The State of Western Australia v Bianco

[2007] WASCA 197

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- BIANCO [2007] WASCA 197

Jurisdiction:	SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA	Citation No:	[2007] WASCA 197
Court:	THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
Case No:	CACR:26/2007	Heard:	10 SEPTEMBER 2007
Coram:	OWEN JA WHEELER JA MILLER JA	Delivered:	28/09/07
No of pages:	14	Judgment Part:	1 of 1
Result:	Appeal allowed Sentence of 30 months' imprisonment increased to 42 months' imprisonment
Category:	B
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Parties:	THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA ANTHONY BIANCO
Catchwords:	Criminal law and procedure Sentencing State appeal Company accountant convicted on 297 counts of stealing as a servant $924,937.16 involved Offences occurring over six and a half years Partial restitution Total effective sentence 30 months' imprisonment Plea of guilty Whether sentence manifestly inadequate
Legislation:	Nil
Case References:	Barrick (1985) 7 Crim App R 78 Collins v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 108 Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321 Everett v The Queen [1994] HCA 49; (1994) 181 CLR 295 Hladin v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 50; (2005) 156 A Crim R 176 Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 29; (1999) 195 CLR 665 Peel v The Queen [1971] HCA 59; (1971) 125 CLR 447 Smith v The Queen [2003] WASCA 235

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) CITATION : THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- BIANCO [2007] WASCA 197 CORAM : OWEN JA

WHEELER JA
MILLER JA

HEARD : 10 SEPTEMBER 2007 DELIVERED : 28 SEPTEMBER 2007 FILE NO/S : CACR 26 of 2007 BETWEEN : THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Appellant

AND

ANTHONY BIANCO
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram : GOETZE DCJ

File No : IND 1542 of 2006

Catchwords:

Criminal law and procedure - Sentencing - State appeal - Company accountant convicted on 297 counts of stealing as a servant - $924,937.16 involved - Offences occurring over six and a half years - Partial restitution - Total effective

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sentence 30 months' imprisonment - Plea of guilty - Whether sentence manifestly inadequate

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Appeal allowed

Sentence of 30 months' imprisonment increased to 42 months' imprisonment

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : Mr R E Cock QC & Mr C J Henderson
Respondent : Mr D Grace QC & Mr G R Dean

Solicitors:

Appellant : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Respondent : Dean & Rowick

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Barrick (1985) 7 Crim App R 78
Collins v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 108
Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321
Everett v The Queen [1994] HCA 49; (1994) 181 CLR 295
Hladin v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 50; (2005) 156 A Crim R 176
Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 29; (1999) 195 CLR 665
Peel v The Queen [1971] HCA 59; (1971) 125 CLR 447
Smith v The Queen [2003] WASCA 235


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1 OWEN JA: I have read the reasons that Miller JA intends to publish. I agree with his Honour's reasons and with his conclusion that the sentence should be set aside and replaced by an aggregate sentence of 42 months, structured in the way set out by Miller JA. There is only one matter on which I wish to make specific comment.

2 Were it not for the fact that this was a State appeal and for the otherwise good antecedents of the respondent, the substituted sentence could have been higher. The respondent stole the money from a small business of which he was a trusted employee. Small business is the heart and soul of commerce in this country. It provides employment for a high percentage of the workforce. Many small businesses lack the capacity to install the sophisticated checks and balances in accounting systems that some larger enterprises can afford. In those circumstances, the level of trust that a small business reposes in its accounting staff can be even greater than in a larger operation.

3 This, then, is the nature of the relationship between Alltype Engineering Services (in effect, a small family business) and the respondent. The breach of trust represented by the respondent's offending was of a very high level. The victim impact statements attest to the serious impact the offences have had, not only on the proprietors of the business but on other employees. It is not difficult to imagine the financial effect on a business of this type (and therefore on its proprietors and other employees and prospective employees) of the removal of something in excess of $900,000 over a six year period.

4 In my view, the respondent's offending demanded condign punishment. The outcome reflected in Miller JA's conclusion is an appropriate response.

5 WHEELER JA: I agree with Miller JA.

6 MILLER JA: The respondent was convicted in the District Court of 297 counts of stealing as a servant. The sums of money stolen ranged from sums less than $1,000 to sums which exceeded $10,000. The offences occurred between 31 March 1999 and 17 November 2005. All took place at Naval Base, where the respondent was a servant of Exceleng Corporation Pty Ltd, trading as Alltype Engineering Services (Alltype).

7 The respondent pleaded guilty to all counts on the indictment and was sentenced on 20 February 2007 to a total term of 30 months'

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imprisonment, to be served immediately. He was made eligible for parole. The sentence dated from 1 February 2007.

8 Because there were 297 counts on the indictment, the learned sentencing judge was required to sentence the appellant individually for each offence. He did this by putting the offences into a number of brackets. For offences of stealing up to $1,000, a term of 6 months' imprisonment was imposed. For offences involving sums of money between $1,000 and $2,000, a sentence of 8 months' imprisonment was imposed. For offences involving sums between $2,000 and $5,000, a sentence of 10 months' imprisonment was imposed. For offences involving sums between $5,000 and $7,500, a sentence of 1 year's imprisonment was imposed. For offences involving sums between $7,500 and $10,000, a sentence of imprisonment for 1 year was imposed. For offences where the sum stolen exceeded $10,000, a further 1-year sentence was imposed.

9 There were 109 counts of stealing less than $1,000, for which 6 months' imprisonment was imposed on each count; 59 counts of moneys between $1,000 and $2,000, for which 8 months' imprisonment was imposed on each count; 57 offences of stealing between $2,000 and $5,000 for which imprisonment of 10 months was imposed; 55 offences of stealing between $5,000 and $7,500, for which 1 year's imprisonment was imposed; 13 counts of stealing between $7,500 and $10,00, for which 1 year's imprisonment was imposed; and four counts of stealing more than $10,000, for which a further 1 year was imposed.

10 The learned sentencing judge directed that the sentences imposed in each category be made cumulative. That is, sentences of 6 months, 8 months, 10 months, 1 year, 1 year, and 1 year were all accumulated to make a total term of 5 years. All other sentences were directed to be served concurrently. The maximum sentence before application of the Sentencing Legislation Amendment and Repeal Act 2003 (WA) was, thus, 60 months' imprisonment. Each penalty was then reduced by 25%, to take account of the respondent's plea of guilty and there was a further deduction of one-third to take into account the requirements of the Sentencing Legislation Amendment and Repeal Act 2003. When accumulated, the sentences were 3 months, 4 months, 5 months, 6 months, 6 months and 6 months respectively, which totalled 30 months.

Appeal

11 The appellant was given leave to appeal on 12 June 2007. The grounds of appeal are as follows:

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1. The total sentence imposed by the learned sentencing Judge was manifestly inadequate having regard to:

1.1 the seriousness of the offences:
Particulars
The sentence failed to reflect adequately:

(a) the fact that the offending constituted a gross abuse of the position of trust and responsibility that the offender held with his employer;

(b) the fact that the offending occurred over a lengthy period of time, namely six years;

(c) the considerable sum of money stolen;

(d) the fact that the offending was motivated by greed and to further the offender's lifestyle;

1.2 the need for general deterrence.

1.3 sentencing standards for the offence of stealing as a servant in comparable circumstances.

The facts

12 The respondent was appointed company accountant of Alltype in January 1998. Just over 12 months later, he began stealing from the company. He transferred money electronically from his employer's account to a number of other accounts. $48,468.50 was transferred to an account in his name. $170,042.48 was transferred to his Visa account. $30,409.94 was transferred to an account in the name of the respondent and his father (an account that had not been used for 17 or 18 years). $687.80 was transferred to an account in the name of the appellant's family business. $569,000 was transferred to Burswood Nominees Ltd. $21,285.58 was transferred to the account of a former girlfriend. Although there was some dispute about the amount transferred to the account of the former girlfriend, there was no dispute about the fact that the respondent had stolen a total of $924,937.16. He consented to judgment against him in proceedings brought in the District Court for that sum. The explanation for the thefts was that the respondent was a gambler at the Burswood Casino.

13 It appears that the respondent was able to utilise his knowledge of the accounting systems of his employer to hide the transfer of the various moneys. This meant that, over six and a half years, no thefts were

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detected. However, on 23 November 2005, an accounts assistant located a number of abnormal transactions in the general ledger. She brought the matter to the attention of the respondent, who was the assistant's overseer. The respondent tried to influence the assistant not to mention the matter to the directors of his employer and said that he would personally investigate the abnormalities.

14 On 25 November 2005, the accounts assistant noticed that the abnormal transactions had been deleted from the ledger. She discussed this with the respondent and was told not to tell anybody. However, she made further inquiries and located other abnormal transactions. She brought them to the attention of one of the company directors.

15 On 28 November 2005, the respondent made some admissions to a director. They were admissions of theft of company funds. His employment was terminated and inquiries were then set in train. They revealed the total of over $924,000 which was stolen.

16 On 20 July 2006, the respondent was questioned at the offices of the major fraud squad. He declined to answer any questions in relation to the missing money. He was arrested and charged.

17 At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution tendered two victim impact statements. The first was from Colin Heitman, managing director of Alltype. His family company owned 60% of the company. In the statement, he traced the history of the company. It was involved in the metal industry. Mr Heitman expressed dismay at the fact that he found that a person whom he had know for eight years and whom he understood as a trustworthy employee and a family friend had been stealing such a substantial sum of money on a weekly basis from his business. Considerable financial pressure was put on Mr Heitman and his family. There was a financial impact on the business, which he said had been denied the opportunity to develop and invest in the current buoyant market. He estimated that gross losses amounted to something in excess of $1.6 million and said that it would take 30 years of saving $20,000 to catch up for what had happened.

18 Terry Tremain-Hill is the wife of William Tremain-Hill and a shareholder in Alltype. Her husband was also a director. In her victim impact statement, she recounts how her husband studied as an apprentice in the Williamstown dockyards in Melbourne and worked his way up to eventually become part-owner of a steel fabrication company. She recounts how seriously he took his work and how hard he has worked to

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achieve that result. She points out that the respondent was employed as company accountant to enable the directors to work in their areas of expertise. This involved them travelling to a number of worksites around the State, leaving the respondent as a trusted member of the company to perform his role as accountant. Profits were not forthcoming and the financial burden to the Tremain-Hill family was substantial. The emotional impact was considerable.

Sentencing

19 After hearing submissions from counsel for the respondent, the learned sentencing judge recounted the facts of the case, carefully dividing the various offences into the several categories I have mentioned. His Honour found a number of aggravating factors present. They were:

(1) the senior position of trust held by the respondent within his employer;

(2) the fact that the company was only a small one and the respondent was regarded by at least one of the directors as a member of his family;

(3) the fact that the respondent had the trust and confidence of the directors;

(4) the fact that his breach of trust was at a high level by reason of the confidence that had been reposed in him;

(5) the fact that the respondent used his knowledge of accounting procedures to hide his thefts so that they would not be detected;

(6) the attempt by the respondent to influence a junior member of staff not to report him when she discovered the wrongdoing;

(7) the debiting of abnormal transactions from the ledger to hide them when the wrongdoing was discovered; and

(8) the fact that the offences had occurred over such a long period of time.

20 The learned sentencing judge made reference to the victim impact statements and expressed the view that not only had the Heitman and Tremain-Hill families suffered a substantial loss, but there had been an adverse effect upon fellow employees in what was a small company.

21 The learned sentencing judge turned to matters personal to the respondent. He pointed out that he was 32 years of age and a single man. He had the support of his parents, who had worked hard to ensure that he

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was properly educated and given every opportunity in life. He obtained an accounting degree from Curtin University and was studying to be a certified practising accountant. He had gone direct from university to Alltype. He had been in receipt of an annual salary of $63,000 and had use of a fuel card. He had no prior convictions. There were a number of references provided, which testified to his 'otherwise ... good character'.

22 The learned sentencing judge referred to a pre-sentence report and psychological report, which had been made available to him. Those documents have been made available to this court. The pre-sentence report dated 17 October 2006 records that the respondent was co-operative with the writer and accepted full responsibility for his actions. He was said to be remorseful for his behaviour and the effect it had on his career, family and the company. It was recorded that he had support from his family, who were currently providing him with accommodation and paying his living expenses. He was said to be ashamed of the fact that his family were involved in civil proceedings regarding the offences. Psychological counselling to address his issues of gambling addiction were recommended.

23 The psychological report of Dr Vivienne Cass, dated 18 January 2007, describes the respondent as an immature man, in denial that his gambling behaviour was a serious problem. He is described as having an immature personality development and is therefore easily led, and capable of acting out values and beliefs without thought or personal commitment. He was regarded as a man torn between the values of his parents in regard to work and achievement and his own desires to fulfil his own material needs. His immaturity led him to identify achievement as related to being admired as a 'high-roller' and being well-known in the casino context. Psychotherapy was recommended to help him work towards greater maturity.

24 The learned sentencing judge made reference to the respondent's remorse, shame and appreciation of the distress caused to his family and friends. He took notice of his plea of guilty and restitution, which at that point amounted to only $724. However, the learned sentencing judge recognised that there was likely to be recovery of between $330,000 and $348,000 in consequence of the respondent's bankruptcy. This has proven to be so. An affidavit of Gary Richard Dean, solicitor for the respondent, reveals that $336,000 will be paid by way of restitution.

25 The learned sentencing judge took account of the need for deterrent sentences, not only in the sense of personal deterrence, but also general

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deterrence. Reference was made to a number of decided cases and his Honour thought that those cases suggested that a sentencing range of 4 to 5 years was appropriate for offences of this nature.

26 The critical factors in sentencing were: (1) the respondent's plea of guilty; (2) the respondent's remorse; (3) the restitution; (4) the breach of trust; and (5) the attempts to conceal what had been done. Deterrence was considered to be of primary importance in the sentencing process.

Grounds of appeal

27 Mr Grace QC, Senior Counsel for the respondent, rightly pointed out that the grounds of appeal appear to complain that the total effective sentence infringed the totality principle of sentencing, although that word is not used within the grounds. Use of the words 'the seriousness of the offences' in ground 1.1 should read 'the seriousness of the offending'.

28 The principles which relate to appeals against sentence have been stated in many cases and are well accepted. They are succinctly stated in Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 29; (1999) 195 CLR 665, [15] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ):

The principles according to which an appellate court may interfere with such a discretionary judgment by a sentencing judge are well established. In their application to a Crown appeal against sentence they were summarised in R v Allpass (1993) 72 A Crim R 561 and R v Clarke [1996] 2 VR 520. Of particular importance in the present case is the principle that a court of criminal appeal may not substitute its own opinion for that of the sentencing judge merely because the appellate court would have exercised its discretion in a manner different from the manner in which the sentencing judge exercised his or her discretion. This is basic: House v The King(1936) 55 CLR 499. The discretion which the law commits to sentencing judges is of vital importance in the administration of our system of criminal justice. (Footnotes added.)

29 In Hladin v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 50; (2005) 156 A Crim R 176, Steytler P (with whom Wheeler and Roberts-Smith JJA agreed) reviewed a number of sentences imposed in cases of fraud or stealing over the preceding 10 years. It is unnecessary to restate the analysis which is contained at [37] et seq. I referred to these cases and others in Collins v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 108 and concluded, at [31]:

I have considered Steytler P's review of sentencing trends in cases of this nature which is contained in Hladin v Western Australia (2005) 156 A Crim R 176, at [37] - [44] inclusive. This review indicates that, in cases in

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which there has been a substantial sum of money stolen by a servant of his or her employer, sentences under the old regime ranged between 4 and 5 years' duration. In some cases, offenders were sentenced to lower terms, but, generally speaking, there were special reasons why sentences were lower in those cases.

30 McLure JA (with whom Steytler P agreed) said of the offence of stealing as a servant at [18]:

As to the offence of stealing as a servant, it is apparent from the decisions of this Court (and its predecessor) that the offence is serious, involving as it does the abuse of a position of trust, and that fact results in significant weight being given to the need for general deterrence with an associated reduction in the weight given to personal antecedents such as prior good character. The consequence of the application of these principles is that in this jurisdiction, where the amount stolen is substantial and involves multiple offences, ordinarily the appropriate penalty for the offence is a term of immediate imprisonment. A number of the relevant authorities are detailed in the reasons of Steytler P in Hladin v Western Australia (2005) 156 A Crim R 176 at [37] - [44]. Other relevant authorities include Smith v The Queen [2003] WASCA 235; Nelmes v The State of Western Australia [2004] WASCA 191 and Wilkie v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 156.

31 The appellant and the respondent have presented the court with a list of cases of stealing as a servant between 1991 and 2007. These tables draw a distinction between those cases decided prior to, and those decided after, the application of the transitional provisions. The respondent accepts that the governing principles were those set out in Smith v The Queen [2003] WASCA 235, where Murray, Parker and Miller JJ, at [29] said:

In this State, sentencing in cases of stealing as a servant and like offences is generally governed by the principles set out in R v Barrick (1985) 7 Crim App R 78 at 82. In The Queen v Sivandran, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 960154; 22 March 1996, Scott J (with whom Kennedy and Wallwork J agreed) put the position as follows:

'So far as the appropriate sentence for a case such as this is concerned, the relevant principles have been set out by the House of Lords in the case of John Barrick (1985) 7 Crim App R 78 at 82 in the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal where the factors involved in sentencing in a case such as this are set out as being:

"( i) the quality and degree of trust reposed in the offender including his rank;

( ii) the period over which the fraud or the thefts have been perpetrated;

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(iii) the use to which the money or property dishonestly taken was put;

( iv) the effect upon the victim;

( v) the impact of the offences on the public and public confidence;

( vi) the effect upon fellow employees or partners;

(vii) the effect on the offender himself;

(viii) his own history;

( ix) those matters of mitigation special to himself such as illness; being placed under great strain by excessive responsibility or the like; where, as sometimes happens, there has been a long delay, say over two years, between his being confronted with his dishonesty by his professional body or the police and the start of his trial; finally, any help given by him to the police."

Barrick's case has been accepted and applied in the Court of Criminal Appeal in Western Australia on a number of occasions since it was delivered: see Birch v R (1993) 69 A Crim R 181 and R v Carreras (1992) 60 A Crim R 402. That is not to say either that Barrick is binding upon this Court or that the list of matters set out above are exhaustive. See R v Wilkinson, unreported CCA SCt of WA; Library No 960035; 25 January 1996 per Franklyn J at 10'.

32 Mr Grace's submission was that the decided cases reveal a wide breadth of discretion in the sentences which have been imposed over the years for the offence of stealing as a servant. This is true. However, it is also true that sentences imposed for stealing substantial sums over substantial periods of time in blatant breach of trust have generally led to sentences well above the sentences imposed in the present case. The total effective sentence has often been considerably greater than that imposed upon the respondent.

33 It is clear that only limited assistance can be gained from the decided cases. The present case is one in which it was necessary for the learned sentencing judge to balance the seriousness of the offending against the undoubtedly good personal circumstances of the respondent. However, in doing that, the learned sentencing judge was bound to accept that, in the list of relevant factors set out in Barrick(1985) 7 Crim App R 78, the first six factors told strongly against the respondent. That is to say, (i) the degree of trust reposed in him; (ii) the period over which the thefts had occurred; (iii) the use to which the money was put; (iv) the effect upon the

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victims of the offences; (v) the impact of the offences on public confidence; and (vi) the effect upon fellow employees or partners.

34 The learned sentencing judge took full account of the other three factors; namely, the effect on the offender himself, his own history and matters in mitigation personal to himself. Included in this was a recognition of the respondent's early plea of guilty, remorse and the shame brought upon his family. Account was taken of the restitution which had been made to date and that which was likely to take place in the future.

Conclusion on appeal

35 Accepting that this is a State appeal against sentence, and therefore special considerations apply, the total effective sentence imposed upon the respondent was, nevertheless, well below that which could have been expected for the multiplicity of offences he committed in the circumstances which I have described. The total effective sentence was manifestly inadequate. This indicates in itself that there was a failure on the part of the learned sentencing judge to exercise appropriately the discretion which was reposed in him: Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321, [59] (Kirby J). As McHugh J pointed out in Everett v The Queen [1994] HCA 49; (1994) 181 CLR 295, 306:

The approach of a court to a jurisdiction that specifically authorizes a Crown appeal against sentence must necessarily be different from the approach that this Court takes on an application for special leave to appeal against an order setting aside a conviction. The jurisdiction to hear a Crown appeal against sentence is conferred on a court of criminal appeal so that that court can ensure that, so far as the subject matter permits, there will be uniformity of sentencing. Uniformity of sentencing is a matter of great importance in maintaining confidence in the administration of justice in any jurisdiction. Sentences that are higher than usual create justifiable grievances in those who receive them. But inadequate sentences also give rise to a sense of injustice, not only in those who are the victims of the crimes in question but also in the general public. Inadequate sentences are also likely to undermine public confidence in the ability of the courts to play their part in deterring the commission of crimes. To permit the Crown, as well as convicted persons, to appeal against sentences assists in maintaining confidence in the administration of justice.

36 I recognise that State appeals against sentence do cut across 'time-honoured concepts' (Peel v The Queen [1971] HCA 59; (1971) 125 CLR 447, 452) and that there is an 'attitude of restraint' in relation to them. This was put by Kirby J in Dinsdale at [62] as follows:
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The attitude of restraint reflected in such remarks has often been justified on the basis that a Crown appeal against sentence puts the prisoner in jeopardy of punishment for a second time, a feature that is ordinarily missing from an appeal, or application for leave to appeal, brought by those who have been sentenced. [Whittaker v The King (1928) 41 CLR 230, 248 (Isaacs J dissenting); cf R v Tait (1979) 46 FLR 386, 388 - 390; (1979) 24 ALR 473, 476 - 477; Malvaso v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 227, 234; R v Grein [1989] WAR 178, 180; Everett v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 295, 299; 124 ALR 529, 531 - 532.] The consequence is that where the Crown appeals, it is normally obliged to demonstrate very clearly the error of which it complains. The further consequence is that, where such demonstration succeeds, it is conventional for the appellate court to impose a substituted sentence towards the lower end of the range of available sentences. [A consideration acknowledged in the CCA judgment at 2 by reference to R v Peterson [1984] WAR 329, 330 - 331; cf R v Clarke [1996] 2 VR 520, 522.] This convention tends to add an additional restraint upon interference, given the strong resistance that exists against appellate 'tinkering' with sentences.

37 Accepting all of these principles, and giving them proper weight, I am of the view that the total effective sentence imposed upon the respondent was manifestly inadequate. It should, in my view, have been a sentence of 42 months' imprisonment or 12 months greater than that which was imposed.

38 It becomes necessary to resentence the respondent. No complaint has been made about any of the individual sentences which were imposed, but only about the extent to which they were accumulated. I would set aside the learned sentencing judge's order for accumulation and instead direct that, in the last two categories of cases in respect of which a sentence of 6 months was imposed, the first two counts in each category should be cumulative and the balance concurrent. That would make an extra 12 months that I consider the respondent should serve. In other words, the sentences imposed by the learned sentencing judge should remain, but in relation to the last two categories, the sentences should be varied to read:

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Date	Description	Enactment	Plea	Verdict	Date of sentence	Final Outcome
Between 27/1/00-21/10/05	Steal as Servant x 13 (Amounts between $7,500 - $10,000) Counts 115-116, 152, 165-168, 171-172, 193, 280, 288, 296	Criminal Code s 378(7)	Guilty	Guilty	20/2/07	6 months' imprisonment on each count Sentences on counts 115-116 cumulative Each other sentence concurrent with sentence on count 115
Between 1/9/00-4/10/00	Steal as Servant x 4 (Amounts over $10,000) Counts 173-174, 183-184	Criminal Code s 378(7)	Guilty	Guilty	20/2/07	6 months' imprisonment on each count Sentences on counts 173-174 cumulative Each other sentence concurrent with sentence imposed on count 173

39 The result is that, in my opinion, the appeal should be allowed, the sentences imposed by the learned sentencing judge be varied in the way in which I have indicated and the total effective sentence imposed upon the respondent should become one of 3 years 6 months, or 42 months' imprisonment.