The State of Western Australia v Collard

Link copied
Case Copied 34 min read

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- COLLARD [2015] WASCA 86

CORAM:   BUSS JA

NEWNES JA
MURPHY JA

HEARD:   20 NOVEMBER 2014

DELIVERED          :   8 MAY 2015

FILE NO/S:   CACV 45 of 2014

BETWEEN:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

First Appellant

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT MINISTERIAL BODY
Second Appellant

AND

DONALD COLLARD
First Respondent

SYLVIA RACHEL COLLARD
Second First Respondent

GLENYS DALE COLLARD
Second Respondent

ELLEN THOMAS
Third Respondent

EVA JETTA
Fourth Respondent

WESLEY ROHAN COLLARD
Fifth Respondent

BEVERLEY ANNE HUMPHRIES
Sixth Respondent

DARRYL FREDERICK COLLARD
Seventh Respondent

BONNIE COLLARD MILLER
Eighth Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :PRITCHARD J

Citation  :COLLARD -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [No 4] [2013] WASC 455 (S)

File No  :CIV 1772 of 2010

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Costs - Claim for damages against State for breach of fiduciary duty in wardship of Aboriginal children - Novel claim - Claim potentially relevant to other former wards of State - Claim dismissed - No order as to costs made - Whether 'test case' - Consideration of principles applicable to costs in 'test case' and 'public interest litigation'

Legislation:

Rules of the Supreme Court Act 1971 (WA), O 66 r 1
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 37, s 60(1)(e)

Result:

Appeal allowed
Respondents to pay appellants' costs of the action to be taxed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

First Appellant               :     Mr T C Russell

Second Appellant          :     Ms R Young

First Respondent           :     Mr I Freeman

Second First Respondent     :     Mr I Freeman

Second Respondent      :     Mr I Freeman

Third Respondent          :     Mr I Freeman

Fourth Respondent        :     Mr I Freeman

Fifth Respondent           :     Mr I Freeman

Sixth Respondent          :     Mr I Freeman

Seventh Respondent      :     Mr I Freeman

Eighth Respondent        :     Mr I Freeman

Solicitors:

First Appellant               :     State Solicitor for Western Australia

Second Appellant          :     State Solicitor for Western Australia

First Respondent           :     Aboriginal Legal Service (WA)

Second First Respondent     :     Aboriginal Legal Service (WA)

Second Respondent      :     Aboriginal Legal Service (WA)

Third Respondent          :     Aboriginal Legal Service (WA)

Fourth Respondent        :     Aboriginal Legal Service (WA)

Fifth Respondent           :     Aboriginal Legal Service (WA)

Sixth Respondent          :     Aboriginal Legal Service (WA)

Seventh Respondent      :     Aboriginal Legal Service (WA)

Eighth Respondent        :     Aboriginal Legal Service (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

A Goninan and Co Ltd v Gill [2001] NSWCA 77; (2001) 51 NSWLR 441

Attrill v Richmond River Shire Council (1995) 38 NSWLR 545

Blue Wedges Inc v Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts [2008] FCA 8; (2008) 165 FCR 211

Buddhist Society of Western Australia (Inc) v Shire of Serpentine - Jarrahdale [1999] WASCA 55

Collard v The State of Western Australia [No 4] [2013] WASC 455

Collard v The State of Western Australia [No 4] [2013] WASC 455 (S)

Commissioner for Equal Opportunity v ADI Ltd [2007] WASCA 261(S)

Commissioner of Taxation v…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read The State of Western Australia v Collard and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2015] WASCA 86
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The State of Western Australia and another party (the appellants) appealed a decision made by the Supreme Court of Western Australia regarding costs in a case brought by the respondents, who sought damages for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by the State during their time in the care of the Child Welfare Department. The respondents' claims were dismissed, and the primary judge ruled that there should be no order as to the costs of the action, considering the case to be in the nature of a 'test case'. The appellants challenged this decision, arguing that they should be awarded their costs due to their success in the case.

The key legal issues before the court involved the principles applicable to costs in 'test cases' and 'public interest litigation'. The court needed to determine whether the case was a 'test case' and, if so, whether the principles applicable to such cases would result in no order for costs. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the case could be characterized as 'public interest litigation', which might also affect the costs order.

The court reviewed the principles established in previous cases, such as Water Administration Ministerial Corporation v Mills, De Silva v Ruddock, and Geeveekay v Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria (No2), which indicated that while important legal questions may be involved, if the litigation is brought for the individual benefit of the applicant and not for the benefit of the public or to enforce a public duty, costs should follow the event. The court found that the respondents' action was not principally of a public interest character but was brought for their individual benefit. Consequently, the court ruled that the principles applicable to 'test cases' and 'public interest litigation' did not apply, and the appellants should be awarded their costs.

In conclusion, the court allowed the appeal and ordered that the respondents pay the costs of the appellants. This decision was based on the finding that the case was not a 'test case' in the relevant sense and did not involve public interest litigation, thus costs should follow the event in favour of the successful party.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: This is an appeal against orders as to costs made by Pritchard J in an action brought by the respondents against the appellants for equitable compensation and damages. The respondents' action was dismissed and her Honour ordered that there be no order as to the costs of the action, on the basis, in substance, that the action was in the nature of a 'test case'. The appellants have appealed against the primary judge's decision, contending that as they were successful in the action her Honour should have ordered the respondents to pay their costs. As the appeal is as to costs alone, the appellants require leave to appeal: Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 60(1)(e). On 22 May 2014, it was ordered that the question of leave be referred to the hearing of the appeal. As a result of difficulties in service of the appeal notice on some of the respondents, the appellants also require an extension of time within which to appeal and that question was also referred to the hearing of the appeal. The first respondents are the parents of the second to eighth respondents (the children). The first respondents were also the parents of Glen, Donald and William (all now deceased). The primary judge found that, on 13 March 1958, by an order made by the Children's Court at Brookton, the third respondent, then six months of age, was committed to the care of the Child Welfare Department. On 3 December 1961, the second, the fourth to eighth respondents, and William and Donald were committed to the care of the Child Welfare Department, pursuant to an order of the Children's Court at Brookton. At the time, those children ranged in age from eight months to 10 years. All remained subject to an order committing them to the care of the Child Welfare Department until they reached 18 years of age (the wardships). After they were made wards and until their teens or early adulthood, most of the children spent little (if any) time with the first respondents. The primary judge concluded there was no doubt that all have been deeply scarred by their separation, by the fracturing of their family relationships, and by their disconnection from their aboriginal culture, which occurred as a result of the children being made wards [4]. The respondents commenced proceedings against the appellants by a writ of summons issued on 10 May 2010. In the action, the respondents claimed that upon the acquisition of British sovereignty the Crown assumed duties and powers in relation to the aboriginal inhabitants of Western Australia which gave rise to a fiduciary duty to the inhabitants with respect to their welfare, that assumption of duty being manifested in the enactment of a series of statutes commencing with the Aborigines Protection Act 1886 (WA) and at the time of trial being the Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA). The respondents alleged that, during the wardships, the appellants owed various fiduciary duties to the first respondents in their dealings with the children and to the children in exercising the powers of a guardian of the children. The respondents claimed, in substance, that the fiduciary duties to which the appellants were subject were duties not to fail to act in the best interests of the children with respect to their custody, maintenance and education, and not to disregard their interest in being raised in their natural family unit. It was alleged that the appellants breached those duties in various ways during the wardships. In her reasons, her Honour referred to these fiduciary duties as the primary fiduciary duties.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Thus, in Water Administration Ministerial Corporation v Mills [2000] NSWCA 194; (2009) 49 NSWLR 249, a landowner had applied to the Water Resources Commission under s 167 of the Water Act 1912 (NSW) for approval of a levee bank on the river abutting its property. Some adjacent owners objected to the levee bank on the ground that it would adversely affect their properties. Approval was given but the objectors successfully appealed to the Land and Environment Court against the approval. An appeal to the New South Wales Court of Appeal against the decision of the Land and Environment Court was upheld. In rejecting the objectors' submission that there should be no order as to the costs of the appeal, Mason P (with whom Meagher and Powell JJA agreed) said:It is clear that this is a test case because we were told that several others await this decision. However, that factor is not determinative. … the proceedings … were brought by the objectors in their own interests and could not be characterised as public interest litigation. I think the costs should follow the event … And in De Silva v Ruddock [1998] FCA 311, the unsuccessful plaintiff's contention there should be no order as to costs was rejected on the ground that, while an important legal question was involved, the action could not be characterized as being wholly or principally of a public interest character as it was brought for the individual benefit of the applicants, to enable them to remain in Australia, not for the benefit of the public or to enforce a public duty. Similarly, in Geeveekay v Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria (No2) [2008] VSC 152, a submission by the unsuccessful applicant that there should be no order as to costs was rejected, the court concluding that while the appeal involved an important question of law - whether a terms contract for the sale of land was a credit contract regulated by the Consumer Credit (Victoria) Act 1995 (Vic) - the resolution of which was in the public interest, the appeal was brought by the applicant in pursuit of its own commercial interests. See also Hollier. Against that background, we turn to the issues which arise on the appeal. It is convenient to deal first with ground 4 of the grounds of appeal, relating to the second appellant. As mentioned earlier, the claim against the second appellant was dismissed by consent on the first day of trial, senior counsel for the respondents having informed the court, in substance, that the claim appeared to be based on a misunderstanding of the law and he did not consider it could succeed (ts 33 ‑ 34). The costs were reserved. In the subsequent determination of the costs of the action it appears, however, that the position of the second appellant was overlooked. In her reasons for judgment on costs, the primary judge did not refer to the circumstances in which the claim against the second appellant was dismissed, her reasons dealing only with the respondents' claim against the first appellant. Nevertheless, the effect of her Honour's order was to deny the second appellant an order for costs against the respondents.