JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL
CITATION: THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- LANGFORD [2010] WASC 412
CORAM: SIMMONDS J
HEARD: 20 & 23 DECEMBER 2010
DELIVERED : 23 DECEMBER 2010
FILE NO/S: INS 151 of 2010
BETWEEN: THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Prosecution
AND
DANIEL MATTHEW LANGFORD
Defence
Catchwords:
Criminal law and procedure - Bail application - Relevant considerations other than risk of flight
Legislation:
Bail Act 1982 (WA), s 14, s 22, sch 1 pt C cl 1, cl 3, cl 3A, sch 2
Criminal Code (WA), s 338E, s 401, s 444
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA)
Result:
Bail refused
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Prosecution : Mr A M Dungey
Defence: Ms M M In De Braekt
Solicitors:
Prosecution : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Defence: Megan In De Braekt
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Dabag v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASC 22
KM v The Queen (Unreported, WASC, Library No 7193, 14 July 1988)
Re Her Honour E A Woods; Ex parte Hardie Finance Corporation Ltd [2008] WASC 282
Sabau v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASC 183
Saka v The Queen [2001] WASC 92
SIMMONDS J: This matter requires to be resolved now, and therefore I will deal with it now. It is an application of some difficulty; however I have determined on the difficult balancing enterprise that this court must undertake that I will refuse the application for bail and these will be my reasons. These reasons are being delivered orally so that the parties are aware of them. The reasons will be edited in due course. Any publication of the decision however, will have to be after the relevant trial.
This is an application for bail. The applicant faces nine charges, which I was told will be reduced shortly to five charges, on an indictment that is yet to be preferred. I will have more to say about that in a minute. I now recite the charges expected: one of aggravated stalking with intent contrary to the Criminal Code (WA) s 338E(1)(a); one of burglary in the place of another with intent to commit an offence, Code s 401(2)(c); and three of wilful damage or destruction by fire, Code s 444(1)(a). The prosecution opposes the grant of bail.
On 27 July 2010, the applicant was arrested and taken into custody; and on 1 September 2010, a magistrate refused the applicant's application for bail. The applicant has been in custody continuously since his arrest.
Bail Act 1982 (WA) s 14(1), read with (2) and (4)(b)(i), makes it plain that I have the jurisdiction to grant bail for an appearance notwithstanding that another judicial officer whose jurisdiction was inferior to mine, such as a magistrate, refused to grant bail for that appearance. It is well established that my jurisdiction to grant bail is an original jurisdiction and the…
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- Case
- [2010] WASC 412
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the applicant's medical and rehabilitation needs were sufficiently compelling to warrant bail despite the risk of flight and other adverse factors. The court also had to consider the applicant's argument that the impasse over immunity should prompt the state to seek judicial resolution. The court noted that while there was some support for this argument, it seemed there was a procedural path available to resolve the matter. The court acknowledged the applicant's concerns but had to weigh them against the risk of flight and other relevant considerations.
After considering the evidence and arguments, the court concluded that the applicant's need for medical attention and rehabilitation was significant but not sufficient to overcome the risk of flight and other adverse factors. The court believed that the applicant's concerns would be communicated to the prison authorities to ensure they were addressed appropriately. Ultimately, the court decided to refuse the bail application.
The court's final order was that bail was refused. The court indicated that if the impasse over immunity was not resolved promptly and further delays occurred, it might consider the consequences for a further application. The court's decision highlighted the need to balance various considerations when granting bail, especially in cases involving risks of flight and significant personal circumstances.
Orders
Orders of the court
Bail refused
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
However, the applicant further strongly insists - and there is I must admit some support for the insistence but I simply say that in passing - that there is in the decision of Blaxell J, in Re Her Honour E A Woods; Ex parte Hardie Finance Corporation Ltd [2008] WASC 282, particularly at [21], when read with [23], some support for the view of the applicant that, where an impasse is reached on an immunity question, it is for the state to resolve that impasse promptly by bringing the matter before the court as a limitation on its disclosure obligation. I simply note that in passing because it seems to me that there is presently a procedural vehicle which may permit this matter to be resolved. If it does not, and if further delays supervene, I have already indicated what might be the consequence for a further application. There is, however, a still further matter that I need to address; and this further matter is one that, it seems to me, goes to other relevant circumstances of the kind referred to in the opening words of cl 1, quoted above. The applicant has a prosthetic, or partial limb at least, which requires the regular installation of new fixtures. New fixtures are presently due I was informed, and were sent to the prison. However, the prison did not allow those new fixtures to be installed and they were returned to the person who sent them, the applicant's father. Unless those fixtures are replaced relatively soon, I was informed, the applicant would be reduced to living in a wheel chair with the difficulties that would pose for him in the prison environment. The applicant has also suffered from, in the past, alcohol abuse issues which his time in custody has enabled him to address and which he would anticipate further addressing were he to be released from custody through attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings in a nearby town. Furthermore, there is surgery to be done to a hand injured some time ago, which I interpret as before these incidents or at least all of them, surgery which cannot be conducted upon him or can only be conducted on him with great difficulty while he is in custody. Those matters, it seems to me, in combination are indeed matters which bear on the grant of bail and are in favour of the grant of bail; however, they have to be balanced with all of the matters that I have referred to. When I do balance all of the matters that I have referred to, taking account of the prima facie position to which His Honour, Nicholson J, referred in KM v The Queen. I arrive at the conclusion that I indicated at the commencement of these reasons, namely, that the present application must be refused. I should add that when I finished delivering these reasons the applicant raised with me his concern for his hand and his leg. I indicated to him that my reasons should be provided to the prison authorities as well so that they are aware that the court is aware of his concerns with respect to that fixture, and with respect to that surgery, so that to the extent that the court's reasons can add weight to those matters being dealt with, notwithstanding he is in custody, those matters can be addressed.