NSW Highlands property achieved at a sale “a value very significantly in excess of its current agreed value” then it was inevitable that the parties’ total combined liabilities (secured and unsecured) would exceed the value of their combined total assets.
Her Honour found that sale of the NSW Highlands property was, on the evidence before the Court as to the parties’ respective financial circumstances, inevitable. Her Honour recorded that there was no evidence before the Court that either party had the financial capacity to retain the property. Her Honour ordered, inter alia, the sale of that property. Her Honour subsequently ordered, on 24 December 2013, that the husband’s application for a stay of the final orders be dismissed.
The husband appealed the final property orders. On 2 May 2014 the Full Court of this Court (May, Ainslie-Wallace and Ryan JJ) dismissed the husband’s appeal together with his related appeal from the order dismissing his application for a stay of the final property orders (Thompson & Berg [2014] FamCAFC 73).
The husband applied to the High Court of Australia for special leave to appeal to that Court from the orders of the Full Court. On 15 October 2014 the High Court refused the husband’s application for special leave to appeal.
A number of consequences follow, relevant to these current appeals, from the husband having exercised and exhausted his rights of appeal with respect to the final property orders.
First, not only is the correctness of the final property orders to be presumed, but it is not open to the husband to challenge their validity in these appeals.
Second, the issues joined between the parties in the proceedings leading to the making of the final property orders were brought to an end by those orders and are not susceptible to any re-opening in these appeals.
Third and to similar effect, the issues agitated by the husband, and joined between the parties, in his previous appeals to the Full Court of this Court have been determined by the conclusions of that Full Court. It is not open to the husband to attempt to re-litigate those issues which were found by the Full Court to have no substance in determining them.
Finally, it is not open to the husband to argue in this Court, as he seeks to do, the correctness of the High Court’s decision to refuse his application for special leave to appeal to that Court. The husband asserts before us that the determination of the High Court is affected by “fundamental epistemic error”. Neither that, or indeed any, complaint by the husband concerning the determination of the High Court is open to the husband to agitate before this Court.

These appeals

On 28 May 2015 Judge Kemp in the Federal Circuit Court made orders by way of enforcement of the final property orders pursuant to ss 105 and 114 of the Act on the wife’s application to enforce the final property orders. The husband appeals from those orders by his Notice of Appeal (EA 91 of 2015) filed on 23 June 2015. For convenience this appeal will be referred to as “the enforcement appeal”.
Notably, in the enforcement appeal the husband seeks an order not only that the enforcement orders of 28 May 2015 be set aside (Order 1) but also that the final property orders be set aside (Order 2).
Moreover in the enforcement appeal the husband seeks orders which this Court could not legitimately make even if the enforcement appeal were allowed. The husband seeks an order directed to the wife’s former solicitor personally, who is not and never has been a party to these proceedings, to “… refund to the wife all monies received by [the solicitor] or channelled through her in relation to this case” (Order 4). The husband further seeks, in Order 5, an order for interim spousal maintenance in his favour when no such order was ever sought by him prior to the expiration of the limitation period in s 44(3) of the Act; and the final property orders were intended to end the parties’ financial relationships. These matters have been explained to the husband, more than once, in the course of the various proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court, yet he persists in seeking orders he must know to be without foundation.
On 20 August 2015 Judge Kemp made an order dismissing the husband’s application for a stay of the enforcement orders of 28 May 2015. The husband also appeals that dismissal by his Notice of Appeal (EA 144 of 2015) filed on 28 August 2015. For convenience, this appeal will be referred to as “the stay appeal”.
The stay appeal would appear to be nugatory or of no utility given that the enforcement appeal has now been heard and is to be determined and the stay appeal will be rendered nugatory if there is found to be no substance in the enforcement appeal. For this reason I deal first with the enforcement appeal.

The enforcement appeal (EA 91/2015)

By Ground 1 of this appeal the husband contends that Judge Kemp erred in finding that no ground under s 79A of the Act for setting aside the final property orders was pursued by the husband on the enforcement application.
At [3] and [4] of his Reasons for Judgment delivered on 28 May 2015, Judge Kemp records that on the enforcement application the husband relied upon his Response filed on 18 December 2014; his affidavit filed on 18 December 2014; and his affidavit filed on 25 February 2015.
No application by the husband seeking relief pursuant to s 79A of the Act was filed by the husband prior to the hearing and determination of the enforcement application. Indeed no such application has ever been filed.
None of the documents the husband actually filed on the enforcement application contain any reference at all to s 79A of the Act.
None of those documents, viewed individually or collectively, could legitimately be characterised as an application pursuant to s 79A of the Act, and I reject the husband’s hindsight attempt to now so characterise them.
Review of the transcript of the hearing of the enforcement application on 14 May 2015 demonstrates that the husband did not agitate s 79A of the Act as a basis for his contention that the final property orders be set aside.
Subsection (1A) of s 79A was in fact raised by Judge Kemp in the course of the hearing of the enforcement application in explaining to the husband that the parties could seek to vary the final property orders by consent under that subsection. Subsection 79A(1) was not raised by Judge Kemp and, more importantly for present purposes, was not raised by the husband at all (see transcript of proceedings 14 May 2015, p. 42). Indeed, it can be seen from the transcript that the husband’s response to Judge Kemp when this topic was raised was only to the effect that this was something “we”, that is the husband and the wife “ought to consider”; that is that a variation by consent pursuant to subsection (1A) of s 79A ought be considered by the parties.
Likewise in his final submissions on the hearing of the enforcement application the husband made no reference at all to s 79A of the Act.
It was in that important context that Judge Kemp recorded this at [10] to [12] of his Reasons delivered on 28 May 2015:
10.The Court now deals with the responsive orders sought by the husband. The husband seeks an order that the final orders made by Judge Walker be set aside. The Court accepts the submissions of Mr Grew that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to do so. No ground is pursued under s.79A of the Act. The final orders were the subject of an appeal to the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia, with the husband’s appeal dismissed on 2 May 2014 by that Court, constituted by May, Ainslie-Wallace and Ryan JJ. That appeal also dismissed the husband’s application in an appeal for the provision of a transcript and dismissed his appeal against the refusal to grant a stay of the final orders. Further, the husband was ordered to pay the wife’s costs of and incidental to the appeals, such costs to be agreed or, failing agreement, assessed. This Court has had regard to the reasons of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia and those reasons are incorporated in these reasons, as if fully set out herein.
11.The husband applied for special leave to appeal to the High Court from the orders of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia, set out above, and that application for special leave to appeal was refused on 15 October 2014 by that Court, constituted by Hayne and Crennan JJ.
12.As such, this Court accepts that the husband has exercised his appeal rights and that the appellate course, available to him, has now run to its conclusion. As explained to the husband, this Court cannot look behind the decision and final orders of Judge Walker, and that the matters that he, substantially, ventilated before this Court on the hearing of the wife’s enforcement application appear to be the same matters and issues which he raised before Judge Walker or had the opportunity of doing so, or took up before the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia and were dealt with by that Court, albeit not to his satisfaction.
In my judgment his Honour was plainly correct to observe that the Court had no jurisdiction in the enforcement application to set aside the final property orders. Further, his Honour was plainly correct in observing in that context that no ground was pursued by the husband pursuant to s 79A of the Act on that application.
What becomes obvious is that the husband, armed with the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Kemp delivered on 28 May 2015, has subsequently sought to bolster his argument for a stay of the enforcement orders made on 28 May 2015, by purporting to agitate in the subsequent stay application heard on 18 August 2015 that he was pursuing relief pursuant to s 79A of the Act.
However, that cannot support the contention of the husband advanced by Ground 1 in the enforcement appeal that his Honour made any such error.
The husband ought not be permitted to argue on an appeal from the enforcement orders a matter he did not raise before the primary judge in the hearing and determination of that application (Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68).
I need only add that even if the husband had filed an application pursuant to s 79A(1) in the enforcement proceedings agitating the issues he sought to agitate in the stay application, such an application would appear to be doomed to failure.
As is recorded in [79] of the Reasons for Judgment delivered by Judge Walker on 26 September 2013, the husband first agitated as an issue alleged

non-compliance with the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) (“FLR”) at a directions hearing prior to the final trial of those proceedings. The husband again agitated that issue at the outset of the trial of the property proceedings.
The husband pursued that issue, together with a number of contentions asserting the property trial was not legitimately conducted, in his unsuccessful appeal of the final property orders to the Full Court of this Court.
In rejecting his appeal from the final property orders the Full Court of this Court specifically rejected the husband’s arguments that the trial conducted by Judge Walker was not legitimate (see [61]).
The Reasons for Judgment of the Full Court of this Court delivered on 2 May 2014 (Thompson & Berg (supra)), amply demonstrate why the husband could not succeed on a repeated contention that the trial of the property proceedings was not legitimately conducted because of any alleged

non-compliance with the FLR; or any alleged failure by the trial judge to address evidence; or any purported denial of procedural fairness to the husband.
Those Reasons for Judgment also demonstrate that the husband raised these issues in an attempt to demonstrate error on the part of the trial judge in support of his appeal against the final property orders. Those issues having been considered and determined by the Full Court in those previous appeals it was not open to the husband to re-litigate them.
It would thus not have been open to the husband to again agitate the same issues on the enforcement application, which had been determinatively concluded by the Full Court, as establishing a ground under s 79A(1), even if he had attempted to mount such an application, which it has been demonstrated he did not. The principles in relation to what is known as Anshun estoppel apply (see Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589 and also RK & SK (2010) FamCAFC 142).
There is thus no merit in Ground 1.
Grounds 2 to 10 (inclusive) in the enforcement appeal are expressed as follows:
2.His Honour erred in excluding consideration of material that was not allowed to be heard, or was misconstrued, or was ignored, or was not appraised by Judge Walker or by the Full Court of the Family Court or by the High Court, and of whether orders made were supported by evidence and reasoning that was before the respective courts in the respective hearings in a way that each party was allowed to address.
3.His Honour erred in refusing to appropriately consider the question of whether the Full Court’s finding that because the case had been initiated in the Federal Circuit Court parties and their lawyers were not obliged to discharge the responsibilities set out in Rule 1.08 of the Family Law Rules 2004 ought disqualify the FCCA from determining matters under the Act.
4.His Honour erred in refusing to consider submissions that Ms [Berg’s] amended application for enforcement of final orders was a further beach of FLR 1.08 responsibilities by Ms [Berg] and her solicitor Ms Pickel.
5.His Honour erred in ignoring submissions that the enforcement action sought by the wife would further escalate the family violence suffered by the husband.
6.His Honour erred in holding that the property sale component of the final orders were not strictly timetabled so that Judge Walker’s subsequent refusal to grant a stay to allow for the appellate process could not entail unenforceability of those orders after expiration of the schedule.
7.His Honour erred in curtailing and then disregarding
cross-examination of the wife in relation to paragraph 18 of her affidavit of 20 November 2014 when it, together with material in paragraph 7 of the husband’s affidavit of 17 December 2014, went to the issues of misrepresentation of the final orders to police and of misleading the court, typical of the critical FLR 1.08 breaches in this case, and it displayed both the unfounded nature of the wife’s fear and the impediment to rational communication and sound judgment between the parties created by the wife’s current solicitor and her predecessor.
8.His Honour erred in refusing to consider the husband’s submission that there is scope for a court to hold a party’s lawyer to account for serious breaches of FLR 1.08 responsibilities to the court and to both parties, and that in this case Ms Pickel ought to be required to withdraw and refund so that the parties can resolve their matter without the impediment of a conflicted lawyer.
9.His Honour erred in making enforcement orders that entailed additional injustice beyond that involved in simply rescheduling the final orders and in not adjusting the final orders to eliminate the internal inconsistencies identified.
10.His Honour erred in relying on the wife’s account of her financial position when this was misleading in critical respects.
In my judgment, by way of overview, to the extent that purported alleged errors can be identified within any of these grounds, these demonstrate either fundamental misconception on the part of the husband as to the nature of enforcement proceedings; or alternatively the husband’s steadfast refusal to acknowledge that final determinations, binding upon him, have been made on issues he has raised for determination historically.

There was no scope whatsoever in the enforcement proceedings for Judge Kemp to revisit or reconsider any of the issues determined by Judge Walker leading to the making of the final property orders.
Nor was there any scope for Judge Kemp to revisit or reconsider any of the issues conclusively determined by the Full Court in the appeal from the final property orders as referred to.
Nor was there any scope for Judge Kemp to entertain any arguments of the husband, as he sought to advance, as to the merits of the High Court’s refusal of his application for special leave to appeal.
Thus any of the husband’s complaints contained in these grounds to the effect that Judge Kemp erred in one or other of these respects is devoid of substance.
Ground 2 is so lacking in particularity that the errors purportedly asserted in this ground cannot be identified and it thus does not constitute a proper ground of appeal. These deficiencies are not remedied by the husband’s written outline nor his oral argument which contain no more than sweepingly broad assertions, equally unparticularised. I find no merit in Ground 2.
Grounds 3, 4 and 8 each repeat, in one form or another, the same contentions the husband previously advanced to the Full Court of this Court in his previous appeals as to the FLR and their applicability. These are rejected on the same basis and, moreover, are not open to be argued by the husband on these appeals given the determination of the Full Court. I would respectfully adopt, without any unnecessary repetition of them, the Reasons of the Full Court delivered on 2 May 2014 in rejecting each of these grounds of appeal.
As to Ground 5, the legitimate pursuit by a party of that party’s legal rights cannot be characterised as behaviour of a kind which conceivably constitutes “family violence” within the meaning of the Act. The wife was legitimately entitled to pursue enforcement of the final property orders including, as they did, orders for sale of the NSW Highlands property.
As is apparent from the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Walker, the husband has always been opposed to the sale of the NSW Highlands property, albeit that her Honour found that the husband’s proposed orders in the property proceedings were divorced from the reality of the parties’ financial circumstances.
That the final property orders did not find acceptance with the husband and, indeed, even if they caused him some degree of stress or anxiety, this was of no relevance to Judge Kemp’s determination of an application to enforce the final property orders that were made.
In oral argument the husband sought to expand upon by Ground 5 by agitating the proposition that the enforcement orders made by Judge Kemp in and of themselves constituted “family violence” within the meaning of the Act. I think that proposition only need be stated for its lack of merit to be apparent.
There is thus no merit in Ground 5.
Ground 6 of this appeal, as it is expressed, is unintelligible and is thus not a proper ground of appeal.
Ground 6 would appear to contain a complaint about Judge Walker’s refusal to stay the final property orders, an issue already conclusively determined by the Full Court of this Court in the earlier appeal proceedings referred to.
In the enforcement application Judge Kemp dealt with the husband’s argument about “timetabling” in [23] and [24] of his Honour’s Reasons delivered on 28 May 2015; and his Honour thereafter discusses in those Reasons the processes and timing of the respective appeal processes pursued by the husband. I can discern no error in any of that discussion.
On the enforcement application Judge Kemp exercised the powers in ss 105 and 114 of the Act to enforce the final property orders in the circumstances as they presented at the time of the hearing and determination of the enforcement application.
As Judge Kemp observed at [30] of his Reasons, his Honour identified the need to enable the final property orders to be enforced with minimal interference to their original terms.
I am not persuaded of any error in his Honour’s determination to make the enforcement orders his Honour made. In my judgment there is no substance in any complaint to the contrary and thus there is no merit in Ground 6.
Ground 7 of this appeal is directed to matters which are irrelevant to the enforcement orders ultimately made by Judge Kemp.
Judge Kemp did not make enforcement orders in the same terms as was sought by the wife. In fact, the wife did not persist in seeking, as she originally had in the enforcement application, any orders or injunctions for her personal protection and no such orders were ultimately made by Judge Kemp.
The enforcement orders as made by Judge Kemp speak from themselves. The husband fails to demonstrate how it is that issues beyond the scope of those orders have any relevance at all to the content of the enforcement orders as determined by Judge Kemp.
Pursuant to s 114(3) of the Act the Court had a discretion to grant such injunctions in aid of enforcement of the final property orders as appeared to the Court to be just or convenient to make, either unconditionally or on such terms and conditions as the Court considered appropriate (Harris Re: Banaco Pty Ltd (No 2) (1981) FLC 91-100; Rieck & Rieck (1981) FLC 91-067 and Stowe & Stowe (1981) FLC 91-027).
I am not persuaded that any error attended Judge Kemp’s exercise of discretion to make the enforcement orders his Honour made. Ground 7 also fails.
For the same reasons Ground 9 must also fail.
No stay of the final property orders was ever granted beyond the 28 day stay period for notice to creditors to be given as provided for in the final property orders. The husband’s subsequent application for a stay of the final property orders was refused by Judge Walker and as already noted the husband’s appeal from that refusal was dismissed by the Full Court.
There was no “shortening” of the private sale period provided for in the final property orders, as the husband’s submissions before us would have it.
As already noted the final property orders were made on 26 September 2013. At [19] of his Reasons for Judgment delivered in the enforcement application Judge Kemp records the wife’s concerted attempts, commencing soon after the final orders were made, to secure the husband’s cooperation in carrying the final orders, as far as sale of the NSW Highlands property was concerned, into effect. The husband’s cooperation was not forthcoming.
It bears repeating that the enforcement application was determined in the circumstances that existed at that time. Those circumstances included the husband’s pursuit of his appeals to the Full Court.
It was ultimately determined by that Full Court that the husband was “wholly unsuccessful” and that his appeals were “demonstrably without merit” (see [138]), such that the husband was ordered to pay the wife’s costs of and incidental to those appeals.
The operative circumstances also included the husband’s unsuccessful application for leave to appeal to the High Court and the husband’s continued opposition thereafter, notwithstanding having exhausted his appeal rights, to the ordered sale of the NSW Highlands property. The operative circumstances also included that the wife alone was continuing to meet substantial secured debt commitments with respect to the NSW Highlands property even after her permanent move to alternate accommodation on 24 May 2014.
As already noted, Judge Kemp in the exercise of his discretion determined the enforcement orders to be made. There is no substance in the complaint agitated in Ground 9 that his Honour erred in the exercise of that discretion.
Ground 10 contains an entirely unparticularised assertion to the effect that the wife’s evidence in the enforcement application as to her financial position was “misleading in critical respects”. The husband’s written submissions in support of this ground are likewise assertive rather than demonstrative of matters of facts supporting these assertions.
In support of her application for enforcement the wife relied upon, inter alia, her Financial Statement filed on 12 May 2015. As can be seen from the transcript of the hearing of the enforcement application, on the hearing the husband was given ample opportunity to cross-examine the wife. The transcript of those proceedings of 14 May 2015 reveals that the husband

cross-examined the wife for in excess of two hours on that application.
Review of the transcript of the cross-examination does not reveal that any failure of the wife as to the accuracy of that contained in her sworn Financial Statement was demonstrated in the course of cross-examination.
What is revealed by the transcript is that the husband proceeded on the misconceived notion that a business the wife had operated on her own account as a sole trader since late 2009 was somehow to be treated as a jointly owned or operated business.
Judge Walker recorded her findings in relation to this aspect at [48] to [51] of her Honour’s Reasons for Judgment delivered on 26 September 2013.
In the enforcement proceedings Judge Kemp was perfectly entitled to rely upon the wife’s evidence as to her financial circumstances and indeed there would appear to be no legitimate basis for his Honour to have done otherwise. Ground 10 fails.
There thus being no merit in any of the grounds of appeal against the enforcement orders made by Judge Kemp on 28 May 2015, the appeal against those orders must be dismissed.
As I observed earlier in these Reasons, as regards the stay appeal, that appeal is rendered nugatory if there is no substance found in the enforcement appeal.
In my judgment as there is no substance in the enforcement appeal it necessarily follows that the stay appeal is rendered nugatory and the stay appeal ought also be dismissed.
I would therefore order that both appeals be dismissed.

Ainslie-Wallace J

I, too, would dismiss both appeals for the reasons given by Kent J and I would join in making that order.

May J

I agree with the Reasons of Kent J and agree that the appeals should be dismissed. It will be ordered that appeals EA 91 of 2015 and EA 144 of 2015 be dismissed.

May, Ainslie-Wallace and Kent JJ

Costs

These appeals are entirely without merit. There are circumstances which justify an order for costs. The provisions of s 117(2A) of the Act provide the matters to be considered in deciding whether an order for costs should be made. In this case, it must be remembered that these appeals arise from orders for enforcement of orders. The appellant has been wholly unsuccessful. The respondent should have her costs. She had the assistance of solicitors to prepare submissions which were of assistance to us.
The wife was unable to tell us the amount of costs she seeks, as she is yet to receive the bill from her solicitors. It may be in the vicinity of $1,500, however if the bill received is a greater sum, there should be an assessment.

I certify that the preceding eighty-six (86) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Full Court (May, Ainslie-Wallace & Kent JJ) delivered ex tempore on 19 February 2016.

Associate:

Date: 23 February 2016