| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted | |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
No. 1533 of 2006
| THE QUEEN |
| v |
| PETER NORRIS DUPAS |
---
JUDGE: | Hollingworth J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 15 September & 1 November 2010 | |
DATE OF RULING: | 3 November 2010 | |
DATE OF PUBLICATION OF REASONS: | 3 May 2011 | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2011] VSC 180 | |
---
Evidence – Identification evidence – Opinion evidence – Whether psychological evidence admissible as to the possible effects of post-event information on memory – Whether psychological evidence admissible concerning police photoboard – Whether, if admissible, such evidence should be excluded under s 135 – Evidence Act 2008 ss 76, 79, 80, 135
---
APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Crown | Ms M Williams SC Mr T Hoare | Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr G Thomas SC | Victoria Legal Aid |
| Mr M Regan |
HER HONOUR:
Introduction
The accused was charged with the murder of Mersina Halvagis at the Fawkner Cemetery on 1 November 1997. The circumstantial Crown case relied in part upon the evidence of Katica Melnik, Horst Peter Weller and Laima Burman, identifying the accused as the man, or as resembling the man, they saw at the cemetery that day. Each of those witnesses identified, or saw the resemblance in, the accused after they had been exposed to photographs of him in the media.
The accused applied, unsuccessfully, to exclude the evidence of Melnik, Weller and Burman. That decision is the subject of separate reasons.
The accused also sought to adduce expert evidence from Dr Richard Kemp, a psychologist from the University of New South Wales School of Psychology, who has expertise in the area of eyewitness identification evidence.
Although the accused’s written application had sought leave to admit Dr Kemp’s evidence under s 108C of the Evidence Act 2008 (“the Act”)[1], the accused’s counsel submitted orally that the evidence was in fact sought to be adduced under s 79 of the Act, and the matter proceeded on that basis.
[1]Section 108C is concerned with the admission of expert opinion evidence as an exception to the credibility rule in s 102.
Section 79 contains an exception to the opinion rule. The opinion rule is contained in s 76 of the Act, and provides that “Evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed.”
Section 79(1) provides that “If a person has specialised knowledge based on the person's training, study or experience, the opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion of that person that is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge.”
Section 80 is also relevant, as it provides that:
Evidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is about –
(a) a fact in issue or an ultimate issue; or
(b) a matter of common knowledge.
Dr Kemp prepared an initial report, dated 13 July 2010 (“the first report”). On 15 September 2010, prior to the empanelment of the jury, Dr…
Continue reading The Queen v Peter Norris Dupas
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- The Queen v Peter Norris Dupas [2011] VSC 180
- Case
- [2011] VSC 180
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues revolved around whether the psychological evidence was admissible and, if so, whether it should be excluded under section 135 of the Evidence Act 2008. The court needed to determine the admissibility of opinion evidence regarding the effects of post-event information on memory and whether such evidence was relevant and reliable under sections 76, 79, and 80 of the Act. Additionally, the court examined whether the potential prejudice of the evidence outweighed its probative value, necessitating exclusion under section 135.
The court held that the psychological evidence was admissible and did not warrant exclusion under section 135. The court found that the evidence was relevant and reliable, contributing to the understanding of the reliability of witness identification. The court emphasised that the evidence did not solely rely on the witness's subjective experience but was grounded in psychological research and expert opinion. The probative value of the evidence, in relation to the reliability of the identification, outweighed any potential prejudice. The court ruled that the evidence was appropriately considered by the jury in assessing the reliability of the identification evidence.
The final orders of the court were to confirm the admissibility of the psychological evidence in question and to reject the defendant's application to exclude it under section 135. The case was remitted to the trial court for further proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.