The Queen v Lovegrove and The Queen v Clancy

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CITATION:The Queen v Lovegrove and The Queen v Clancy [2018] NTSC 2

PARTIES:THE QUEEN

v

LOVEGROVE, Stephen

AND

THE QUEEN

v

CLANCY, Brendon George

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION

FILE NO:(21728714) & (21734145)

DELIVERED:  16 January 2018

DELIVERED AT:  DARWIN

HEARING DATES:  27 and 28 December 2017

JUDGMENT OF:  SOUTHWOOD J

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – Sentencing – backdating of commencement of sentence – electronic monitoring – residential rehabilitation – Sentencing Act (NT) s 5(2)(k), s 63(5) – no backdating for electronic monitoring and residency at a residential rehabilitation facility – sentence to be reduced

Bail Act (NT) s 27A(1)(iaa), s 27A(1)(iab), s 27A(1)(ia)
Criminal Code s 405(1), s 405(2)
Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 33(1), s 40B, s 40B(2), s 63, 63(1), s 63(2), s 63(3)
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 s 47, s 47(1), s 47(2), s 47(3)
Justice (Corrections) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2011 s 26
Sentencing Act (NT) s 3, s 5, s 5(1), s 5(2), s 5(2)(k), 60A(1), s 62(1), s 63A(2), s 63(4), s 63(5)
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 18, s 18(1), s 18(4)
Statute Law Revision Act 2011

Pappin v The Queen [2005] NTCCA 2, applied

Akoka v The Queen [2017] VSCA 214; Alimudin v McCarthy; Nurdin v Bravos [2008] NTCA 7; (2008) 23 NTLR 102; Eatts v Dawson (1990) 21 FCR 166; Forrest v The Queen [2017] NTCCA 5; Griffiths v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 293; Hughes v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 48; Makarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; Nottle v Trenerry (1993) 3 NTLR 68
Okwechime v Sindel (2009) 235 FLR 299; R v Cartwright (1989) 17 NSWLR 243; R v Douglas Unreported, New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, 4 March 1997; R v Eastway Unreported, New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, 19 May 1992; R v Elphick (No 2) [2012] ACTSC 87; R v Eyles (No 3) [2017] ACTSC 1; R v Heaney Unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, 27 March 1996; R v Judge Frederico; Ex parte Attorney-General [1971] VR 425; R v McHugh (1985) 1 NSWLR 588; R v Renzella [1997] 2 VR 88; R v Wronski v Raue [2012] ACTSC 87, referred to

R v Currado Calesso SCC 21558128; R v Lowe SCC 21715822; R v Ralph Forbes SCC 21646710; R v Rhys Watts SCC 21632323; R v Stephen Edwards SCC 21634627, not followed

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Prosecution:  C Ingles

Defendant:R Goldflam

Solicitors:

Prosecution:  Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions

Defendant:Northern Territory Legal Aid Corporation

Judgment category classification:    B

Judgment ID Number:  Sou1801

Number of pages:  36

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

The Queen v Lovegrove and The Queen v Clancy [2018] NTSC 2

No. (21728714) & (21734145)

BETWEEN:

THE QUEEN

AND:

STEPHENLOVEGROVE

AND

THE QUEEN

AND

BRENDON GEORGE CLANCY

CORAM:     SOUTHWOOD…

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Details
Case
[2018] NTSC 2
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of The Queen v Lovegrove and The Queen v Clancy involved sentencing decisions where the accused spent time on electronic monitoring or in a residential rehabilitation facility prior to their imprisonment. The legal issues addressed were whether the court could backdate the commencement of the sentence to include the time spent under these conditions and, if not, whether the court could consider these periods when reducing the sentence. The Northern Territory Supreme Court provided guidance on these matters, drawing from precedents such as Pappin v The Queen and Markarian v The Queen, as well as statutory provisions under the Sentencing Act (NT) and the Bail Act.

The court held that it does not have the power to backdate the commencement of a sentence to include the time an offender spends in the community under electronic monitoring or on bail with stringent conditions at a residential rehabilitation facility. This decision aligns with the principles of instinctive synthesis and the High Court's guidance in Markarian v The Queen. However, the court may consider such periods when reducing the sentence of imprisonment. The court found that a point of error occurs only if the accused’s bail conditions demonstrate that in substance the offender has already suffered a significant penalty, and the sentencing court fails to account for this by reducing the sentence accordingly. The court emphasised the importance of distinguishing between bail and sentencing, noting that bail should not be treated as a deferred sentence or a sentencing option.

In conclusion, the court ruled that while it cannot backdate the commencement of a sentence for periods spent under electronic monitoring or in a residential rehabilitation facility, it may consider these periods when reducing the overall sentence of imprisonment. The court highlighted the need for sentencing judges to clearly state the extent of any reduction for these reasons, similar to reductions for a guilty plea. The decision underscores the importance of ensuring that bail is not conflated with sentencing, to avoid disproportionally lenient sentences. The court also suggested that careful consideration should be given to granting bail for rehabilitation purposes before a guilty plea is entered.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The approach taken in Pappin v The Queen is consistent with the principles of instinctive synthesis addressed by the High Court in Markarian v The Queen.[35] There does not appear to be any requirement to state the extent of any reduction of a sentence because of stringent bail conditions. However, given it was stated in Akoka v The Queen[36] that “offenders will be encouraged to seek residential treatment if it is understood that sentencing judges will acknowledge, and give credit for, the punitive nature of residency in such a facility”, the better practice may be for the sentencing judge to state the extent of any reduction on the same basis that the extent of a reduction in sentence for a guilty plea is stated by the sentencing judge.Conclusion In accordance with the reasoning set out above, I find the court does not have power to backdate the commencement of a sentence of imprisonment for either the time an offender spends in the community on electronic monitoring under the provisions of s 27A(1)(iaa), (iab) or (ia) of the Bail Act, or on bail on stringent conditions at a residential rehabilitation facility. However, a sentencing court may consider such matters and may because of them reduce a sentence of imprisonment which might otherwise have been imposed on an offender. A point of error will only occur if the accused’s bail conditions demonstrate that in substance the offender has already suffered a penalty of significance and the sentencing court fails to take this fact into account and reduce the sentence of imprisonment accordingly. It also seems to me that a sentencing court should very carefully consider whether an accused person should be granted bail to undertake a rehabilitation program before an accused person has pleaded guilty. I agree with Messrs Freiberg and Morgan[37] that legal structures matter. I further agree with them that “[b]ail is not a sentencing option, nor should it be an alternative to sentence.” Bail should not be treated as a deferred sentence. A sentencing court should be careful to avoid this kind of conflation. It has the potential to result in disproportionally lenient sentences. Commonly, sentencing courts do not have all of the facts of the offending to be able to decide the appropriate sentence to be imposed on the accused at the time bail is granted.----------------------------

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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