The State of Western Australia v ADR

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JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CRIMINAL

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- ADR [2018] WADC 168

CORAM:   TROY DCJ

HEARD:   26 NOVEMBER 2018

DELIVERED          :   7 DECEMBER 2018

FILE NO/S:   IND BUN 178 of 2015

BETWEEN:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

AND

ADR

 

Catchwords:

Nil

Legislation:

Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 143(2)

Result:

Limitations on accused's opening address identified

Representation:

Counsel:

The State of Western Australia : Mr M Hunter
Accused : In person

Solicitors:

The State of Western Australia : State Director of Public Prosecutions
Accused : Not applicable

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Cotic v the State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 252

KMT v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2018] WASCA 49

Manyam v the State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 107

O'Connell v State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 96

Peck v the State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 20

R v Farooqi [2014] 1 Cr App R 8

R v Karapandzk (2008) 184 A Crim R 320

R v MM [2004] NSWCCA 81; (2004) 145 A Crim R 148

R v Nona [1997] 2 Qd R 436

R v Oulds (2014) 244 A Crim R 443

Ritchie v The State of Western Australia (2016) 260 A Crim R 367

TROY DCJ:

Introduction

  1. This matter originally came before me for trial on 9 October 2018.  The accused is charged by this indictment with a total of 17 offences of indecently dealing with and sexually penetrating his daughter HMR.  He also faces one count, count 18, of unlawfully assaulting her thereby doing her bodily harm.  The accused pleaded not guilty to all counts on 9 October 2018.

  2. On the morning of 11 October 2018 I discharged the jury as a whole and the trial was aborted.  This was the second time that this trial has been aborted.  The first occasion was before her Honour Judge Braddock on 2 May 2017 when the accused terminated the services of his then lawyer, Mr Graeme Allen.  When the matter came before me for trial the accused was, and still is, self-represented.  The matter is listed for a third trial commencing 22 January 2019.

  3. Following the premature conclusion of the second trial, the State successfully applied for orders permitting the complainant HMR to give her evidence at a pre-recording.  This occurred on 19 November 2018.

  4. At the start of the second trial the accused addressed the jury at some length at ts 439 - 449.  Subsequently, the State indicated in writing that objection is taken to the accused in essence repeating certain identified portions of that speech at the third trial.

  5. The accused has indicated (ts 699) that the content of his opening speech at the third trial is likely to be quite different from the speech that he delivered on 9 October 2018.

  6. My rulings in this decision are predicated on the basis that the accused remains without legal representation at the third trial.  On 15 November 2018 I…

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Details
Case
[2018] WADC 168
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The State of Western Australia brought proceedings against ADR in a court in Australia. The nature of the dispute concerns the scope and permissible content of a defence counsel's outline of issues in contention under the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). The case was heard and decided by Doyle CJ, with Duggan & David JJ concurring. The central legal issue before the court was whether the address by the defence counsel at the conclusion of the prosecution's opening address was appropriately confined to outlining the issues in contention, as required by section 288A of the Act, or whether it exceeded this scope by including general observations and reminders to the jury of their duties.

The court determined that section 288A of the Act imposes stricter limitations on the content of the defence counsel's address than the equivalent provision in New South Wales. Specifically, the court held that the address should be strictly limited to outlining the issues in contention without delving into general principles of law or aspects of the case facts. Doyle CJ emphasised that it is in the interests of justice for the parties to identify and narrow down the issues in contention and inform the jury accordingly. However, the outlining of issues should not become an occasion for the defence to argue its case or remind the jury of their duties. In this case, although the address by defence counsel was brief, certain aspects of it were found to exceed the permissible scope under section 288A.

In conclusion, the court found that the defence counsel's address included general observations that were not relevant to outlining the issues in contention. While these observations were accurate, they were not appropriate at this stage of the proceedings. The court reiterated that the function of the defence counsel's address at this stage is to identify and outline the issues in contention, not to argue the case or remind the jury of their duties. The court's decision underscores the importance of adhering to the specific limitations imposed by section 288A to ensure that the trial proceeds in a fair and just manner.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In that case counsel for the appellant addressed in exercise of the right conferred by s 288A of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). That section relevantly provides as follows:288A ‑ Defence to be invited to outline issues in dispute at conclusion of opening address for the prosecution(1)On the trial of an offence on information, the judge is to invite the defendant, at the conclusion of the prosecutor's opening address, to address the court to outline the issues in contention between the prosecution and the defence.(2)The defendant may then address the court accordingly or decline the invitation. It is clear that s 288A is much more restrictive than s 143(2). In his judgment Doyle CJ (with whom Duggan & David JJ agreed) observed that the equivalent New South Wales provision appeared to give somewhat more latitude to counsel than s 288A (although I observe not as much as s 143(2)): [44]. Doyle CJ agreed at [44] with the following observations made by Howie J in R v MM [2004] NSWCCA 81; (2004) 145 A Crim R 148 [139], where his Honour said, referring to the New South Wales provision,… It is not an opportunity for defence counsel to embark upon a dissertation on the onus and standard of proof, or the functions of judge and jury, or to anticipate the directions or warnings to be given by the trial judge, or to urge upon the jury the way that they should assess the evidence of a witness to be called in the Crown case. It behoves trial judges to ensure that the addresses of counsel are not open to abuse, particularly in a case where the contents of the address is circumscribed by a provision of an Act. To permit counsel to ignore such a limitation is not in the interests of justice, either generally or in the particular case. It may be appropriate for a trial judge to ensure, before the defence opens and in the absence of the jury, that defence counsel is aware of the limited basis of an opening under s 159 and that the address will comply with it. Doyle CJ observed at [45] that the point that Howie J made about a trial judge ensuring that defence counsel is aware of these limitations was a pertinent one. Doyle CJ further held at [46] and [48]:46.It is in the interests of the administration of justice that the parties identify the matters in issue, narrow them down as far as possible, and inform the jury of the issues that are in contention between the prosecution and the defence. But the process of identifying and outlining issues should not become an occasion for the defence to argue its case, either by reference to general principles of law or by reference to aspects of the facts of the case. In the present case, while the address by defence counsel was brief (occupying only two pages of transcript), there are aspects of it that, in my opinion, travel beyond the scope of s 288A.48.Counsel's general observations did not contribute to the outlining of issues in contention. They were accurate, so far as they went, and in a sense harmless. But it is not appropriate for defence counsel, at this stage of the proceedings, to embark upon an outline of general principles relevant to the trial that is about to unfold. If this were to be permitted, sooner or later the question would arise of where the outline is to stop. The function of the address by defence counsel at this stage is to identify issues in contention, and to outline them, not to remind the jury of their duty.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established