The Owners of Rosneath Farm Survey Strata Plan 35452 and Rowell & Anor
[2007] WASAT 95
•30 APRIL 2007
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
STREAM: COMMERCIAL & CIVIL
ACT: STRATA TITLES ACT 1985 (WA)
CITATION: THE OWNERS OF ROSNEATH FARM SURVEY STRATA PLAN 35452 and ROWELL & ANOR [2007] WASAT 95
MEMBER: MR T CAREY (MEMBER)
HEARD: 27 FEBRUARY 2007
APPLICANT'S CLOSING SUBMISSIONS FILED 26 MARCH 2007
RESPONDENTS' CLOSING SUBMISSIONS FILED 30 MARCH 2007
DELIVERED : 30 APRIL 2007
FILE NO/S: CC 1880 of 2006
BETWEEN: THE OWNERS OF ROSNEATH FARM SURVEY STRATA PLAN 35452
Applicant
AND
WARWICK HAROLD MITFORD ROWELL
GILLIAN ELIZABETH ROWELL
Respondents
Catchwords:
Strata titles - Common property surveystrata scheme - Occupation of house on common property as residence - Whether strata company empowered by s 31 of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA) to make application - Whether strata company acting "for the benefit of all the proprietors" - Nature of common property - Whether any rights held superior to those of other proprietors - Whether occupation "exclusive" - Appropriate relief
Legislation:
Building Units and Grouped Titles Act 1980 (Qld), s 30(7)
Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 9, s 95, s 95(1), s 95(3), s 95(3)(a)
Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA), s 17, s 17(1) s 19, s 19(2), s 31, s 35, s 35(1), s 35(1)(a), s 42(8), s 81, s 83, Sch 1(1)(2)(a), Sch 2(2)
Result:
Orders made requiring vacation from house on common property and cessation of its use as a residence
Declaration under s 95(3) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) made
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Ms P Cahill
Respondents : Mr G MacIntyre SC
Solicitors:
Applicant: Shaddicks Lawyers
Respondents : Christopher Garvey
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Clark and The Owners Of Rosneath Farm - Strata Plan 35452 & Ors [2007] WASAT 85
Nullagine Investments Pty Ltd v Western Australian Club Inc (1993) 177 CLR 635
Platt v Ciriello [1998] 2 Qd R 417
Re Burton; Ex Parte Rowell & Anor [2006] WASC 277
State of Western Australia v Ward [2000] FCA 191
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
Summary of Tribunal's decision
The applicant sought orders requiring the respondents to cease residing at a house built on a common property lot in a survey‑strata scheme. It regarded the respondents' use of the house to be excessive and contrary to the respondents' rights as tenants in common, along with all other proprietors in the scheme, in respect of common property.
The respondents raised a number of arguments against their eviction. They argued that despite using the house as their residence, they were not in exclusive possession of it, bearing in mind the many uses to which other proprietors and non‑proprietors put the house while they lived there. In the alternative, they relied upon an agreement between the original owner of the parcel and the company of one of the respondents, which was said to bestow a residential entitlement on the company which continued to the present. They also challenged the capacity of the applicant to bring the application to evict them.
The Tribunal found that the respondents had not demonstrated any right to the house superior to that of other proprietors. It also found that the rights which they had asserted and continued to assert were contrary to the essence of common property and breached two applicable by‑laws. The applicant was entitled, if not obliged, to bring the application in accordance with its duties to control and manage the common property for all proprietors and to enforce its by-laws.
The Tribunal ordered that the respondents vacate and cease to use the house as their residence, and remove their personal effects and make good any damage caused in so doing. The Tribunal refused to make any order in consequence of the applicant's use of sheds on common property because the evidence did not show that the use was exclusive of the other proprietors.
Introduction
Warwick Harold Mitford Rowell and Gillian Elizabeth Rowell (Rowells, Mr Rowell or Mrs Rowell as the context requires) are the proprietors of Lot 3 on Survey‑Strata Plan 35452 in respect of the parcel of land known as Rosneath Farm, Dunsborough. The Pink House is wholly contained within a common property lot, shown as "CP Lot 9" on the survey‑strata plan. Since 1996, the Rowells have used the Pink House as their sole residence, although some issue has arisen as to the nature of their occupation and the current rights of other lot proprietors to use the Pink House.
The strata company for the scheme (strata company) seeks orders that the respondents vacate and cease to use the Pink House as a residence, remove personal effects, chattels and fixtures from the Pink House, adjoining outbuildings and sheds, and make good any damage thereby caused. In broad terms, the application is founded upon the ground that the Rowells are exercising rights and privileges in relation to the Pink House superior to those enjoyed by the other lot proprietors to which they are not entitled. A declaration pursuant to s 95 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) in relation to the orders made is sought.
The Rowells, who were represented by senior counsel, raised threshold points going to the strata company's authority to make the application to the Tribunal and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, both of which were the subject of adverse rulings, accompanied by brief reasons in each case, at the hearing. I will provide fuller reasons for each of those rulings now before turning to the substantive issues in the case.
Threshold issues
Regarding the question of the authority of the strata company, it was submitted that the resolution empowering the strata company to take action to secure the Rowells' vacation from the Pink House was not a valid exercise of the strata company's powers under s 35 of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA) (ST Act) to manage and control the common property "for the benefit of all the proprietors", when, in terms of owner numbers, the resolution represented a minority view. The Rowells also sought to invoke the concept of reasonable user, citing State of Western Australia v Ward [2000] FCA 191, a decision about native title, in contending that an exclusive or superior use by one proprietor of a small portion of the common property was permissible and did not require any corrective action by the strata company under its s 35 duty.
In my view, the expression "for the benefit of all proprietors" in s 35 means that the strata company's control and management of the common property must be for the benefit of the whole corporate body of proprietors, and must not be for the benefit of individual proprietors where that benefit undermines the corporate benefit. Any assessment of what is for the benefit of all proprietors will depend upon the facts of each case. With reference to the facts of this case, if it be the fact that one owner uses part of the common property to the exclusion of other proprietors, when it possesses no special rights or privilege in respect of that part, then the strata company, in the exercise of its duty to control and manage the common property for the benefit of all of the proprietors, is entitled to take steps to rectify that situation. There may be a question as to the existence of such rights or privilege, which would be for determination in the proceedings instituted by the strata company. But arguments going to that issue cannot undermine the authority of the strata company to embark upon a course to which it is committed by a regular resolution.
Further, in my view, it is not open to analyse common property as a composite of cells, some of which can be used by individual proprietors to the permanent or indefinite exclusion of others. Section 17 ST Act describes common property in the following terms:
"(1)Common property shall be held by the proprietors as tenants in common in shares proportional to the unit entitlements of their respective lots."
The essential feature of a tenancy in common is unity of possession, each of the tenants having the right to occupy the whole of the property in common with the others: Nullagine Investments Pty Ltd v Western Australian Club Inc (1993) 177 CLR 635 at [643]. Therefore, to the extent that the strata company considers that any part of the common property is the subject of unwarranted privileged use by any proprietor, it may take action under s 35.
In the respondents' further closing submissions, filed 30 March 2007, the respondents raised for the first time an argument that there are currently challenges being made to the entitlement of the original owner of the parcel, Richard Clark (Clark) to vote; if those challenges are successful, the resolution authorising the application is without lawful foundation, and the Tribunal should await the determinations of those challenges. The Tribunal's recent decision in Clark and The Owners Of Rosneath Farm - Strata Plan 35452 & Ors [2007] WASAT 85 does not appear to assist the Rowells in that regard. In any event, the substantive issues have now been debated and I see no reason why they should not be determined and orders made, consistent with the Tribunal's objective under s 9 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (SAT Act) to act as speedily as practicable.
The challenge to the Tribunal's jurisdiction under s 83 of the ST Act was predicated on the invalidity of the purported exercise of power by the strata company based on the s 35 argument and falls away in light of the finding that the strata company was authorised to bring the application.
I now turn to the substantive issues. Based on the evidence and submission of the parties, these issues are:
1)What rights do the Rowells have in relation to the Pink House? Does their use exceed their rights?
2)What is the position in relation to the adjoining buildings and sheds, and a caravan adjacent to the Pink House?
3)To what relief is the strata company entitled?
What are the Rowells' rights in relation to the Pink House?
In order to assess whether any legal basis exists for the Rowells' claim to be entitled to some superior right to the Pink House over other proprietors which enables them to use it as their residence, it is illuminating to consider the historical background. On 14 March 1996, Richard Clark, the original owner of the parcel, and Mr Rowell's company, Rowell Consulting Services Pty Ltd (RCS), entered a Development Agreement under which RCS was appointed as "estate manager" for a maximum of four years from the first meeting of the strata company. It is common ground that RCS remained as farm manager until 12 April 2003. Funds, labour, material and equipment were to be provided by RCS for the construction of what became the Pink House, and RCS received a credit to its capital account and an entitlement to interest.
Clause 5 of the Development Agreement included:
"A five year lease agreement with an option to renew for a further five years will be at market rent."
The parties agree that this is a reference to RCS having the lease and option mentioned of the Pink House, although they disagree as to whether that was tied to the continuing status of RCS as farm manager.
It appears that no discrete lease documentation materialised until May 2002, after the Rowells had lived there for five and a half years. Mr Thomas Black (Black) is the proprietor (with his wife) of a lot in the scheme, and for a period, was a member of the council of owners. According to his evidence, which is uncontested in this respect, in about March 2002, Black informed the Rowells of his view that their lease under the Development Agreement had expired, which caused them to seek from the council of owners continuation of the "lease". They were successful in that regard, and on 15 May 2002, a lease document on the standard REIWA "Agreement to Take Residential Premises" was executed for a term of 13.5 months expiring 30 June 2003 with an option to renew for two further one year periods. On 30 June 2004, another lease on the standard REIWA form was executed for a term of one year commencing 30 June 2004, with options to renew for two further one year periods. Prior to the expiry of the first of the option periods on 30 June 2006, the Rowells indicated their intention to exercise the option, which would have extended their right of occupation to 30 June 2007. Each of the three written lease agreements named the Rowells, not RCS, as lessee.
The strata company took proceedings under the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA) to terminate the most recent of the agreements to which I have just referred. It was successful before a magistrate (albeit the magistrate struck down the agreement and found in its place that a periodic tenancy existed) but the magistrate's decision was quashed on review by the Supreme Court: Re Burton; Ex Parte Rowell & Anor [2006] WASC 277. In His Honour's judgment in the review, Martin CJ accepted that the agreement was not a valid exercise of power by the strata company on the basis that the prerequisite of a resolution without dissent (s 19(2) ST Act) had not been met. Interestingly, His Honour made an obiter observation at [56] that the Rowells would be able to establish a right to exclusive occupation of the Pink House only if they could establish an agreement had been entered in accordance with s 19 – which as the magistrate had found, and His Honour accepted, had not occurred – or that all the lot owners had jointly conferred that right on them. However, the latter alternative had not been put to either the Supreme Court or the magistrate and the Chief Justice did not deal with it.
What then is the source of the Rowells' right to occupy the Pink House as their residence as asserted by them? The Rowells have contended for two alternative sources. The first is their rights as tenants in common of the common property. The second is through RCS's rights under cl 5 of the Development Agreement. I will consider each source in turn.
Rights as tenant in common
The Rowells submitted that their rights are of non-exclusive occupancy and use which co‑exist with other proprietors subject to the qualification that they are exercised by each party reasonably having regard to the interests of the other. There is nothing exceptionable, in my view, about this submission. The Rowells then submitted that the fact that the Rowells use "a portion of" the Pink House as a dwelling does not unreasonably interfere with or obstruct the use of the common property by other proprietors, and the evidence of those proprietors in favour of the current use of the Pink House was cited in support. This submission picks up two of the by‑laws applicable to the scheme which reinforce the commonality of entitlement amongst tenants in common. Schedule 1 by‑law 1(2)(a) provides:
"1. Duties of proprietor, occupiers, etc.
...
(2)A proprietor, occupier or other resident of a lot shall —
(a)use and enjoy the common property in such a manner as not unreasonably to interfere with the use and enjoyment thereof by other proprietors, occupiers or residents, or of their visitors; "
Schedule 2 by‑law 2 provides:
"2. Obstruction of common property
A proprietor, occupier, or other resident of a lot shall not obstruct lawful use of common property by any person."
Generally, for any individual proprietor to assert, by action or words, that some common property is "their home" is contrary to the essence of common property. This what the Rowells have done, yet they seek to argue that they are doing no more than exercising their rights as a tenant in common. Although it is true that at common law all co‑owners are entitled to the use of each and every part of the land co‑owned, and that the right of user extends to the exploitation of the land such as the growing of crops (see Bradbrook, AJ Australian Real Property Law 3rd ed Thomson Lawbook Co, 2002, page 386 at par 11.13), this is subject to the proviso that a co‑owner must not exclude other co‑owners from the land.
There is ample evidence, including admissions from the Rowells' side, that they have used the whole of the Pink House as their sole residence. In the words of Mrs Rowell from the witness box, referring to the Pink House, "this our home". They sleep, eat and entertain there, and have the use of all the domestic and office facilities which one normally associates with a modern dwelling house. The Rowells' furniture and personal effects are there. It is also clear that they exercise control over who enters the Pink House, albeit having something akin to a "communal house" policy to most of the house during daylight hours. Mrs Rowell, in her oral evidence, referred to the Rowells' "rights to privacy" given that the Pink House was "our home", at certain times, in particular in the early hours of the morning. From her evidence, it was clear that the Rowells regarded any decision to allow other people to stay at the Pink House, for example on occasions the Rowells were away, as theirs. Moreover, Mrs Rowell stated in cross‑examination that it was their intention to stay there. They wished to build on their own lot, but they could currently not afford to do so.
In addition to the control which the Rowells exercise over entry, there was evidence from Black and Clark, which I accept, that they regard it as a matter of impracticality and embarrassment for them or other proprietors to use the Pink House without the Rowells' permission for the reason that it is their (the Rowells') home, and that they do not want the Rowells to continue to use the Pink House in this way.
Again, at common law, no obvious mechanism exists for the resolution of differences as to how commonly owned land should be used, which, according to the authors of Australian Real Property Law at par 11.13 places pressure on the co‑owners to reach agreement. In the strata context, as already mentioned in these reasons, the strata company's duty under s 35 of the ST Act entitles it to take action against a proprietor exercising its rights in respect of part of the common property to the exclusion of other proprietors, in the absence of any special right or privilege.
There is a question as to whether the Rowells' use of the Pink House as a residence is "exclusive" use. In relation to this question, the Rowells found themselves contending for propositions which were anomalous with their insistence to the present day that a lease exists in favour of either themselves or RCS. Thus, in her first statement, Mrs Rowell said:
"It is incorrect to assert that I or my husband assert or exercise exclusive use of the Pink House."
To support the non‑exclusivity of their use, the Rowells relied upon evidence indicating that the Pink House was used for a wide range of functions by other proprietors and invitees. They argued that the Pink House was used by large numbers of proprietors on strata company business and in connection with the efforts to obtain new purchasers. Among the myriad of uses advanced, the Rowells claimed the Pink House was being used as an office, display building, a testing and demonstration of technologies, mail collection point and for child and aged care (related to particular proprietors or their invitees). Kitchen facilities were made available to a wide range of users. Some of these claimed uses are disputed by the applicant. There was evidence going both ways in relation to the extent to which the fruit and vegetables from the garden in the front of the Pink House were available to proprietors other than the Rowells, although Mrs Rowell's evidence in cross‑examination that the Rowells established and maintained the garden, and it would be unreasonable for other proprietors to simply come and take vegetables is consistent with her perception of the Pink House as her home.
What is meant by "exclusive use", and the capacity that exists for proprietors to themselves adjust (exclude or enlarge) the rights of their co‑tenants in common, were discussed in a Queensland decision upon which each party relied, Platt v Ciriello [1998] 2 Qd R 417. Large parts were extracted in the respondents' further closing submissions. It is unnecessary for present purposes to go into the various judgments in detail. However, the following passage from the judgment of Ambrose JA provides a useful summary of what is to be regarded as "exclusive" in the current context. Section 30(7) of the Building Units and Group Titles Act 1980 (Qld), to which the passage refers, is an exclusive use provision similar to s 42(8) of the ST Act:
"When any proprietor of a lot makes use of the common property for a reasonable purpose from time to time, he will often be making an exclusive use of it while doing so.
In my judgment however that lot proprietor will not be making 'the exclusive use' of the common property in such cases to which s 30(7)(a) of the Act refers. The 'exclusive use' contemplated by that section is the sort of exclusive use which a proprietor makes of his lot. While he is proprietor of that lot no other person without his assent may use it for any purpose – subject of course to any personal obligation upon him founded upon contract or equitable principles which gives some other person entitlement to use it.
In my judgment the sort of 'exclusive use' contemplated by by‑law 30(7) is that to which the body corporate may give a right in respect of a designated part of the common property which is similar to the right which a proprietor has with respect to his lot."
Applying this passage to the present case, I find that the Rowells have been engaging in the sort of exclusive use of the Pink House in its entirety which a proprietor makes of his lot and in respect of which they might have applied to the strata company for a by‑law under s 42(8). The fact that the Rowells regularly permit others to use it for a variety of purposes is consistent with the passage, given its references to the proprietor's use of his lot and his control over any use by others.
The Rowells submitted that a proprietor may, in relation to a portion of common property, exercise a "non‑exclusive occupancy analogous to occupancy by a lodger". I do not think this categorisation assists them, as a lodger is subject to the absolute discretion of the landlord (save for his contractual obligation in relation to the lodger) and the constraints which arise in the strata titles context applying to the rights of proprietors as between themselves are absent.
Rights accruing under Development Agreement
According to Mrs Rowell's first statement filed in this proceeding:
"Our company has an Agreement with Mr Clarke which gives a 10 year tenancy of the Pink House, and any documentation with the Strata Company merely confirms that arrangement."
Then, par 18 of the Rowells' closing submissions included the following:
"[The rights which RCS has to occupy the Pink House] are rights deriving from the original owner and comprise an encumbrance upon the common property of which the proprietors had notice upon purchasing their interests."
The closing submissions proceeded to suggest that it is not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to reach any final adjudication upon "the rights of RCS to occupy a portion of the common property pursuant to an agreement with the original owner" and that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to make any order in relation to "the vacation of the Pink House by RCS, which is not a party to these proceedings".
Whether or not RCS has ever been the lessee pursuant to the Development Agreement, and whether or not it continued as lessee after its term as farm manager ended in 2003, might be interesting historical questions. However, in my view, the Rowells have failed to demonstrate that RCS has, in 2007, any leasehold interest in the Pink House. Clause 5 of the Development Agreement is particularly vague and hardly exhibits the certainty which is generally required of leases. That very vagueness both allows and presents problems for the Rowells' argument that the term of the lease commenced in June 1997 when, on Mrs Rowell's evidence, the Rowells commenced living at the Pink House in about December 1996 (their contention being that it was only in June 1997 that the Pink House was suitable for habitation). Crucially, it was for the Rowells to demonstrate a legal basis for their occupation. Until recently, they relied upon the lease in their names in relation to which they claimed to have exercised an option to renew which would have entitled them to remain in the Pink House until 30 June 2007. This claim now having been denied them, they rely upon a derivative right arising from an alleged lease from the original owner to Mr Rowell's company said to have been entered into prior to the registration of the survey strata‑scheme. Leaving aside the question of whether any such lease survived the registration of the scheme, the Tribunal finds, based on the evidence before it, that any lease to RCS expired at the end of the original five year term. There is no evidence that the option to a further term was exercised, but there is evidence that the Rowells thereafter entered into what turned out to be an unenforceable lease to them personally. This is not an adjudication on the rights of RCS in relation to the Pink House, but rather a finding of a failure on the part of the respondents to prove the derivative right which they assert. Neither is the potential result an order for the vacation of the Pink House by RCS, but rather an order for vacation by the Rowells.
The Rowells did not contend that they have any other rights to the Pink House, for example under s 42(8) by‑law. The effect is that the Rowells have no greater nor lesser right to the Pink House than any other proprietor of a lot in the scheme. For the reasons already given, that right has been exceeded by their use of the Pink House as a residence.
What are the Rowells' rights in relation to sheds and outbuildings? What is the position with the caravan?
Regarding the shed and outbuildings, which appear to be on a common property lot other that CP 9, it seems that no right beyond that of proprietors as tenants in common has even been claimed; in any event, there is no evidence of any better right.
The evidence indicated that there are three sheds on the common property, in one of which the Rowells store some of their things and other proprietors also store things. In my view, the applicant has not established that the Rowells' use of the sheds has been to the exclusion of other proprietors, as was the case in respect of the Pink House. Their storage of chattels, and even fixtures, in the sheds does not connote that other proprietors are unable to use the sheds in any particular way. The mere fact of storage is not sufficient. No order affecting the Rowells' use of the sheds is justified.
A further complaint of the strata company involved the Rowells' use of a caravan in close proximity to the Pink House. Mrs Rowell said that it had been used for strata company purposes and for the accommodation of potential proprietors and voluntary workers. However, the evidence of both Clark and Black was that the caravan was controlled by Mr Rowell who dealt directly with the owner. The inference I have drawn is that the caravan has been used by Mr Rowell as an adjunct to his promotional activities. None of the orders which the applicant seeks would apply to the caravan, as it is not owned by the Rowells. The Tribunal is permitted to make orders only in the terms sought by applicants, or terms which are in substance the same: s 81 of the ST Act. I had considered whether the applicant should be given the opportunity of amending its application to pursue in this application relief in relation to the caravan. In the end, I decided against this course for reasons including the avoidance of delay, the primary subject of the application being use of the Pink House, and the possibility that the Tribunal's decision on that subject will impact upon the future use and location of the caravan in a way which makes any determination by the Tribunal unnecessary.
To what relief is the strata company entitled?
There was some debate at the hearing regarding the terms of the principal order in terms that "the respondent ... vacate and cease to use the building ... known as the 'Pink House' ... as a residence to the exclusion of other proprietors ...". The Rowells' concern about this was that it might be seen as removing all their rights in relation to the Pink House when, as proprietors, they have the rights described in s 17 of the ST Act. I consider that, read as a whole, the terms of the order sought are reasonable and convey the mischief which the strata company wishes to remedy of the use of the Pink House as a residence to the exclusion of other proprietors. The evidence that the Rowells' personal effects, chattels and fixtures are in the Pink House indicates the need for the second order (removal of all personal effects, chattels and fixtures, to the extent that that pertains to the Pink House) and also the third order sought (make good any damage caused by such removal).
Subject to the matter referred to in the next paragraph, the strata company is entitled to the orders sought in par 1 of the application pursuant to its duty to control and manage the common property for the benefit of all proprietors under s 35(1) of the ST Act. As I have discussed, this is, in substance, because it is in the interests of the body of proprietors that common property is managed in such a way that the rights of all proprietors as tenants in common are respected. Where, as here, use of common property by one proprietor excludes other proprietors, no right to so exclude proprietors such as a lease or exclusive use by‑law exists, and any proprietor raises an objection, the strata company is entitled if not obliged to take steps to restore the commonality of entitlement which underlines the concept of common property. I am also satisfied that the Rowells' use of the Pink House has been in breach of both Sch 1 by‑law 1(2)(a) and Sch 2 by‑law 2, and the orders represent an incident of the exercise by the strata company of its duty to enforce the by‑laws under s 35(1)(a) of the ST Act.
The order sought by the strata company was that the Rowells vacate (as residents) the Pink House within seven days and make good within the same period. In my view, such a requirement would be unduly onerous given the effect of the order is that the Rowells are to relocate their residence of almost 10 years. I consider a reasonable time to allow them to do this is two months, the first month and a half notionally to relocate and remove their personal effects and furniture, and the remainder to allow them to make good any damage. However, the global time stipulation applies in relation to both.
The strata company sought a declaration pursuant to s 95(3)(a) of the SAT Act that s 95(1) applies to these orders. The Rowells did not make any submission objecting to such a declaration and I consider that the strata company is entitled to the additional comfort that such a declaration provides.
Orders
1.On or before 30 June 2007, the respondents shall:
(a)vacate and cease to use the building situated on common property Lot 9 on strata plan 35452 known as the "Pink House" as a residence to the exclusion of other proprietors of lots on strata plan 35452 and invitees of other proprietors of lots on strata plan 35452;
(b)remove all of the personal effects, chattels and fixtures of the respondents from the Pink House; and
(c)make good any damage caused to the Pink House by the removal of any personal effects, chattels or fixtures of the respondents.
2.There is a declaration pursuant to s 95(3)(a) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) that s 95(1) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) applies to these orders.
I certify that this and the preceding [42] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
___________________________________
MR T CAREY, MEMBER
7