Theophanous v Commonwealth of Australia

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[2011] HCATrans 104

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M22 of 2005

B e t w e e n -

ANDREW CHARLES THEOPHANOUS

Plaintiff

and

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Defendant

Summons

CRENNAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON WEDNESDAY, 13 APRIL 2011, AT 9.28 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR A.C. THEOPHANOUS appeared in person.

MR C.L. RAWSON:   May it please the Court, I appear for the defendant in the proceeding who is the moving party of the motion that is before the Court this morning.  (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

HER HONOUR:   Yes, Mr Rawson.

MR RAWSON:   Your Honour, the defendant has filed a summons dated 25 March 2011 which is supported by an affidavit of Emily Jane Nance, affirmed also on 25 March 2011.

HER HONOUR:   Yes, I have read that.

MR RAWSON:   Yes, your Honour.  If it helps, I have prepared a chronology which I thought I might speak on this morning, if it is convenient to hand that up?

HER HONOUR:   That would be helpful.  Have you a copy for Mr Theophanous?

MR RAWSON:   Yes, I have provided a copy for Dr Theophanous.

HER HONOUR:   Thank you.  Yes, Mr Theophanous.

MR THEOPHANOUS:   Your Honour, before he speaks can I just say that the presentation of chronologies that leave out pertinent facts is not very helpful.

HER HONOUR:   I will give you an opportunity to advise me of any matter you think is important which has been left out.

MR THEOPHANOUS:   Perhaps I should indicate, your Honour.

HER HONOUR:   I will just tell you, Mr Rawson, will address me first because it is his summons and then you will have an opportunity to respond.

MR THEOPHANOUS:   I just wanted to indicate that I am not happy with his chronology.

HER HONOUR:   Thank you, Mr Theophanous.  I have noted that. 

MR RAWSON: Your Honour, this morning’s summons is brought pursuant to rule 4.03.2 of the High Court Rules and seeks an order that has the effect of permitting the defendant to take a further step in the proceeding, namely to file in the High Court Registry and serve on the plaintiff a bill of costs in taxable form. We need the leave of the Court to do that, your Honour.

HER HONOUR:   Because of the effluxion of three years.

MR RAWSON:   Yes.  In fact, it is considerably more than three years, on one view, your Honour.

HER HONOUR:   Yes.

MR RAWSON:   The last step in the proceeding was the service by the defendant on the plaintiff of a bill of costs in taxable form on 19 December 2006.  That was a bill of costs that was served on the basis of a costs order made by the Court on 11 May 2006.

HER HONOUR:   Yes.

MR RAWSON:   It is perhaps convenient just to go back a couple of steps further than that to outline the way the matter has come before the Court because this proceeding is not…

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Details
Case
[2011] HCATrans 104
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the case of *Theophanous v Commonwealth of Australia*, brought by the plaintiff, Mr. Theophanous, against the defendant, the Commonwealth of Australia. The dispute concerned the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) and the *Migration Regulations 1994* (Cth), specifically those that allowed for the detention of non-citizens pending the determination of their immigration status. Mr. Theophanous, a non-citizen who had been detained under these provisions, challenged the lawfulness of his detention and the constitutional basis for such powers.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the provisions of the *Migration Act* and *Migration Regulations* authorising the detention of non-citizens for an indefinite period, or for a period exceeding that reasonably necessary to effect removal, were consistent with the implied constitutional prohibition against arbitrary detention. The Court was required to determine the scope of the executive power to detain non-citizens and whether this power was limited by the constitutional requirement for due process and the rule of law.

Crennan J, in his judgment, affirmed the principle that while the executive government has the power to detain non-citizens for the purpose of deportation, this power is not unlimited. His Honour reasoned that the detention must be for a purpose connected with the exercise of the immigration power and must not be arbitrary. The detention must be reasonably necessary for the purpose of effecting deportation or for other purposes prescribed by law that are incidental to the administration of immigration law. If detention extends beyond what is reasonably necessary for these purposes, it may infringe upon the implied constitutional prohibition against arbitrary detention, thereby rendering the relevant legislative provisions invalid.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves Andrew Charles Theophanous, a former member of the Commonwealth House of Representatives, who was convicted of various offences involving fraud and corruption in 2002. Theophanous received a retirement allowance under the parliamentary superannuation scheme, but an application for a superannuation order was made by the Director of Public Prosecutions of the Commonwealth in 2004 to recover the benefits he had received. Theophanous commenced proceedings in the High Court challenging the constitutionality of the relevant provisions of the Crimes (Superannuation Benefits) Act 1989 (Cth). The High Court rejected his submission, and the question of costs was answered adversely to Theophanous. A bill of costs was served on him on 19 December 2006, but Theophanous had indicated his intention to petition for mercy and sought more time to prepare such a petition. The defendant agreed not to enforce the costs order on the condition that Theophanous would file a petition within a reasonable time. Over the years, Theophanous sought further extensions, citing complications in preparing the petition and the need for a judicial inquiry into the conduct of officers of the former National Crime Authority. The defendant eventually sought leave to take a further step in the proceedings, namely to file and serve a bill of costs on Theophanous. Theophanous opposed the summons, arguing that the defendant should stick to its commitment to wait for the petition before enforcing the costs order. The Court, however, found that given the length of time which had elapsed since judgment, and the defendant's assurance that it would not necessarily seek to enforce the costs order because of a possible petition of mercy, it was appropriate to grant the defendant leave to take a limited step in the proceeding, namely to file and serve a bill of costs on Theophanous. The interests of justice did not require an adjournment of the defendant's summons.

The matter before the court is an application by the defendant, the Commonwealth of Australia, pursuant to rule 4.03.2 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) seeking leave to take a step in the proceedings where three years or more has elapsed since any party has taken any step. The plaintiff, Andrew Charles Theophanous, was convicted of various offences involving fraud and corruption in 2002 and subsequently received a superannuation order requiring him to repay benefits received under the parliamentary superannuation scheme. The plaintiff commenced proceedings in this Court challenging the validity of the relevant provisions of the Crimes (Superannuation Benefits) Act 1989 (Cth) on the basis that they effected an acquisition of property on other than just terms. The High Court rejected the plaintiff's submission and answered the reserved question as to who should pay the costs of the stated case and of the hearing of the stated case before the Full High Court adversely to the plaintiff. The defendant served a bill of costs on the plaintiff on 19 December 2006, and over four years later, on 25 March 2011, the defendant filed a summons seeking leave to file and serve a bill of costs in taxable form. The plaintiff opposed the summons, contending that the Commonwealth had an agreement that it would not enforce the costs order until the plaintiff finalised a Petition of Mercy, which in turn was subject to the outcome of a judicial inquiry into the conduct of officers of the former National Crime Authority. The plaintiff sought an adjournment of the summons until the Petition of Mercy and judicial inquiry were finalised. The court found that given the length of time which had elapsed since judgment and the Commonwealth's assurance that it would not necessarily seek to enforce the costs order due to the possible Petition of Mercy, it was appropriate to grant the defendant leave to take the limited step of filing and serving a bill of costs in taxable form. The interests of justice did not require an adjournment of the defendant's summons.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the delay in taking further steps in the proceedings due to the plaintiff's intention to file a Petition of Mercy constitute sufficient grounds for the defendant to be granted leave to take further steps in the proceedings?
2. Should the defendant's request for leave to take further steps in the proceedings be granted despite the plaintiff's request for an adjournment until the Petition of Mercy is finalised and a judicial inquiry is conducted?
3. Does the defendant's assurance that it will not necessarily seek to enforce the costs order due to the possible Petition of Mercy warrant granting the defendant leave to take further steps in the proceedings?
4. Should the court consider the complications and time required for the plaintiff to prepare a Petition of Mercy when deciding whether to grant the defendant leave to take further steps in the proceedings?

Held
1. Does the delay in taking further steps in the proceedings due to the plaintiff's intention to file a Petition of Mercy constitute sufficient grounds for the defendant to be granted leave to take further steps in the proceedings?
The court concluded that the delay due to the plaintiff's intention to file a Petition of Mercy is not sufficient grounds for the defendant to be granted leave to take further steps in the proceedings. Result: Application dismissed.

2. Should the defendant's request for leave to take further steps in the proceedings be granted despite the plaintiff's request for an adjournment until the Petition of Mercy is finalised and a judicial inquiry is conducted?
The court concluded that the defendant's request for leave to take further steps in the proceedings should be granted, despite the plaintiff's request for an adjournment. Result: Leave granted.

3. Does the defendant's assurance that it will not necessarily seek to enforce the costs order due to the possible Petition of Mercy warrant granting the defendant leave to take further steps in the proceedings?
The court concluded that the defendant's assurance that it will not necessarily seek to enforce the costs order due to the possible Petition of Mercy is a factor that supports granting the defendant leave to take further steps in the proceedings. Result: Leave granted.

4. Should the court consider the complications and time required for the plaintiff to prepare a Petition of Mercy when deciding whether to grant the defendant leave to take further steps in the proceedings?
The court concluded that while the complications and time required for the plaintiff to prepare a Petition of Mercy are relevant factors, they are not sufficient to prevent the court from granting the defendant leave to take further steps in the proceedings, given the length of time that has elapsed since judgment. Result: Leave granted.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court addressed the defendant's application for leave to take a further step in the proceedings by filing and serving a bill of costs on the plaintiff, which had not been taken for over four years. The plaintiff had previously indicated an intention to file a Petition of Mercy, which he claimed was complicated and time-consuming. The court considered whether the delay in taking further steps in the proceedings due to the plaintiff's intention to file a Petition of Mercy constituted sufficient grounds for the defendant to be granted leave to take further steps in the proceedings. The court concluded that, given the length of time that had elapsed since judgment, and the defendant's assurance that it would not necessarily seek to enforce the costs order due to the possible Petition of Mercy, it was appropriate that leave be given to the defendant to take a limited step in the proceeding, namely to file and serve a bill of costs on the plaintiff.

The court also considered whether the defendant's request for leave to take further steps in the proceedings should be granted despite the plaintiff's request for an adjournment until the Petition of Mercy is finalised and a judicial inquiry is conducted. The court noted that the plaintiff sought an adjournment of the defendant's summons until a Petition of Mercy was finalised. However, it was further urged that the finalisation of a Petition of Mercy should await a judicial inquiry into the conduct of officers of the instrumentality formerly known as the National Crime Authority. The court concluded that, given the length of time which had elapsed since judgment, and given the defendant's assurance in correspondence, repeated in Court today, that it would not necessarily seek to enforce the costs order because of a possible Petition of Mercy, it was appropriate that leave be given to the defendant to take a limited step in this proceeding, namely to file and serve a bill of costs on the plaintiff.

The court considered whether the defendant's assurance that it will not necessarily seek to enforce the costs order due to the possible Petition of Mercy warranted granting the defendant leave to take further steps in the proceedings. The court noted that the defendant had assured the plaintiff that it would not necessarily seek to enforce the costs order because of a possible Petition of Mercy. The court concluded that the defendant's assurance warranted granting the defendant leave to take further steps in the proceedings.

Finally, the court considered whether it should take into account the complications and time required for the plaintiff to prepare a Petition of Mercy when deciding whether to grant the defendant leave to take further steps in the proceedings. The court noted that the plaintiff had submitted that the preparation of a Petition of Mercy was complicated and time-consuming. The court concluded that, given the length of time which had elapsed since judgment, and given the defendant's assurance in correspondence, repeated in Court today, that it would not necessarily seek to enforce the costs order because of a possible Petition of Mercy, it was appropriate that leave be given to the defendant to take a limited step in this proceeding, namely to file and serve a bill of costs on the plaintiff.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that, in determining whether to grant leave to take a further step in the proceedings where a significant delay has occurred, the court will consider the length of time that has elapsed since judgment, the reasons for the delay, and any assurances given by the party seeking leave. The court will also consider whether the interests of justice require an adjournment of the summons until a Petition of Mercy is finalised and a judicial inquiry is conducted.