The State of Western Australia v Stephens [No 2] - [2021] WASC 318

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL

CITATION:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- STEPHENS [No 2] [2021] WASC 318
CORAM:   SOLOMON J
HEARD:   19 AUGUST 2021
DELIVERED          :   20 SEPTEMBER 2021
FILE NO/S:   SO 6 of 2019
BETWEEN:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Applicant

AND

PAUL ANDREW STEPHENS
Respondent

Catchwords:

Criminal law - High Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020 (WA) - High risk serious offender - First review - Whether respondent remains a high risk serious offender - Whether continuing detention order should be affirmed or rescinded - whether community would be adequately protected if respondent released on a supervision order

Legislation:

Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006 (WA)
High Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020 (WA)

Result:

Continuing detention order affirmed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant	:	B D Meertens
Respondent	:	N R Barber

Solicitors:

Applicant	:	State Solicitor's Office
Respondent	:	NR Barber Legal

Cases referred to in decision:

The State of Western Austalia v MBW [No 7] [2020] WASC 404
The State of Western Australia v Corbett [No 5] [2017] WASC 115
The State of Western Australia v Rao [No 2] [2020] WASC 467
The State of Western Australia v Stephens [2020] WASC 200

SOLOMON J:

Every just society grapples with the tensions that arise from violent criminal conduct. The need to punish perpetrators and protect the community can compete with other important objectives, such as the humane rehabilitation of damaged individuals back to productive participation in society and limiting the infringement of personal liberties.
These tensions have plagued humanity since antiquity. In perhaps the most widely‑read literature of antiquity, one needs only to complete three short chapters before one confronts violent crime between people, indeed brothers, that besets the only identified human population. Immediately, the Mark of Cain represented a conflation of these tensions: a punishment, a mark of opprobrium, a warning sign to the unsuspecting and, at the same time, a gift of the prospect of rehabilitation and protection from the angry mob.
The High Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020 (WA) (the Act) is a statute that, among other things, permits the State to apply to the court for an order that a person be detained in custody for an indefinite term notwithstanding that the offender has completed his or her sentence. The objects of the Act are twofold. First, the Act is directed to ensure the adequate protection of the community and of victims of serious offences. Secondly, the object of the Act is to provide for continuing control, care or treatment of high risk serious offenders.[1]
[1] s 8 of the Act.
The Act seeks to strike a balance between the protection of the community and the rights of an individual offender. As much is reflected in the express objects of the Act. In addition, the observations of Hall J in The State of Western Australia v Corbett [No 5],[2] in respect of the now‑repealed Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006 (WA) (repealed Act), are equally apposite under the Act.
[2] The State of Western Australia v Corbett [No 5] [2017] WASC 115 (Corbett).
At [9] his Honour observed (with references to statutory provisions omitted):
It is a significant thing to deprive a person of his liberty, not for something he has done but for something that he might do in the future. In order to justify detention on these grounds the evidence must be acceptable and cogent and establish the existence of a serious danger to the community to a high degree of probability. Such a finding requires satisfaction that there is an unacceptable risk that the person would commit a serious sexual offence if not placed under a supervision order or detained.
Hall J at [11] went on to make the following observation which is particularly pertinent to this matter (again, with references to statutory provisions omitted):
The justification for making a continuing detention order is the existence of an unacceptable risk of serious sexual offending that cannot be adequately controlled by conditional release. However, detention also serves the purpose of allowing treatment and care in a secure environment. This confirms an obligation on the part of prison authorities to facilitate change by offering programmes and access to counselling.
On 15 June 2020, Tottle J made an order that the respondent, Mr Stephens, be detained in custody for an indefinite term for control, care and treatment under s 17 of the repealed Act. The background to and detailed reasons for that order are set out in The State of Western Australia v Stephens.[3] That comprehensive explanation need not be repeated but stands as the necessary background to these reasons.
[3] The State of Western Australia v Stephens [2020] WASC 200 (Initial Decision).
As the Initial Decision makes plain, Tottle J made that order having found that Mr Stephens presented a serious danger to the community (a matter which Mr Stephens did not contest), there being an unacceptable risk that if Mr Stephens were not subject to a continuing detention or a supervision order, he would commit a serious sexual offence (as defined in s 3 of the repealed Act).
Under s 125 of the Act, the order made by Tottle J under the repealed Act is taken to have been made under the corresponding provision of the Act. The corresponding provision to s 17 of the repealed Act is s 48 of the Act. Therefore, Tottle J's order is, in effect, an order made under s 48 of the Act.
Although s 48 of the Act is the corresponding provision of s 17 of the repealed Act, the threshold issue under those two provisions is differently characterised. Under s 17 of the repealed Act, the threshold issue is whether the offender is found to be 'a serious danger to the community'. In contrast, under s 48 of the Act, the threshold issue is framed as whether the court finds that the offender is 'a high risk serious offender'. However, under s 7(3) of both the repealed Act and the Act, the matters to which the court is required to have regard in its determination of whether the relevant threshold has been met, are materially identical. It follows that Tottle J's finding that Mr Stephens presented a serious danger to the community, takes effect as a finding that Mr Stephens is a high risk serious offender for the purposes of pt 5 of the Act.
The relevant statutory regime has been helpfully summarised in The State of Western Australia v Rao [No 2],[4] and The State of Western Austalia v MBW [No 7].[5]
[4] The State of Western Australia v Rao [No 2] [2020] WASC 467 (Fiannaca J).
[5] The State of Western Austalia v MBW [No 7] [2020] WASC 404 (Derrick J).
The present application arises under pt 5 of the Act. Section 63 stipulates that the purpose of pt 5 is to ensure that an offender's detention under a continuing detention order is regularly reviewed.
In particular, the application is made by the State under s 64(1) for the detention of Mr Stephens to be reviewed. The State is required to make that application under s 64(2) so as to ensure that the review is carried out as soon as practicable after the end of the period of one year from the time when the offender would not have been in custody had a continuing detention order not been made. Specifically, by application dated 1 June 2021 pursuant to s 64 of the Act, the State applied for the order of Tottle J to be reviewed as soon as practicable after 14 June 2021.
On a review under pt 5, s 68 of the Act makes clear that the threshold issue is whether the court finds that the offender 'remains' a high risk serious offender. Mr Stephens was never found to be a high risk serious offender because such a finding was not applicable under the repealed Act. However, for the reasons already explained, Tottle J's finding takes effect as if Mr Stephens had been found to be a high risk serious offender, and the word 'remains' is to be understood in that context.
Under s 68, upon conducting a review, if the court does not find the offender remains a high risk serious offender, the court must rescind the continuing detention order. If, on the other hand, the court finds that the offender remains a high risk serious offender, then the court must either 'affirm the continuing detention order' or make a supervision order in place of a continuing detention order.
Again, the expression 'affirm the continuing detention order' is to be understood in its proper context. Although, in a literal sense, the word 'affirm' might suggest confirmation or ratification of the initial detention order (here, the order made by Tottle J in June 2020), the exercise to be undertaken is not a review of the appropriateness of the previous order. Rather, the word 'affirmed' is directed to an assessment of whether the existing order remains appropriate and necessary in the present circumstances.
In considering whether to make a continuing detention order or a supervision order, s 68(2) mandates that ensuring the adequate protection of the community is the paramount consideration.
The observations of Hall J in Corbett in respect of a review under the repealed Act are equally relevant to pt 5 of the Act. His Honour said at [8]:
The clear intention of the review process is to allow for the possibility of a change of circumstances. Detention under the DSO Act is not a punishment for a past offending: it is a protective mechanism designed to prevent the risk of future serious sexual offending from being realised. If circumstances change such that the risk of reoffending reduces or can be adequately managed in the community, then the continuing need for detention must be considered: Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Dick [No 5] [2013] WASC 357. It does not follow from this that a court conducting an annual review is bound by the factual findings made at previous hearings. In practice, however, there is usually little prospect that expert evidence on a review will call into question the previous finding that the respondent was a serious danger to the community: Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Pindan [No 3] [2017] WASC 107 (Fiannaca J) [51].
Hall J continued from [10]:
The risk of reoffending may change over time. It may be affected by age, health, or the successful completion of treatment. The availability of new technology or resources in the community may also affect whether the risk of reoffending can be managed by a supervision order. There is also the possibility that the risk may increase because of a failure of treatment or a relapse into deviant thinking.
If the risk changes or resources improve to enable more efficacious conditions then the need for detention may dissipate. In these circumstances, continuing detention may be unjust.
The review process is intended to ensure that detention only continues where necessary. It mitigates the otherwise draconian effect of imprisoning people for crimes that they have not committed. Reviews are not, therefore, a mere welfare check: they are an exercise of judicial power to affirm, vary or rescind a detention order. Continuing detention should not be ordered unless that course is justified by the circumstances existing at the time of the review. The court should choose the order that is least invasive of the person's right to be at liberty, whilst ensuring an adequate degree of protection of the community: The State of Western Australia v Latimer [2006] WASC 235; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Decke [2009] WASC 312.
For the review, s 67 envisages that one or more independent reports will be prepared by an expert or experts. Such reports are to include an assessment of the level of risk that, without a continuing detention order or a supervision order, the offender will commit a serious offence.[6]
[6] s 74 of the Act.
Expert reports were prepared for this review by Dr Peter Wynn Owen, a consultant forensic psychiatrist, dated 5 August 2021 and by Dr Sarah Barbas, a clinical and forensic psychologist, dated 4 August 2021. Each of Dr Wynn Owen and Dr Barbas had met with Mr Stephens for some time and assessed him directly. Their reports were based on those direct meetings as well as their review of relevant documentation and discussion with others within the prison system who interacted with Mr Stephens.
In addition, a report was prepared by Ms Trudy Hill, a senior community corrections officer, dated 21 July 2021.
Each of the reports was tendered in evidence and each of the three authors was called to give evidence. Broadly speaking, each of the authors confirmed the content of their reports and gave some additional oral evidence.
It is appropriate that I record that each of the three authors of the reports provided clear evidence, which was of considerable assistance to the court, not only in their written reports, but also in oral evidence, and in particular, in response to questions directed to them by the court.
As noted above, in the Initial Decision at [127], Tottle J found Mr Stephens was a serious danger to the community. Tottle J also concluded that, having regard to the evidence, there was doubt as to whether a supervision order would provide adequate protection for the community.[7] Accordingly, his Honour found that Mr Stephens should be detained in custody for an indefinite term for control, care and treatment.[8]
[7] Initial Decision [139].
[8] Initial Decision [139].
Tottle J also made a number of recommendations.[9] These included that Mr Stephens should participate in a further Sexual Offender Intensive Treatment Program and, subject to Mr Stephens' consent, he should be trialled on anti‑libidinal treatment and that the trial should commence immediately.[10]
[9] Initial Decision [140].
[10] Initial Decision [140].
The evidence presented at the review reflected three broad areas of focus, which are appropriate for the statutory review required by pt 5 of the Act:
(a)the progress made by the offender since the initial continuing detention order;
(b)further treatment that might be warranted; and
(c)the level of continuing risk to the community posed by the offender.

Mr Stephens' progress since the Initial Decision

The evidence established that Mr Stephens had commenced a further Sexual Offender Intensive Treatment Program but that he had withdrawn before the completion of the program and had only completed 71 of the 107 sessions of the program. It was also established that no progress had been made in respect of Mr Stephens being trialled on anti‑libidinal treatment. It is fair to say that the recommendations of Tottle J remain largely unfulfilled.
It was common cause and accepted by Mr Stephens himself, that he still had important treatment needs that have not yet been addressed satisfactorily. Indeed, it was accepted on behalf of Mr Stephens by his own counsel that Mr Stephens had told both Dr Wynn Owen and Dr Barbas that he needs additional time in custody to continue to work towards his release and, to that extent, Mr Stephens concedes that he remains a high risk offender. I shall return to the significance of this concession below.
The circumstances and reasons for Mr Stephens' early withdrawal from the Sexual Offender Intensive Treatment Program were each the subject of evidence. It is not necessary to record the detail of those matters. However, the following is of some importance.
Dr Wynn Owen had prepared a report in April 2020 in relation to Mr Stephens, which formed part of the evidence for the Initial Decision. Dr Wynn Owen conducted a further assessment of Mr Stephens for the purposes of the pt 5 review, dated 5 August 2021. In his more recent report, Dr Wynn Owen considered that Mr Stephens had made some progress that was 'definitely evidence of improved treatment over the last year, notwithstanding that the course was not completed'.[11]
[11] ts 200.
The improvements included a higher degree of self‑awareness and reduction in minimisation and denial. Importantly, Dr Wynn Owen did not consider that these improvements reflected a strategy of 'impression management' by Mr Stephens. Dr Wynn Owen explained that on the basis of his clinical assessment, he considered these improvements were genuine.
As to the problems that led to Mr Stephens' early withdrawal from the program, notwithstanding some rather strident criticism of Mr Stephens contained in a report from the facilitators who apparently administered the course, Dr Wynn Owen explained that he was unsurprised by the difficulties Mr Stephens confronted and by his early withdrawal. Dr Wynn Owen explained that the environment of the program would have been very stressful for Mr Stephens, who has relatively limited coping skills and found himself in a difficult process.
Dr Wynn Owen observed that notwithstanding Mr Stephens' failure to complete the program, he had spent a substantial amount of time in the program and there 'clearly was a shift' in Mr Stephens' awareness and attitude to sexual violence.[12]
[12] ts 194.

Further treatment that might be warranted

Dr Wynn Owen considered that Mr Stephens would benefit from the opportunity to undertake the program again in a different environment, such as the Bunbury Regional Prison, together with additional one‑on‑one psychological support and possibly also anti‑libidinal treatment. Dr Wynn Owen explained that anti‑libidinal treatment (in which he has considerable expertise and experience) is no longer used as a stand‑alone form of treatment. Rather, its efficacy lies in being used as part of a broader program of treatment. The anti‑libidinal treatment permits the offender to obtain the benefit of a broader treatment regime without the intrusion or distraction of thoughts and urges, which can be ameliorated by anti‑libidinal treatment.
Dr Wynn Owen thus considered that the benefits of Mr Stephens undergoing a further Sexual Offender Intensive Treatment Program would be maximised by the following:
(a)undertaking the program in a different location, such as the Bunbury Regional Prison;
(b)undertaking the program with the benefit of one‑on‑one psychological support to assist Mr Stephens to cope with the program; and
(c)having Mr Stephens assessed for the appropriateness of commencing anti‑libidinal treatment to supplement his participation in the program.

The risk now posed by Mr Stephens

Dr Wynn Owen undertook an assessment of the risk of Mr Stephens committing a future serious offence. He did so using actuarial and non‑actuarial tools in combination with a clinical assessment. These included two standard mechanisms: the Static‑99R measure and the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol, referred to as 'RSVP' (including PCL-R).
The score under the Static‑99 measure is of limited utility for a pt 5 review because, as Dr Wynn Owen explained, the assessment emanates from past offending so that the only basis upon which a score can change is by reference to things such as new offending or a change in victim selection. As Mr Stephens has been in custody, these are not factors that could have been altered. It emerged from Dr Wynn Owen's explanation that the only factor that could alter the assessment while Mr Stephens remains in custody is his age. Mr Stephens' risk assessment can only improve when he reaches the next statistical age bracket which is 60, still some years away.
The more relevant tool for the purposes of a pt 5 review is the RSVP, which is the tool by which it is possible to assess and manage the risk prospectively. In his written report, Dr Wynn Owen addressed the various elements of the RSVP. In summary, Dr Wynn Owen observed some improvements and that 'these shifts indicate an increased readiness for treatment intervention and a greater likelihood that such intervention will be effective'.[13]
[13] Exhibit B, Book of Materials Volume Two (Exhibit B) (Report of Dr Wynn Owen) [110].
At the same time, Dr Wynn Owen concluded that the risk scenarios and imminence of offending were unchanged since the last assessment. In the end analysis, Dr Wynn Owen was 'of the opinion that Mr Stephens currently presents a high risk of committing a future serious (sexual) offence'.[14]
[14] Exhibit B, (Report of Dr Wynn Owen) [117].

Dr Wynn Owen explained the two most significant elements that presented as risk factors for reoffending were the existence of sexual deviance and psychopathic personality. Both remain present in Mr Stephens.
As to the former, Dr Wynn Owen explained that he had diagnosed Mr Stephens with the disorder of paraphilia, being an intrusive desire for sexually deviant behaviours, and specifically paedophilia, being a sexual interest in pre‑pubescent children. The condition is a life‑long disorder and is not amenable to being cured by treatment. Dr Wynn Owen explained, 'there is very little in terms of treatment. The interventions tend to be criminogenic, rather than therapeutic'.[15]
[15] ts 173.
That is, the programs provided to offenders are designed to address the risk of future offending, not to rid the person of the disorder. Dr Wynn Owen explained that 'the vast majority of individuals with paedophilic thinking do not commit any form of offence throughout their lifetime'.[16] That is a significant matter. Plainly, the law is directed to the commission of an offence, not the disorder itself. The object of any program or support to be provided to people such as Mr Stephens is not to cure their disorder but to assist them to become like the vast majority of individuals with paedophilic thinking who are able to control and regulate their conduct so as to never commit any form of offence.
[16] ts 17.
As to Mr Stephens' psychopathy, Dr Wynn Owen explained that he scored Mr Stephens at 25 on the standard clinical assessment, whereas the 'Hare Psychopathy Checklist' cut‑off score for prototypical psychopathy is 30. Dr Wynn Owen explained that in other jurisdictions, 25 is used as the cut‑off and that a score of 25 particularly viewed in light of the offences of 1999 shows a callous lack of empathy which is a significant factor in the risk of future offending.
At the same time, Dr Wynn Owen explained that Mr Stephens had made progress in his level of self‑awareness of his condition and that 'self‑awareness is regarded as one of the most significant dynamic risk factors for future offending'.[17]
[17] ts 198.
Overall, Dr Wynn Owen expressed the position as follows:
This risk likelihood has not changed materially since Mr Stephens was assessed for DSO proceedings in 2020, however, I note that he currently presents as being more open to treatment intervention and more prepared to honestly participate in treatment.[18]
[18] Exhibit B, (Report of Dr Wynn Owen) [119].
I raised with Dr Wynn Owen the fact that Mr Stephens himself had expressed a preference to remain in prison to access further support and intervention and did not feel equipped to manage thoughts and feelings associated with his offending. Dr Wynn Owen explained that Mr Stephens' attitude has a number of potential psychological impacts. These include the ability to attribute responsibility to others which reduces the likelihood of preventing oneself from offending. That means Mr Stephens presents a high risk of future offending. Dr Wynn Owen went on to explain that Mr Stephens' attitude might also enable or elevate the risk of his offending by attributing external responsibility or blame.

Dr Barbas' report

The report in evidence of Dr Barbas was not, in substance, materially different from the views expressed by Dr Wynn Owen. Dr Barbas stated that Mr Stevens suffered from paraphilia paedophilic disorder and general personality disorder. Dr Barbas acknowledged some gains having been made over time by Mr Stephens but that his treatment needs in relation to sexual offending remain largely unchanged.
Dr Barbas also noted that Mr Stephens participated in, but failed to complete, the Sexual Offender Intensive Treatment Program. Dr Barbas also recommended that Mr Stephens participate in a further program at an alternative facility and also suggested Bunbury Regional Prison, where there will be access to supportive therapeutic facilitators. Dr Barbas explained that a further Sexual Offender Intensive Treatment Program is scheduled to commence in the final quarter of 2021 at the Bunbury Regional Prison. In oral evidence, Dr Barbas confirmed that she recommended that Mr Stephens undertake the program at Bunbury Regional Prison later this year and that this was logistically possible.

Ms Hill's report

As noted above, a report was prepared by Ms Trudy Hill, the Senior Community Corrections Officer responsible for Mr Stephens. The report was tendered in evidence.[19] Ms Hill noted that Mr Stephens is considered by staff to be a polite and respectful individual who follows directions and complies with prison‑based rules. Ms Hill reported that Mr Stephens received visits from members of the St John Lutheran Church in March and May 2021 but that these are his only contacts other than professional supports. Mr Stephens reported to Ms Hill that he has no support from any family members.
[19] Exhibit B, (Report of Ms Trudy Hill).
In addition, Mr Stephens has no accommodation options available from his own resources. Although the absence of accommodation in this instance is not determinative, it is appropriate that the issue be the subject of some comment. That is because some emphasis is placed on the issue of accommodation by the State as the applicant.
The State advanced the following written submissions:
1.Generally, the unavailability of accommodation for an HRSO can determine the outcome of a review.[20]
2.Although the availability of suitable accommodation is subject to change, it is unlikely that accommodation will become available by the date of the forthcoming review and, if that is correct, the lack of accommodation weighs heavily in favour of the court deciding to affirm the continuing detention order.[21]
[20] Applicant’s outline of submissions for first review of detention on 19 August 2021 (Applicant’s outline of submissions) [103].
[21] Applicant’s outline of submissions [104].
In support of those submissions, the State referred to the observation of Hall J in Corbett that '[t]he absence of suitable accommodation makes it impossible to be satisfied that a supervision order is presently a viable option'.[22]
[22] Applicant’s outline of submissions [80].
In light of the manner in which the State framed its submissions in this regard, it is important to point out that far from relying on the absence of accommodation as a basis for denying the release of the offender, Hall J's remarks were directed to the entirely unsatisfactory consequence of the lack of accommodation. This is plain from the full paragraph of his Honour's reasons at [5]:
The end result is that a man who should be able to be released into the community under supervision cannot be. He will continue to be deprived of his liberty because no suitable accommodation can be found. As I have noted in other cases, accommodation is not merely a place to live, it is also an integral component in assessing whether the risk of re‑offending can be properly managed. The lack of accommodation in this case makes release on a supervision order impossible. However, this really begs the question of why accommodation is not available. Has enough been done by the executive to make provision for people like Mr Corbett? That is a question for others to answer, though some of the evidence at this hearing suggests that the answer is 'no'.

Like many high risk serious offenders, Mr Stephens cannot rely on his family for accommodation. The limited accommodation options for such persons post‑release are further reduced due to the preclusion of sexual offenders, the need for a fixed release date for waitlisting, the need for face‑to‑face community‑based interviews, and time limits on the accommodation provided. Presently, the only viable option for Mr Stephens appears to be the HRSO Supported Accommodation Program, managed by Uniting WA. That program consists of six properties that offer supported accommodation for up to approximately 12 months.
At the time of the review, Mr Stephens was fourth on the waitlist, with no possible estimate of when he would be first on the list.
Ms Hill explained her understanding of the position. When a continuing detention order is imposed or affirmed, high risk serious offenders are taken off the list and returned to the waiting list 12 months prior to their next review. Their place on the waitlist is then determined by the number of high risk serious offender respondents scheduled to have their reviews in the subsequent 12 months. For example, if eight high risk serious offenders' applications are to be heard in the 12 months before a particular high risk serious offender respondent's review, then that respondent will be placed ninth on the waiting list. In situations where the only barrier to release under a supervision order is accommodation, the court may indicate an intention to make a supervision order and adjourn to maintain the high risk serious offender's position on the waiting list until accommodation becomes available.
The affirmation of the continuing detention order will thus mean that Mr Stephens will come off the waiting list. He will be returned to the waiting list some 12 months before his next review. There is no way of knowing how far up the list he will be by the time of his next review. At this point, I can do little more than echo the comments of Hall J and observe that it would be unjust if, at the point of the next review, Mr Stephens was otherwise suitable to be released on a supervision order, but his continued detention was rendered necessary due to the absence of accommodation.
Having regard to the careful and comprehensive evidence of Dr Wynn Owen and Dr Barbas and the attitude of Mr Stephens himself, I am left with little doubt that at present, if Mr Stephens did not remain detained in custody, there would be a real and sensible, and therefore unacceptable, risk to the community that Mr Stephens will commit a serious offence.
In all the circumstances, having regard to the evidence and the matters set out in s 7(3) of the Act, I am satisfied to a high degree of probability that it is necessary to make a restriction order in relation to Mr Stephens to ensure adequate protection of the community against an unacceptable risk that Mr Stephens will commit a serious offence. Mr Stephens, therefore, remains a high risk serious offender.
Moreover, having regard to the paramount need to ensure adequate protection of the community, I find that for the time being a supervision order will not be adequate to ensure that adequate protection and accordingly, I affirm the continuing detention order.
The matters I have referred to at [4] - [6] above warrant reiteration. The care and treatment of offenders is an express object of the Act. Although there is no express statutory power for the court to give any particular or concrete expression to that object by requiring specific measures to be undertaken, I respectfully agree with the sentiment expressed by Hall J in Corbett that in a broad sense the regime reflects an obligation on the part of prison authorities to facilitate change through appropriate measures. To that end, the court routinely includes recommendations in these matters. Regrettably, and no doubt in some instances for good reason, the recommendations are often not implemented.
In addition to the other matters referred to by Dr Wynn Owen, Dr Barbas and Ms Hill, I would make the following specific recommendations, some of which are identical to those made by Tottle J:
1.Mr Stephens should participate in a further Sexual Offender Intensive Treatment Program. That should happen, if at all possible, at Bunbury Regional Prison, and Mr Stephens should receive individual counselling and support to assist him to manage the program.
2.Mr Stephens should be assessed as soon as possible for suitability for anti‑libidinal treatment.
3.Mr Stephens should be encouraged and, to the extent possible, assisted to participate in activities of a pro‑social nature - activities involving educational or work skill training with others and also social activities.
4.Mr Stephens should be assisted in establishing social supports in the community.
5.Steps should be taken to secure suitable accommodation well in advance of the next review.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
NW
Associate to Justice Solomon
20 SEPTEMBER 2021