SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil)
THOMPKINS v MEDICAL BOARD OF AUSTRALIA
[2018] SASC 72
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Peek
1 June 2018
PROCEDURE - STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY - INHERENT AND GENERAL STATUTORY POWERS - TO STAY OR DISMISS ORDERS OR PROCEEDINGS GENERALLY
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY - SUMMARY DISPOSAL - SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT OR RESPONDENT: STAY OR DISMISSAL OF PROCEEDINGS
The plaintiff, a practising psychiatrist, applies for a permanent stay of proceedings in the South Australian Health Practitioners Tribunal arising from allegations that, between October 2002 and August 2004, he engaged in professional misconduct during and after course of his treatment of a patient, BW. The investigation into the plaintiff’s conduct occurred as a result of two mandatory notifications made by treating medical practitioners of BW on 18 February 2014 and 16 April 2014 respectively and included allegations that he entered into a sexual relationship with BW shortly after his treatment of her ceased.
The plaintiff asserts that the proceedings should be stayed on a number of grounds and particularly that, due to the defendant’s delay in notifying the plaintiff of the mandatory notifications and subsequent investigations (which delay was asserted to be contrary to the provisions of the National Law), the plaintiff had proceeded to routinely cull and destroy patient records including those of BW; and that he was now prejudiced due to the unavailability of potentially exculpatory evidence.
Held per Peek J (refusing the application for a stay):
1) The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that actual - rather than presumptive – prejudice occurred as a result of asserted delay by: BW; or the medical practitioners in notifying the defendant of the alleged misconduct; or the defendant in investigating the alleged misconduct.
2) The defendant did not breach its statutory obligations to notify the plaintiff as soon as practicable. The minutes of committee meetings established compliance with the legislative scheme and the plaintiff failed to prove to the contrary.
3) In any event, having regard to the factual matrix advanced by the defendant (including substantial esoteric knowledge displayed by BW), the present case is not of the exceptional nature required to justify a permanent stay of disciplinary proceedings.
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (South Australia) Act 2010 (SA) s 31, s 35, s 152, s 160, s 161, s 162, Sch 1, referred to.
Minister for Natural resources v New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council and Anor (1987) 9 NSWLR 154, applied.
R v Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police; ex parte Calveley & Ors [1986] 1 All ER 257, distinguished.
Jago v The District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23; Walton v Gardiner (1993) 77 CLR 378; R v Edwards (2009) 83 ALJR 717; Medical Board of Australia v Woollard (2017) 51 WAR 32; Police v Sherlock (2009) 103 SASR 147; R v B, P [2016] SASCFC 30; XD v…
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- Case
- [2018] SASC 72
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether the delay in BW notifying the defendant of the allegations and the delay by the medical practitioners in making their mandatory reports to the defendant caused sufficient prejudice to Thompkins to warrant a stay of proceedings. The court also needed to consider whether the decision by the defendant to withhold notice of the notifications resulted in the loss of evidentiary material, which would constitute exceptional prejudice. Furthermore, the court had to assess whether these delays and the withholding of notice, alone or in combination, amounted to exceptional prejudice that would justify staying the proceedings.
The court examined the evidence and arguments presented by both parties, including the extensive history of notifications against Thompkins and the decision-making process of AHPRA in handling the notifications. The court found that while the allegations were serious and the delay in notifying Thompkins and the practitioners may have contributed to some prejudice, they did not establish the exceptional degree of prejudice required to justify a stay of proceedings. The court also determined that the loss of evidentiary material did not reach the threshold of exceptional prejudice. Consequently, the court dismissed Thompkins' application for a stay of proceedings.
In summary, the court held that the delays and the decision to withhold notice, individually and collectively, did not amount to exceptional prejudice. Therefore, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed, and the proceedings before the Tribunal will continue.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: PEEK J
These matters are to be considered against the background of the plaintiff’s stance that he did not discuss personal matters with BW and that he did not associate with her outside consultations. Thus when interviewed by AHPRA, he stated:[32] [32] Interview with Richard Thompkins dated 1 April 2016, Affidavit of Nicholas James Iles Exhibit NJI5.Q. Do you, just as a general question, do you ever discuss personal, your own personal matters with patients?A. Can you be more specific?Q. Well, for example, members of your family, personal issues you might be going through, where you live, hobbies you might have, things like that?A. Well that’s, you know, that’s a real scatter-gun question, with all due respect. I mean, there’s lots of, my, there’s a spectrum within psychiatrists, and I’m very much towards one end of the spectrum, because as best I can I like to be a blank canvas. The patient always colours in the canvas the way they want to do it, so to speak, but I’m not big on making personal disclosures, not at all. Hobbies, yes, yeah, why not. I do talk about my hobbies sometimes.Q. Would you talk about personal matters relating to your family or children or any of those type of things?A. Very seldom. But most cases, not at all… In fact, I have a, I have a, I have a bit of a thing about that. Most cases, definitely not at all.Q. Do you recall whether you discussed any such matters with [BW]?A. No.Q. You don’t recall, or you didn’t discuss any such matters?A. We’re talking 12 or 13 years ago. I don’t recall, but I think in all probability, I did not discuss.Q. In the course of treating a patient, would you ever attend a patient’s house?A. For a home visit, say. Oh, very rarely. I can probably, how long have I been there? 18 years. I can probably count on the fingers of one hand the number of people. That would be for home visits. So the answer to your question is almost never, but of course occasionally in special circumstances.Q. Did you ever attend [BW]’s house?A. Never.Q. Would a patient ever attend your house?A. Absolutely never.Q. Did [BW] ever attend your house or any property you have an interest in?A. Absolutely never.CONSIDERATION OF THE PLAINTIFF’S STATED GROUNDS The plaintiff’s stated grounds are summarised and grouped above at paragraph [19]. I proceed to consider them in that order of groupings. Delay by BW in notifying the defendant of the allegations of alleged misconduct (whether personally or through the agency of other medical practitioners) (Ground 1.1); and delay by the medical practitioners in making their respective mandatory report’s to the defendant (Ground 1.2) The plaintiff seeks to rely upon delay by BW in complaining of the plaintiff’s alleged conduct, and upon delay by the notifying medical practitioners in notifying AHPRA. I accept that in determining whether prejudice has occurred, account may be taken of “the period elapsed since the alleged misconduct occurred, including the part of the period prior to the Board becoming aware of the alleged misconduct”.[33] However, that delay must be causative of the actual prejudice suffered by the plaintiff for the permanent stay. Here, the plaintiff rightly acknowledges that “nonetheless, the real source of prejudice was the … decision of the Defendant to withhold notice of the Notifications… in the course of which the Complainant’s medical records were “culled””.[33] Medical Board v Woollard (2017) 51 WAR 32.