The State of Western Australia v PMB
[2011] WASC 116
•9 MAY 2011
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION: THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- PMB [2011] WASC 116
CORAM: MURRAY J
HEARD: 20 APRIL 2011, 3 MAY 2011
DELIVERED : 9 MAY 2011
FILE NO/S: MCS 3 of 2011
BETWEEN: THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Applicant
AND
PMB
Respondent
Catchwords:
Criminal law and procedure - Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006 (WA) - Application for continuing detention order or supervision order - Term of imprisonment served for serious and other sexual offences - Whether offender a serious danger to the community - Whether continuing detention order or supervision order should be made - Terms of supervision order
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Supervision order imposed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Ms L O'Connor
Respondent: Mr D McKenzie
Solicitors:
Applicant: Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Respondent: Legal Aid (WA)
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Nil
MURRAY J:
The application
This is an application by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), pursuant to s 8 of the Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006 (WA) (the Act).
The application seeks orders against the respondent under ss 14 and 17 of the Act. On 18 February 2011, on the basis of the information then put before me, I expressed my satisfaction that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the court might, under s 7(1) of the Act, find that the offender is a serious danger to the community.
I made orders under s 14 for two psychiatrists, Dr Wojnarowska and Dr Wynn Owen, to report, as required by s 37 of the Act. They did so, respectively on 9 April 2011 and 11 April 2011. I received those reports in evidence and I have read them.
When those orders were made, the respondent was still serving a term of imprisonment. That sentence expired on 7 April. I therefore ordered, pursuant to s 14(2)(b)(i), that the respondent be detained in custody until the application of the DPP was heard and determined.
Under the Act, s 17, I am first required to consider and find whether the respondent is, 'a serious danger to the community' within the meaning of the Act. If I do so find, I may order that the respondent be detained in custody indefinitely for his control, care and treatment, or I may make a supervision order for a period to be stated in the order, setting out the conditions upon which the respondent is permitted, despite the fact that he is found to be a serious danger to the community, to be at large.
Under s 17(2), in deciding which form of order is appropriate, 'the paramount consideration is to be the need to ensure adequate protection of the community'. It is not necessary that the court should provide a guarantee that the respondent will never offend again. Such a thing would be impossible. The obligation of the court is to do what it may to provide the community with adequate protection against the commission, by the respondent, of a serious sexual offence.
This court has regularly approached that task upon the basis that the form of order chosen should interfere with the respondent's right to be at liberty (having served the term of imprisonment imposed upon him) to no greater extent than is necessary to ensure the adequate protection of the community from the commission of a further serious sexual offence.
Section 18 provides a standard set of conditions governing the operation of a supervision order, and s 18(2) provides:
The supervision order may contain any other terms that the court thinks appropriate -
(a)to ensure adequate protection of the community; or
(b)for the rehabilitation or care or treatment of the person subject to the order.
In other words, in relation to the terms of a supervision order, the period for which it is to operate and the conditions which are imposed, the same principle operates. The court should do what is required to ensure adequate protection of the community, including making provisions directed towards the rehabilitation, care and treatment of the offender, but it should do no more than is thought appropriate to pursue those aims.
The hearing of the application was conducted, by consent and pursuant to s 42(4) of the Act, by receiving in evidence various documents concerned with the respondent's antecedents, including his criminal history, reports and documents tendered in evidence in indictable proceedings for the serious sexual offences of which the respondent has been convicted and for which he has been sentenced, transcripts of those proceedings so far as they are available, other prison‑based treatment and risk management reports concerning the respondent, and the psychiatric reports to which I have already referred.
Dr Wojnarowska, Dr Wynn Owen and Ms Court, an officer within the community corrections section of the Corrective Services Department, also gave oral evidence. The primary facts are abundantly clear.
The threshold question, whether the respondent is a serious danger to the community within the meaning of the Act, falls to be answered by reference to s 7(1):
Before the court dealing with an application under this Act may find that a person is a serious danger to the community, the court has to be satisfied that there is an unacceptable risk that, if the person were not subject to a continuing detention order or a supervision order, the person would commit a serious sexual offence.
Section 3(1) of the Act defines the term 'serious sexual offence' by reference to the meaning given to that term in the Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 106A. It is sufficient, for present purposes, to note that that means the commission or attempted commission of sexual offences defined in Ch XXXI of the Criminal Code (WA), or a former provision of the Criminal Code which was the equivalent of a current offence for which, in either case, the maximum penalty that may be imposed is 7 years imprisonment or more than 7 years imprisonment.
Section 7(3) of the Act provides:
In deciding whether to find that a person is a serious danger to the community, the court must have regard to -
(a)any report that a psychiatrist prepares as required by section 37 for the hearing of the application and the extent to which the person cooperated when the psychiatrist examined the person;
(b)any other medical, psychiatric, psychological, or other assessment relating to the person;
(c)information indicating whether or not the person has a propensity to commit serious sexual offences in the future;
(d)whether or not there is any pattern of offending behaviour on the part of the person;
(e)any efforts by the person to address the cause or causes of the person’s offending behaviour, including whether the person has participated in any rehabilitation program;
(f)whether or not the person’s participation in any rehabilitation program has had a positive effect on the person;
(g)the person’s antecedents and criminal record;
(h)the risk that, if the person were not subject to a continuing detention order or a supervision order, the person would commit a serious sexual offence;
(i)the need to protect members of the community from that risk; and
(j)any other relevant matter.
The first group of offences
On 26 November 1990, the respondent pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, a number of sexual offences, some of which were serious sexual offence within the meaning of the Act. They were offences against ss 183 and 189 of the Criminal Code, sections since repealed and replaced by offences incorporated into Ch XXXI of the Code.
The victims of the offences were the respondent's daughter and son. There were three offences of procuring the respondent's daughter to indecently deal with him while she was under the age of 13 years, six offences of indecently dealing with his daughter while she was under the age of 13 years, two offences of indecently dealing with her while she was under the age of 16 years, and one offence of procuring her to indecently deal with him while she was under the age of 16 years.
There were 12 offences involving the respondent's daughter, and in respect of those offences committed while she was under the age of 13 years, the maximum term of imprisonment was 7 years. Thereafter, the maximum penalty reduced to 4 years imprisonment. There were therefore 9 serious sexual offences committed against the respondent's daughter. Three offences of indecently dealing with the respondent's son were committed while he was under the age of 14 years. They were serious sexual offences as defined.
The offences were representative of a course of conduct and were committed between 1987 and 14 June 1990. By the time the matters came before the District Court, the respondent's daughter and son were aged about 13 and 10, respectively. They would now be aged about 34 and 31, respectively. It will be seen that the offences against the respondent's daughter commenced when she was about 10 or 11, and the respondent's son was aged 7 or 8.
At the time, the respondent was separated from his wife. The marriage was effectively at an end. The offences were committed when the children were with the respondent for access visits on the weekend. They involved having the respondent's daughter masturbate him to the point of ejaculation, and rubbing her vagina. The respondent would masturbate his son.
On 26 November 1990, Williams DCJ sentenced the respondent to an aggregate term of 5 years imprisonment and made him eligible for parole. As the relevant legislation was then framed, the respondent became eligible for parole after serving one‑third of the aggregate term, ie, after a period of 20 months. He was released on parole as soon as he might be.
After a period of work release, commencing on 14 April 1992, the respondent was admitted to parole on 26 May 1992 for a period which, as the legislation was then framed, would expire on 24 January 1994. As will be seen, the parole was breached by further offending and was retrospectively cancelled, but that did not have the result of subjecting the respondent to a further period of incarceration.
Soon after the respondent was imprisoned, it was noted that he was well‑motivated to receive treatment for the sexual offending, and he was admitted to the sex offender treatment program at that time being conducted at Fremantle Prison, and later at Casuarina Prison. His progress was thought to be good, and he completed the program by March 1992. It was thought that it had been successful.
He was described as constituting, 'a low risk of reoffence' by the acting coordinator of the program. His improvement was considered to be such that he might have access again to his daughter, then aged 15 and about to take up residence in a flat with a boyfriend. The respondent himself was firmly of the view that he presented no danger to either of his children.
The second group of offences
There has been no further offending against either child. The respondent seems now to have no contact with either of them and, of course, as I have noted, they are both adults, apparently leading their own lives. Their present circumstances are unknown.
However, the respondent did commit further offences which brought him back before the District Court in Bunbury in 1994, where he pleaded guilty to four offences committed between the beginning of September 1993 (in breach of the respondent's parole) and the end of March 1994. They were all offences of indecently dealing with a male child between the ages of 13 and 16 years, contrary to s 321(4) of the Criminal Code, an offence punishable by 7 years imprisonment.
Three of the offences involved a 14‑year‑old child, and one was a 13‑year‑old child. One of the children was lured to the respondent's unit by an offer of cigarettes and gifts, and the other was shown a pornographic video causing the offender and the child to become aroused. On each of the four occasions the respondent rubbed the genital area of the boy outside the child's clothing.
On 20 July 1994, O'Sullivan DCJ sentenced the respondent to an aggregate term of 2 years imprisonment and made him eligible for parole. The judge appreciated that the respondent needed further treatment. His Honour said he was disturbed by the fact that the respondent was prepared to again engage in activities clearly calculated to corrupt young people. As the legislation was then framed, the respondent became eligible for parole after serving 8 months of the term of imprisonment.
He was admitted to parole on 13 April 1995, having undertaken a sex offender treatment program while in Kalgoorlie Prison. A psychiatrist who had been consulted by the respondent made the formal psychiatric diagnosis of paedophilia. That medical practitioner noted that the respondent was motivated to continue with treatment which, at that time, involved the prescription of the testosterone blocker known as Androcur. However, it seems that the respondent only took that for a few months, and drug treatment of that kind has, as I understand it, not been prescribed or undertaken by the respondent since then.
Having been admitted to parole on 13 April 1995, the respondent served out the parole period and complied, during that period, with a direction made by the Parole Board, as it then was, to undertake a community based sex offender treatment program, which he completed successfully.
The third group of offences
The respondent was again before the District Court charged on indictment with 16 offences, all against the same child. Again he pleaded guilty by the fast‑track process available in the District Court.
The offences were committed between 1 June 2001 and 3 May 2003, a period of about 2 years, when the male complainant was aged between 13 and 15. As can be seen, these offences commenced to be committed just over 6 years after the respondent had been previously released on parole. The respondent attributes the lack of offences during this period to the fact that he was employed and occupied for much of this time.
The facts in relation to this group of offences, as found by her Honour Kennedy CJDC, are that the victim of the offences was a boy being cared for by his grandfather, who lived in the same block of residential units as the respondent. The grandfather and the respondent became friendly, and by that introduction the respondent came to know the child, who would come to his unit regularly for help with homework, and then other grooming activities occurred.
The respondent would allow the child to view internet pornography sites on his computer, and the activity progressed to encouraging the child to masturbate to obtain an erection and to performing acts of oral sex upon the child, the form of sexual penetration known as fellatio. One offence of taking indecent photographs of the child, who posed naked, was committed. There were a total of 16 offences charged, and it was accepted that they were representative of a course of conduct over the period identified.
In passing sentence, her Honour commented that she was concerned that the respondent appeared to have no understanding of the harm which the commission of such offences against children would do to them. Her Honour undoubtedly thought the respondent was a considerable danger of the commission of such offences against children. She did not particularly identify male adolescent children, but I think the evidence was strong that that was the particular sexual deviancy represented by the illness of paedophilia from which the respondent suffers. I note that all of the offences of which he was convicted on this occasion are serious sexual offences within the meaning of the Act.
Her Honour sentenced the respondent to a term of 6 years imprisonment in aggregate. She ordered eligibility for parole, and the sentences were backdated to commence on 8 April 2005. Her Honour made no particular treatment recommendation, perhaps having regard to the psychiatric report provided by Dr Srna which was before her. Dr Srna had confirmed the diagnosis of paedophilia, and added a reference to a narcissistic personality disorder.
Dr Srna's report, dated 17 May 2005, noted the previous treatment attempts which had not prevented this series of offences. He added:
There is little chance that further therapy would significantly change this in terms of penetrating his narcissistic defence and reducing his strong paedophilic drive. Certainly, revisiting the sex offender treatment programme would be one of the conditions of his suitability for parole, as well as one‑on‑one therapy attempt to at least somewhat decrease his obvious propensity to re‑offend.
On the other hand, Ms Edmands, who provided a psychological report, said that the respondent was a good candidate for treatment and expressed the opinion that there was every indication that he would benefit from inclusion in an intensive sex offender treatment program while serving his sentence. That recommendation was picked up by the community corrections officer.
That is what happened, as I understand it. Over an extended period between the end of January and 16 October 2007, the respondent undertook a prison‑based intensive sex offender treatment program. I think the proper conclusion is that the respondent completed it successfully, although, in the exit report provided by those who presented the course, there is a clear note of a guarded assessment, particularly having regard to earlier failures to avoid offending after the apparently successful completion of similar programs.
The reporting officers said that the respondent, 'met some program objectives, made some treatment gains and demonstrated some degree of increased acceptance of responsibility for his behaviour'. However, they added that given past failures, an extensive period during which the respondent successfully practised his offence‑avoiding techniques would be required before there could be any realistic acceptance of lasting changes away from his paedophilic deviant tendencies. Additional support would be required in the community if treatment gains were to be maintained.
The Prisoners Review Board was not persuaded that there could be any confidence that the respondent would not return to offending behaviour. There is in evidence before me a document giving the history of the various decisions of the Board over the years. That document shows that, in advance of the earliest eligibility date for the respondent to be released on parole after serving 4 years of the 6 year term, ie, 8 April 2009, the board considered an application for parole. On 10 March 2009, parole was denied. The board's record notes that the reason given was:
Entrenched sexual offending over a number of years against both male and female children, high risk of re‑offending. The Board notes completion of Sex Offender Treatment Program, however, considers limited treatment gains.
The Board did not simply defer consideration of release on parole. Parole was denied. Of course, the program had been completed, and no doubt the Board had available to it the assessment of the facilitators, but the consequence was that the respondent served out the full 6‑year term, which expired on 7 April 2011.
The pessimism about the respondent's capacity to remain offence free is reflected in a sex offender risk update report dated 9 September 2010, provided by the forensic psychologist, Ms Martin. She observes, by way of conclusion:
[The respondent] has completed two intensive sex offender treatment programs and re-offended within about 18 months after his first program. Program facilitators of his most recent program note that he has made some gains, but fall short of suggesting that he has reduced his risk of re‑offending. Generally program completion assists offenders to learn how to manage risk … [The respondent's] employment in electronics, use of internet pornography and chatrooms to meet others for casual sex, and photographing of his most recent victim also raises concerns about his potential for other types of sexual offending.
A serious danger to the community
I must make such a finding about the respondent if I am to go on to consider whether I should make an order for the respondent's continuing detention order, or whether I should make a supervision order. As has been seen, the expression 'a serious danger to the community' is one which has a precisely defined meaning by reference to s 7 of the Act. I am required to be satisfied, by acceptable and cogent evidence, to a high degree of probability, that there is an unacceptable risk that the respondent, if uncontrolled in the community, would commit a serious sexual offence.
I have set out the matters to which I must have regard in considering that question. They are enumerated in s 7(3). The respondent concedes that, upon the evidence before me, I may make such a finding. But under the statute, it is a matter about which I must be persuaded. I may not make the finding on the basis that the respondent has made a binding admission that that is the case.
The evidence discussed above supports the conclusion that the respondent has, in the past, and may in the future, have a propensity to commit serious sexual offences against adolescent male children. I think his predilection has moved away from preying on young females. The offences committed upon his daughter have never been repeated. The respondent admits to fantasies about sexual encounters with young adolescent males. He is, in my opinion, properly diagnosed as a paedophile, and that illness from which he suffers is focused in the way that I have described.
He has repeatedly sought to attract the companionship of young males, and to be with them in private circumstances. He has exhibited grooming behaviour designed to make them amenable to participate in such unlawful sexual activity, which often takes the form of masturbation, procuring masturbation and, in the most recent group of offences, progressed to oral sex. Occasionally, the victim has been photographed, presumably for the purpose (at least) of later personal gratification.
The respondent has assiduously over the years sought out and participated in recommended programs of treatment, in an attempt to achieve his rehabilitation. Success with these efforts has been limited. It seems that treatment gains have not been able to be maintained in the community indefinitely, although, between the second and third group of offences described above, there was a lengthy period during which, apparently, the respondent did not offend.
In addition to the historical evidence described above, I have had the benefit of the opinions of both Dr Wojnarowska and Dr Wynn Owen. In their reports and in their oral evidence they expressed the view that there remains a high risk, now and in the immediate future, that, if uncontrolled in the community, the respondent may commit further serious sexual offences of the kind of which he has been guilty in the past. I accept that opinion evidence.
I need only refer to a passage in the report of Dr Wynn Owen dated 11 April 2011. He speaks of the respondent's relapse into offending in relation to the second and third groups of offences, and observes:
He currently states that he would be able to avoid repeating this in the future. However, this will rely on his being able to break a long established pattern of behaviour and manage his deviant sexual arousal, he has previously appeared to make treatment gains following sexual offender programs, but gone on to re‑offend. The effectiveness of his self management strategies, including fantasy management and orgasmic reconditioning, will be difficult to measure and rely on self report. He remains a high risk of sexual re‑offending. However, it is likely that this risk will moderate with increasing age.
I have already noted that the respondent has now attained the age of 64. But as Dr Wynn Owen observed, his libido remains high and he is still relatively fit. In my opinion, he continues to have the capacity to further offend as he has in the past, and perhaps in additional ways, given the additional practice of fellatio during the last group of offences.
Continuing detention or a supervision order?
Again I am assisted by the opinions offered by the psychiatrists, Dr Wojnarowska and Dr Wynn Owen. They are both of the view that continuing detention is unnecessary, and that adequate protection of the community may be provided if the respondent is made subject to a supervision order for a period of 5 years, by which time the respondent will be approaching his 70th birthday.
However, both were of the view that it would be imperative that the respondent should have available to him suitably located, stable accommodation. It does not have to be supervised group accommodation, but it should not be located near an educational institution, a sports facility or other place where children, particularly adolescent children, regularly congregate. The accommodation needs to be stable and relatively long‑term to avoid imposing stress upon the respondent, arising out of worry about the continuing availability of his place of residence.
Both psychiatrists were of the view that the respondent will need what Dr Wojnarowska refers to as 'intensive psychological treatment in the form of both individual and group counselling'. As I understand it, the group counselling would take the form of his participation in what is described as a community based maintenance sex offender treatment program to consolidate what he has learned and to assist in implementing the knowledge which he has gained from his participation in the intensive sex offender treatment programs in prison. This needs to be translated into his daily living.
But as both psychiatrists made clear, one‑on‑one counselling by an expert psychologist will be needed to deal with, not only psychological issues, but also wider issues concerned with the respondent's resocialisation and reintegration into the community. Dr Wynn Owen said this counselling should:
address areas of personal awareness, including acknowledgement and management of paedophilic drive; age‑appropriate socialisation and pro‑social behaviour, interpersonal skills and development of understanding of and capacity to fulfil intimacy needs.
The psychiatrists made it plain in evidence that it will be critical to avoid allowing the respondent to drift into a situation where he is isolated, lonely and bored. If that is to occur, the risk of reoffence is increased greatly.
Both psychiatrists have noted the respondent's interest in computers. For recreational purposes he plans to follow an interest in computer games. He has worked in performing computer repairs and hopes to obtain employment in that field. He has not worked for a long time, in that or any other field. He lacks formal qualifications, and those factors and his age, alone would seem to militate against success in obtaining employment in this field.
Nonetheless, the recreational interest would seem to be beneficial. However, both psychiatrists injected a note of caution when they observed that he had previously used the computer and the display of pornographic material on it as a grooming activity preparatory to the commission of sexual offences.
It was suggested that if the respondent should be allowed to have a computer in his home (which I would think to be beneficial) he either should not have internet access or, at least, his computer should be subject to random checks and monitoring to ensure that, if the respondent was ordered not to open and view any pornographic or other sites with content which might stimulate his paedophilic interest, that any breach of that condition could be detected. I agree.
Because of the history of the use of a computer in connection with the commission of sexual offences, I would think that any breach of an order of that kind, if brought before the court, would be viewed most seriously, and would place in jeopardy the continuation of the supervision order.
Dr Wojnarowska noted that the short trial of Androcur had been reported by the respondent to be successful in lessening his sexual drive and urges. She explained that this was a form of treatment by way of testosterone suppression by anti‑androgenic hormone therapy. She referred to research data which suggested that such treatment may be particularly successful in relation to paedophilia. She recommended that such treatment be trialled again with the respondent to determine if it could be used successfully without harmful side effects of any severity.
Dr Wynn Owen was less enthusiastic about pharmacological treatment of this kind. He doubted its effectiveness in the case of the respondent, because the respondent had told him that it had not worked when it was previously tried. That is quite the opposite, it would appear, of what he said to Dr Kemp, the psychiatrist who, in 1994, reported to the court that the trial had been said by the respondent to be:
very useful in suppressing all sexual imagery and impulses, deviant and heterosexual adult in type. He is reporting minimal sexual drive, no erections, etc.
Dr Wynn Owen felt that as the respondent had said to him that the opposite was the case, he had no confidence in the accuracy of the earlier reporting, and he was therefore unprepared to recommend this treatment. However, he accepted that, with the agreement of the respondent, it might be trialled and an assessment made of its effectiveness. A report dated 21 April 2011 by a prison medical officer, Dr Wee, makes it clear that the respondent will only agree to undertake such treatment if the court requires it. I will not make that order under those circumstances.
Dr Wynn Owen agreed, as did Dr Wojnarowska, that it had been reported in the journals that certain antidepressant medication had been used as a pharmacological treatment in cases like that of the respondent, with some success. Such medication might avoid the adverse side effects of the hormone therapy, but such medication might have its own adverse side effects, and it seemed to me to be clear from the evidence of the psychiatrists that the use of such antidepressant medication for the purpose being discussed could be regarded as experimental only, and unproven.
Both psychiatrists said, and I accept, that at least initially, relatively intense supervision by a community corrections officer would be required, aided, to the extent thought to be necessary, by a mentor, and the provision of other specialist advice. The object is to put in place a way of life which will provide the respondent with supportive social contact and meaningful activities or occupation in the community. I suggested, and the experts appeared to accept, that he would find it valuable if he could do some volunteer work of a charitable kind so that he might make a valuable contribution to the welfare of the community. As yet, it seems, he has not formulated any precise plans.
The recommendations made by the psychiatrists as to the content of a supervision order and the conditions which should be incorporated were supported by the psychologist, Ms Wager, an officer of the Department of Corrective Services. I had before me her report of 10 April 2011. I need not discuss it here, because it was broadly to the same effect as the evidence to which I have already referred.
I have mentioned that I received a report from, and heard evidence by, the community corrections officer, Ms Court. She had undertaken a thorough investigation of the respondent's needs in the way of supervision in the community. Again, it would not be appropriate to discuss that material here. In discussing the recommendations, which I accept, made by the psychiatrists, I have approved arrangements substantially in the form proposed by Ms Court.
I discussed those arrangements with counsel during the hearing. I left to them the task of preparing a draft order, incorporating appropriately framed conditions. They have undertaken that task, and I have settled the final form of the order which will take effect upon its execution, upon the publication of these reasons.
Primarily, the time between the hearing of the application and the publication of these reasons has been occupied by the need to permit Ms Court to finalise arrangements for the respondent's accommodation, with the assistance and approval of an organisation which will provide the accommodation.
Ms Court has now reported to me that the accommodation is available. In my view, it is suitable accommodation having regard to the sort of considerations to which I have previously referred. The respondent is approved by the agency which is the accommodation provider, to occupy the particular residence.
If necessary, once that is in place, the respondent, with the assistance of his community corrections officer, should be able to arrange permanent accommodation with HomesWest. He has applied for such accommodation and I understand he is given a high priority for the provision of that accommodation, subject only to availability. That would be secure, long‑term accommodation, and I have referred to the characteristics of that accommodation which would make it suitable for occupation by the respondent.
After careful consideration of the evidence to which I have referred, I am satisfied that adequate protection of the community from the respondent's commission of serious sexual offences can be provided by making a supervision order for a period of 5 years, to take effect upon its acknowledgement by the respondent's signature.
The conditions which have been devised are flexible and designed to secure the protection of the community and to advance the treatment and rehabilitation of the respondent. They rely, to a considerable extent, upon the expert judgment of an assigned community corrections officer, aided by the capacity of that officer to obtain expert advice and to implement recommendations made by other experts. In particular, as time goes by and (hopefully) the respondent continues to make progress, the conditions are framed so as to enable the relaxation of what will, in the first instance, be intensive supervision and intensive remedial work.
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