The Western Australian Coastal Shipping Commission and Stevedoring Employers of Australia Ltd v Wallner, Alphonse

Case

[1979] FCA 100

4 Oct 1979

No judgment structure available for this case.

Workmen's

compensation - Discont inuance o f weekly

payments - Application t o T r i b m a l - Disputed

c l a i m - Liability t o make l n t e r i m payments o f

conpensa t jon - Evldence o f accep tance o f

liability.

S t a t u t o r y interpretation

-

Relevance o f

legislative

h i s t o r y -

Pena l p r o v i s i o n

-

Crea t ion

o f

c i v i l r l g h t -

Eeaning o f "due under t h i s Ordinance" - Workmen's

Compensation Ordinance

( N . T .) .

The

Western

A u s t r a l i a n

C o a s t a l

Sh lpp lng Comqisslon

and

S tevedor ing Employers

of

A u s t r a l i a

L l m i ~ e d

v.

A l p h ~ x ~ s c

-----p

Wallnex.

--

No. 3 o f 1979.

C o r a l : Brelman,Gailop

and Lockharr JJ.

Date :

4 October 1979.

Canberra.

I:.! TKE I 'EDZklL CO3RT OF A[:S?Ii.+LIA

I

1

NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY )

No.

of 1979

)

GENE=

DIVISION

)

ON AF'PEAL FRO24 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NOXTHERM TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN : THE WESTERN AUSTRALIAN

COASTAL SHIPPING COFhiISSION

AND STEVEDORING EMPLOYERS

OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED

A p p e l l a n t s

( P l a i n t i f f S)

AND

: ALPHONSE VTALLNER

R e s p o n d e n t

( 3 e f e n d a n t )

O R D E R

JUDGES MAKING ORDER

:

B r e n n a n ,

G a l l o p and L o c k h a r t JJ.

DATE OF ORDER

:

4

O c c o b e r 1 9 7 9 .

WHERE MADE

:

C a n b e r r a .

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.

T h e appeal be

d i s m i s s e d .

2 .

T h e appel lants pay

the respondent ' s

costs of

t h e appeal.

I N THE I?CDZT)AL COURT OF -4iiSTELUI.i

) 1

NORTHEBI TERRITORY DISTRICT -REGISTRY)

No.

3 of

1 9 7 9

GENERAL DIVISION

1

BETWEEN : THE WESTERN AUSTRALIAN

COAST&

SHIPPING COW.lISSION

AND STEVEDORING EElPLOYERS

OF AUSTRPPLIA LIL.IITED

A p p e l l a n t s

(Plaintiffs)

AND : ALPHONSE WALLNER

R e s p o n d e n t

( D e f e n d a n t )

COWiA,1

: B r e n n a n ,

G a l l o p and

L o c l ; h a r t

JJ.

4 O c t o b e r 1 9 7 9

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BRENNAN J:

T h e

appel lants

(whom

I

s h a l l c a l l

t i n e

e i n p l o y e r s )

w e r e t h e respondent parties t o a claim made by the

respondent

(whom

I

s h a l l c a l l t h e w o r k m a n )

for

c o m p e n s a t i o n

under t he Wor?mzn1s

C o m p e n s a t i o n

O r d i n a n c e ( N . T. ) .

T h e claim

w a s c o m m e n c e d on

11

O c t o b e r

1 9 7 8 by

f i l i n g a n

a p p l i c a t i o n

w i t h t h e R e g i s t r a r of

t h e Workmen's

C o m p e n s a t i o n T r i b u n a l

i n accordance w i t h t he T r i b u n a l ' s

R u l e s .

T h e S t a t e m e n t of

C l a ~ m

a l l e g e d l n t e r

a l l a c h a t

a t a l l m a t e r i a l

t i m e s

t h e workman w a s employed by

t h e employers a s a wharf

l aboure r ,

and

t h a t h e

s u s t a i n e d personal

i n j u r y

by

acc iden t w h i l s t

i n t h e course of

h i s employment on

2 8

March 1974.

The employers' Answer t o t h e Statement o f

Claim

put

t h e s e

a l l e g a t i o n s

i n

i s sue .

I n November

1978, t h e workman took o u t an

i n t e r l o c u t o r y

summons

c a l l i n g upon

t h e Western

Aus t ra l i an

!

I I

Coastal Shlpping Commission

t o appear be fo re t h e Tribunal

o r a member

i n chambers

on

an a p p l i c a t i o n which

t h e

workman intended t o make.

Whether t h i s procedure, which

accorded with Rule 25 of

t h e Tr ibuna l ' s

Rules, w a s t h e

appropr ia t e way

t o invoke

t h e T r i b u n a l ' s

j u r i s d i c t i o n

is

by

no means

c l e a r , b u t t h e p a r t i e s concurred i n it.

The

r e s u l t a n t o rde r was

descr ibed

and

accepted

a s having

I

been made by t h e ~ r i b u n a l . Although t h e summons was

!

d i r e c t e d t o b u t one of

the employers, both appeared by

I

!

counsel and t h e o rde r w a s made

a g a i n s t both.

Counsel f o r

t h e einployers

disavows

any o b j e c t i o n t o t h e proceedings

i n

I

r e s p e c t of

t h e -joinder

of p a r t i e s .

The workman

sought an

I

o rde r t h a t t h e f i r s t employer

"pay weekly

payments of

compensation

t o t h e a p p l i c a n t worker

a t t h e r a t e s

se t o u t

i n t h e Workmen's Compensation Ordinance 1949 as amended

from t h e d a t e when it discont inued weekly payments 1 5 t h

September

1978 u n t i l t h e d a t e of

t h e hear ing of

t h i s mat ter"

and

an

o rde r

f o r c o s t s of

h i s app l i ca t ion .

I n support

oT

h l s a p p l ~ c a t i o n ,

he E ~ l e d

an

a f f i d a v i t and

deposed:

"2.

I received weekly payments under t h e

Workmen's Compensation Ordinance from

t h e f i r s t respondent

from t h e 28th day

of March,

1974 u n t i l t h e 1 5 ~ h

day of

September,

197 8.

3 . The f i r s t respondent discontinued t h e

s a i d weekly payments

on o r about t h e

15 th day of

September, 1978 and t o t h e

b e s t of my

knowledge, information and

b e l i e f

such discontinuance was

no t i n

accordance wi th Ehe

s a i d Ordnance ,

an

A c t o r determinat ion of

t h e Tribunal."

The t e r m s of

t h i s a f f i d a v i t r e f l e c t t he terms

of

s.7A

of t h e Ordinance, upon which t h e workman based h i s

app l ica t ion .

That

s e c t i o n v7as

t h e foundation

f o r t h e

submissions made on h ~ s

behalf

before t he Tribunal ,

on

.

,

appeal before t h e Supreme Courc of t h e Northern Territory,

and before t h i s Court.

The

sec t ion reads:

"

7A.

(1) An

employer s h a l l n o t , except i n

accordance wi th t h i s Ordmance,

an A c t o r

determinat ion

of

t h e Tribunal ,

d i s c o n ~ i n u e ,

withhold o r diminish a weekly o r o the r payment

due under c h i s Ordinance t o a person.

Penalty:

100 d o l l a r s .

(2) The onus of proving t h a t a weekly

o r o t h e r payment was

discontinued,

withheld o r

diminished i n accordance with t h i s Ordinance, an

A c t o r a determination

of

t h e Tribunal s h a l l be

I ,

on

t h e

employer.

On 17 November 1978 t he Tribunal, accepting

t h e substance of t h e workman's submissions, made "an

in te r im award of

compensation i n favour of t h e appl icant"

and it ordered:

"1. t h a t t h e respondents pay weekly payinents of

compensation pursuant t o t h e provis ions of

t h e Workmen's

Compensation Ordinance

1 9 4 9

( a s amended)

t o t h e app l ican t I?LPHONSE WALLNER

from t h e 15th day September

1978 t o t h e d a t e

of

t h i s i n t e r im award

and

t h e r e a f t e r

from week

t o seek

u n t i l

f u r t h e r

o rder ;

2.

t h a t payment of

a r r e a r s be made wi th in 7 days

of today; "

Despite t h e delphic t e r m s i n which

t he order was made,

t he

employers

s u f f i c i e n t l y

understood

t h e order

t o

requ i re them

t o make

c e r t a i n payments

t o t h e workman

t h e r e a f t e r ,

and rhey

d id so.

They appealed

aga in s t t h e

order t o t h e Supreme

Court of

t h e Eorthern Ter r i to ry

where

Fors te r

C . J .

d i s m ~ s s e d

t h e appeal wi th

c o s t s ,

and

they now

appeal t o t h i s Court aga in s t h i s Honour's

order .

A f t e r

t h e appeal t o t h i s Court was

i n s t l t u t e d ,

bu t before it was heard,

t h e workman's

claim f o r

compensation was heard and determined by t h e Tribunal .

It i s coinmon

ground t h a t t h e Tribunal made a determinat ion

i n favour of the workman, awarding him compensation bo'c!~

r e t ro spec t i ve

and

f o r t h e f u t u r e ,

covering

t h e per iod

r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e order of

17 November

1978

( " the

November

o r d e r " ) , and awarding compensation i n an amount

g r e a t e r than t h e amount pa id t o him by

t h e einployers

consequent upon t h e making of

t h e Noveinber order .

An

appeal aga ln s t t h e award

has been

i n s t l t u t e d and

is

pending.

Apart from t h e o rders f o r c o s t s made

aga in s t

t h e employers

(which they seek t o have set a s ide i n t h i s

appea l ) , t h e e f f e c t of

t h e November

order may,

on one

view,

be merged

i n t h e Tr ibuna l ' s l a t e r award.

So long

a s t h a t award

s t ands ,

t h e r e so lu t i on of

t h i s appeal

cannot

a f f e c t t h e workman's

en t i t l ement t o r e t a i n

t h e

moneys paid t o him consequent upon t h e November o rder ,

bu t i f t h a t award

should be

set a s ide ,

a ques t ion might

a r i s e a s t o whether

t h e November

order

a f f e c t s t h e

workman's

en t i t l ement t o r e t a i n those moneys.

I t would

n o t be appropr ia te t o determine a t t h i s s t a g e an

appeal

aga in s t t h e November

o rder i f t h e determinat ion of

t h e

appeal would

no t

a f f e c t t h e r i g h t s

and

l i a b i l i t i e s of

t h e p a r t i e s

(see Sun L i f e Assurance Co.

of

Canada v.

J e r v i s

119441

A . C . l l l )

b u t t h e determinat ion of

t h i s

appeal w i l l determine t h e en t i t l ement of

t h e workman

t o

t h e cos t s ordered t o be paid t o him and t h a t i s s u f f i c i e ~ r

t o warrant

t h e hear ing

and

de~e rmlna t i on

of

t h e appeal.

Sect lon 7A i s a penal provision.

The employer

i s prohibited,

under pena l ty ,

from engaging i n t h e conduct

which sub-section

(1) specifies.

I t does no t i n t e r m s

c r e a t e a

c i v i l l i a b i l i t y enforceable

f o r t h e beneEit

and

a t t h e s u l t of a workman.

I t s terms may

be con t ras ted

with t h e s e c t i o n s of

t h e Ordinance which

impose upon

an

employer a liability t o pay compensation, and which confer

upon

a workman

a r ec ip roca l r i g h t CO rece ive it

( c f .

ss.

7 , 8 , 9 and 11).

I t i s never theless a provis ion

which is ca l cu l a t ed t o ensure t h a t an employer pay money

t o a workman,

and

it is a ques t ion of

l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t ,

t o be i n f e r r e d from t h e s ec t i on i n t h e l l g h t of a l l i t s surrounding circumstances whether a corresponding c i v l l

r i g h t is conferred upon t h e workman.

(Sovar v.

Henry Lane

Pty.Ltd.

(1967) 1 1 6 C.L.R.397

a t pp.404,405; Atklnson v.

Newcastle Waterworks Co. 118771 2 Ex.D.441 a t p.448).

A t f l r s t s i g h t , s.7A

appears t o confer upon

t he workman

( o r o t h e r benef lc la ry )

a

r l g h t t o t h e payments

whlch

t h e

s ec t i on requ i res

t h e employer

t o make.

I n t h e employers'

submission, however, s.7A

does n o t give rise t o a

c i v i l r i g h t t o t h e payments

t he r e in mentioned.

The employers'

s u b ~ i s s i o n

would

f lnd

t h e employers'

c i v i l liability t o make

those payments i n

o the r provis ions of

t h e Ordinance;

and

c h e l r submission i s

t h a t t h e workman

must

r e l y on

those

o t h e r provis lons alone

a s t h e c h a r t e r of h l s r l g h t s . This submission rests upon t h e phrase "payment due under t h i s Ordinance t o a person"

which

i s s a i d t o l i m i t t h e opera t ion of

s.7A

t o payments

l

which an employer i s required t o make pursuant t o o the r

provislons of t h e Ordinance.

This

c o n s t r u c t ~ o n would

deny

any

e f f e c t t o s.7A

save t h e lmposltlon of a cr lminal penal ty a s a sanct lon

t o secure t h e payment of moneys due t o a xrorkman under

I

other provlslons oE t h e Ordinance.

The s ec t l on , thus

construed, would have some work t o do: it would enhance

t h e remedies

t o p r o t e c t

t he workman's

r i g h t s ,

though

it V70uld n o t extend those r i g h t s .

The ques t ion i n

i s s u e i n t h i s appeal i s whether

s.7B

e x t e ~ d s

t h e

workman's

r i g h t s ,

a s w e l l a s p ro tec t ing

them.

This was

t h e

e f f e c t

j u d i c i a l l y

accorded

t o t h e

s t a t u t o r y

antecedents of s.7A,

i n t h e United Kingdom and i n

Victoria,

and

t h e workman

submits t h a t it i s t h e e f f e c t

which ought t o be accorded t o s .78, having regard no t

only

t o i ts

t e x t u a l

s i m i l a r i n e s t o s e c t i o n s m

t h e

United Kingdom and Victor'ian A c t s ,

b u t a l s o t o i t s

legislative

h i s t o r y

i n t h e

Ordinance

i t s e l f .

I n t h e United Klngdorn,

s . 1 4

of

t h e Workmen's

Compensation A c c 1923

and s . 1 2 of

t h e Workmen's

Compensation A c t 1925 each provided:

"an employer s h a l l

n o t be

e n t i t l e d o the rv l s e than

i n pursuance

of

an

agreement

o r arbitration t o end o r diminish a weekly payment"

. .

except i n c e r t a i n

spec i f i ed cases ,

inc luding

a

case rrhere

t h e workman re turned t o work and a case where it was

r -

e s t ab l i shed

t h a t t he

incapac i ty due

t o h i s compensable

i n j u r y had

ceased.

I t was he ld t h a t t h i s provis ion

e n t i t l e d t h e workman

t o continue

t o rece ive

t h e weekly

payment which he had been rece iv ing even though it i s subsequently asce r ta ined t h a t he was n o t so e n t i t l e d .

I

The purpose of

these provis ions was s t a t e d by Lord

Buckmaster i n ilnchor Donaldson,Ld. v. Crossland [l9291

A.C.297

a t p.302:

I

"Its purFose L S , t o my msnd, ,slain.

LL

i s t o secure t h a t i f weekly payinencs

a r e ,

i n f a c t , being made t o a workman,

they

s h a l l no t be ended

a p a r t from

agreement

o r

a r b i t r a t i o n

except

i n t h e

cases

t h a t

a r e

spec i f i ed . "

H i s Lordship r e f e r r e d t o t h e judgment

i n Ocean Coal Co.

v.

Davies

[l9271 A.C.271

showing t h a t the workman's

r i g h t s

were extended by t h i s provision during t h e per iod when

t h e workman's

en t i t l ement t o compensation

reinained

i n

d i spu te and

undetermined.

H e s a i d

( a t p.303) :

"The b a s i s o f

t h i s judgment

was

t h a t t h e r e

was

no ob l iga t ion

t o pay

a f t e r incapac i ty

had admittedly ceased, b u t it does n o t

a f f e c t t h e ques t ion of

t h e liability

t o

pay

during t h e per iod when

t h e quest ion

a s t o incapacity i s i n d ispute .

Lord

Wrenbury,

i n h i s judgment,

s t a t e d

(p.294)

t h a t t h e r i g h t s under

s . 1 4

were

a s follows:

' I t c r e a t e s i n t h e employer

an obligation

t o pay de f a c t o whether

he

i s d e ju re

l i a b l e o r n o t u n t i l

t h e liability

de

jure

IS determined.'

ATld Lord Carson s a i d

(on p.297): 'Pending an agreement o r an

a r b i t r a t i o n ,

an

employer

i s no t

e n t i t l e d

t o

end weekly payments under t he A c t of

1 9 0 6 ,

and probably i f t h e employer,

con t ra ry t o

t h e sec t ion ,

d ld end

such payments

t h e

workman

r.rould

be

e n t i t l e d t o pu t t h e law

i n motion t o recover such payments, and

t h e Courts would have power

t o l n s i s t upon

such payments,

e i t h e r t o t h e vorkman

o r ,

i f

t h e

i n t e r e s t s of

j u s t i c e

s o requ i red ,

l n t o

Court, pending t h e determination of t h e

a r b i t r a t i o n . '

"

The Vic tor ian provis ion ,

s . 1 4

of

t h e Workers

~ompensat ion Act

1953 was

accorded

a

l i k e opera t ion

i n

Edgar v.

Pennel l

[l9581 V.R.450.

The Vic tor ian s ec t i on

prorlded a pena l ty , y e t i c s efzect. T:7as s ~ r ~ ~ i l a r

r o

t h e English sec t ions .

OIBryan J.

s a i d a t p.454:

,I

Although c lause 7 i s no t couched i n

p r ec i s e ly

t he

same

language

a s t h e

English s.12

and

although t h e r e a r e o the r

d i f f e r ences i n t h e two

A c t s I

t h ink I

should hold i n accordmce wi th these

dec i s ions

t h a t t h e ob l i ga t i on

c a s t upon

t h e employer t o continue weekly payments

(except a s provided by paragraph (1) of

c lause 7) i s an ob l iga t ion which can be

enforced no t only by t h e penal provisions

o f

paragraph

(2) b u t a l s o i f t h e worker

commences proceedings f o r an award under

t h e Act,

by

an

in te r lm award

f o r t h e

continuance of t h e weekly payments pendlng award.

t h e determinat ion of t he claim, i f t h e

The presence of

t h e penal provis ions

i n paragraph (2)

of

c lause 7 does no t i n

my

opinion l e ad t o rhe conclusion t h a t t h e

ob l iga t ion

c a s t on

t h e employer

t o cont inue

weekly payments does no t c a r ry wi th it a CO-re la t ive r i g h t i n t h e worker t o t h e i r continuance.

These cases wonld arguably apply t o s .78 i n

t h e form i n whlch it stood when

it was f i r s t introduced

i n 1970.

Sect ion 7A(1) then read:

"&-I employer

s h a l l n o t ,

excepr I n accordance

with t h i s Ordinance o r a determinat ion o f

t h e Tribunal ,

discontinue

o r diminish a

weekly payment of comgensation t o an in ju red

workman.

Penal ty:

One

hundred d o l l a r s .

"

But

i n

1974

t h e p r e sen t provis ion was

s u b s t i t u t e d f o r t h e

o r i g l n a l s.7A.

The

amendment

appears ,

c l e a r l y enough,

t o

be designed t o extend t h e &it of s.7A:

~t is made t o

apply t o payments o the r than weekly payments, it proscribes

t h e withholding of payments

a s well a s t h e discontinuance

-

o r diminution of payments, and it i s made t o apply t o payments due t o persons o t h e r than an in ju red workman. While extending t he ambit of t h e s ec t i on , however, t h e

1974 amendment introduced a concept which i s n o t expressed

i n t h e English o r Vic tor ian provis ions

-

t h e concept

t h a t

t h e payment which i s no t t o be discontinued, wxthheld o r

d in in ished i s "due under" t h e Ordnance .

These words a r e

no t t o be found i n any of

t h e s t a t u t o r y antecedents

of

s.7Af

and t h e construction which t h e cou r t s placed upon

t h e provis ions

of

t h e 1923 A c t

(U.K. )

t r e a t e d t h e

re fe rence t o weekly pay;oents

as a re fe rence t o payments

which were claimed t o be due,

and vhich might t u r n o u t nor:

t o have been due a t a l l , as Lord Sherr ington pointed ou t i n Llndsay v. Glasgow Iron and S t e e l Co.1925 S.C.287 a t

p.295:

"Although s ec t i on 1 4 of

t h e A c t of

1923 does n o t

use t h e word

'compensation',

bu t r e f e r s only t o

'weekly payments',

it i s , I

th ink ,

c l e a r t h a t

t h e weekly payments which t h e employer is thereby

p r o h ~ b i t e d

from discont inuing a r e regarded

a s

being of t h e same na tu re as t h e weekly payments

vhich t h e workman

recelved p r i o r t o such

discontinuance. I n s h o r t , they a r e payments

vhlch t h e workman claims t o be due t o him a s

compensation under t h e Workmen's Compensation Acts,

1906 t o 1923.

Such being t h e i r charac te r , I see

no good reason why t h e workman's claim to receive

these payments

should no t form t h e sub j ec t of

an

award

by

an

a r b i t r a t o r a c t i ng under

t h e au thor i ty

of

s ec t i on 1 (3) of

t he principal A c t , o r vhy

t h e

workman1 S

claim,

i f sus tained by

t h e a r b i t r a t o r ,

should n o t be enforced by

t h e procedure appropr ia te

In t h e case of

any o t h e r award.

"

UnLess

the ne-l s-;2cu-,~1ry phzase "du3 undkr t i l l ;

Ordinance" can properly be read a s equivalent t o "claimed

-

t o be due under t h i s Ordinance",

t h e sec t ion must have a

d i f f e r e n t meaning

from

t h a t of

i ts s t a t u t o r y antecedents .

The quoted phrase was introduced by t h e same

amendment a s t h a t which extended t h e ambit of

s.7A

t o t h e

withholding of payments o t h e r than weekly payments.

I t i s

n o t pos s ib l e t o read "due under"

a s meaning merely

"claimed t o be due under" when t h a t phrase i s applied t o

t h e withholding of payments o the r than weekly payments.

The amendment could no t have been intended t o requ l re

an employer vho, on v a l i d grounds,

d isputes a claimant's

en t i t l ement t o a payment o t h e r than a weekly payment,

t o

make t h e payment so soon as r h e claim i s made.

I t could Pot

;

have been

intended t h a t c r lminal l ~ a b i l i t y

should

a t t a c h

t o an employer who, being under no liability t o a

claimant ,

never having made

a payment

c o n s i s t e n t with

l i a b i l i t y t o t h e

claimant ,

and

d ~ s p u t i n g

t h e

c la imant ' s

i

en t i t l ement t o payment,

f a i l s t o pay

e i t h e r a weekly o r

- !

o t h e r payment

according t o t h e exigencies of

t h e claim

made.

I

I

!

On

t h e o t h e r hand,

a

l i t e r a l cons t ruct ion of

t h e

phrase "due under t h i s Ordinance" cannot be accepted.

I

Apart from sweeping away t h e workman's protection which

!

provis ions of t h i s kind have been deslgned t o confer -

a

rcsult i-hj-ch vroulcl b e i r . a -z~cable

i f rhe S C Z ~ U E ~ L : ~

language w e r e i n t r a c t a b l e

(see, f o r example,

Rank

Xerox

Ltd. v. Lane [l9781 3 W.L.R.643)

- a l i t e ra l construction

- -

of

t h e ph ra se would g l v e rise t o an antithesis w i t h i n

s.7A:

t h e s e c t l o n would be

cons t rued a s p rov id ing

t h a t

payments which are due under t h e Ordinance might be

d i s c o n t i n u e d w i t h h e l d

o r diminished

" i n

accordance

w i t h

[ t h e ] Ordlnance" which makes them due,

o r " i n

accordance w i t h

[ a ]

de t e rmina t ion

o f

t h e T r ibuna l "

which

is bound

t o e n f o r c e t h e Ordinance.

Conversely,

i f a

paymeot

r e f e r r e d t o i n s .7k

f e l l w i t h l n

an exc iuso ry

p r o v i s i o n i n t h e Ordinance,

it

cou ld n o t b e

s a i d t o be

"due under t h i s Ordlnance";

and if t h e Tr ibuna l determined

t o g r a n t exemption from a

payment r e f e r r e d t o i n s.7A,

t h a t payment

cou ld n o t be

s a i d t o b e

"due under

t h i s

Ordlnance".

S e c t l o n 7k must t h e r e f o r e relate t o more

e x t e n s i v e classes o f

payments

t h a n t h o s e which

are,

i n t h e

l l t e r a l s e n s e ,

due under

t h e Ordinance.

The t r u e meaning

o f

t h e p h r a s e and t h e

purpose

o f

t h e

s e c t l o n

a r e t o b e

a s c e r t a i n e d by

r e f e r e n c e

t o t h e h l s t o r y

o f

t h e p r o v l s l o n

and

i t s p r e s e n t

s t r u c t u r e .

The h i s t o r y o f

t h e provision

shov~s

t h a t i t s

an teceden t s

were i n t ended t o s e c u r e t o a workman

a payment which,

a l though

it may

u l t i m a t e l y

prove n o t t o have been

payable ,

i s n e v e r t h e l e s s

expec ted

t o be

p a i d

i n t h e o r d l n a r y

cou r se of making payments t h e liability f o r which has

been

a c c e p ~ z d

Ly t h e employer.

Tile ;r-rucliul-e er' t i e

sec t lon shows

t h a t ,

although

t h e l i a b l l l t y t o make

t h e

-

payment

i n ques t lon must be

r e f e r a b l e t o t h e Ordinance,

che opera t ion of

t h e s ec t i on extends t o payments

beyond

those which o the r s ec t i ons of

t h e Ordinance make

payable.

, .

A purpose of s.7A i s t o preclude t h e employer

from departing u n i l a t e r a l l y from

an

agreemelt o r

arrangement which was

sought by

t h e workman

( o r o t h e r

benef ic ia ry ) and accepted by

t h e employer,

o r which was

o f fe red by t h e employer and accepted by

t h e workman

( o r

o t h e r bene f i c i a ry ) ,

and whlch would

r e s u l t i n a

payinent

by

t h e employer

r e f e r a b l e t o t h e provisions

af

t h e Ordinance.

I n my

opinion,

t h e s ec t i on extends t o a payment where

t h e liability upon which

t h e workman

( o r o t h e r beneficiary)

,

r e l l e s t o make

it payable i s a

l i a b i l i t y accepted o r

admltted by

t h e employer,

whether t h e payment i s i n t r u t h

due o r no t ,

and whether o r no t t he payment

1s ul t imate ly

held t o have been due.

I f an employer vrlshes t o resile

from o r qua l i fy h i s acceptance o r admission

of

l i a b l l l t y ,

t h e s ec t i on r equ l r e s hlm

t o seek t h e approval of

t h e

Tribunal ,

o r t o be ab le t o lnvoke t h e protection o f an

A c r ,

o r t o be wi th in an exemgtion whlch

overrides

t h e

s t a t u t o r y ob l iga t ion rrhlch

s.7A

superimgoses

upon

t h e

employer's acceptance o r admission of liability.

I n t h e p r e sen t case ,

t h e r e

i s evidence

a s t o

t h e employers'

acceptance o r admlsslon of

l ~ a b i l i t y ,

and

no evidence t h a t any of t h e exceptions applied.

I n h i s

affidavit, t h e workman deposed t h a t he had been

r e c e i v i n g "weekly payments

under the. . .0rdinanceU

from

28 March 1974 u n t l l 15 Seprember 1978.

Payment by an

employer of weekly compensation payments IS evidence of

h i s acceptance o r admission of liability under t h e

Ordinance

i n r e s p e c t of

rhe i n j u r y f o r which

the workmm

c l a i m s , though the accep'iaoce o r admission does n o t blnd

t h e employer when

t h e claim i s f i n a l l y l i t i g a t e d .

There w a s s u f f i c i e n r evidence

i n t he workman's

affidavit

t o suppor t t h e making of

an o r d e r f o r t h e continuance of

t h e weekly payments \7hlch, p r i o r t o 15 Seprember 1978,

t h e employers had been paying.

The employers c a l l e d no

evidence i n d e n i a l of

t h e i r l i a b i l i t y under

s.7A,

b u t

merely p u t t h e efficacy of s.7A

t o tile test .

The

employers

f a l l e d b e f o r e

t h e Tribunal,

and b e f o r e t h e Supreme Courc on

appeal .

F o r s t e r C . J .

Iras

r i g h t

i n d i s m i s s ~ n g

t h e ap?eal,

and i n my

judgment t h e

appeal t o t h i s Court from h l s judgment

and o r d e r f a i l s .

I

would

d ismlss

t h e appeal wi th c o s t s .

I

c e r t i f y t h a t thls and the

/ 3

preceding pages are a t r u e copy of the

Reasons f o r J u d ~ e n t h e r e l n o f h l s H o n o u r

M r .

Jus t l ce

ckrzm-,

A-4 C7J.

Associate

.I

Detedi 4. Oc5dT /779

LP7 THE FEDEZAL COITXl' OF AU~TRIiLIA

\ 1

1

.

.

:jCltT:1En?[ .IL?:P.I'TCI::fliST:<I

CT &sCx STRy )

- # a . 2

uLC

i V 7 3

1

GENERAL DIVISION

ON APPEAL FaOM THE SUPREME CCOUKT OF

I

THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRBLIfi

i

!

!

BETWEEP?:

THE I.ESTERN AUSTRALIAN COASTAL

/

SHIPPING CO>i?IISSION f\XD STEVEDORIEG: .

ENPLOYERS OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED

!

I

I

Appellants

i

( P l a i n t i f f s )

AND :

Respondent

(De fe~dan t )

CORFX: Erennan, Gallop & Lockharc JJ.

4 October

19 79

-

REASONS FOR JUDGl*ZNT

GALLOP J. :

In

t h i s ,3ppeal

the appe l ian t employers appeal aga ins t a

dec i s ion of

the Chief Judge dismissj.ng an appeal from 2 decj..sioa

1

c .

of

the ~ o r k m e n ' s Coupensation

Tribunal

del ivered

on

17 !?ov=ii~bzr

1978. The respondent ~-?orlcer

had

been

i n r e c e i p t o f

~rczk~nen's

compensation under the Workmenf S Compensation

-

Ordin,znce from the

-

Wzsteril Aust ra l ian Shipping Commission from 28 March 1974 1mtil

15 Sep~ember 1978.

On o r about 15 Septembsr 1978 the sa id

cfi~~ini.:;

J i o : ~

&..c

YLIZ~IIUSCL

:.7+d<Ly

9 3 y . 2 2 3 ~ ~

-dnc+

z rh? $14

i in^?,: :

.

The

presen t respondent

thereupon appl ied t o the ~o rkmen ' s

Compensation Tribunal Eor a determination of

the l i a b i l i t y azld

t h e amount of

compensation payable by t h e appel lants by

app l i ca t i on dated 11 October 1978.

In sho r t the rsrorker a l leged

t h a t he

had

sus ta ined personal

i n ju ry by

acc iden t a r i s i n g i n the

,

course of h i s employment on or about 28 Plarch 197L.

By znswer

dated 24 October 1978 t h e employer put i n i s sue the quest ion of

employment and the worker's incapaci ty f o r work.

The worker

then

app l ied by

i n t e r locu to ry

suitrno~s

r e t ~ r n a b l e

on 7 November

1978 and supported by an a f f i d a v i t of

9 November

1978 f o r 2n

in te r im award of weekly payments or' compensation froin 15 Septergbsr '

1978 u n t i l the hearing of

the

subs tan t ive appl ic l t io! l .

The

summons vras heard on 15 and 17 Wovember, and on r;he l a t e r da te

t h e Tribunal ordered zn in te r im aiiard or' conpezlsati-or? in favour

of the worker by way of xreekly pajments pursllznt t o the Ordiilance

from 15 September

1978 u n t i l

f u r t h e r order ,

2nd

cec ta in o ther

orders .

The employer appealed t o r;he Supreiile Court of the

Northern T e r r i t o r y by n o t i c e of

appeal dated 24 November

1978

and the Chief Judse del ivered h i s reasons f o r judgment

on t h z t

appeal. on 12 March 1979.

The Chief Judge dismissed the appeal

wi th

cos t s .

It v7as

d isc losed

i n argument

t h a t the

substant ive a p p l i c a ~ i o n

i

dated 11 October 1978 has been heard and dete-mined by the Tribunal,

2nd

j-csultcd

F n c12 ~ . i : l ~ d

>?ini, rr~.x!c xi1

~ s - / o u r

oi :he w.~r!;:;-

L C ~

r\leelcly payments a t t o t a l incapaci ty rates es from 15 September

1978 and c e r t a i n o ther payments

pursuant t o the Ordinance which

he had been underpaid i n respec t of

the period p r i o r t o 15

September 1978.

I t w a s

f u r the r d isc losed t h a t the employer has

appealed t o the Supreme Court of

the Northern Te r r i t o ry aga ins t

t h i s dete-mination and

t h a t t h a t appeal

i s

s t i l l pending.

I n

these circumstances the ques t ion a rose whether we

should have

continued

the hearing

of

t h i s appeal aga ins t t h e in te r locu tory

order o r \-.hether we

should have

deferred any f u r t h e r consider-

a t i o n of

the present appeal u n t i l such time as the appeal by

the employer aga ins t the Tr ibuna l ' s

determination of

the

.

substant ive app l ica t ion s h a l l have been determined by t h e Suprerne

Court

of

the Northern Te r r i t o ry .

, .

I f

the worker

i s successful i n the appeal i n s t i t u t e d by t h e

employer aga ins t the Tr ibunal ' s

decis ion oil

the

substant ive

'

app l i ca t i on , h i s r i g h t s w i l l not

be

a f fec ted by

he

determinatior,

of

t h i s appcal ,

He

w i l l have received 2nd be e n t i t l e d t o continze

t o receive weekly p a p e n t s of

compensation a s from 15 September

1978. I f , on the o ther hand, he i s no t success fu l , then the

determiirination of

t h i s appeal may have

some e f f e c t .

The de te r -

mination of

t h i s appeal w i l l i n any event determine

the ent i t lement

of

the worker

t o t h e cos t s ordered t o be

pa id t o l i i m by

t h e

Tribunal

and

by

the

Supreme

Court

i n i t s appe l l a t e j u r i sd i c t i on .

I

This

i s s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant

determination of

t h i s appeal a t

l

t h i s

sLage.

The a f f i d a v i t of

9 November

1978 i n support of

the app l i -

c a t i on made

by

i n t e r locu to ry sumons was

i n the

following

terms:

"1.

I a m the app l i can t i n he

above ac t ion.

2. I received weelcly payments under the Workmen's

Compensation Ordinance from the f i r s t respondent from the 28th day of March, 1974 u n t i l t h e 15 th day of September, 1978.

3. The f i r s t respondent discontinued the s a i d weelcly payments on o r about the 15 th day of

September, 1978 and t o the bes t of my knowledge,

information and b e l i e f

such cliscontinuance was

not i n accordance wi th the s a i d Ordinance,

an

1s

Act

o r determination or'

the T r i b ~ n a l .

There i s no provis ion i n the Ordinance o r the Rules made there-

under

f o r i n t e r locu to ry app l ica t ions .

Hov~ever

, t h e employer

concurred i n the procedure tjhich the worker adopted, and there-

fo r e we

should proceed

to determine

the matter pu t t i ng a s ide s l J .

procedural

de fec t s and

i r r e g u l a r i t i e s .

No

i n j u s t i c e t o the

p a r t i e s i s caused by

adoption of

t h i s course.

The

a f f i d a v i t of

t h e woi-ker w a s couched in terms appropr ia te

t o invoke

the cou r t ' s

j u r i s d i c t i o n ,

i f any,

t o make an award

i n

h i s favour under s.7A of t h e Ordinance.

I t reads:

"7A.

(1)

An

employer s h a l l n o t , except in accordance

wi th t h i s Ordinance, an Act o r deterinination of

the

Tr ibunal , d iscont inue , withhold

or diminish a weekly

o r o ther payment due under t h i s Ordinance t o a person.

Penalty:

100

d o l l a r s .

(2)

The onus of proving t h a t a veekly o r o the r

I

payment 1~7as discontinued, withheld o r diminished i n

I

accordance wi th t h i s Ordinance,

an Act

o r a

de te r -

mination of the Tribunal s h a l l be on the employer. I I

T'r-e

sec t ion i s penal

i n t e r n s and

the quest ion whether

i t

a l s o confers a

c i v i l r i g h t on

t h e worker

and o ther persons

i s a

ques t ion of const ruct ion of the Ordinance (Sovar v. Henry Lane

Pty. Ltd. (1967) 116 C.L.R.

397 a t p.405; Atlcinson v. Newcastle

T~Jaterr.7orks Co.

(1877) 2 Ex.D. 441 a t p.448).

It i s necessary t o

.

consider t h e whole purview of

the Ordinance t o see whether any

, -

r i g h t of

ac t i on i s intended to be

talcen away.

I n Cut ler v.

TJandsworth Stadium Ltd. (19L.-9) A.C.

398 Lord Simonds sa id :

I I The

only r u l e r~~h ich

i n a l l c ircun~stances

i s

v a l i d i s t h a t the answer must depend on a

considerat ion of the whole Act and the c i r -

cumstances inclucling the pre-exis t ing

r I

law in

which i t w a s

enacted.

The pre-exis t ing

l a w t o s.7A was

as introduced i n 1970 i n

the

f o l l o ? ~ i n g

form:

"7A.

A-n

employer s h a l l n o t , except i n accordance

wi th t h i s Ordinance o r a determination of

the

Tribunal , discontinue or diminish a rleelcly payment

of

compensation t o an in ju red workman.

Penalty:

One

hundred

d o l l a r s . I I

The present s . 7 A

was

subs t i t u t ed in 1974.

I t s e f f e c t was

t o

:

excend the a x b i t of

the sec t ion so as t o include payments under

the Ordinance o ther than weekly payments, e ,g . medical expenses,

i

i

and t o embrace persons o ther than workers, e.g.

dependants.

I t

a l s o crea ted an a l t e r n a t i v e offence of

withholding payments

due

- .

. .

11ncier Cl12 Cl;tij.~ianz> j x &.!dLr7-ori :U

;h? 0.

i * . 3 C . c a <

'-7j

\J<I!-

I..I~IJ.:I,$

o r diminishing payments due under the Ordinance.

The employer argued t h a t although the sec t ion may have

conferred a r i g h t t o continuance of weekly payments

i n i t s 1970

form, t h e e f f e c t of the amendment in 1974 has been such a s t o

take away

such r i g h t and t o r e s t r i c t tile

sec t ion t o a penal

opera t ion only.

T'ne worker on t h e o ther hand contends t h a t the

e f f e c t of

the amendment xias

t o expand i t s penal opera t ion t o

payments

o ther than weekly payments and,

a s a necessary co ro l l a ry ,

t o embrace persons o ther than t h e worker, but not t o take away

t h e

enforceable

s t a t u t o r y r i g h t which

the

sec t ion in the

1970

form contained.

It

seems

c l e a r t h a t

i n t h e 1970

fo rn the

s ec t i on d id confer

an enforceable r i g h t t o continuance of

compensation.

I n the

United Kingdom and the S t a t e of

Vic to r ia comparable provisions

have been so construed.

In the United Kingdom s.14 of the

Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 and s.12 of the Worlcmen's

Compensation Act 1925 provided:

"An

employer

s h a l l no t be

e n t i t l e d otherwise than

i n pursuance

of

an agreement or a r b i t r a t i o n t o

end o r diminish a weekly payment except"

i n c e r t a i n spec i f i ed cases ,

including a

case where

the workman

re turned t o \iork and a case where i t ri3s

es tabl ished i h a t t h e

, ,

incapac i ty due t o h i s compensable i n j u r y had ceased.

I t was

held

t h a t t h i s provision

e n t i t l e d t h e worker

t o continxe

t o receive

the I

l

subsequently

t u r n out

t h a t he

\.?as no t

e n t i t l e d t o

t h a t weekly

payment.

Lord Buclcmaster sa id i n Aninchor Donaldson Ltd. v.

Crossland (1929) A.C.

297 a t 302:

I 1 I t s purpose

i s , t o my

mind

p l a i n ,

i t i s t o secure

t h a t i f weelcly payments a r e i n f a c t being made

t o

a workman they s h a l l no t be ended apa r t from agree-

ment

o r a r b i t r a t i o n except

in t h e cases

which a r e

specif ied."

H i s Lordship went on t o quote Lord Wrenbury in Ocean Coal Co.

v .

Davi-es

(1927) A,C.

271 a t 294 where h i s Lordship sa id t h a t the

r i g h t s under

the

sec t ion created

i n the

employer an ob l iga t ion

t o pay

de

fac to whether he

i s de

j u r e

l i a b l e o r no t u n c i l t h e

l i a b i l i t y de

j u r e

i s determined.

In Edgar v. Penell (1958) V.R.

450O'Bryan J. i n construing

t h e

Victorian

s ec t i on

sa id :

I

"Although

c lause 7

i s no t couched

i n p r ec i s e ly t h e

same language as the English sec t ion 12, anci

although t h s r e a r e

o ther d i f fe rences

i n the

two

acts,

I th ink I should hold i n accordance wi th these

decis ions

t h a t

the

ob l iga t ion

c a s t upon

the

e~nplojrer

t o continue weekly payments (except as provided by

paragraph :

of

c lause 7 )

i s an ob l iga t ion which can

be enEorced no t only by t h e penal provisions of

paragraph (2) bu t a l s o i f the worker comences

proceedings

f o r an avard under the A c t by an in ter im

avard f o r the continuance of the 5-~eekly

payments

pending the determination of the claim i f the Board

sees f i t t o make

such an in te r im award.

The presence of the penal provisions i n paragraph ( 2 )

of

c lause 7 does no t i n my

opinion lead t o the

conclusion

t h a t

the

ob l iga t i on c a s t

on

t h e employer

I -

t o

continue weekly p a p e n t s does not

ca r ry wi th i t

a

CO-re la t ive r i g h t

i n t h e worker

t o

t h e i r

continuance. 11

1 cesp?c:f;illv

tL3i:se

v.icil the a?proecll c ~ f r3'5;-ysr. J. in Krl:sr

v . ? e n d 1 (supra) .

i t seeas plain t o illc?

t h a t ~ h e

1970

sec t lon

conferred a r i g h t in the worker

t o t h e continuance of v~eekly

The extended operat ion of

the sec t ion i s , i n my

view,

t o

preserve the pa t t e rn of weekly o r o ther payments being made under

t h e Ordinance u n t i l they a r e properly terminated

i n accord2nce

with t h e Ordinance, an Act,

o r determination of

the T r i b u ~ a l .

The payments may be properiy terminated i n a number of vays, f o r

.

example, by agreement

( i . e .

i n accordance wi th the Ordinance on

the b a s i s of

incapaci ty having ceased), becacse of

r e fu sa l of

t h e

worker t o submit himself t o a medical examination (Second Schedule

paragraphs 5 , 10 G 15) , by review and determination (Second

Schedule paragraph l l ) , by redl-mption (Second Schedule uaragraph

I

1 2 ) , o r the x\~orkm~n

ceasing t o r e s ide i n the TerrFtory

(Second

Schedule paragraph 13).

It was

contended by thl- employers t h a t the worker's i n t e r -

p r e t a t i o n i n t h i s case would

lead t o a

r e s u l t idlereby

t h e employer

wou1.d be required l o pay a t the r a t e claimed by a vrorlcer a t the

time of an i n i t i a l claim f o r compensation, o r run the rislc or'

prosecution f o r withholding a payment

"due

under t h i s h d i n a n ~ e " .

I ,

Such an argument involves an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of

the irords

due

under thisordinance" which would be synonymous with the words

I

I f claimed

'

t o be

due under

t h l s ~ r d i n a n c e " .

Cer ta in ly this 1.7as

the

const ruct ion given t o the U.K.

l e g i s l a t i o n i n Lindsay v.

Glasgoi~~ .

l r o n C; Siez l 20.

(1:125)

S .C .

;c57

CL:, L J L ~

S i l e ~ r ~ n ~ i o n

said

" ~ l t h o u g h

sec t i on 14 of

the A c t of

1923 does no t

use,. the word

'compensation'

but r e f e r s only t o

'weekly paymsnts'

it i s I think c l e a r that t h e

weekly payments which t h e employer i s thereby

prohibi ted from continuing a r e regarded a s being

of the same na ture as the weekly payinents which

t h e workman received p r i o r

t o such discontinuance.

I n shor t they a r e payments which

the ~.orrker claims

t o be due t o him as co~npensation

under i.iorkmen1s

Compensation Acts 1906-1923. Such being t h e i r charac te r I see no good reason why a workman's

claim t o receive these payments

should n o t form

the

subject of

an award

by an Arb i t r a to r a c t i n g

under

.the a u t h o r i t y of

s e c ~ i o n

l ( 3 ) of

the

p r inc ipa l Act, o r why

the workman' S claiin i f

sustained by the Arb i t r a to r should no t be

enforced

by the proceciure appropr ia te i n the case and any

o ther award. "

In my

view s .7A

i s not d i rec ted t o the

s i t u a t i o n ;<here the

worlcer malces

an i n i t i a l c l a i m f o r compensation and the enployer ,

on v a l i d gromds,

wishes

t o d i spu te the worker 's

ent iclemez~t

t o

a weekly payment.

I t cannot mean t h a t i n such a

s i t u a t i o n the

employer i s obliged t o make payments imed ia t e l j r .

I f he refused

t o make a payment, t h i s would no t amount t o a withhol.ding of a

I t

payment, it vrould merely be a r e fu sa l .

The xords

d i s con t i rue ,

withhold o r diminish"

connote

con t inu i ty , no t r e f u s a l of

a weekly

o r o ther payment,

the l i a b i l i t y f o r which has never been accepted

by the employer o r determined by the Tribunal .

I n t h i s case the re had been 2 pa t t e rn of

weekly payments

f o r

over four years .

In my

view i t i s consonant wi th p r inc ip l e and

in accordance wi th proper

const ruct ion principles

CO

i n t e r p r e t

I 1

t h e words of S. 7A "due under t h i s ordinance" a s meaning

accepted

l 1

as due"

o r

awarded and there fore due".

A ~ o p t i n g

t h i s meaning

t o the words of s . 7 A the employer has on the evidence discontinued

o r withheld weekly psyments due under t h e Ordinance and has not

done so i n accordance wi th the Ordinance, an A c t o r determination

of the Tribunal.

I 1.7ould dismiss t h e appeal.

I certlfy that this and the 7

precedinz pages are a true copy of the Reasoos for JuudgmentherelnofhlsIionour Mr. Justlce

Dated: k 8&L /975

--

a

IN THI;: FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

IFORTITERN TERRITORY DISTRICT HEGISTRY

NO. 3 Of 1979

GENXRAL DIVISION

l

.

l

------

OIJ APPEAL TROM THE SUPREICE COURT OF

THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTILALIA

BETWEEN :

Appellants (Plaintiffs)

ALPHONSE WALLNER

Respondent (~efendanta

COW-1: BREIDTAN, GALLOP AND LOCKHART JJ

P3ASONS FOR JUDGIbE NT

LOCKISART J.

In the United Kingdom the precursor of 8 .

7A, S. 14 of the Worlunen's Compensation Act 1923 and-%. 12

of the Worlmen's compensation Act 1925, have been construed

by English Courts, including the House of Lords, to be

provisions entitling worlcmcn to continue receiving weekly

payments which they had been receiving albeit that it is

subsequently ascertained that they were not so entitled.

Lord Buckmaster said in Anchor Donaldson Limited v.

Crossland 1929 A-C. 297 at p. 302:-

"Its Furpose is, to my mind, plain. are, in fact, being made to a workman, they shall not be ended apart from agreement or arbitration except in the cases that are ~pecified.~~

Although the language is not precisely the same, S. 14 of the Workers Compensation Act 1953 (Victoria) has been similarly construed by OIBryan J.

in Edgar v. Fennel1 1958 V.R. 450 notwithstanding the

presence of a penal provision in the section.

Section 7A was first introduced into-the Workers

Compensation 0rdinance.iN.T.) in 1970 in this form:-

accordanze with this Ordinance or a

"(1 ) An employer shall not, except in

determii~ation

05 the Tribunal, discontinue

or dlminish a weekly payment of compensation

to an injured workrnul.

Penalty: One Hundred Dollars.

Probably it too had the same meaning as its

English and Victorian counterparts.

In 1974 the present section was substituted

for the origin21 S. 7 A .

It introduced the notion that

the prohibition applied to the discontinuance, withholding

or diminution of payments "due under this Ordinance1'.

Although the operation of S. 78 was extended toapply to

more than weekly paynen-l;s,

forbade the withholding of

pajrments as well as their discontinuance or diminution, an:

applied to payments due to persons other than workmen,

one would

no t r e a d i l y g ive

t he

s ec t i on a meaning

d i f f e r e n t t o t h a t which it probably had

from

1970

t o 1974 and which i t s predecessors had

i n t h e United

Kingdom

and

Vic tor ia .

However,

i n my

opinion the language of t h e s ec t i on

i n e v i t ~ b l y

l e ads t o t h e conclusion

t h a t i t has no

operat ic

beyond

imposing a penal ty f o r contravention of i t s

provis ions .

The

sec t ion i s c a s t i n t he language

of

prohibi t ion .

It

does not purport

t o c r e a t e r i g h t s .

A l l it

does

i s t o

provide a penal ty f o r non compliance.

What

i s prohibi ted

1s t h e a c t of t he employer i n discontlnuing,

withholding,

o r diminishing a weekly o r o ther payment -

due under t h e

Ordinance t o a person.

One must look elsewhere than t o

S.

7 A i t s e l f t o f i n d t he worlterls r i g h t t o payment

and

t h e employer's

obligation t o pay.

The language i s

inappropr ia te

t o support

t h e

c r ea t i on by

t he

s ec t i on i t s e .

of

such a r i g h t and

ob l iga t ion .

Payments may be due under var ious provis ions of the

Ordinance.

There may be a l i a b i l i t y t o make'payments

pursuant t o a determinat ion of the Tribunal o r a memorand-

of

an a,;reeme~it r e g i s t e r e d under S.

6N,

which i s

enforceable a s 11 it were

a determjnat ion of

t he T r l b ~ m a l

(Sect ion 6N

( 6 ) ).

-4 l i a b i l i t y t o pay compensation may bt

c r a t e d by

s.

7

( l ) , whether

o r no t it has

c ry s t a l i z ed i n

t he form

of

a determinat ion of t he Tribunal o r t h e

recording of a memorandum of an agreement under S. 61J.

Section 7 (1) operates of its own force to impose a

liability on the employer to pay compensation to a workmar

who has sustained personal injury by accident arising out

of or in the course of his emplojment by the employer.

Other provisions of the Ordinance create liabilltie~

to pay moneys to the work~nan. For instance, S. l1 require the employer to pay costs of medical and surgical treatrner hospital treatment, nursing services, and mbulance

services incurred by reason 02 the relevant injury or

disease.

If the employer-discontinues,

withholds or

diminishes any of these payments, except in accordance

with the Ordinance and Act or de-cermlnation of the

Tribunal, he commits a breach of S. 7A.

Thus construed the section provides the worker

with an additional weapon in his armory; but it does not

extend his rights to compensation. Nor does it produce

what were described in argument as possible draconian

consequences to the employer, although he does run the

risk of prosecution if he discontinues, withholds or

diminishes payment and it is subsequently established

that the paylnent was in fact due under the Ordinance.

For the sectiol? to have additional operation

necessarily involves raading the words "payment due under this Ordinance1' as if they meant "claimed t;o be due under

this Ordinance" or llaccepted

as due under this Ordinance".

In my opinion the section cannot be so construed.

There

i s a fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n between

a payment

t h a t is rfclaimed t o be duelr o r r'accepted as being duerr

and a payment t h a t i s due.

I n my

opinion t h i s construct ion of

the s ec t i on does

not

c r ea t e l o g i c a l inconsis tencies

because

of

t h e presencr

o f the words

Ifexcept i n accordance with t h i s Ordinance

an Act

o r d e t e n i n a t i o n of

the Tribunal".

It i s t r u e

t h a t a payment cannot a t the same point of time be both

due and no t due;

bu t theexception

r e l a t e s t o t h e

p roh ib i t ion

aga ins t discontinuing,- withholding

o r

d iminishi r~g

pz.yments,

not t o the payments themselves

being due.

Cons t ruedas I ' ~ h i n k

i t must

be,

t h e s ec t i on

means simply t h a t i f a payment due under t h e Ordinance

should be pald today,

i t m u s t be paid and, i f it i s not

paid by

u n i l a t e r a l a c t of

the employer without t h e

au tho r i t y of t h e Ordinance,

an Act or determination of

the Tribunal ,

t h e employer runs the r i s k of prosecution.

A common ins tance

i s where an employer has

assumed l i a b i l i t y t o pay compensation under S.

7 (1 ) and

the re i s no determination of

t h e Tribunal o r recording

of a memorandum of .an agreement under S. 6N.

The employel

can be

discharged from h i s l i a b i l i t y as t o payment i f he

i~lvokes

t h e machinery

of

the Ordinance t o f r e e himself

from Turther l i a b i l i t y .

9 e $ r i l l then be wi th in the

exception provis ion of S.

/A.

If he does not do so, y e t

cezses making

payments

and

i s u l t i n a t e l y held t o be

l i a b l e t o have continued making those payments,

he w i l l

be i n breach of S.

7 A .

It may be t h a t Che

s ec t i on thus construed produces 2

,

r e s u l t not intended by

i t s draughtsman;

but t h a t i s not

t o t h e point .

I'iy

t a s k i s t o i n t e r p r e t the language

employed

i n accordance

wl th

t h e

es tab l i shed p r inc ip l e s

of

construct ion.

For these reasons i n my

opinion the apoeal should

be

allm? ed.

his

i s t o c e r t i f

t h a t t h i s and

the

preceding

f i v e

(57 pages

here in a r e

a t r u e copy

of

t h e reasons f o r

judgment

of

h i s Honour

M r .

J u s t i c e

Lockhart

/ v 7 / " < .

;<,(./g= 9

........ ..

........ ........ A

Date

~ss,&ia-Le

I 5

'

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