Thiansawang (formerly Klugt) v The Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust ATF the Social Work
[2017] NSWWCCPD 12
•10 April 2017
| WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION | ||
| DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR | ||
| CITATION: | Thiansawang (formerly Klugt) v The Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust ATF The Social Work [2017] NSWWCCPD 12 | |
| APPELLANT: | Wirunlak Thiansawang (formerly Naomi Klugt) | |
| RESPONDENT: | The Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust ATF The Social Work | |
| INSURER: | GIO General Ltd | |
| FILE NUMBER: | A1-3283/16 | |
| ARBITRATOR: | Ms J Snell | |
| DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION: | 15 September 2016 | |
| DATE OF APPEAL DECISION: | 10 April 2017 | |
| SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION: | Whether the Arbitrator was correct to find that a case of injury under s 4(a) or 4(b) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 had not been made out upon the evidence; whether in respect of the former case the Arbitrator was correct to find that s 9A of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 had not been satisfied upon the evidence | |
| PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER: | Acting Deputy President Larry King SC | |
| HEARING: | On the papers | |
| REPRESENTATION: | Appellant: | City Lawyers and Consultants |
| Respondent: | Gillis Delaney Lawyers | |
| ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL: | 1. The Arbitrator’s Certificate of Determination of 15 September 2016 is confirmed. | |
INTRODUCTION
The appellant worker in this appeal seeks to overturn a decision of an Arbitrator finding that she had not made out a case of frank injury to her left ankle by reference to three alleged specific incidents for the purposes of s 4(a) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act), and further that she had not satisfied s 9A of the 1987 Act. The appellant also challenges the Arbitrator’s finding that a case of aggravation of a disease for the purposes of s 4(b) of the 1987 Act had not been made out.
The claim which thus failed before the Arbitrator was one for weekly compensation and medical expenses advanced by way of an Amended Application to Resolve a Dispute which was filed in the Commission on 8 August 2016 pursuant to leave granted on that day by the Arbitrator.
BACKGROUND
The appellant worked for the respondent as a care service employee from October 2013. Her place of employment was a nursing home in Collaroy. Her duties involved attending to elderly people who were suffering dementia. That work required a lot of manual activity, involving the appellant in much time on her feet, standing, walking, pushing, lifting and assisting with lifting etc. This range of duties in such a place of work is all too familiar in our society as was the appellant’s evidence in respect of it in her evidentiary statement of
20 June 2016 that was before the Arbitrator.That evidentiary statement adduced evidence of three incidents which occurred in the course of the appellant’s employment with the respondent affecting her left ankle. They were the following:
(a) On 9 April 2014 the appellant “… was assisting an elderly patient Paul back to his room when [she] suddenly felt sharp pain in [her] left ankle.”
(b) On 2 March 2015 at about 9.00 pm she “… was assisting elderly patient Dorothy to the bathroom when [she] turned sharply to the left while assisting the patient and felt sharp pain in left ankle.”
(c) On 3 March 2015 at about 7.00 pm she “… was assisting an elderly patient Robert into bed when [she] stepped on a floor mattress next to the bed and felt sharp pain in left ankle”.
The appellant’s evidentiary statement recorded that she consulted her general practitioner, Dr Loke, underwent some radiological investigations and had some physiotherapy as well as being given general advice, prescribed pain killers and advised to strap her left ankle and take as much strain as possible on her right leg. Dr Loke referred her to an orthopaedic surgeon, Dr Riley, who in turn referred her to a podiatrist at Wahroonga whom she did not see because of the expense. She obtained a soft ankle brace from another source, but apparently did not find it of much use.
On 25 August 2015 the appellant, who was born in Thailand, went there on holiday. Her evidentiary statement says that on a rainy day she “slipped and injured [her] left ankle because it was unstable after the injury/ies at work”.
She had earlier made a claim for compensation benefits, in respect of weekly payments and medical expenses, which the respondent’s insurer denied on 2 July 2015. No claim in respect of s 66 benefits was advanced. She went off work altogether on 16 November 2015.
The claim came on for hearing before Arbitrator J Snell on 17 August 2016. No oral evidence was led and at the conclusion of counsels’ addresses the Arbitrator reserved her decision. It was given on 15 September 2016. The learned Arbitrator found against the appellant in respect of the allegations of injury, substantial contribution to injury from employment, and aggravation of a disease: see paragraph [4(a),(b) and (c)] above. Against the event that she had erred in a critical respect or respects as to the appellant’s case on injury and aggravation of disease, the Arbitrator went on to deal with the appellant’s entitlement to compensation had the appellant succeeded. She held that there was no basis upon which an award for weekly compensation could be made in the appellant’s favour although a general award in relation to medical expenses would have been made: see paragraphs [103]-[121] of the Arbitrator’s reasons.
THRESHOLD MATTERS
There is no dispute that the threshold requirements of s 352(3) and (4) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 have been met.
ON THE PAPERS
The parties are in agreement that this appeal may be dealt with “on the papers” and upon my own consideration of the material before the Arbitrator and now before me I am satisfied that that is a proper approach.
FRESH EVIDENCE
Neither party sought to lead fresh evidence upon the appeal.
ISSUES IN DISPUTE
The issues in dispute upon this appeal are whether the Arbitrator erred in:
(a) making a factual finding to the effect that the appellant had not established a case of injury within the meaning of s 4(a) of the the 1987 Act;
(b) making a factual finding in respect of the case that the appellant had not satisfied the requirement of s 9A that her employment was a substantial contributing factor to any such injury, and
(c) finding that the appellant had not made out a case of aggravation of a disease process.
EVIDENCE
The relevant evidence before the Arbitrator from the appellant included the abovementioned evidentiary statement by her, a claim form dated 20 March 2015, another form headed “Hazard/Incident & Injury Report”, a number of medical certificates from Dr Loke, an x-ray report of 24 April 2015 by Dr Makeham, an MRI report of that date from Dr Lucas, a report of Dr Peter Giblin, orthopaedic surgeon, of 1 March 2016, a report of Mr Stepkovitch, physiotherapist, dated 20 November 2015 and a report of Dr Dale Kong, occupational physician, dated 27 October 2015. (This is not an exhaustive statement of the material put into evidence for the appellant: correspondence comprising s 74 Notices from the respondent’s insurer, correspondence from the respondent itself and some other medical certificates were before the Arbitrator, but in my view the evidence I have detailed is the relevant evidence.) A further statement from the appellant dated 2 August 2016 was admitted as a late document by Arbitrator Snell when she gave leave for the filing in the Commission of the Amended Application to Resolve a Dispute, but that document is material only to the calculation of compensation in my view, not to the primary questions upon which the Arbitrator’s decision really rests.
For the respondent the evidence was serial reports of Dr Paul Miniter, who had examined the appellant on a medico-legal basis, dated 13 April 2015, 4 June 2015 and 9 May 2016, together with a number of other documents which had also been adduced by the appellant, namely medical certificates from Dr Loke, the radiological reports of Drs Lucas and Makeham, the s 74 Notices and the “Hazard/Incident & Injury Report”.
As to the circumstances of the appellant’s alleged ankle injuries and the alleged connection with her employment with the respondent, the important evidence is in her evidentiary statement of 20 June 2016 and in the histories in the medical material.
As to her evidentiary statement, paragraph 3 is as follows:
“On 9/4/2014, I was assisting an elderly patient Paul back to his room when I suddenly felt sharp pain in my left ankle. On 2/3/2015, at about 9 pm I was assisting elderly patient Dorothy to the bathroom when I turned sharply to the left while assisting the patient and felt sharp pain in left ankle. On 3/3/2015, at about 7 pm I was assisting an elderly patient Robert into bed when I stepped on a floor mattress next to the bed and felt sharp pain in left ankle.”
The report of Dr Kong dated 27 October 2015 contains the following history on the second page under the heading “Background and Clinical History”:
“…
In 2014 Ms Klugt reported that she was escorting a resident at the facility. She was turning left when she noted sudden onset of pain in the left outer aspect of her ankle. She described the pain as being very sharp and lasting a few seconds. After the pain subsided she was able to continue working. She felt that her ankle might have been minimally swollen at the time. She was able to continue with her duties that day and was able to continue working on the following days without difficulty.
Ms Klugt was doing well until approximately 12 months later. On this occasion she was again escorting a resident when she was again turning left and noted sudden onset of a sharp pain in the left outer aspect of her ankle. The pain was similar to that on the first occasion, i.e. earlier. On this occasion the pain again lasted a few seconds and again she felt that there may have been minimal swelling. Later that evening she had two to three further recurrences of the pain occurring when she was walking. She did not note the pain when she was just standing or sitting. Due to the recurrence of the pain she attended her treating doctor who recommended light duties.
…”
Later in the report under the heading “Current Status” the doctor records:
“In August 2015 Ms Klugt went on holidays to Phuket in Thailand. While she was there she did slip and injure her ankle. …”
The report of Dr Giblin dated 1 March 2016 contains the following history, under that heading, on the first and second pages of the report:
“HISTORY
...
In the course of her duties, she hurt her left ankle on 2 March 2015 when she was assisting an elderly client. She turned slightly sharp to the left and had acute left ankle pain. She rested it, and the pain subsided.
She remained at work.
On 3 March 2015 she was again doing a similar activity and she stepped on the mattress on the floor, next to the patient’s bed he had acute left ankle pain. She rested briefly, the symptoms settled and went away. She continued on with normal duties.
On 9 April 2014 she was again assisting an elderly client and the same ankle pain returned and this time it did not resolve.
…”
As I read them the various medical certificates are uninformative as to the circumstances in which the appellant’s ankle pain developed.
In the respondent’s case the first report of Dr Miniter dated 13 April 2015 contains the following history on page two thereof:
“…
She told me that on 9 April 2014 she was escorting one of the residents when her foot suddenly experienced significant pain which caused her to fall to the ground. When she was able to get up she did so without difficulty and it seemed as though the matter resolved instantaneously. She had no treatment nor investigation.
As I understand it, on 2 March 2015, the same problem occurred. Once again there was a sudden discomfort and she has had some pain in the lateral gutter continue as a consequence. She has not had any episodes of giving way nor instability.
…”
The subsequent reports from this witness dated 4 June 2015 and 9 May 2016 do not expand upon the history recounted in the first report.
So far as the reports of Drs Kong and Giblin are concerned, I think it is fair to say that neither of them contains any expression of opinion on causation explaining what brought about the appellant’s ankle pain and connecting it with some identifiable incident or incidents of her employment. Indeed so far as I can see Dr Kong’s report is silent on these matters and Dr Giblin’s, under the heading “DIAGNOSIS” on page four is in the following terms which I regard as uninformative:
“DIAGNOSIS
Based upon her history and examination, she has the provisional diagnosis of a soft tissue injury to her left ankle, reasonably causally related to the subject accident, and consistent with her work environment as being the main contributing factor to the left ankle injury. The injury is soft tissue in nature and consistent with the findings on the MRI scan referred to in the body of this report.”
I do not think it is possible to extract with any clarity from this passage in the doctor’s report whether the diagnosis is ultimately provisional or firm; what he speaks of when he mentions “the accident”; what he speaks of when he mentions the appellant’s “work environment”; and how any feature of that environment or her working duties constitute the “main contributing factor” to whatever the nature of the injury is.
So far as the view of Dr Miniter as to causation is concerned, in my view there is no similar lack of information or uncertainty. In his first report on page three in answer to the third and fourth of the specific questions put to him he squarely said that there had been no injury and that the appellant’s employment with the respondent was not “… the main contributing factor to the disease (or aggravation)”. In his subsequent reports he affirmed those propositions.
THE ARBITRATOR’S REASONS
Brief mention of how the Arbitrator decided the case has been made above. It is appropriate to give a little more detail at this stage.
In a comprehensive passage of her reasons extending from paragraph [55] to paragraph [78], occupying almost four pages, the learned Arbitrator dealt with the allegation of injury. She noted in paragraph [59] that each of the three incidents of left ankle pain suffered by the appellant met the temporal requirement in s 4 of the 1987 Act and occurred in the course of the appellant’s employment with the respondent, but also noted that more was needed to establish “injury” for the purposes of s 4(a). Specifically by reference to the decision of Roche DP in North Coast Area Health Service v Felstead [2011] NSWWCCPD 51 she held that the appellant needed to show a sudden identifiable pathological change in order to make out a case of injury.
She dealt with the incident of 9 April 2014 in paragraphs [61]-[65] of her reasons, holding that the contents of the appellant’s evidentiary statement and the “Hazard/Incident & Injury Report” did not enable her to infer anything more than that the appellant experienced pain in the left ankle and that the evidence of Drs Giblin and Loke did not materially assist. As to the respondent’s case, paragraph [63] of her reasons indicates an acceptance of Dr Miniter’s views which negate the allegation of injury and employment connection.
As to the incidents of 2 and 3 March 2015, the Arbitrator dealt with them in paragraphs [66]-[78] of her reasons. In paragraph [66] she noted a discrepancy between the history recorded by Dr Giblin and the content of Dr Loke’s medical certificates, and in particular in paragraphs [67] and [68] she held that upon proper analysis the report of Dr Giblin did not provide the necessary content so as to be of any assistance to the appellant, rather it was bare assertion or unexplained assertion amounting to ipse dixit.
The learned Arbitrator went on to note in paragraph [70] the absence of a report from the treating orthopaedic surgeon, Dr Riley. She drew an adverse inference, which can only have been on the critical question of causation. She went on to discuss the views of Dr Miniter and in paragraph [77], and for reasons set out in paragraphs [73]-[77], preferred his views to those of Dr Giblin.
In relation to the appellant’s case of frank injury or injury simpliciter to her left ankle, the Arbitrator returned to it in order to consider s 9A of the 1987 Act against the event that her decision outlined above was wrong: see paragraphs [91]-[102] of her reasons which are again comprehensive. It is sufficient to say that substantially for the same reasons as negated any inference of injury, the Arbitrator held that any concept of employment being “a substantial contributing factor” to the appellant’s left ankle problems was negated.
Finally in respect of the primary question of entitlement to compensation benefits, the learned Arbitrator dealt with the allegation of aggravation of a disease (s 4(b) of the 1987 Act) in paragraphs [79]-[90] of her reasons. The critical passage is [86]-[89] of her reasons, where, again on essentially the same grounds as she had held negated any room for a finding of injury or substantial contributing factor, she rejected this case.
For reasons which will shortly follow I do not think it is necessary to refer to the Arbitrator’s decision in relation to the computation of compensation i.e. that no weekly benefits would be available in any event.
SUBMISSIONS ON APPEAL
The appellant’s grounds of appeal were 13 in number, although the final four related to the computation of any weekly benefit that might have been recoverable. It is sufficient to set out the nine grounds which go to the primary question of any entitlement, as follows:
“2.8 Grounds of appeal
1.The Arbitrator erred in finding that the Appellant had not discharged the onus of proof in relation to injury within the meaning of Section 4(a) [of the 1987 Act].
2.The Arbitrator erred in preferring the report/s of Dr Miniter over that of
Dr Giblin.3.The Arbitrator erred in holding that the report of Dr Giblin had no probative value.
4.The Arbitrator misdirected herself in respect to the application of ‘common sense’ to issues of injury and causation.
5.The Arbitrator erred in drawing a Jones v Dunkel inference regarding the absence of a report from Dr Stuart Riley.
6.The Arbitrator should have found injury within the meaning of Section 4(a)
7.Further or in the alternative the Arbitrator should have f[o]und injury within the meaning of Section 4(b) [of the 1987 Act].
8.The Arbitrator erred in holding that the Appellant’s [sic] did not satisfy the requirements of 9A.
9.The Arbitrator should have found that the Appellant’s employment was the main if not the only contributing factor to her injury.
…”
In relation to paragraphs [1] and [7] of these grounds of appeal, detailed written submissions were advanced which put that the three incidents or episodes of left ankle pain and symptoms were frank incidents and “… clearly more than just events where the Appellant experienced pain. Rather she was engaged in a physically demanding task (moving geriatric patients) and experienced sharp pain on twisting and moving.” Reference was made to the absence of cross-examination and to the mention in the medical evidence of at least a pathological condition of synovitis and of a sprain injury.
Grounds 2 and 3 are referable to the view the Arbitrator took of the evidence of Dr Giblin. The appellant put in paragraph [41] of her submissions that whilst there was no doubt that Dr Giblin’s report displayed some confusion about dates, it was unfair to reject his opinion as not demonstrating any necessary reasoning or explanation. It was submitted that the history recorded by Dr Giblin was better as to the circumstances of the onset of ankle pain than the history recorded by Dr Miniter, and that it appeared that the Arbitrator had been unreasonably impressed by Dr Miniter’s qualifications and experience when the likelihood was that they were no better than Dr Giblin’s.
As to ground 4, it was submitted that there was “… a very obvious commonsense connection between the incidents and the sudden onset of pain at the time of the incidents to explain that some form of injury occurred.” It was then incumbent to consider the medical opinions and determine the nature of the injury that occurred and its contribution to the pathology evident in MRI.
Ground 5 of the grounds of appeal put that it was erroneous to draw an adverse Jones v Dunkel inference in light of the absence of a report from Dr Riley, the treating orthopaedic surgeon. It was submitted that Dr Riley should not be seen to be in the appellant’s “camp”, a reference to the undoubtedly correct proposition that it should appear that a witness is in the camp of the party who does not call the witness, or that in all the circumstances it is only to be expected that the party not calling the witness should call him or her, before an adverse inference can be drawn based on the failure to do so.
Ground 6 dealt with the Arbitrator’s rejection of the case under s 4(b) of the 1987 Act. I think the essence of this submission is to be found in paragraph [51] of the appellant’s written submissions and comes to the proposition that “… if the Arbitrator was prepared to accept that the condition which Dr Miniter agreed she suffered was a manifestation of pain due to a disease, it was incumbent to consider whether, armed with the correct history of the accidents and the role of work therein, on a proper analysis the disease was aggravated, accelerated or exacerbated by work.” It was put that that was clearly the position.
So far as grounds 8 and 9 are concerned, they challenged the Arbitrator’s decision that s 9A of the 1987 Act had not been satisfied. The submission put the proposition, a correct one, that a “substantial” factor is one which must be “real and of substance”, but not be the only, or even the most significant, factor. However, once that correct proposition was put (in paragraph [59] of the written submissions), with all respect, the subsequent written argument in paragraphs [60] and [61] do not demonstrate how the evidence satisfied the test.
So far as the respondent’s submissions on the appeal are concerned, I think it is fair to say that they support the Arbitrator’s decision according to its terms and specifically put that she was entitled to prefer and act upon the opinion of Dr Miniter rather than the medical evidence relied upon by the appellant.
In relation to grounds 1 and 7 of appeal, the respondent submitted that the Arbitrator did not in reality reject the appellant’s evidence but rather took the view that it did not make out the necessary factual ingredients of a case. This submission was elaborated by reference to the evidence at some length, but the ground covered in paragraphs [6]-[21] of the respondent’s submissions is to a large extent a restatement of the Arbitrator’s reasoning.
The same goes for the respondent’s response to grounds 2, 4 and 6.
Finally in relation to ground 5, the respondent in paragraphs [34] and [35] of its submission simply supported the legitimacy of the Jones v Dunkel inference drawn by the Arbitrator.
CONSIDERATION AND CONCLUSION
I have made some passing comments on features of the evidence, the Arbitrator’s reasons and the submissions of the parties which are relevant to my decision and what follows should be read in conjunction with them.
The three determinations on the primary question of the appellant’s entitlement to compensation and respondent’s liability to pay compensation made by Arbitrator Snell were all decisions of fact. Findings that a case of injury, a case of substantial contribution to injury from employment, and a case of aggravation of a disease process have not been made good are classical conclusions of fact. They are determinations, in effect, that as a matter of fact upon the evidence the party carrying the onus of proof has not discharged it.
In those circumstances the test that I direct myself must be applied in the resolution of this appeal is whether the critical decisions arrived at by the learned Arbitrator were open to her in the sense that they were fairly supported by the evidence or lack of evidence, and whether no contrary view so predominates upon a proper evaluation of the evidence or lack of evidence as to displace her conclusions: this I take to be the effect of the decision of Roche DP in Raulston v Toll Pty Limited [2011] NSWWCCPD 25; 10 DDCR 156 (Raulston) especially at [19]. There the Deputy President in my opinion correctly stated the law, applying, in the context of the Commission, High Court authority: Whiteley Muirand Zwanenberg Ltd v Kerr (1966) 39 ALJR 505 especially per Barwick CJ at 506. The High Court itself had subsequently (but prior to Raulston) affirmed that approach: see Zuvela v Cosmarnan Concrete Pty Limited [1996] HCA 30; 140 ALR 227; 71 ALJR 29.
I intend no disrespect to the appellant’s detailed and careful arguments upon this appeal when I say unhesitatingly that by application of the test just stated I believe the determinations made by the learned Arbitrator were well open to her. In so saying I acknowledge that the work of managing elderly dementia patients can and frequently does involve people in the position of the appellant taking strain on various parts of their body including their lower limbs and feet. That may involve strain on the ankles. So much can be observed by anyone who has attended a nursing home or retirement village, and there is no need to observe dementia patients to appreciate the possibility that such strain can be imposed upon a carer. Indeed so much can be observed in private dwellings. I also acknowledge that stepping from one type of surface onto another, such as from a firm floor to a mattress (see paragraphs [4(c)] and [16] above) might sometimes destabilise a person’s lower limbs, and that that might sometimes in turn throw particular strain on an ankle.
But it is not a matter of judicial knowledge that every incident of work such as was the daily lot of the appellant always throws strain upon the ankles which is apt to cause injury in the sense of a sudden identifiable pathological change. Direct or circumstantial evidence linking an onset of symptoms with an incident of the employment is plainly required to satisfy s 4(a) of the 1987 Act or, where a disease process is involved, s 4(b). As to the disease case advanced by the appellant, the Arbitrator was correct to draw attention to the 2012 amendments to the legislation requiring employment to be the main contributing factor to the aggravation of the disease (see paragraph [80] of her reasons). The appellant submitted that this requirement was satisfied, but it does not appear that any evidence achieving that result was identified and in my view there was none. The same can be said for the distinct requirement in s 9A in respect of the primary case on injury not involving disease.
In this case I think the evidence was correctly analysed by the Arbitrator and was vague, imprecise and failed to provide any basis for linking the employment and the appellant’s ankle problems in any relevant sense. The statement set out above at paragraph [16] is a stark demonstration of this. No more can be taken from it than that ankle pain came on whilst the appellant was at work, something which, as the Arbitrator noted, goes no further than satisfying the temporal or “in the course of” requirement of injury.
The histories and expressions of opinion in the medical evidence advanced by the appellant in her case before the Arbitrator cannot to my mind fairly be said to improve the position so as to discharge her onus. The Arbitrator was correct to say that the evidence of Dr Miniter was clearer and unequivocally negated the appellant’s case. The Arbitrator accepted that evidence. It was open to her to do so, and her decision to do so was properly fortified by the adverse inference she drew against the appellant’s case by reference to the absence of a report from Dr Riley. In this connection the appellant’s submission that Dr Riley, as the treating orthopaedic surgeon, was not in the appellant’s “camp”, so that such an inference was not available to the Arbitrator, was erroneous: Payne v Parker (1976) 1 NSWLR 191 at 202, citing O’Donnell v Reichard (1975) VR 916 at 921. In any event, it does not appear that the Jones v Dunkel inference was critical to the Arbitrator’s decision. (In saying this I do not ignore the body of authority post Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305; 52 NSWLR 705; 25 NSWCCR 218 (Makita) and which really begins with Sydneywide Distributors Pty Limited v Red Bull Australia Pty Limited [2002] FCAFC 207; 234 FCR 549 to the effect that Makita can be regarded as a counsel of perfection and that where medical evidence is concerned it is often the case that doctors, relying on experience and intuition as well as expertise – i.e. bringing to bear a degree of art as well as science – cannot elaborate much upon an ipse dixit. But in a case where Dr Giblin expressed himself in language which lacked clarity and no evidence was offered from a treating medical specialist, I do not think that the learned Arbitrator fell into error in preferring Dr Miniter.)
For these reasons the appeal should be dismissed and the determination of the Arbitrator confirmed. It follows that there is no need to consider the final question of the calculation of compensation benefits.
ORDER
The Arbitrator’s Certificate of Determination of 15 September 2016 is confirmed.
Larry King SC
Acting Deputy President
10 April 2017
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