Thompkins v Medical Board of Australia

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

THOMPKINS v MEDICAL BOARD OF AUSTRALIA

[2018] SASC 72

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Peek

1 June 2018

PROCEDURE - STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY - INHERENT AND GENERAL STATUTORY POWERS - TO STAY OR DISMISS ORDERS OR PROCEEDINGS GENERALLY

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY - SUMMARY DISPOSAL - SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT OR RESPONDENT: STAY OR DISMISSAL OF PROCEEDINGS

The plaintiff, a practising psychiatrist, applies for a permanent stay of proceedings in the South Australian Health Practitioners Tribunal arising from allegations that, between October 2002 and August 2004, he engaged in professional misconduct during and after course of his treatment of a patient, BW. The investigation into the plaintiff’s conduct occurred as a result of two mandatory notifications made by treating medical practitioners of BW on 18 February 2014 and 16 April 2014 respectively and included allegations that he entered into a sexual relationship with BW shortly after his treatment of her ceased.

The plaintiff asserts that the proceedings should be stayed on a number of grounds and particularly that, due to the defendant’s delay in notifying the plaintiff of the mandatory notifications and subsequent investigations (which delay was asserted to be contrary to the provisions of the National Law), the plaintiff had proceeded to routinely cull and destroy patient records including those of BW; and that he was now prejudiced due to the unavailability of potentially exculpatory evidence.

Held per Peek J (refusing the application for a stay):

1) The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that actual - rather than presumptive – prejudice occurred as a result of asserted delay by: BW; or the medical practitioners in notifying the defendant of the alleged misconduct; or the defendant in investigating the alleged misconduct.

2) The defendant did not breach its statutory obligations to notify the plaintiff as soon as practicable. The minutes of committee meetings established compliance with the legislative scheme and the plaintiff failed to prove to the contrary.

3) In any event, having regard to the factual matrix advanced by the defendant (including substantial esoteric knowledge displayed by BW), the present case is not of the exceptional nature required to justify a permanent stay of disciplinary proceedings.

Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (South Australia) Act 2010 (SA) s 31, s 35, s 152, s 160, s 161, s 162, Sch 1, referred to.
Minister for Natural resources v New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council and Anor (1987) 9 NSWLR 154, applied.
R v Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police; ex parte Calveley & Ors [1986] 1 All ER 257, distinguished.
Jago v The District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23; Walton v Gardiner (1993) 77 CLR 378; R v Edwards (2009) 83 ALJR 717; Medical Board of Australia v Woollard (2017) 51 WAR 32; Police v Sherlock (2009) 103 SASR 147; R v B, P [2016] SASCFC 30; XD v…

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Details
Case
[2018] SASC 72
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Dr Richard Thompkins, a psychiatrist, has applied to the court for a stay of proceedings initiated by the Medical Board of Australia in the South Australian Health Practitioners Tribunal. The Board filed a complaint on 28 October 2016, alleging that Thompkins engaged in professional misconduct between October 2002 and August 2004 in the course of, and subsequent to, his treatment of a patient, BW. BW alleges that Thompkins made inappropriate comments and actions during their appointments and that they began a sexual relationship after she ceased consulting him. Thompkins denies these allegations. The case hinges on the statutory framework set out in the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (South Australia) Act 2010, which governs the regulation of health practitioners and the role of the Medical Board of Australia and the Australian Health Practitioners Regulation Authority.

The court was required to decide whether the delay in BW notifying the defendant of the allegations and the delay by the medical practitioners in making their mandatory reports to the defendant caused sufficient prejudice to Thompkins to warrant a stay of proceedings. The court also needed to consider whether the decision by the defendant to withhold notice of the notifications resulted in the loss of evidentiary material, which would constitute exceptional prejudice. Furthermore, the court had to assess whether these delays and the withholding of notice, alone or in combination, amounted to exceptional prejudice that would justify staying the proceedings.

The court examined the evidence and arguments presented by both parties, including the extensive history of notifications against Thompkins and the decision-making process of AHPRA in handling the notifications. The court found that while the allegations were serious and the delay in notifying Thompkins and the practitioners may have contributed to some prejudice, they did not establish the exceptional degree of prejudice required to justify a stay of proceedings. The court also determined that the loss of evidentiary material did not reach the threshold of exceptional prejudice. Consequently, the court dismissed Thompkins' application for a stay of proceedings.

In summary, the court held that the delays and the decision to withhold notice, individually and collectively, did not amount to exceptional prejudice. Therefore, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed, and the proceedings before the Tribunal will continue.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The plaintiff, Dr Richard Thompkins, a psychiatrist, applies to this Court for a stay of proceedings in the South Australian Health Practitioners Tribunal (the Tribunal) arising from a complaint filed by the defendant, the Medical Board of Australia, on 28 October 2016. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff engaged in professional misconduct between October 2002 and August 2004 in the course of, and subsequent to, his treatment of a patient, BW.Background – the plaintiff’s medical treatment of BW BW first attended the plaintiff’s psychiatric practice on 21 October 2002 for the purpose of obtaining a report in connexion with Family Court proceedings in which she was involved.[1] Thereafter, she attended some 63 regular appointments with the plaintiff between 21 October 2002 and 19 May 2004. In BW’s statement dated 9 June 2016, she asserts that the plaintiff made and performed a number of inappropriate comments and actions during the course of the appointments. She asserts that subsequent to the 19 May 2004 appointment, she ceased consulting the plaintiff so that she could “possibly have a relationship with him”; and that on 17 June 2004, they began a sexual relationship which lasted until 28 July 2004, when he ended the relationship.[1] This report in exhibit BW1 within the exhibit BW1 of the affidavit of BW made 8 June 2017. The position of the plaintiff is that he did not make or perform any inappropriate comments or actions during the course of the appointments and that he never performed any sexual act with BW during the course of the appointments or at any other time. The National Law Regulating Health Practitioners The statutory framework central to the proceedings before the Tribunal is set out in the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (South Australia) Act 2010 (the National Law), which commenced on 1 July 2010. It governs the Medical Board of Australia, the Australian Health Practitioners Regulation Authority (AHPRA), and the regulation of health practitioners generally. The defendant is one of 14 ‘National Boards’ established by s 31 of the National Law. The functions of the National Boards are prescribed by s 35, and include the overseeing of investigations into the conduct of medical practitioners and the reference of such investigations to the relevant tribunals. AHPRA is the national regulatory agency established by the National Law,[2] and provides various support to the National Boards, including by managing investigations into the professional conduct of registered health practitioners. [2] Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (South Australia) Act 2010, Sch 1, Part 4. The commencement of the National Law also established mandatory reporting obligations for registered health practitioners. Section 160 of the National Law specifically permits a ‘National Board’ to investigate a health practitioner upon receipt of such mandatory reports (to be referred to henceforth as ‘notifications’). Ms Hayley Kennett, of AHPRA, deposed in her affidavit of 9 June 2017 as to the delegation of investigations into such notifications as at the time of the present notifications into the plaintiff’s conduct (early in 2014) as follows:[3]10. When AHPRA received a notification it was lodged and sent to the Director of Notifications who would conduct an initial risk assessment and allocate it to one of the two teams in SA Notifications, each led by a separate Manager.11. The Director determined whether the notification was in regard to a registered health practitioner and whether it related to a matter that was a ground for notification under the National Law.12. The Director also determined whether the notification was classified as normal or high risk. In my experience, alleged sexual misconduct by a health practitioner would typically be considered high risk.13. Once a notification was allocated to a team and then assigned to an Investigator, they arranged for a preliminary assessment report to be considered by a relevant Board delegate. The Board delegate, typically a sub-Committee on behalf of the Board, would decide the outcome at assessment, including whether an investigation should be conducted and provide strategic direction as necessary. [3] Affidavit of Hayley Jane Kennett dated 9 June 2017, [10]-[13].The Investigation and Proceedings before the Medical Tribunal

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As summarised above, AHPRA first resolved to not inform the plaintiff of the notification or investigation on 11 March 2014. The minutes of the email “meeting” between the relevant committee members record that they formed “the reasonable belief” that giving the plaintiff notice might “prejudice the investigation” or “place a person’s health or safety at risk”, within the meaning of ss 151(3) and 161(4) of the Act. The basis for such a belief is recorded as being:1.The allegation is extremely serious and, if substantiated, likely to amount to professional misconduct. Given the practitioner’s extensive notification history which includes notifications in respect of alarmingly similar allegations, it is recommended that the Board direct the writer to investigate the practitioner.2.Given the practitioner’s legacy history, and historical concerns regarding his potential interference with evidence in respect of previous notifications and Tribunal proceedings, it is considered that giving the practitioner notice of:a) This notification might prejudice an investigation of the notification or place a person’s health or safety at riskb) The proposed investigation might seriously prejudice the investigation or place a person’s health or safety at risk. The committee resolved to not notify the plaintiff until certain further investigative processes had been completed, including obtaining statements from BW, and the two notifying practitioners. AHPRA affirmed this resolution to not notify in subsequent committee meetings. The first was on 22 April 2014 when the Committee first considered the second mandatory notification. In a “preliminary assessment report”, which was apparently before them, the nature of the “legacy history” is further recorded thus:[37] Analysis●The practitioner has a very extensive notification history, traversing numerous issues including his prescribing habits and issues connected with medico-legal reports prepared for proceedings before the Family Court of Australia.●In 2007 (MBSA 389/2007), Dr Thompkins provided an undertaking to the Board not to prescribe drugs of dependence, as part of the resolution of proceedings before the Medical Practitioner’s Professional Conduct Tribunal.●Additionally, there have been notifications against the practitioner for:- Allegedly kissing a 16 year old female patient during session. The Board determined not to pursue the matter, as a result of the patient’s fragile mental state- Allegedly breaching confidentiality by releasing information about the treatment of the alleged victim of sexual abuse to her abuser (her father, for whom he was the treating psychiatrist). The former Board laid a complaint before the Medical Practitioner’s Professional Conduct Tribunal, but failed to make proof. The Board was ordered to pay costs, which were settled in the amount of $67,500.- Allegedly breaching professional boundaries by attempting to pursue a personal and/or sexual relationship with a patient. A formal complaint was laid before the Medical Practitioner’s Professional Conduct Tribunal, but was ultimately dismissed. The Board sought judicial review in the Supreme Court, which was unsuccessful. The Board was ordered to pay costs, which were settled in the amount of $250,000. It is understood that, in this case, there was a strong suspicion that Dr Thompkins altered his patient’s clinical records. [37] See minutes of the meeting dated 22 April 2014, HJK 2, and letter from the AGS to Mr Iles dated 4 July 2017, RBT 10. This report was provided to the Defendant on 4 July 2017.

Decision

Reasons for decision

PEEK J
I consider that the evidence before this Court concerning loss of evidentiary material (together with the plaintiff’s submissions in that regard) do not establish that exceptional degree of prejudice needed to justify the granting of a stay of the proceedings. Conclusion I have considered each asserted ground both alone and in combination with each of the others. For all of the above reasons, I conclude that a stay is not warranted and I dismiss the plaintiff’s action.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PEEK J

These matters are to be considered against the background of the plaintiff’s stance that he did not discuss personal matters with BW and that he did not associate with her outside consultations. Thus when interviewed by AHPRA, he stated:[32] [32] Interview with Richard Thompkins dated 1 April 2016, Affidavit of Nicholas James Iles Exhibit NJI5.Q. Do you, just as a general question, do you ever discuss personal, your own personal matters with patients?A. Can you be more specific?Q. Well, for example, members of your family, personal issues you might be going through, where you live, hobbies you might have, things like that?A. Well that’s, you know, that’s a real scatter-gun question, with all due respect. I mean, there’s lots of, my, there’s a spectrum within psychiatrists, and I’m very much towards one end of the spectrum, because as best I can I like to be a blank canvas. The patient always colours in the canvas the way they want to do it, so to speak, but I’m not big on making personal disclosures, not at all. Hobbies, yes, yeah, why not. I do talk about my hobbies sometimes.Q. Would you talk about personal matters relating to your family or children or any of those type of things?A. Very seldom. But most cases, not at all… In fact, I have a, I have a, I have a bit of a thing about that. Most cases, definitely not at all.Q. Do you recall whether you discussed any such matters with [BW]?A. No.Q. You don’t recall, or you didn’t discuss any such matters?A. We’re talking 12 or 13 years ago. I don’t recall, but I think in all probability, I did not discuss.Q. In the course of treating a patient, would you ever attend a patient’s house?A. For a home visit, say. Oh, very rarely. I can probably, how long have I been there? 18 years. I can probably count on the fingers of one hand the number of people. That would be for home visits. So the answer to your question is almost never, but of course occasionally in special circumstances.Q. Did you ever attend [BW]’s house?A. Never.Q. Would a patient ever attend your house?A. Absolutely never.Q. Did [BW] ever attend your house or any property you have an interest in?A. Absolutely never.CONSIDERATION OF THE PLAINTIFF’S STATED GROUNDS The plaintiff’s stated grounds are summarised and grouped above at paragraph [19]. I proceed to consider them in that order of groupings. Delay by BW in notifying the defendant of the allegations of alleged misconduct (whether personally or through the agency of other medical practitioners) (Ground 1.1); and delay by the medical practitioners in making their respective mandatory report’s to the defendant (Ground 1.2) The plaintiff seeks to rely upon delay by BW in complaining of the plaintiff’s alleged conduct, and upon delay by the notifying medical practitioners in notifying AHPRA. I accept that in determining whether prejudice has occurred, account may be taken of “the period elapsed since the alleged misconduct occurred, including the part of the period prior to the Board becoming aware of the alleged misconduct”.[33] However, that delay must be causative of the actual prejudice suffered by the plaintiff for the permanent stay. Here, the plaintiff rightly acknowledges that “nonetheless, the real source of prejudice was the … decision of the Defendant to withhold notice of the Notifications… in the course of which the Complainant’s medical records were “culled””.[33] Medical Board v Woollard (2017) 51 WAR 32.