The State of Western Australia v Gonzalez

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CRIMINAL

CITATION:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- GONZALEZ [2014] WASC 242

CORAM:   SIMMONDS J

HEARD:   25 JUNE 2014

DELIVERED          :   25 JUNE 2014

FILE NO/S:   INS 193 of 2013

BETWEEN:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Applicant

AND

YOVAN JOSHUA GONZALEZ
Respondent

Catchwords:

Evidence - Admissibility in trial for armed robbery of conduct and convictions in previous trials - Section 31 of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) - Whether significant probative value shown - What degree of risk of an unfair trial - Comparison of value with risk

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A

Result:

Application dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant:     Ms Z M M Jenkins

Respondent:     Mr A O Karstaedt

Solicitors:

Applicant:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Respondent:     NR Barber Legal

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Bennett v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 70

Dair v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 72; (2008) 36 WAR 413

Daniels v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 213

Di Lena v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 162

Donaldson v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 196; (2005) 31 WAR 122

KRM v The Queen [2001] HCA 11; (2001) 206 CLR 221

Preston v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 64

SIMMONDS J: 

(This judgment was delivered extemporaneously and has been edited from the transcript.)

Introduction

  1. This is an application by the state for orders to permit it to lead certain evidence at a trial by jury, listed to commence on 1 September 2014 on the present indictment, INS 193 of 2013.

  2. The basis for this application is that the evidence to be led is propensity evidence, admissible under Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 31A.

  3. I should immediately note that I have concluded the application should not be granted.  The following are my reasons.

  4. First, I describe the matter the subject of the present indictment.

  5. Then I describe the state's application in more detail and the evidence to which that application relates.

  6. Then I describe the applicable legal principles, including the statutory background relevant to determining the application.

  7. I then apply the legal principles.

  8. The concluding section of these reasons is my conclusion and orders.

  9. I turn then to the matter the subject of the present indictment, INS 193 of 2013.

The present indictment

  1. The indictment is dated 1 February 2014 and reads:

    On 26 April 2013, at Bassendean, Yovan Joshua Gonzalez stole from the Australian and New Zealand Banking Group trading as ANZ Bank, with threats of violence, a sum of money the property of the Australian and New Zealand Banking Group trading as ANZ Bank.

    And that Yovan Joshua Gonzalez was armed with a dangerous weapon, namely a handgun.

  2. The statement of material facts for that offence of armed robbery is as follows, excluding the final paragraph:

    At about 3:22 pm on Friday 26 April 2013, the accused attended at the ANZ Bank located within the Bassendean Shopping…

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Details
Case
[2014] WASC 242
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The State of Western Australia was the plaintiff in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, bringing charges against Gonzalez for armed robbery. The central issue was the admissibility of prior conduct and convictions of the accused in previous trials, which the prosecution sought to introduce as evidence under section 31 of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA). The court needed to determine whether this evidence met the criteria of having significant probative value and whether its admission would pose a risk of an unfair trial.

The court analysed the admissibility of propensity and relationship evidence under the Evidence Act, particularly section 31A, which governs the admissibility of such evidence in criminal proceedings. The court held that the admissibility of evidence under section 31A(2) is a matter of law, not discretion, and requires the evidence to have significant probative value and a probative value that outweighs the risk of an unfair trial. The court also considered the risk of the jury overvaluing the evidence and the necessity of a particular warning in specific circumstances. Ultimately, the court had to assess whether the probative value of the evidence, when weighed against the risk of an unfair trial, demonstrated that fair-minded people would consider the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt to be paramount.

The court concluded that the evidence in question had significant probative value and that the risk of an unfair trial, despite the potential for the jury to overvalue the evidence, was outweighed by the importance of the evidence in establishing the accused's propensity to commit the crime. The court found that fair-minded people would consider the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt to be paramount over the risk of an unfair trial. Consequently, the court admitted the evidence.

The final orders of the court were to admit the evidence of the accused's prior conduct and convictions in the trial for armed robbery, subject to any necessary warnings to the jury.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Evidence Act s 31A is as follows:31A.Propensity and relationship evidence(1)In this section -propensity evidence means -(a)similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; or(b)evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had;relationship evidence means evidence of the attitude or conduct of the accused person towards another person, or a class of persons, over a period of time.(2)Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for an offence if the court considers -(a)that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and(b)that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial.(3)In considering the probative value of evidence for the purposes of subsection (2) it is not open to the court to have regard to the possibility that the evidence may be the result of collusion, concoction or suggestion. On the authorities cited to me on the application of those provisions, I take the following 10 propositions to be established:(1)A determination by a trial judge to admit evidence under Evidence Act s 31A(2) is one of law, not of discretion. If the trial judge concludes that the evidence has significant probative value, and fair‑minded people, comparing its probative value to the risk of an unfair trail, would think the public interest in producing relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over risk of an unfair trial, then he or she is bound to admit it: see Di Lena v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 162 [60] (Roberts‑Smith JA, Wheeler & Pullin JJA agreeing).(2)The definition of propensity evidence in Evidence Act s 31A(1) is extraordinarily wide, going beyond what the common law understood by that category of evidence and embracing not just similar fact evidence but also evidence of the character or reputation of the accused, or of a tendency that he or she has had, as well as other evidence of the conduct of the accused person: see Preston v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 64 [36] (Mazza JA, Martin CJ & Buss JA agreeing); and Di Lena [52]. The evidence does not need to fall within the category of similar evidence, let alone strikingly similar evidence: see Donaldson v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 196; (2005) 31 WAR 122 [120] ‑ [122] (Roberts‑Smith JA, Wheeler JA agreeing).(3)The evidence in question must be relevant before it can be admitted into evidence. This means it must be such as could rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding: see Dair v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 72; (2008) 36 WAR 413 [60] (Steytler P), which I note was quoted in Daniels v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 213 [47] (Buss JA, Martin CJ & Mazza JA agreeing).(4)The evidence in question must also be of significant probative value, meaning it must be such as could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the relevant facts and issues to a significant extent, ie, more is required than mere relevance, but less than a substantial degree of relevance. It is a probative value which is important or of consequence. Significance of the probative value of the tendency evidence must depend on the nature of the fact in issue to which it is relevant, and the significance or importance which that evidence may have in establishing the fact: see Dair [61], which I note was quoted in Daniels [47].(5)Evidence Act s 31A(2)(b) requires the court to assess the degree of risk of unfairness at trial that will be occasioned by the admission of the evidence in question, the court having already found under s 31A(2)(a) that the evidence has significant probative value: see Dair [62], as described in Daniels [50].(6)The risk of an unfair trial includes the risk that a jury might uncritically overvalue the probative effect of the evidence, and conclude that an accused must have committed the offence charged simply because he or she has committed other offences, or has done, or has a reputation for doing, other discreditable things, rather than confining the use of the evidence to a process of dispassionate, logical reasoning: see Donaldson [127].(7)When assessing the risk of an unfair trial for the purposes of Evidence Act s 31(A)(2)(b), the court will take into account any directions that might be given to the jury in an attempt to overcome the prejudice, and their likely effect on the jury: see Dair [64] (Steytler P), as described in Daniels [50] (Buss JA).(8)However, it is important to bear in mind in respect of the matter of directions that when propensity evidence is admissible as such, because it meets the requirement of the admission of evidence of that kind, the standard propensity warning will not be required: see Dair [64]; see also Daniels [94] referring to Dair [64] among other authorities, and explaining that by 'standard propensity warning' is meant a warning of the kind described by McHugh J in KRM v The Queen [2001] HCA 11; (2001) 206 CLR 221 [2] ‑ [3], and explaining also that the reason the standard propensity warning is not required is that:[T]he very purpose of the evidence is to prove that the accused is the type of person who is likely to have committed the offence or offences charged.(9)At the same time, a particular warning might be required in the circumstances of an individual case. Whether a warning is required and its terms will depend on those circumstances: see Dair [65].(10)Having identified the probative value of the evidence and the degree or risk of an unfair trial, the court must then make the comparison referred to in Evidence Act s 31A(2)(b). That comparison requires an assessment to be made of whether fair‑minded people would think that the interests of justice require the admission of the evidence despite the risk. For that purpose, fair‑minded people are to be regarded as reasonable members of the general public, who are not lawyers and who have informed themselves of at least the most basic considerations relevant to arriving at their conclusion, founded on a fair understanding of all the relevant circumstances: see Dair [66] ‑ [67], referred to in Daniels [50].

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established