The Owners Strata Plan No 57164 v Yau

The Owners Strata Plan No 57164 (the Owners Corporation) appealed a decision of the primary judge concerning consent orders made by Bergin CJ in Eq. The dispute centred on whether these consent orders, which settled legal proceedings, could be set aside. The Owners Corporation argued that the underlying settlement agreement was invalid, rendering the consent orders irregular, illegal, or against good faith, and thus subject to being set aside under UCPR, r 36.15(1) or the court's inherent jurisdiction.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the consent orders could be set aside, and if so, under what circumstances. Specifically, the court had to determine if the executive committee of the Owners Corporation had the authority to instruct senior counsel to settle the legal proceedings. This authority was challenged on two grounds: firstly, that a meeting of the executive committee was not properly constituted due to insufficient notice, and secondly, that the settlement involved matters requiring a special resolution of the Owners Corporation, which had not been obtained. The court also considered whether the Owners Corporation's conduct after the orders were made constituted ratification and whether there had been an undue delay in seeking to set them aside.

The court reasoned that for consent orders to be set aside under UCPR, r 36.15(1), it must be shown that they were made irregularly, illegally, or against good faith. While the primary judge found that an invalid underlying agreement could render orders irregular, he concluded that the Owners Corporation had not established this. Furthermore, even if irregularity were found, the primary judge would not have exercised his discretion to set aside the orders due to ratification and delay. The Owners Corporation's argument that the court was compelled to set aside the orders under its inherent jurisdiction if the underlying agreement was void was also considered. However, the court noted that the respondents contended that entered court orders are generally final and cannot be set aside except in specific circumstances like fraud, which were not present.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.