The State of Western Australia v Imk

Case

[2018] WADC 171

20 DECEMBER 2018


JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CRIMINAL

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- IMK [2018] WADC 171

CORAM:   SLEIGHT CJDC

HEARD:   19 JULY 2018, 24 AUGUST 2018, 15 OCTOBER 2018 & 26 NOVEMBER 2018

DELIVERED          :   20 DECEMBER 2018

FILE NO/S:   IND 1246 of 2017

BETWEEN:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

AND

IMK


Catchwords:

Criminal procedure - Application for an order of unfitness to stand trial - Turns on its own facts

Legislation:

Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996 (WA)

Result:

Declaration that accused unfit to stand trial and will not be mentally fit to stand trial within six months.

The indictment dated 5 October 2017 is quashed.

Order for release of the accused.

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant : Mr M M Cvetkoski
Accused : Mr A D Sullivan

Solicitors:

Applicant : State Director of Public Prosecutions
Accused : Legal Aid

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):


Nil

SLEIGHT CJDC:

  1. This is a decision under the Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996 (WA) (the Act) on the issue of whether the accused is fit to stand trial. There are three issues:

    1.is accused mentally unfit to stand trial;

    2.if so, will this unfitness to stand trial change in the next six months?; and

    3.if the court is satisfied as to issues 1 and 2, whether, in addition to quashing the indictment, the court should make an order releasing the accused or make a custody order.

  2. The accused is charged with 20 counts on an indictment dated 5 October 2017 consisting of 10 counts of unlawfully and indecently assaulting his daughter, nine counts of unlawfully and indecently dealing with his daughter, a child under the age of 14 years and one count (count 10) of unlawfully and indecently assaulting a neighbour's child.

  3. The alleged offences are said to have occurred between 31 August 1967 and 15 January 1977.  In relation to the alleged offending against the accused's daughter, the State's case is that the alleged offending is representative of a course of sexual abuse of the complainant daughter over many years on numerous occasions starting at a time when the complainant was aged approximately four years old.

  4. The complainant daughter is now 54 years of age.  She lives out of Western Australia.  She has two children of her own and one adult stepchild.  The accused is her biological father and he is now 81 years of age.

Charges

  1. The details of the alleged offending in relation to each count on the indictment is summarised in the written submissions filed by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP).  I will briefly summarise the allegations:

    Count one alleges that on a date in 1967 the complainant daughter had a nightmare involving snakes.  She was screaming out.  The accused came into the bedroom and slid into the bed with her.  The complainant daughter alleges the accused pulled his penis out for her to look at and stroke, to show her some snakes were friendly.

    Count two alleges that in 1967 when the complainant daughter's mother was in hospital, the accused took off the complainant daughter's nightie and rubbed his penis on her stomach and vagina.

    Count three alleges that in 1969 the accused tried to put his fingers inside the complainant daughter's vagina which caused severe pain.

    Counts 4 to 7 alleges offences on a date unknown between 14 January 1969 and 16 January 1971.  It is alleged the accused came to the complainant daughter's bedroom at night and climbed into her bed and tickled her vagina.  The accused grabbed the complainant daughter's hand and then placed it on his penis which was exposed and erect.  The accused then licked the complainant daughter's tummy area.  The accused then tickled the complainant daughter on the outside of her vagina.

    Counts 8 and 9 are alleged to have occurred on an unknown date between the 14 January 1970 and 1 January 1971.  It is alleged the accused climbed into the complainant daughter's bed and grabbed her hand and placed it on his erect penis.  It is alleged the accused then touched the complainant daughter's vagina, moving his hands around in a circular motion against her clitoris.

    Count 10 alleged to have occurred between 31 December 1969 and 1 January 1972.  It is alleged the accused kissed a neighbour's child on the mouth.  It is alleged the child was approximately 12 years old.

    Count 11 alleges that in 1971 the accused came to the complainant daughter's bed and placed her hand on his penis.

    Counts 12 and 13 are alleged to have occurred on a date unknown between 30 November 1972 and 15 January 1973.  It is alleged the accused entered the complainant daughter's bedroom, climbed into her bed and touched her on her vagina underneath her clothing.  On the same occasion it is alleged he rubbed his penis up against her bottom.

    Count 14 alleges an offence between 31 December 1972 and 1 January 1974.  It is alleged that whilst the complainant daughter was suffering from measles the accused placed his hand in her knickers and touched her vagina.

    Count 15 alleges that on a date unknown between 31 December 1974 and 1 January 1976, the accused entered the complainant daughter's bedroom while she was lying on the bed reading.  It is alleged the accused pulled out his erect penis and rubbed it around her face.

    Counts 16 to 19 are alleged to have occurred between 14 January 1975 and 15 January 1977.  It is alleged that the accused whilst naked climbed into the bed of the complainant daughter and rubbed his hands over her body.  It is alleged he also rubbed her vagina.  It is also alleged that he rubbed his penis against her and tried to place his penis in her bottom and vagina.

    Count 20 alleges an offence on a date unknown between 15 January 1976 and 1 April 1976.  It is alleged the accused offered the complainant daughter some sweets and then asked her to show her breasts.  When she did not respond it is alleged the accused's hands went to her skirt and knickers.

  2. All the offences against the accused are serious offences. The maximum penalty on the charges of unlawful and indecent assault is a term of imprisonment for four years with hard labour.  The maximum penalty on the charges of unlawful and indecent dealing of a child under the age of 14 years is a term of imprisonment of seven years.  If the accused was convicted of the charges against him then he could expect a lengthy term of imprisonment.

Is the accused mentally unfit to stand trial?

  1. The first issue to consider is whether the accused is mentally unfit to stand trial. The test of whether a person is not mentally fit to stand trial is set out in s 9 of the Act:

    9.  Mental unfitness to stand trial, definition

    An accused is not mentally fit to stand trial for an offence if the accused, because of mental impairment, is —

    (a)unable to understand the nature of the charge;

    (b)unable to understand the requirement to plead to the charge or the effect of a plea;

    (c)unable to understand the purpose of a trial;

    (d)unable to understand or exercise the right to challenge jurors;

    (e)unable to follow the course of the trial;

    (f)unable to understand the substantial effect of evidence presented by the prosecution in the trial; or

    (g)unable to properly defend the charge.

  2. A mental impairment is defined in s 8 of the Act as being an intellectual disability, mental illness, brain damage or senility.  'Mental illness' is also defined in the Act and it is not in dispute in this matter that IMK suffers from a mental illness.

  3. An accused person is presumed to be mentally fit to stand trial until the contrary is found.[1]  The question of whether the accused is not mentally fit to stand trial is decided on the balance of probabilities after the court enquires into the question and informs itself in any way the court thinks fit.[2]

    [1] Section 10(1) of the Act.

    [2] Section 12(1) of the Act.

  4. There had been a number of reports received in relation to the question of the accused's mental disabilities and whether he is mentally unfit to stand trial, namely:

    1.a report of Dr Mandy Vidovich dated 23 February 2018 (commissioned by the accused's lawyer);

    2.a report of Dr Elizabeth Vuletich dated 7 May 2018 (commissioned by the DPP);

    3.a report of Dr Roger W Warne, geriatric specialist ordered by the court dated 23 November 2018; and

    4.a report of Dr Roger W Warne, geriatric specialist requested by DPP dated 30 November 2018.

  5. Both Dr Vidovich and Dr Vuletide are neuropsychologists.  Neither is a medical practitioner.

  6. Dr Vidovich after conducting neuropsychological testing states that:

    Regarding his cognition, both [IMK] and his wife noted deterioration in his thinking over the last 12 months or so, with this occurring in the context of health issues and the stressors associated with the current changes.  A need for prompting, with a lack of clarity in his thinking, together with slowing of his thought processes has been observed.  His mood had been low, with irritability.

    [IMK] found it challenging to consistently apply himself during the testing, becoming readily distracted by this thoughts in relation to his legal matters and his perceptions of his deceased ex-wife and his daughter.  Disgruntled and agitated at times, he repeatedly voiced his opinions regarding his subjective issues with the Court processes.  His slowness, distractibility and fatigue also impacted on the amount of testing that was able to be completed.

    Inspection of his neuropsychological profile revealed impairments across a number of domains of his cognition.  He had trouble mentally manipulating information in mind and consistently focusing his attention.  Cognitive and visuomotor slowing was evident, together with impairments in his perceptual and visuospatial abilities.  Inefficiency in the uptake and spontaneous recall of novel material was observed, as well as, indications of dyspraxia.  Executive deficits, including reductions in planning, organisation, reasoning and problem solving were demonstrated.  He was tangential and perseverative in his interactions and thought processes.  Expressive language skills were functional and appeared relatively intact.  Whilst his behaviour was appropriate, he was irritable, with low mood.

    Collectively, [IMK] would meet diagnostic criteria for a Major Neurocognitive Disorder.  Whilst this is likely of a vascular aetiology (given his medical history) neuroimaging would need to be undertaken to support the aetiology of the diagnosis.  Cognitive dysfunction in association with his lengthy history of diabetes and his significant kidney disease would also not be unexpected.  Day-to-day variability will be influenced by his pain state and level of fatigue.

    With respect to [IMK]'s fitness to participate in Court proceedings, his cognitive impairment is of a severity as to significantly compromise his capacity to fairly participate in his legal matters.  Given his medical conditions, progressive deterioration in his cognition in the longer term is expected, noting however that he also has medical co-morbidities that impact on his wellbeing and fitness in a more general sense.  With respect to the specific criteria of the Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996 – section 9, the following is of relevance:

    a)unable to understand the nature of the charge;

    Whilst the nature of the charges was not discussed with [IMK] at length, he is considered capable of understanding them.  This is also likely to be so, given his recall of having been similarly charged in 1999.

    b)unable to understand the requirement to plead to the charge or the effect of a plea;

    [IMK] has the capacity to understand the need to plead to the charge.

    c)unable to understand the purpose of a trial;

    With explanation, [IMK] is likely to understand the purpose of a trial, even if he is unable to appreciate the need for such in the current situation.

    d)unable to understand or exercise the right to challenge jurors;

    [IMK] would require assistance with respect to this component of any legal proceedings.  His need for support is associated with his limited capacity to keep track of behaviours or commentary within the court room that may reflect any biases.

    e)unable to follow the course of the trial;

    f)unable to understand the substantial effect of evidence presented by the prosecution in the trial; or

    g)unable to properly defend the charge.

    With respect to components (e) through to (g), it is my clinical opinion that [IMK] is not capable of following the course of a trial, would have significant difficulty keeping track of the evidence presented by the prosecution, and would thereby, in effect, be unable to properly defend the charge.  In addition to his sensory deficits, his slowed processing speed, poor capacity to sustain attention and trouble mentally manipulating information in mind, would make it very difficult for him to follow, lengthy dialogue, questions with multiple components and the presentation of specific details relevant to the allegations.  His concrete thought processes, impaired memory, and reduced reasoning and problem-solving abilities also significantly limit his capacity to critically analyse presented materials.

    Whilst recognising I am not a medical practitioner, and specific comment may need to be sought from his treating doctor, his significant health co-morbidities would also appear, in and of themselves, to be influencing factors with respect to his physical fitness to participate in any lengthy trial proceedings.

  7. Dr Vuletich stated that she also conducted a neuropsychological assessment and that the assessment revealed a pattern of very similar results to the assessment conducted by Dr Vidovich.

  8. Dr Vuletich concluded at [79] of her report:

    On the basis of the medical information provided, the history outlined in the documents reviewed and the informant report of [the accused's wife], the current observations and assessment findings are consistent with a neurodegenerative condition (Dementia).  [IMK] would be considered to meet DSM-V, diagnostic criteria for Major Neurocognitive Disorder.

  9. Dr Vuletich stated at [81] ‑ [92]:

    81.With respect to section 9 of the Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996, and the question of [IMK]'s fitness to enter a plea/stand trial, the following points are of relevance:

    A.Unable to understand the nature of the charge

    82.As outlined in the test results section (see pages 8 to 11), whilst [IMK] demonstrates multiple cognitive impairments, his basic verbal and language abilities appeared functional.  However, despite having previously discussed his charges and court matter with Dr Vidovich, he struggled to articulate a consistent and clear understanding of the charges on this occasion, or to describe a basic understanding of the facts and elements in the alleged offences.  He would appear to require re-directing and prompting in relation to his understanding of the charges at this time.

    B.Unable to understand the requirement to plead the charge or the effect of a plea

    83.A summary of [IMK]'s responses to questions about the legal process are outlined under the results section (see section Current situation and legal matter, paragraphs 61 ‑ 68).

    84.He could describe some knowledge of the concepts of guilty and not-guilty, though was unaware of their effect on a case.  Explanation appeared to temporarily assist in his understanding, though it is unclear whether he has sufficient capacity to maintain this understanding over time.  Given that these questions were recently discussed with him by Dr Vidovich, his lack of current understanding raises concerns that he has not maintained awareness of the effect of entering a plea.

    C.Unable to understand the purpose of a trial

    85.[IMK] required some support and explanation to demonstrate an understanding of the purpose of a trial, and he seemed to be easily confused by the roles and functions of various parties involved.  With explanation, he appeared to poses (sic) simple awareness of the importance of hearing evidence, and testing this in order to determine innocence or guilt.

    D.Unable to understand or exercise the right to challenge jurors

    86.Following discussion, he could demonstrate awareness of the general right to challenge Juror, though he did not know how or when this would occur, or who would be involved.

    E.Unable to follow the course of a trial

    87.With respect to his ability to follow the course of proceedings, his slowed processing, vulnerable working memory, and executive dysfunction (cognitive disinhibition, impaired mental flexibility, verbal reasoning weakness), would likely make it difficult for him to consistently and efficiently process complex and large amounts of verbal material, such as that presented in a court hearing.  Whilst his memory for simple material is reasonable, it is clear from the current findings that he struggles to maintain larger amounts of verbal information.  When the quantity of material exceeds his simple attention (~7 items), it is not effectively retained.  Accommodations could be considered to assist him in this regard (e.g. his legal representatives distilling down material to key points, repetition of the information).  However, there remains a core risk that he would not follow or process material sufficiently even with adaptions.

    88.Extreme care should be taken if questioning [IMK]; as he would appear vulnerable to failing to keep track of long-winded verbal questions with multiple parts.  In the context of his executive dysfunctioning, he would also appear at risk of impulsive, tangential, perseverative, and poorly reasoned responses, and not fully appreciating what has been asked.

    F.Unable to understand the substantial effect of evidence presented by the prosecution in the trial

    89.Please see my response at 87 above.  Additionally, [IMK] appears highly perseverative in his thinking, and has difficulty 'shifting' his mindset from what he perceives as important.  This is likely to further complicate his ability to process, hold in mind, and therefore understand any detailed facts presented in the case.  That is, due to his cognitive deficits, he is more likely than others to react before fully hearing, and properly processing what is presented to him.

    G.Unable to properly defend the charge

    90.Repeat neuropsychological assessment, performed by independent neuropsychologists, have revealed significant impairments in [IMK]'s higher-level thought (concrete reasoning, reduced problem-solving, inflexibility and 'sticky' thinking, cognitive disinhibition, limited self-monitoring, shallow insight), as well as reduced ability to juggle more than a fairly cursory amount of material (~4 pieces of information) in working memory.

    91.Taken together, these deficits would impede [IMK]'s capacity to hold necessary facts in mind, weigh up or evaluate the information presented, carefully consider the relevance and generate a logical argument in defence.  Moreover, his perseveration and impulsivity would likely further compromise his ability to mount a defence.

    92.In my opinion, these cognitive impairments render him unable to defend or answer the charge.

  10. Dr Roger Warne, geriatric specialist, examined IMK on 23 November 2018.  In his report dated 23 November 2018, Dr Warne gave a diagnosis that the accused suffered cerebral ischaemia which was described as a cognitive impairment affecting executive function, orientation and mild recent memory impairment, vermal cerebellar degeneration.  In summary Dr Warne stated as follows:

    [IMK] presents the problem of an increasingly frail married man whose independence at home is threatened by his mild cognitive impairment, unsteady walking and falls, ischaemic heart disease and postural hypotension.

  1. In a subsequent report dated 30 November 2018, Dr Warne reported as follows:

    •[IMK] does suffer from a mental impairment: Cerebral Ischemia – Cognitive impairment affecting executive function, orientation and mild recent memory impairment, vermal cerebellar degeneration.

    •The mental impairment is likely to exist for six months or more i.e., it is progressive.

    •I agree with assessment and conclusions in the attached reports from Doctor Vuletich and Doctor Vidovich.

    •I do not think he is fit to drive a motor vehicle and that he should undergo a formal Driving test to assess fitness to drive owing to weakness in legs and executive dysfunction.

    •He is in very poor health and the management plan I outlined at the end of my report 3rd(sic) of November 2018 of [IMK]'s health should be implemented.

  2. The State in this matter concedes that the accused is not mentally fit to stand trial within the meaning of the Act.  The State also concedes that the accused will not become mentally fit to stand trial within six months, given the nature of his medical history and his age.  In my opinion, the concessions made by the State are appropriate as both neuropsychological reports and the report of Dr Warne dated 30 November 2018 conclude that the accused suffers a cognitive impairment which I conclude constitutes an intellectual disability and therefore falls within the definition of a mental impairment within the meaning of the Act.  Further all three reports conclude that the accused is unfit to stand trial.  Given his age and the nature of his mental condition, this impairment is not likely to improve in the next six months.

  3. Accordingly, I conclude that the accused is not mentally fit to stand trial and will not become mentally fit to stand trial within six months.

  4. Section 19 of the Act provides that if a judge decides that the accused is not mentally fit to stand trial and is satisfied that the accused will not become mentally fit to stand trial within six months after the finding, the judge must make an order quashing the indictment, without deciding the guilt or otherwise of the accused and either release the accused or make a custody order in respect of the accused.[3]

    [3] See s 19(1) and (4) of the Act.

  5. In light of my findings that the accused is unfit to stand trial and will not become mentally fit to stand trial within six months, I make an order which is required under the Act quashing the indictment.

Release order or custody order

  1. The next issue to consider is whether a release order or a custody order should be made.  Subsection 19(5) of the Act sets out the criteria that must be satisfied before a custody order can be made.

    (5)A custody order must not be made in respect of an accused unless the statutory penalty for the alleged offence is or includes imprisonment and the judge is satisfied that a custody order is appropriate having regard to —

    (a)the strength of the evidence against the accused;

    (b)the nature of the alleged offence and the alleged circumstances of its commission;

    (c)the accused's character, antecedents, age, health and mental condition; and

    (d)the public interest.

  2. The charges against the accused all have a statutory penalty of imprisonment.  Accordingly, a custody order can be made if I consider that it is appropriate to do so based upon the criteria set out in s 19(5) of the Act.

The strength of the evidence against the accused

  1. The State's case in this matter is in the nature of historic sexual allegations.  The strength of the State's case is dependent upon the jury accepting the evidence of both complainants.  The complainant daughter first reported the offending to police in 1997.  The accused was arrested and interviewed in 1998 and subsequently charged.  During this interview the accused made certain admissions of a contextual nature concerning such things as family dynamics, where the family lived at various times and things of that nature.  However, the accused denied the allegations of sexual impropriety.  In 1999 the office of the DPP discontinued the charges against the accused as it concluded there was no reasonable prospect of conviction.  However subsequently, the complainant daughter provided further particulars and the accused was recharged.  He was also reinterviewed by police on 9 November 2016.  Again, although the accused made certain admissions concerning contextual matters, he denied sexually interfering with his daughter.

  2. The police obtained a statement in 1999 from the mother of the complainant daughter. The nature of her evidence is contextual evidence as to the nature of the family dynamics, her marriage to the accused and where the family resided at various times. The mother of the complainant daughter is now deceased and if her evidence is to be led leave from the court will need to be obtained under sch 3 cl 7(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA).

  3. The State's case also includes evidence from a school friend who slept over at the complainant daughter's home at the address where it is alleged counts 15 to 19 are alleged to have been committed.  The school friend's evidence will be that on each occasion she had a sleepover she slept in a bed with the complainant daughter.  She remembers on each occasion the accused would take the complainant daughter out of the bed during the night.  Her evidence will be that she remembers a fearful look on the complainant daughter's face.  She also recalls a time when the accused slid into bed and the complainant daughter saying 'no, no dad'.  She says the complainant was crying and pleading with the accused.  She recalls the accused removing the complainant daughter from the bed and she recalls the complainant sobbing.

  4. Another school friend made a statement that she stayed over at the complainant's house a couple of times.  The school friend recalls hearing footsteps during the night and recalls the accused being in the room.  The school friend says the complainant daughter clutched the school friends arm tight and whispered 'don't go, don't leave me.  He won't touch me if you're here'.  The evidence of the school friend is that the complainant daughter was frightened.  The school friend states that the accused walked in and looked at the two girls and then left the room.

  5. There is also a statement from the complainant daughter's husband that in 1979 when he first met the accused, the complainant daughter was teary and upset and disclosed to him that the accused had entered her room while she was in bed and intended to sexually abuse her and she screamed for him to get out.  The complainant daughter complained to her future husband that she had been sexually abused starting from the age of when she was four or five years old.  The State will seek to lead this evidence to rebut any submission of recent invention.

  6. The statement of the second complainant (who was born in 1957) is that when she was 11 years of age she and her family were living next door to the accused.  She states that she regularly visited the property of the accused and used to go into his shed with him.  She said that she and the accused would cuddle each other but these cuddles became more intense.  She remembers that on at least the last two occasions this occurred it was accompanied by a kiss.  She described one occasion where the accused started to unzip a jump suit she was wearing and also started kissing her on the mouth.  She described the kiss as an adult kiss.

  7. The State's case is that the evidence of both complainants are cross‑admissible under s 31A of the Evidence Act1906 (WA) as propensity evidence. I do not believe it is necessary for the purposes of this decision that I express any views about whether it is likely that the State would be successful on an application for a ruling that evidence of both complainants is cross‑admissible.

  8. Given the historic nature of the offending it is quite clear that a Longman direction will need to be given to the jury arising from the forensic disadvantages the accused suffers as a result of the delay in the complaints being made by the complainants.

  9. The accused in his two interviews categorically denied the offending and therefore the case is reliant upon the jury accepting the complainants' evidence as credible and reliable.

  10. The State acknowledges that its case is not an easy prosecution and that it has been made weaker by delay.  It is always difficult for a judge prior to trial to make an assessment of the strength of the prosecution's case particularly when there is no direct corroboration of each of the allegations making up the counts and the case is dependent primarily upon the jury's assessment of the credibility of the complainant.  However, given the supportive evidence that I have mentioned, I conclude that there is a reasonable prospect of convictions being obtained concerning the allegations of both complainants.

The nature of the alleged offence and the alleged circumstances of its commission

  1. The nature of the alleged offending and the alleged circumstances has been detailed earlier in this decision.  As I have already commented earlier, if convicted the accused is likely to receive an immediate term of imprisonment.

The accused's character, antecedents, age, health and mental condition

  1. The accused is aged 81.  He has a single prior conviction on 28 May 1980 for aggravated assault.  He was placed on a good behaviour bond for two years.  The facts of that case were that the accused was a MTT bus driver at the time.  On the way to returning to the depot in a bus after finishing his duties he picked up a mentally impaired person at a bus stop.  He later drove to a location where he stopped the bus.  He sat beside the person, kissed her, fondled her breasts through her clothing and placed a hand on her thigh.  He then drove her to her place of employment.  When interviewed, he admitted the offence.

  2. The accused currently lives in a retirement facility for the elderly in the metropolitan area with his wife of 15 years.

  3. The accused was described in the report of Dr Vidovich as presenting as frail and unwell.  He complained of symptoms of gout, which affected his feet and caused pain and swelling.  He ambulated extremely slowly using two walking sticks.  He was similarly described by Dr Vuletich.  She stated that the accused presented as an elderly, very frail man, who appeared pale and in poor general health.  He was seated in a high backed chair, with a walking frame and walking stick in close proximity.  His gait was described as extremely slow and shuffle-like and he utilised a walking stick to move around the house.

  4. Dr Warne in his report dated 23 November 2018 described the accused as being increasingly frail with a number of different health issues.  In the subsequent report dated 30 November 2018 he concluded that the accused was 'in very poor health'.

  5. Given the accused's age, his place of residence, his lack of mobility and the fact that he has not committed any offences since 1980, I conclude that there is little risk of him committing any further offences.

Public interest

  1. A major public interest consideration is the need to reduce the risk of the accused re‑offending against the complainants and other persons.  In my opinion given the age, frailty and living circumstances of the accused the risk of re‑offending is very low.  However, this is not the only consideration.  It is also in the public interest that people with mental illnesses are provided with the best possible treatment and care; and with the least restriction of their freedom and the least interference with their rights and dignity.[4]

    [4] See for example, s 10 of the Mental Health Act 2014 (WA) which sets out the objects of the legislation in caring for mentally ill persons.

Conclusion

  1. I come to the conclusion that I should not make a custody order but rather make an order for release.  This is based upon the accused's age, frailty and the low risk of re‑offending.

  2. For the above reasons, I make the following orders:

    (a)a declaration that the accused is unfit to stand trial and will not become mentally fit to stand trial within six months;

    (b)the indictment dated 5 October 2017 is quashed; and

    (c)the accused be released.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the District Court of Western Australia.

CG
ASSOCIATE TO CHIEF JUDGE SLEIGHT

11 DECEMBER 2018


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