Theobald and Delancy
[2010] FMCAfam 1140
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| THEOBALD & DELANCY | [2010] FMCAfam 1140 |
| FAMILY LAW – Parenting – interim hearing – family consultant’s recommendations – change to existing orders pending final hearing. |
| Family Law Act 1975, ss.60CA, 60CC, 61DA, 65DAA |
| Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 Hall & Hall (1979) 5 Fam LR at 609; FLC 9-713 Makita (Australia) Pty Limited v Sprowles (2001) NSWCA 305 |
| Applicant: | MR THEOBALD |
| Respondent: | MS DELANCY |
| File Number: | SYC 4104 of 2009 |
| Judgment of: | Monahan FM |
| Hearing date: | 30 August 2010 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 30 August 2010 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 30 August 2010 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr MacPherson |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Meehans Solicitors |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | None |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Legal Aid Commission Of NSW |
| Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: | Ms Stolier |
| Solicitors for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: | Mark Whelan, Lawyer |
ORDERS
All extant interim applications are dismissed.
All current interim parenting orders remain in full force and effect.
Costs of the parties today be reserved.
AND THE COURT NOTES THAT:
(A)The matter remains listed for final hearing on 8 November 2010 at 10:00am for an estimated time of two (2) days.
(B)Pursuant to ss.65DA(2) and 62B of the Family Law Act 1975, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders are set out in Annexure A and those particulars are included in these orders.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Theobald & Delancy is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYC 4104 of 2009
| MR THEOBALD |
Applicant
And
| MS DELANCY |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an interim hearing of an application initially filed by MR THEOBALD (“the father”) on 13 July 2009 against MS DELANCY (“the mother”) seeking final parenting orders in relation to the child, [X] (“[X]”). More specifically, the father is seeking orders to the following effect:
·sole parental responsibility for [X];
·[X] live with the father; and
·[X] spend time with the mother, as agreed.
The father’s application is supported by various affidavits filed in these proceedings the most recent being his affidavit sworn and filed 9 July 2010. He also relies on the affidavit of his mother, Ms R (“the paternal grandmother”) also sworn and filed 9 July 2010. He is legally represented by Mr MacPherson of Counsel, today.
The mother, in her amended response, filed 16 July 2010, opposes the orders sought by the father and seeks parenting orders to the opposite effect as that sought by the father:
·sole parental responsibility [X];
·[X] live with her; and
·[X] spend two weekly periods with the father for two hours duration at agreed times.
The mother relies on her various affidavits filed in these proceedings: most recently, her affidavit sworn 15 July 2010 and filed 16 July 2010. She is legally represented by her solicitor, Ms Field, today.
Pursuant to orders made by Altobelli FM, on 3 December 2009, an Independent Children’s Lawyer (“the ICL”) was appointed to represent the interests of [X] in the name of Ms Rowley. Ms Rowley withdrew from these proceedings on 23 July 2010 and Mr McGraw now appears as the ICL. [X] is legally represented by Ms Stolier of counsel, today.
Background
The parties entered a relationship around the end of 2006 and separated in April 2009 when [X] was about 19 months old. [X] will turn three in less than two weeks’ time. Neither party has re-partnered, it would appear, since separation. The father suffered an acquired brain injury from a car accident when he was just eight years old. He lives in his home in [omitted] and his mother, the paternal grandmother, and his sister, the paternal aunt, live nearby. The mother lives in a granny flat on a property at [omitted], but has plans to move to [omitted] in the very near future.
The father commenced these proceedings in [omitted] Local Court, following the parties’ separation on 5 May 2009. The parties subsequently entered into consent orders, which included an order that transferred these proceedings to this Court. Those orders also provided for the child to live on a “three-day-on, three-day-off basis” with each parent. In other words, an equal-time arrangement. There were also orders for the child to spend time with either parent on certain other defined special days.
The matter came before Altobelli FM on 17 August 2009. On that occasion, his Honour made orders including that the parties attend a child dispute conference and that the existing parenting orders continue. The matter returned before his Honour on 13 October 2009 and, on that occasion, his Honour made an order by consent for a DNA test, to determine paternity as the mother had alleged that the father may be someone other than Mr Theobald.
The matter returned before his Honour on 3 December 2009 and on that occasion his Honour discharged paragraph 2(c) of the existing parenting orders. That order stated:
“That the child [X] born [in] 2007 (“[X]”) live with both the mother and the father on the following basis:”
(c)On a non changeover day [X] will spend time with each parent who he is not living with for two hours from 1.30 pm until 3.30 pm or such other time as agreed at [park omitted] or such other location as agreed.”
All other existing orders were kept in place.
When the matter returned before his Honour on 3 February 2010 an order was made for the preparation of a family report and further orders by consent were also made which discharged paragraphs 1 and 2 of the orders made in May 2009. In lieu the new orders, which remain the current orders, provide as follows:
“1. That the child [X] born [in] 2007 live with the Father in each week from 12 noon Wednesday to 5pm Saturday and otherwise the child live with the mother.
2.That the Court notes that the Father and the Mother have agreed for the child to commence preschool at [L] or such other preschool as they may agree on Monday and Thursday each week.
3.That both the Father and the Mother shall use their best endeavours to ensure the child’s prompt and continuing attendance at such preschool as they may agree the child shall attend.
4.That changeover arrangements in relation to the child as agreed by the Father and the Mother and in default of agreement [omitted].”
In other words, what the parties agreed to was that [X] live with the mother, four days each week and the father, three days each week. It would also appear that [X] has been attending his day care centre, [L], every Monday and Thursday.
On 4 March 2010, Sexton FM made various orders including listing the matter for final hearing before me on 8 November 2010.
The Family Report dated 31 May 2010 was subsequently prepared by Ms M, family consultant, and released to the parties the following day. Given Ms M’s recommendations that changes were needed to the interim parenting arrangements, I made an order in Chambers on
2 June 2010 listing the matter before me on 11 June 2010 for mention.
At that time, I made the following notation of the orders:
“a)The family report of Ms M, dated 31 May 2010 and released 1 June 2010 has recommended changes to the interim parenting orders.
b) The purpose of the mention hearing is to consider whether the current interim parenting orders should remain in full force and effect and whether the matter should remain listed for final hearing on 8 and 9 November 2010.”
On 11 June 2010 I determined that the matter should remain listed for final hearing and that there should be an interim hearing on 23 July 2010 to consider the issues raised by Ms M. Unfortunately, when the matter came before me on 23 July 2010, the ICL was required to withdraw because of a possible conflict of interest. Consequently, I listed the matter for both a mention hearing on 28 August 2010 and an interim hearing today. At the mention hearing I determined that the matter remained fixed for final hearing and that the interim hearing today should proceed. The interim hearing did proceed before me today.
Issues
The dispute today focuses solely on whether the strong recommendations of Ms M should be implemented immediately, as the mother seeks, or considered at the final hearing, as the father seeks. The ICL supports some significant modification to the current orders but not to the same extent as sought by the mother.
What the mother proposes is that, until the matter can be finally determined in early November 2010, the current orders be changed to reflect the following outcome:
·sole parental responsibility to the mother;
·[X] live with the mother; and
·[X] spend two two-to-three-hour periods per week with the father.
As stated, the ICL supports some changes to the current orders but only with respect to the time spent by [X] with his father. In other words, the ICL supports the retention of the equal shared parental responsibility, as agreed between the parties in 2009 and earlier in 2010 that [X] live with the mother and spend two days per week with the father. The ICL also proposes that this would be from 12noon to 5:00pm each Wednesday and from 12noon to 5:00pm each Friday or Saturday.
The father seeks that the current interim orders remain in full force and effect.
The Family Report
Ms M conducted her interviews on 21 May 2010, that is more than three months ago. She provides details of her interviews with the father and the mother in paragraphs 13 through 31, inclusive. Her observations of [X] are contained in paragraphs 32 to 34. Her evaluation is contained in paragraphs 35 to 43.
At paragraph 35, Ms M states:
“35. It is clear that [X] is a child with serious attachment difficulties. His primary attachment appears to be his mum. But this attachment also appears somewhat insecure. His attachment to his father does not appear strong enough to assist him to feel secure when he is distressed. It is very likely that his attachment difficulties have been brought about, to a large degree, by the care arrangements he has experienced since his parents’ separation. The arrangements, whereby he was moved between his parents’ homes on a three-day, and then three and four day, rotating basis are inappropriate for a child of his age and likely to lead to major difficulties, as appears to be the case in this matter. Such an arrangement is not likely to be in the child’s best interests, even if the parents have both been very involved in the child’s care, prior to the separation, and the parents have a very positive and cooperative co-parenting relationship, particularly if a child is of the age that [X] was – that is about 18 months old – when this arrangement was agreed upon. The most important aspect of a child’s development, between the ages of about 18 months to three years, is for them to develop a close and secure attachment. A secure attachment to one or, perhaps, more adults provides the basis on which children can develop a whole range of other important aspects of their emotional and psychological and social development.”
At paragraph 40 Ms M states:
“40. Ms Delancy relates very appropriately to [X] and she seems very attuned and sensitive to his needs. Although it is clear that his attachment is to his mother, this attachment seems to have been disrupted by [X]’s care arrangements and now appears to be somewhat insecure. Arrangements need to be put in place, as soon as possible, to enable [X]’s relationship with his mother to become more secure. It would be in his interests to spend virtually all his time with her and spend time with his father twice a week, during the day, for about two to three hours at a time. Such a regime should continue for at least six months, if not longer, and hopefully this will allow [X] to be more secure in his attachment to his mother.”
At paragraph 41 she states:
“41. I’m not in a position to recommend that [X] spend any more time with his father than this without having access to information about the impact of his brain injury on his parenting ability. An assessment by a neuropsychologist of Mr Theobald’s liabilities and the effect of his brain injury on this, should be conducted in order to provide the Court with information that might assist in determining what long term care arrangements should be made for [X].”
At paragraph 42 she states:
“42. I understand that this matter is listed for a final hearing, in November of this year. It would not be in [X]’s interest if the current arrangements were to continue as his attachment difficulties are likely to be further exacerbated if he continues to move between his parents’ homes, as he does currently.”
At paragraph 43 she states:
“43. It is difficult to recommend that the parents should continue to share equal joint parental responsibility for [X] without having access to the information about the impact of
Mr Theobald’s acquired brain injury on his parenting capacity, especially in relation to his ability to make major decisions affecting [X]’s long term future.”
Finally, Ms M provides her recommendations in paragraphs 44 to 47:
“44. It is recommended that [X] live with the mother.
45.It is recommended that [X] spend time with his father, twice a week, for periods of two to three hours, for a period of six months.
46.It is recommended that interim orders be made according to the two preceding recommendations, as soon as possible.
47.It is recommended that a neuropsychologist with expertise in acquired brain injury and parenting issues conduct an assessment of Mr Theobald’s parenting capacity prior to any final orders being made.”
Agreed and disagreed facts
The parties agree, or are not in significant disagreement, in relation to the following:
·they had a relationship from around November 2006 until their relationship broke down and they separated in early 2009;
·there is one child of their relationship, [X], who, as I have indicated will be three in just over two weeks’ time;
·that [X] has lived with both parents, in a shared parenting arrangement, in accordance with interim orders, since shortly after separation, when he was just 18 months old;
·the father has an acquired brain injury; and
·the matter should proceed to a final hearing in November, perhaps with some reservations from the ICL.
The parties also indicated that they were in disagreement over the following matters:
·the father’s brain injury on his capacity to parent;
·the effect of the current shared parenting arrangement on [X];
·whether either party presents as a risk to [X]; and
·whether the interim orders should be changed, with immediate affect.
The parties’ submissions
Ms Field provided the Court with a comprehensive written outline of case. She submitted that her client fully supported the recommendations of Ms M which, as stated, call for radical changes to the current parenting orders. She referred the Court to various passages of her client’s most recent affidavit and Ms M’s report in support of her client’s request for changes to the existing spend-time regime. Ms Field also confirmed that her client would be moving, shortly, to a location that will be approximately 45 minutes, by car, from the father’s residence.
Ms Stolier, for the ICL, submitted that the ICL had formed the view, based on Ms M’s report, that there was a live issue in relation to [X]’s attachment that required some significant changes in the present parenting arrangements. However, the ICL did not support the mother’s request for sole parental responsibility. Moreover, the ICL had formed the preliminary view that two five hour periods per week would be appropriate, in the all the circumstances, in relation to [X]’s spend-time with his father.
Ms MacPherson, for the father, submitted that the current orders should remain in full force and effect, pending the final hearing in November 2010. He described the mother’s request for changes to the current orders as “extraordinary in light of previous consent orders she had agreed to.”
Mr MacPherson, asked the Court to be cautious in approaching Ms M’s report, given the prevailing circumstances and that this is merely an interim hearing of the matter. He also asked the Court to be mindful of the comments of Heydon JA, as he then was, in the case of Makita (Australia) Pty Limited v Sprowles (2001) NSWCA 305, in relation to the admissibility and use of “expert” opinion evidence and the facts upon which that opinion is based.
Indeed, Mr MacPherson described some comments by Ms M as, in his words, “speculative” or “based upon insubstantial views, particularly of the mother”. Mr MacPherson also asked the Court to accept that the conclusions drawn by Ms M in paragraphs 35, 36, 42 and 43 were problematic and inappropriate, given that Ms M did not have all the evidence before her. Indeed, Mr MacPherson questioned the reliability of the mother’s evidence, for example, by referring the Court to paragraph 43 of her affidavit, filed 16 July, 2010, when compared with the information contained in exhibit “AF2”.
Mr MacPherson also asked the Court to accept that Ms M did not have the benefit of the subpoenaed material from the New South Wales Police, which raises some issues against the mother; and from [X]’s day care centre. More importantly, Ms M did not have the benefit of Dr G’s reports, dated 13 May 2009 and 25 June 2010.
Dr G’ reports
It is quite clear from Dr G’s most recent report that he sees no problems in the father’s continued care of [X]. Indeed, Dr G states at the bottom of page 1 of his report, dated 25 June 2010:
“I felt that Mr Theobald’s (i.e., the father’s) mood had improved and according to the information available, there have been no anger issues. While clearly, Mr Theobald sustained a significant frontal head injury, given the time since the injury and that fact that his epilepsy is under good control and possibly a mood stabilising effect of the lomotil, I felt that Mr Theobald, from the available evidence, would be able to care for his son. He strikes me as being diligent in his attention and concern for his son. I felt that logistically, he was able to care for his son and while there had been some mood issues in the past, I feel these, as stated, with the passage of time have subsided. Mr Theobald has dealt, over the last two years, with a number of extremely stressful issues and situations and has managed these appropriately, without any anger or emotional issues, such that, overall, I now consider him capable of parenting.”
Day care centre report
In respect of [X]’s day care centre report (exhibit “AF3”), I note that this report is dated 21 May 2010, which was the very day that Ms M interviewed the parties. Having read that report, it does not appear to give arise to any particular concerns. Indeed, it appears that [X] is developing well. The comments under the heading “Social” state:
“[X] has developed bonds with peers in the [omitted] room. [X], both physically and verbally interacts with peers and carers. Also verbally participates in group activities, as well as actions.”
Under the heading “Language”:
“[X] enjoys participating in all group activities, sometimes needing a little encouragement when involved in large group experiences.”
Under the heading “Gross Motor”:
“[X] is very independent when participating in outdoor gross motor activities, utilising all obstacles (something) in indoor/outdoor play, with ease.”
Under the heading “Fine Motor”:
“[X] is still developing his scissor and pencil grip skills. This year we’ll continue to focus on developing these skills.”
Under the heading “Intellectual and Cognitive”:
“[X] enjoys participating in group activities. When interested in certain topics, will, as (sic) lots of questions [X] has developed his colour and counting skills throughout group time.”
Under the heading “Emotional Self-help”:
“[X] has developed well in most areas of self-help. We will continue to focus on the areas he is still developing in.”
Under the heading “Additional Comments”:
“[X] has settled in very well, in the [omitted] room, this year. Responding well to changes in routine. [X] is developing very well, socially, forming bonds with peers and carers. This year, we will continue to focus on the areas [X] is still developing on.”
Law and discussion
The Full Court of the Family Court decision of Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 (“Goode”), guides the Court’s approach in making interim decisions and interim orders, in relation to parenting disputes. Paragraph 81 of that decision, the Full Court noted:
“In making interim decisions, the Court will still often be faced with conflicting facts, little helpful evidence and disputes between parents as to what constitutes the best interests of the child.”
Clearly, this matter is such a case. More specifically, this raises the reality that the Court cannot fully determine issues of credit today as the evidence being presented by the parties, to the Court, has not been tested by cross-examination. That having been said, also at paragraph 81 of the Goode decision the Full Court went on to say:
“However, the legislative pathway must be followed.”
In other words, the relevant provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”) post the 2006 shared parenting amendments must be followed at an interim hearing.
There is considerable disagreement, it would appear, between the parties in this case and, no doubt, the history of the matter will be the subject of evidence in cross-examination for final hearing.
In theory, there is an issue of equal shared parental responsibility to determine today if the Court accepts the mother’s proposal. At this point, let me state that s.61DA of the Act incorporates a presumption that the Court is required to consider, when making a parenting order. That is, the Court must apply presumption that is in the best interests of the child concerned for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility. Section 61DA(2), makes it clear the relevant presumption does not apply, if there are reasonable grounds to believe there’s been abuse of the child, or family violence. Moreover, s.61DA(3) states that:
“Where a Court is making an interim order, the presumption applies, unless the Court considers that it would not be appropriate in the circumstances for the presumption to be applied when making the order.”
In addition, under s.61DA(4) of the Act, the presumption may be rebutted if its application could be contrary to the child’s best interests, those interests being determined by reference to the matters in s.60CC of the Act, in light of the evidence. I will canvass the s.60CC matters in a moment.
If the presumption applies, then the Court is required, under s.65DAA of the Act to consider whether [X]’s best interests would be served by making an order that he spend equal time or, alternatively, substantial and significant time with each of the parties.
Either outcome requires the Court to consider whether the making of a child spending equal time, or substantial and significant time in lieu, with each of the parents would be in the best interests of that child and reasonably practicable, given the circumstances.
Turning to the Goode decision, the Full Court, at paragraph 82, sets out the approach this Court must take in determining interim cases. Clearly, the Court is required to identify the competing proposals; identify the issues in dispute; identify the agreed, or uncontested, relevant facts. These have already been noted in this decision.
At this point, let me note, s.60CA of the Act provides:
“In deciding whether to make a particular parenting order, in relation to a child, a Court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.”
As stated, to determine [X]’s best interest, the Court must consider the primary considerations of factors set out in s.60CC(2) of the Act and the additional considerations in s.60CC(3) are relevant.
Primary considerations: s.60CC(2)
Under s.60CC(2)(a), the Court is required to consider the benefit to [X] of having a meaningful relationship with both of [X]’s parents.
At this point, let me note that meaningful does not mean equal but it clearly signifies that both parties should be involved with their child and clearly signifies an expectation of time to be spent. The right of a child to spend time with each parent, and extended family, is clearly the right of the child. If the Court adopts the mother’s proposal, or even the modified proposal of the ICL, there is a question mark hanging over whether [X]’s time with his father would be meaningful.
Secondly, the Court is required, under s.60CC(2)(b) to consider the need to protect [X] from physical or psychological harm and being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect, or family violence.
There is no doubt, in the Court’s view, that it would be in [X]’s best interests to develop a meaningful relationship not just with the mother but with the father. That needs to be balanced, however, in respect of protecting a child, such as [X], from any psychological harm and the like. Clearly, that is a concern raised by Ms M, in relation to the attachment issue.
Additional considerations: s.60CC(3)
With respect to s.60CC(3)(a), I’d firstly note that the views of [X], while significant, will be a little difficult to determine, in this case, given his very young years. Nevertheless, this will be something the family consultant will no doubt be able to assist the Court on, perhaps with the assistance of the ICL.
As to the nature of the relationship between [X] and each of his parents, again, we have different stories here and the parties’ evidence needs to be tested.
As to the willingness and ability of each of [X]’s parents to encourage a close and continuing relationship between him and the other parent, that is a crucial factor here. Each party says the other is not acting in a way that would encourage a closer relationship between [X] and the other parent.
As to the extent to which each of [X]’s parents has fulfilled, or failed to fulfil, their responsibility as a parent, again, we have different stories here. These stories also need to be tested.
Also, the Court is required to consider the likely effect of any change in [X]’s circumstances. If the Court accepts the mother’s proposal, or the ICLs proposal, that will result in significant change to [X], just eight weeks from the final hearing.
As to any other fact or circumstance, the family report of Ms M has been a catalyst for today’s hearing. It is clear that Ms M’s strong recommendations have prompted the amended response of the mother and the changed views of the ICL, albeit with a new ICL in this matter.
At this point, let me note the Full Court decision of Hall& Hall (1979) 5 Fam LR at 609; FLC 9-713. In that case, their Honours provided an authority of statement as to how reports, such as the one written by
Ms M, should be treated in final hearings. The Court made comments as follows at page 614-615:
“In view of the comments in this case as to the weight to be given to a Family Report, we feel it may be helpful to make certain observations which we stress are of a general nature.
(a) There is no magic in a Family Report. A Judge is not bound to accept it and there should never be any suggestion that the counsellor is usurping the role of the court or that the Judge is abdicating his responsibilities: In the Marriage of Wood (1976) 11 ALR 657; (1976) 27 FLR 1; (1976) 2 Fam LR 11,182; (1976) FLC 90-098; In the Marriage of Harris (1977) 29 FLR 285; (1977) Fam LN No 33; (1977) FLC 90-276.
(b) Family Reports are meant to be, and almost invariably are, valuable and relevant material to assist a Judge in forming his ultimate conclusions. When those views coincide with the judgment of the court, it is not because they have been accepted automatically but because the Judge has found them consistent with the rest of the body of evidence before him.
(c) While the counsellor's views will normally have weight with the court because of his expertise and experience, the counsellor does not usually have the same opportunity as the trial Judge to weigh the evidence, observe the demeanour of the witnesses in court under examination and cross-examination, and make findings of fact based on evidence before the court which might not have been available to the counsellor.
(d) Hence, the counsellor's assessment of the parties may often be based upon facts which the counsellor has accepted but which turn out to be wrong; or favourable or unfavourable views formed by the counsellor from interviewing the parties without the opportunity to test in depth the credit of persons who may in court, and under cross-examination, or in the face of evidence of other witnesses, prove to be of a different character from that which the counsellor has accepted.
(e) Sometimes the Family Report will necessarily be neutral. While the court will be assisted by a positive view, there will be many cases where the counsellor, quite properly, will conclude that the child's welfare will be equally well served, or, regrettably in some cases, equally ill served by either party.
(f) Whether the report contains a positive recommendation, or whether it be neutral; whether the report is accepted by the Judge or whether it is not; the report will still serve the court well and assist the court's investigation. A counsellor, therefore, need not be disturbed if a recommendation is not accepted because the court has had the advantage of much more material and much more examination in depth than was available to the counsellor.
(g)It follows that in some cases it may be desirable to question counsellors about the bases of their recommendations. Indeed, there will clearly be some cases where a practitioner would be failing in his duty to his client if he did not seek to test the recommendations of the counsellor in the light of instructions given to that practitioner. To cross-examine a counsellor is to do no more than to test an expert witness in the same way as any other expert witness may be tested or challenged. Naturally, the decision to cross-examine carries with it the usual hazards involved in cross-examining any witness but more particularly an expert.”
(h) Where there is proper reason for cross-examination, the court will be assisted and, we have no doubt, so will the counsellors. No expert should cavil at any questioning of his role or the foundations of his opinions. We consider that it is always a valuable opportunity for the counsellor himself to examine and test his own methods under critical investigation …
(i) Finally, and most importantly, and as a matter of public policy, no party should leave the court with a belief that justice has not been done because an opportunity to test part of the evidence has been denied …”
Conclusion
Having considered the submissions in light of the available evidence, including the reports of Ms M and Dr G, and in light of the structured discretion in the Act, I am not satisfied there needs to be any changes to the current orders pending final hearing, in just over two months time. That hearing will provide the opportunity to test the views of Ms M and presumably Dr G as well as the evidence of the parties.
This matter remains fixed for final hearing on 8 November 2010.
The right to settle the reasons for this interim decision is reserved.
I certify that the preceding sixty-six (66) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Monahan FM
Date: 20 October 2010
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