| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
S CR 2016 0171
| THE QUEEN |
| v |
| DYLAN BARKER |
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JUDGE: | Beale J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 6–10, 13–17, 20 February 2017 |
DATE OF RULINGS: | 14 February 2017 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | The Queen v Barker (Rulings 1, 2 & 3) |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2017] VSC 57 |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Incriminating conduct – Extension of time for filing of Notices of Incriminating Conduct (Rulings 1 & 2) – Admission of evidence of conduct as evidence of incriminating conduct (Ruling 3) – Jury Directions Act 2015 ss 8, 19, 20, 21 – Di Giorgio v The Queen [2016] VSCA 335.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Crown | Mr Justin Lewis | Office of Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr Justin Hannebery | Paul Vale & Associates |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
1 In the course of this trial, I made the following rulings. First, pursuant to s 8 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (the JD Act), I extended the time for the filing of the prosecution’s first Notice of Incriminating Conduct (the First Notice) (Ruling 1). Second, pursuant to the same section, I extended the time for the filing of the prosecution’s second Notice of Incriminating Conduct (the Second Notice), which referred to conduct which had been inadvertently omitted from the First Notice (Ruling 2).[1] Third, I ruled that some of the conduct referred to in the First Notice and the conduct referred to in the Second Notice was admissible as incriminating conduct (Ruling 3). I indicated that, in due course, I would give written reasons for these rulings, and I do so now.
[1]The accused burning the clothes that he was wearing at the time of the shooting.
Background
2 On 9 February 2016, the accused, Dylan Barker, shot Paul Cochrane, killing him. At the time he fired the fatal shot, Barker was sitting in the driver’s seat of his (Barker’s) car. The preponderance of evidence indicates Cochrane was standing in front of Barker’s car when he was shot. Barker drove off immediately after the shooting.
3 A few minutes before the shooting, Cochrane had attacked a friend of Barker’s named Jeremy Marendaz, lunging at him with a knife, as Marendaz sat in the driver’s seat of Marendaz’s car. Marendaz moved quickly into the passenger seat, managing to avoid being stabbed. A short time later, he drove away.
4 When Barker arrived on the scene in his car, he was told about Cochrane’s knife attack on Marendaz.
5 A key issue in the trial was whether Barker shot Cochrane in lawful self-defence or in retaliation for Cochrane attacking Marendaz.
6 In his police interview, Barker initially set up an alibi but eventually he admitted he was the shooter. He indicated that he did not mean to hit Mr Cochrane, just scare him. He also indicated that he mistakenly believed the cartridge contained glass fragments, not lead pellets. At several stages during the police interview, Barker expressed…
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- Case
- [2017] VSC 57
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the statutory provisions under the Jury Directions Act 2015, particularly sections 8, 19, 20, and 21, to ascertain the admissibility criteria for incriminating conduct. The court also considered the case of Di Giorgio v The Queen, which provided guidance on the interpretation of the relevant sections of the Act. In ruling on the timeliness of the Crown’s notice, the court assessed whether any exceptional circumstances justified extending the prescribed time limits. Regarding the admissibility of the evidence, the court needed to decide if the past conduct met the statutory criteria for incriminating conduct and whether it was relevant to the issues in the case.
In its reasoning, the court held that the Crown had not met the statutory requirements for extending the time for filing Notices of Incriminating Conduct, and thus the notices were deemed late. However, the court found that the evidence of the past conduct could still be admitted as it was relevant and probative of Barker’s state of mind at the time of the alleged offences. The court also concluded that the jury was adequately directed on the limited purpose for which the evidence could be considered. Consequently, the court allowed the Crown to present the evidence of Barker’s past conduct, subject to the statutory guidelines and jury directions.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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