The Queen v Manolas - [2017] NTSC 86

CITATION:The Queen v Manolas [2017] NTSC 86
PARTIES:THE QUEEN
v

MANOLAS, George

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION
FILE NOS:21627328, 21653294, 21713598
DELIVERED ON:  6 December 2017
DELIVERED AT:  DARWIN
HEARING DATES:  Trial 23 October – 6 November 2017
JUDGMENT OF:  BARR J
CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – Elements of offence of stealing – accused director appropriating monies from company’s bank account to pay debts of another company – multiple counts of stealing ‘thing in action’ – s 209(1) Criminal Code (NT) – intention of depriving – alternative definition to ‘intention of permanently depriving’ – that accused appropriated property with the intention to treat the property as his own to dispose of regardless of the rights of the owner – alternative definition includes disposal by lending.
Criminal Code (NT) s 1, s 209(1), s 210(1)
Croton v The Queen (1967) 117 CLR 326, followed
DPP v Brownlie (A Pseudonym) (2015) 45 VR 362, considered
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Crown:D Morters
Accused:M Thomas
Solicitors:
Crown:Office of the Department of Public Prosecutions
Accused:
Judgment category classification:    B
Judgment ID Number:  Bar1713
Number of pages:  7

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN
The Queen v Manolas [2017] NTSC 86

Nos. 21627328, 21653294, 21713598
BETWEEN:

THE QUEEN

Plaintiff

AND:

GEORGE MANOLAS

Defendant

CORAM: BARR J
REASONS FOR RULING
(Delivered 6 December 2017)
Intentionally to permanently deprive

Before providing an aide memoire to the jury, I made a ruling in relation to the proper interpretation of the definition of “depriving” in s 209(1) of the Criminal Code (NT). I now publish reasons, which refine and expand on the reasons delivered to the parties at trial.
The accused was charged on indictment with 20 counts of stealing a “thing in action”, in each case the property of the company Coronation Drive (NT) Pty Ltd (“the Company”).
All except two of the counts in the indictment alleged the electronic transfer by the accused of moneys from the Company’s bank account to the bank accounts of creditors of another company, One Hundred and Fifty One Pty Ltd trading as, and here referred to as “Dymocks Casuarina”, in order to discharge or reduce the liability of Dymocks Casuarina.
Count 8, the first exception, alleged that the accused authorized payment by a cheque drawn on the Company’s bank account to Random House Australia Pty Ltd, a creditor of Dymocks Casuarina. Count 20, the second exception, alleged the electronic transfer by the accused of moneys from the Company’s bank account to the bank account of Dymocks Casuarina.
The term “property” is defined to include things in action.[1] To “steal” is to unlawfully appropriate the property of another with the intention of depriving that person of it. To “appropriate” is to assume the rights of the owner of the property.[2]
There was no issue in relation to each count that, whether by electronic transfer or by cheque…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading The Queen v Manolas

Details

AGLC: The Queen v Manolas [2017] NTSC 86
Case: [2017] NTSC 86
Decision Date: 6 December 2017

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of The Queen v Manolas [2017] NTSC 86 was heard in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory. The defendant, George Manolas, was charged with 20 counts of stealing a ‘thing in action’ from Coronation Drive (NT) Pty Ltd, a company of which he was a director. Specifically, the defendant was alleged to have transferred money from the company’s bank account to the accounts of creditors of Dymocks Casuarina, and to Dymocks Casuarina itself, in order to discharge or reduce their liability. The defendant claimed that these appropriations were loans to be repaid at a future time. The primary legal issue the court needed to address was whether the defendant intended to permanently deprive the company of its property, or whether he intended to treat the property as his own to dispose of regardless of the rights of the company. The court found that, because the company lost its right to recover the appropriated amount from its bank account upon each transfer, the company was permanently deprived of its property. The court further ruled that the definition of ‘depriving’ in the Criminal Code (NT) included an alternative to permanently depriving the owner of property. Under this alternative, the prosecution needed to prove that the defendant intended to treat the company’s property as his own to dispose of regardless of the rights of the company. The court held that this intention could be satisfied by proof that the defendant intended to lend the appropriated property. This ruling allowed the jury to consider whether the defendant had the requisite intention to commit the offence of stealing, even if he intended to repay the amount appropriated at some future time.
The court’s ruling provided clarity on the interpretation of the term ‘depriving’ in the Criminal Code (NT). By recognising an alternative to permanently depriving the owner of property, the court expanded the circumstances in which an accused could be found to have the requisite intention to commit the offence of stealing. This ruling was significant in cases where the accused claimed that the appropriation of property was a loan to be repaid at a future time. The court’s decision allowed the prosecution to prove the element of ‘intention of depriving’ by showing that the accused intended to treat the property as his own to dispose of regardless of the rights of the owner, including by lending. This ruling provided a broader interpretation of the offence of stealing, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of the accused’s intention.

Orders