Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: The Trust Company (PTAL) Limited v Penna [2020] NSWSC 11 Hearing dates: 17 January 2020 Date of orders: 17 January 2020 Decision date: 20 January 2020 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Ierace J Decision: Application for a further stay of the writ of possession due to be executed on Monday 20 January 2020 is refused.
Catchwords: LAND LAW – possession – application for stay of execution of writ of possession – application refused Cases Cited: The Trust Company (PTAL) Limited v Penna [2019] NSWSC 1809
The Trust Company (PTAL) Limited v Penna [2019] NSWSC 1883Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: The Trust Company (PTAL) Limited (Plaintiff)
Giulia Penna (First Defendant)
Carmela Dox (Second Defendant)
Assuntina Laura Sabbarese (Second Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
M Castle (Plaintiff)
In person (First Defendant)
Summer Lawyers (Plaintiff)
File Number(s): 2019/100619
Judgment
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HIS HONOUR: On Friday 17 December 2020, I made orders refusing an application by Giulia Penna, the first defendant to the proceedings (“the defendant”), seeking a stay of a writ of possession by way of a notice of motion dated 14 January 2020, which was set to occur at 9.30am on Monday 20 January 2020. I now publish my reasons.
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The history of this matter is set out in two judgments concerning earlier applications by the defendant for a stay of execution of the writ of possession: see The Trust Company (PTAL) Limited v Penna [2019] NSWSC 1809 (Lonergan J) and The Trust Company (PTAL) Limited v Penna [2019] NSWSC 1883 (Beech-Jones J). That being so, it is unnecessary to provide a history, other than the milestones, of the matter.
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In 2017, a loan of $3,000,000 was secured on two properties in Haberfield, on Yasmar Street and Cove Street, the latter being the property in question (“the Cove Street property”). Repayments ceased in January 2019. On 1 April 2019, The Trust Company (PTAL) Limited (“the plaintiff”) filed a statement of claim, seeking judgment for the plaintiff for possession of both properties and leave to issue a writ of possession. No defence was filed, and a notice of motion for default judgment on the claim for possession of land was filed in May 2019. On 1 August 2019, judgment for possession was given in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the property. The writ of possession was to be executed on 23 August 2019. On 4 October 2019, the Court ordered a stay of the writ of possession until 11 October 2019. The defendant filed a notice of motion for a stay of the writ of possession, which was granted. This was followed by a period of negotiations, culminating in a Deed of Release entered on 4 November 2019 (“the deed”). The deed stated that, as of 30 September 2019, the amount owing was $3,221,609.50. The deed anticipated that the Yasmar Street property would be sold and the Cove Street property would be refinanced by two finance companies.
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Subsequently, a short extension was agreed between…
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- Case
- [2020] NSWSC 11
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the Trust Company was the rightful owner of the property and whether Penna’s claim to the property was valid enough to warrant a stay of the writ of possession. The Court needed to determine the validity of the Trust Company’s title and the merits of Penna’s claims. Additionally, the Court had to consider whether the balance of convenience favoured a stay of execution, balancing the rights of the Trust Company to possess the property against Penna’s right to remain in occupation.
The Court found that the Trust Company’s title to the property was valid and that Penna’s claims were not substantiated enough to warrant a stay of execution. The Court held that the Trust Company was the rightful owner of the property, and therefore, its right to possession was superior. The Court also determined that Penna’s claims did not present a significant enough balance of convenience to justify a stay. Consequently, the application for a stay of execution was refused, and the Trust Company was granted the writ of possession.
The Supreme Court of New South Wales made a final order dismissing Penna’s application for a stay of execution and allowing the Trust Company’s writ of possession to proceed.
Orders
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Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi