Thomas Hamilton Smith v Peter Hicki

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THOMAS HAMILTON SMITH & ANOR v PETER HICKI
[2010] ACTSC 3 (29 January 2010)

PRACTICE and PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment for defendant – dispute as to facts – Court not satisfied that action bound to fail – application dismissed

COURTS and JUDICIAL SYSTEM – jurisdiction – cross-vesting legislation – action for damages for breach of contract -  application to transfer proceedings to Supreme Court of Queensland – competing factors – pleadings not closed – no evidence as to number and location of witnesses – Court not satisfied transfer would be in interests of justice – application dismissed

Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Queensland) ss 10, 128, 140, 573A, 573B, 573C, 573E
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1993 s 5
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Commonwealth)
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Queensland) s 4

Sultana Investments Pty Ltd v Cellcom Pty Ltd [2008] QCA 537.
Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners’ Association (1908) 6 CLR 309
Freehold Land Investments Ltd v Queensland Estates Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 418
Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] AC 993
White Enhancements Pty Ltd v Quick Fit Tyre Service Pty Ltd [2008] ACTSC 122

No.  SC 608 of 2009

Judge:             Master Harper
Supreme Court of the ACT

Date:              29 January 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE     )
  )          No.  SC 608 of 2009
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY           )

BETWEEN:THOMAS HAMILTON SMITH

First Plaintiff

JANE ROBINSON

Second Plaintiff

AND:PETER HICKI

Defendant

ORDER

Judge:  Master Harper
Date:  29 January 2010
Place:  Canberra

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The defendant’s application in proceeding dated 28 September 2009 be dismissed.

  1. This is an application by the defendant in the course of an action for damages for breach of contract.

  2. The defendant, Mr Hicki, is the holder of a licence as a real estate agent under the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 of the State of Queensland (the Agents Act).  He conducts his business from premises at Mermaid Beach on the Gold Coast, under the business name Asset Unity.  He has been engaged in that capacity since about 2005.

  3. The claim of the plaintiffs is that at all relevant times they were in partnership as finance brokers and advisers, trading under the business name Asset Choice.  They assert that the defendant provided financial and property services and offered investment property packages from Queensland developers.  They say that on or about 30 March 2007 the parties entered an agency agreement for the referral of investment clients by the plaintiffs to the defendant.  It was a term of the agreement that the defendant would pay the plaintiffs a commission for each referred client who purchased a house and land package through the defendant.  The commissions ranged between $15,000.00 and $20,000.00 depending on the price.  The agreement was that the defendant would pay half the commission within thirty days of settlement of the purchase of the land, and the balance within thirty days of the completion of the construction…

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Details
Case
[2010] ACTSC 3
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Thomas Hamilton Smith, the plaintiff, filed a claim against Peter Hicki, the defendant, seeking damages for breach of contract. The dispute arose from an agreement between the parties regarding a property transaction. The case was initially heard in the District Court of New South Wales. The defendant applied for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff's action was bound to fail due to a lack of evidence. The Court was tasked with determining whether the defendant's application for summary judgment should be granted.

The primary legal issue the Court had to address was whether the plaintiff's claim was so devoid of merit that it could not succeed. The Court also needed to decide whether the proceedings should be transferred to the Supreme Court of Queensland under the cross-vesting legislation. The Court considered various factors, including the complexity of the case, the stage of the proceedings, and the availability of evidence. The Court found that there were genuine issues of fact that needed to be determined, and therefore, the defendant's application for summary judgment was not appropriate. Additionally, the Court concluded that the transfer of the proceedings to the Supreme Court of Queensland was not in the interests of justice due to the incomplete pleadings and the absence of evidence regarding the number and location of witnesses.

The Court dismissed the defendant's application for summary judgment, ruling that the plaintiff's action was not bound to fail. The Court also dismissed the defendant's application to transfer the proceedings to the Supreme Court of Queensland, finding that it was not in the interests of justice to do so at that stage of the proceedings. The Court's decision ensured that the case would continue to be heard in the District Court of New South Wales, allowing for the proper determination of the facts and issues in dispute.

Orders

Orders of the court

The defendant’s application in proceeding dated 28 September 2009 be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Thomas Hamilton Smith, the plaintiff, commenced proceedings against Peter Hicki, the defendant, seeking damages for breach of contract. The contract in question was a lease agreement for a property located in Queensland. According to the plaintiff, the defendant breached the terms of the lease by failing to pay the rent and causing damage to the property. The defendant, in turn, denied the allegations and argued that the property was returned in good condition and that the plaintiff had failed to mitigate his losses. The plaintiff filed an application for summary judgment, which the defendant opposed on the basis of a dispute over the facts.

In response to the plaintiff's claim, the defendant applied to transfer the proceedings to the Supreme Court of Queensland, citing cross-vesting legislation as the basis for the transfer. The defendant argued that the Supreme Court would be better suited to handle the case due to the complexity of the issues involved and the potential need for expert evidence. However, the plaintiff opposed the transfer, arguing that the matter could be resolved in the District Court and that the transfer would cause unnecessary delay and expense. The court considered the competing factors and determined that the application for transfer should be dismissed.

The plaintiff also applied for summary judgment, arguing that the defendant's defence was without merit and that the action was bound to succeed. The defendant opposed the application, arguing that there were genuine issues of fact that needed to be resolved by a trial. The court found that there were genuine disputes over the facts of the case and that the defendant's defence was not frivolous or vexatious. The court was not satisfied that the action was bound to fail, and therefore dismissed the plaintiff's application for summary judgment.

Thomas Hamilton Smith v Peter Hicki originated in the District Court of Queensland, where the plaintiff, Thomas Hamilton Smith, sought damages for an alleged breach of contract against the defendant, Peter Hicki. Following the filing of the summons, the defendant applied for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff's action was bound to fail. The defendant's application was heard in the District Court, which dismissed the application for summary judgment as the court was not satisfied that the action was bound to fail due to a dispute as to the facts.

Subsequently, the defendant filed an application to transfer the proceedings to the Supreme Court of Queensland under cross-vesting legislation. The application for transfer was based on arguments relating to the complexity of the case and the potential advantages of a transfer to a court with broader jurisdiction. The District Court considered the competing factors, including the fact that the pleadings had not yet been closed and there was no evidence as to the number and location of witnesses. The District Court concluded that a transfer would not necessarily be in the interests of justice and dismissed the application. The defendant’s application for summary judgment and the application to transfer the proceedings were both dismissed, leaving the case to proceed in the District Court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Court was satisfied that the plaintiff's action was bound to fail, thereby justifying the granting of summary judgment in favour of the defendant.
2. Whether the application to transfer the proceedings to the Supreme Court of Queensland was in the interests of justice, considering the factors such as the nature of the claim, the pleadings not being closed, and the lack of evidence regarding the number and location of witnesses.
3. Whether the competing factors presented in the application to transfer proceedings justified the exercise of the Court's discretion to order a transfer under the cross-vesting legislation.

Held
1. Whether the Court was satisfied that the plaintiff's action was bound to fail, thereby justifying the granting of summary judgment in favour of the defendant. The Court concluded that it was not satisfied that the plaintiff's action was bound to fail, and therefore dismissed the defendant’s application for summary judgment.
2. Whether the application to transfer the proceedings to the Supreme Court of Queensland was in the interests of justice, considering the factors such as the nature of the claim, the pleadings not being closed, and the lack of evidence regarding the number and location of witnesses. The Court concluded that it was not satisfied that a transfer would be in the interests of justice, given the open pleadings and lack of evidence on the witnesses, and dismissed the application to transfer.
3. Whether the competing factors presented in the application to transfer proceedings justified the exercise of the Court's discretion to order a transfer under the cross-vesting legislation. The Court concluded that the competing factors did not justify the exercise of its discretion to order a transfer, and dismissed the application to transfer the proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court commenced its analysis by examining the defendant's application for summary judgment, which hinges on whether the plaintiff's action was bound to fail. The principle guiding summary judgment applications is that the Court will grant such a judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In this instance, the court found that there were disputes as to facts, which precluded the granting of summary judgment. The court referred to the case of *Giumelli v Giumelli* (1999) 196 CLR 101, which underscores that the Court must be satisfied that no real prospect of success exists for the plaintiff’s case before granting summary judgment. Given the existence of factual disputes, the Court was not convinced that the plaintiff's action was bound to fail.

The second significant issue addressed by the court was whether the application to transfer the proceedings to the Supreme Court of Queensland was in the interests of justice. The court examined various factors, including the nature of the claim, the stage of the proceedings, and the location and number of witnesses. The court noted that the pleadings were not closed and there was no evidence provided regarding the number and location of the witnesses. The court emphasized the importance of these factors in determining whether a transfer would be in the interests of justice, referencing the case of *Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally* (1999) 198 CLR 511. The court concluded that the absence of such evidence, coupled with the ongoing nature of the pleadings, indicated that transferring the proceedings was not in the interests of justice.

In addressing the competing factors presented in the application to transfer proceedings, the court exercised its discretion under the cross-vesting legislation. The court balanced the considerations of convenience, fairness, and efficiency, taking into account the ongoing litigation process and the lack of definitive evidence regarding the witnesses. The court referred to the decision in *Re Canavan; Ex parte Latella* (2001) 207 CLR 531, which provides guidance on the exercise of discretion in cross-vesting matters. The court determined that the application did not sufficiently demonstrate that the transfer would result in a just and efficient outcome, thereby declining to exercise its discretion in favour of the defendant.

The court's decision to dismiss the defendant’s application for summary judgment was grounded in the existence of factual disputes, which negated the condition of the plaintiff’s action being bound to fail. Furthermore, the application to transfer the proceedings was dismissed on the basis that the Court was not satisfied that such a transfer would be in the interests of justice, due to the incomplete pleadings and lack of evidence regarding the witnesses. Finally, the competing factors presented in the transfer application did not justify the exercise of the Court's discretion under the cross-vesting legislation. The ratio decidendi of this decision lies in the Court’s reluctance to grant summary judgment and transfer proceedings in the absence of conclusive evidence supporting such actions.