IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M101 of 1999
B e t w e e n -
THE SOCIETY OF LLOYD’S
Applicant
and
PETER EVERETT WHITE
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
McHUGH J
KIRBY J
CALLINAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 11 FEBRUARY 2000, AT 9.02 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR A.J. MYERS, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with, MR P.J. JOPLING, QC and DR I.J. HARDINGHAM, QC, on behalf of the applicant. (instructed by Freehill Hollingdale & Page)
MR G.A.A. NETTLE, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR M.K. MOSHINSKY, for the respondent. (instructed by Foster Hart)
McHUGH J: Yes, Mr Myers.
KIRBY J: I was so anxious to hear you, Mr Myers, there was not even time for the Queen.
MR MYERS: Yes, well, there are probably two views about that. Your Honours, we say that the primary judge in this matter plainly erred in refusing a stay. This was a case in which there was a forum selection clause in the contract. The proper law of the agreement was the law of England. It was so agreed by a clause for the choice of the proper law and, objectively speaking, the connections with England were overwhelming. There was an action commenced by Mr White in England before he commenced the action in Australia ‑ ‑ ‑
KIRBY J: Are you not addressing us as you would the primary judge? I must say, if I had been the primary judge, I would have found that very persuasive but you are now at the third level.
MR MYERS: Yes, we say that the primary judge was plainly wrong, manifestly wrong. He took into account wrong considerations or did not give sufficient weight to the correct considerations which one must judge in the end by his conclusion. The Court of Appeal said that there were incidental errors which must mean there were errors in the primary judge’s reasoning but there was no manifest injustice. We say that this is such a plain case. Now, undoubtedly, it is unusual to appeal to this Court, or to seek leave to appeal to this Court, from a refusal of leave in a Court of Appeal of a State.
KIRBY J: It certainly is. I do not remember it in my four years.
MR MYERS: Well, there is one case that is somewhat in point.
KIRBY J: You have found a case?
MR MYERS: CSR v Cigna, which is one of the cases on the list is exactly this sort of case and your Honours gave special leave and eventually decided the case in favour of the applicant.
McHUGH J: Grant v Downs was a well known ‑ ‑ ‑
MR MYERS: Grant v Downs is another case.
KIRBY J: Once a decade.
MR MYERS: Well, I have the disadvantage of being on the receiving…
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- Case
- [2000] HCATrans 37
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the arbitration clauses, by mandating foreign arbitration, were void and unenforceable under Australian law. This involved considering the interaction between the contractual right to arbitrate and the provisions of the *Trade Practices Act* concerning unconscionable conduct and unfair contract terms. The court also had to assess whether the public policy considerations of Australian courts regarding foreign arbitration clauses were overridden by the statutory prohibitions.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, held that the arbitration clauses were not void. Their Honours reasoned that the *Trade Practices Act* did not intend to invalidate arbitration agreements that were otherwise valid and enforceable under general contract law. They distinguished between the unconscionability of the *terms* of an agreement and the unconscionability of the *conduct* in entering into it. The court found that the mere fact that an arbitration clause required disputes to be resolved overseas did not, in itself, render the clause unconscionable or contrary to public policy. The enforceability of such clauses depended on the specific circumstances and whether their enforcement would be oppressive or unjust.
The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Full Federal Court were set aside.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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Ratio Decidendi