The Northern Territory of Australia v Lane, Patricia
[1996] FCA 465
•14 JUNE 1996
CATCHWORDS
COSTS - notice of discontinuance - with or without leave of the court - reason for discontinuance to avoid duplication of proceedings - possibility of qualified consent to discontinue - discretion of court in special circumstances
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - notice of discontinuance - see above
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)
Northern Territory of Australia v Lane (unreported, 24 August 1995, O'Loughlin J)
North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation v Queensland (unreported, 21 March 1996, High Court)
"Landsal Pty Ltd (In liquidation) v REI Building Society (1993) 41 FCR 421
R v Liverpool City Council; ex parte Newman [1993] C.O.D. 65
Garwolin Nominees P/L v Statewide Building Society [1984] VR 469
SCI Operations Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1984) 2 FCR 113
Covell Matthews and Partners v French Wools Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 876
Attorney-General v British Broadcasting Corporation [1978] 1 WLR 477
No DG 6001 of 1994
THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA Applicant
- and -
PATRICIA LANE First Respondent
- and -
THE HONOURABLE ROBERT S FRENCH, THE HONOURABLE HOWARD OLNEY, THE HONOURABLE JANE MATHEWS, THE HONOURABLE HAL WOOTTEN, THE HONOURABLE FREDERICK CHANEY, SEAN FLOOD,
ANTHONY MARK LEE Second Respondent
- and -
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Third Respondent
- and -
MIRIUWONGA GAJERRONGA NINGGUWUNG YAWURRUNG ABORIGINAL CORPORATION, BEN WARD, JOHN TOBY, JIMMY WARD, RONNIE CARLTON, JEFF JANAMA, BUTTON JONES, BEN BARNEY, DODGER CARLTON, KIM ALDUS, PADDY CARLTON, RITA GERRARD, MURPHY SIMON, SHEBA DIGNARI, JOE LISSADELL, CHOCOLATE THOMAS, TOBY BANMAR, RONNIE YUDUN Fourth Respondents
- and -
CECIL NINGARMARA, DOUGLAS BOOMBI, STEPHANIE BOOMBI, ALICE BOOMBI, SANDRA BOOMBI, RITA BOOMBI, HELEN BOOMBI, ROSIE GALLAGHER, DAVID LUAMI, PETER NEWRY, TOM BARNEY, PATRICK BITTANG, BINGLE GUNDARI, CARLTON GEORGE, RODNEY WALMAJA, GREGORY CALWAT, HERBERT ANTHONY, CHARLIE BARNEY, STAN LONG, ASHLEY WILLIAMS, JOCK McDONALD, DIANNE DINGAL Fifth Respondents
O'Loughlin J
Adelaide (heard in Darwin)
14 June 1996
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No DG 6001 of 1994
)
GENERAL DIVISION )
B E T W E E N:
THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA Applicant
- and -
PATRICIA LANE First Respondent
- and -
THE HONOURABLE ROBERT S FRENCH, THE HONOURABLE HOWARD OLNEY, THE HONOURABLE JANE MATHEWS, THE HONOURABLE HAL WOOTTEN, THE HONOURABLE FREDERICK CHANEY, SEAN FLOOD, ANTHONY MARK LEE Second Respondent
- and -
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Third Respondent
- and -
MIRIUWONGA GAJERRONGA NINGGUWUNG YAWURRUNG ABORIGINAL CORPORATION, BEN WARD, JOHN TOBY, JIMMY WARD, RONNIE CARLTON, JEFF JANAMA, BUTTON JONES, BEN BARNEY, DODGER CARLTON, KIM ALDUS, PADDY CARLTON, RITA GERRARD, MURPHY SIMON, SHEBA DIGNARI, JOE LISSADELL, CHOCOLATE THOMAS, TOBY BANMAR, RONNIE YUDUN Fourth Respondents
- and -
CECIL NINGARMARA, DOUGLAS BOOMBI, STEPHANIE BOOMBI, ALICE BOOMBI, SANDRA BOOMBI, RITA BOOMBI, HELEN BOOMBI, ROSIE GALLAGHER, DAVID LUAMI, PETER NEWRY, TOM BARNEY, PATRICK BITTANG, BINGLE GUNDARI, CARLTON GEORGE, RODNEY WALMAJA, GREGORY CALWAT, HERBERT ANTHONY, CHARLIE BARNEY, STAN LONG, ASHLEY WILLIAMS, JOCK McDONALD, DIANNE DINGAL
Fifth Respondents
MINUTES OF ORDER
CORAM: O'Loughlin J
PLACE: Adelaide (heard in Darwin)
DATE: 14 June 1996
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The applicant have leave nunc pro tunc to file a notice of discontinuance in these proceedings on 17 November 1995 in respect of all the claims for relief contained in the application for an order of review dated 19 August 1994 that remain outstanding.
The applicant pay the costs of the fourth respondent and the costs of the fifth respondent of and incidental to these proceedings up to and inclusive of 29 March 1995 plus the costs of those respondents of and incidental to their attendance to take judgment in the proceedings on 24 August 1995.
Subject to par 4 hereof, the question of the costs of the applicant, the costs of the fourth respondent and the costs of the fifth respondent of these proceedings including all reserved costs (but excluding the costs referred to in par 2 hereof and excluding the costs of and incidental to the applicant's notice of motion filed herein on 7 March 1996 and this order) be costs in the cause in Action No WAG 6001 of 1995.
If for any reason howsoever the costs that are the subject of par 3 hereof (or any part or parts of them) are not made the subject of final determination in Action No WAG 6001 of 1995 those costs (or such part or parts of them as the case may be) are reserved for further consideration in these proceedings.
That the fourth respondent and the fifth respondent jointly and severally pay the applicant's costs of and incidental to the applicant's notice of motion filed herein on 7 March 1996 and this order which costs are to be taxed in default of agreement and set off against the costs payable by the applicant to the fourth and fifth respondents pursuant to par 2 hereof.
Liberty to any party to apply on seven day's notice.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No DG 6001 of 1994
)
GENERAL DIVISION )
B E T W E E N:
THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA Applicant
- and -
PATRICIA LANE First Respondent
- and -
THE HONOURABLE ROBERT S FRENCH, THE HONOURABLE HOWARD OLNEY, THE HONOURABLE JANE MATHEWS, THE HONOURABLE HAL WOOTTEN, THE HONOURABLE FREDERICK CHANEY, SEAN FLOOD, ANTHONY MARK LEE Second Respondent
- and -
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Third Respondent
- and -
MIRIUWONGA GAJERRONGA NINGGUWUNG YAWURRUNG ABORIGINAL CORPORATION, BEN WARD, JOHN TOBY, JIMMY WARD, RONNIE CARLTON, JEFF JANAMA, BUTTON JONES, BEN BARNEY, DODGER CARLTON, KIM ALDUS, PADDY CARLTON, RITA GERRARD, MURPHY SIMON, SHEBA DIGNARI, JOE LISSADELL, CHOCOLATE THOMAS, TOBY BANMAR, RONNIE YUDUN Fourth Respondents
- and -
CECIL NINGARMARA, DOUGLAS BOOMBI, STEPHANIE BOOMBI, ALICE BOOMBI, SANDRA BOOMBI, RITA BOOMBI, HELEN BOOMBI, ROSIE GALLAGHER, DAVID LUAMI, PETER NEWRY, TOM BARNEY, PATRICK BITTANG, BINGLE GUNDARI, CARLTON GEORGE, RODNEY WALMAJA, GREGORY CALWAT, HERBERT ANTHONY, CHARLIE BARNEY, STAN LONG, ASHLEY WILLIAMS, JOCK McDONALD, DIANNE DINGAL
Fifth Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CORAM: O'Loughlin J
PLACE: Adelaide (heard in Darwin)
DATE: 14 June 1996
On 6 April 1994 an application for determination of native title ("the application") was filed by the Miriuwonga
Gajerronga People pursuant to the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ("the Act"). The land that was the subject of the claim included land in Western Australia and the Northern Territory of Australia.
On 19 August 1994, the Northern Territory of Australia, ("the Territory") commenced these proceedings (DG 6001 of 1994) in this court under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ("the ADJR Act") and s39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), challenging, inter alia, the decision of the Registrar of the Native Title Tribunal ("the Registrar") to accept the application. In separate proceedings in this court (WAG 112 of 1994) the State of Western Australia also challenged the same decision of the Registrar under the ADJR Act and the Judiciary Act.
On 7 November 1994, there was a combined directions hearing in respect of both the Northern Territory and Western Australia applications. Orders were then made that the matters proceed together by way of hearing and determining certain preliminary issues. The first of those issues concerned a variety of procedural challenges that had been raised by the Territory and Western Australia. The second was intended to be an inquiry which would address questions of the Registrar's jurisdiction, and in addition would be directed towards a consideration of the effect (if any) of pastoral leases, perpetual leases and other forms of land tenure on native title in the Northern Territory. For simplicity I will hereafter use the term "pastoral leases" as a convenient expression to encompass the various forms of land tenure that may come into conflict with claims for native title. The first of those issues proceeded to full argument on 27, 28 and 29 March 1995 and judgment was delivered on 24 August 1995: Northern Territory of Australia v Lane (unreported, 24 August 1995, O'Loughlin J)
By the time the procedural issues came on for argument, the joint applicants were the Territory and the State of Western Australia whilst the first three respondents were the Registrar, the Members of the Native Title Tribunal ("the Tribunal") and the Commonwealth (which had sought and obtained leave to intervene). The fourth respondents were the Miriuwonga Gajerronga People - they being the parties who had lodged the application for determination of native title. The fifth respondents were a group of aboriginal people advocating interests in the Northern Territory section of the claim land in competition with the fourth respondents. The fourth respondents were represented by the Aboriginal Legal Service of Western Australia (Inc) ("the WA Service") and the fifth respondents were represented by the Northern Land Council ("the Land Council").
In anticipation that the separate issue of pastoral leases would, in due course, proceed to argument as a preliminary issue, orders were made and a timetable was composed for the applicant and the fourth and fifth respondents to exchange
their documentary material concerning the grant of pastoral leases in the claim area.
Subsequently a material change in circumstances occurred; the Tribunal referred the application to the Federal Court pursuant to s74 of the Act on 2 February 1995. A directions hearing in that matter (WAG 6001 of 1995 - "the related proceedings") came on for hearing before Lee J on 17 March 1995. In that hearing his Honour made orders which included an order that materials filed in proceedings DG 6001 of 1994 were to be materials filed the related proceedings. With respect, such an order seems most appropriate because one of the more important matters that will have to be considered in the related proceedings will be the question of pastoral leases and their effect (if any) on a claim for native title. Much of the work that the parties have done in these proceedings would, in all probability be of some use in the related proceedings.
The applicants were substantially unsuccessful in the ADJR proceedings. Their argument that the Registrar should not have accepted the application because of alleged procedural defects was rejected. Thereafter, there was no further value in pursuing the ADJR applications. If the ADJR application was pursued the referral by the Tribunal of the application to the Court meant that there would be two sets of proceedings, both of which addressed the issue of pastoral leases.
The Territory formed the opinion that the most expeditious procedure would be for it to discontinue these proceedings (DG 6001 of 1994) leaving the related proceedings as the forum for the determination of the pastoral lease issue. It therefore wrote the WA Service and the Land Council offering to pay the costs of the fourth respondents and the fifth respondents "up to and including the conclusion of the hearing on 29 March 1995" (that being the date on which argument concluded). The offer continued with the proposition that subsequent costs should "become costs" in the related action. I take that to mean that such costs should be costs in the cause in the related action.
The WA Service replied by letter dated 26 September 1995, saying:-
"We do not concede that there is any basis that costs incurred in this matter should not be payed by your client. Nonetheless in the spirit of compromise we would be prepared to accept payment of our costs up to and including the conclusion of the hearing on 29 March 1995. A minute of consent order to that effect is enclosed. We would ask that you sign and return the order by return mail so that this matter can be finalised. If you are not agreeable please advise so that we can have the matter listed for argument as soon as possible."
The proposed order that accompanied the letter of 26 September 1995, which was prepared by the WA Service, did not address the question of future costs either in these proceedings or in the related proceedings. After reciting that the applicant would pay the fourth respondent's costs "up to and including the 9 March 1995" - (that was a mistake as it should have been 29 March) - the proposed order provided that "the matter otherwise be dismissed". There was no reference to costs subsequent to 29 March.
If the Territory had acted on this draft order, the fourth respondents would have lost such rights as they might otherwise have had to claim those subsequent costs in the related proceedings. The Territory considered that this reply amounted to an acceptance of its offer. Mr Young, counsel for the WA Service, made a contrary submission however. He argued that the letter of 26 September was not an acceptance of the Territory's offer. He argued that it, in combination with the draft order, amounted to a counter-offer. Although the letter and the draft order were silent on the subject, his submission was that the WA Service was proposing that each party pay its or their own costs after 29 March; he pointed to the fact that under the Territory's offer there was a risk that, if costs were referred into the related proceedings, the WA Service might be ordered to pay the Territory's costs - and that was a risk which the WA Service was not prepared to accept. I accept Mr Young's submissions. The letter from the WA Service was poorly drafted; its effect was neither immediate nor obvious. But after the benefit of Mr Young's submissions there is a case for proceeding upon the premise that a counter offer was being submitted and I will do so.
The Land Council reacted differently to the Territory's proposal; it replied by letter dated 16 October, enclosing a notice of discontinuance endorsed with a form of consent on behalf of the fifth respondents but with the reservation that the question of the subsequent costs "remain open". In its covering letter the Land Council said:-
"I note your view that the historical material costs become costs in proceedings no. WAG6001 of 1995. We do not share that view. Our position is that costs follow the event and therefore we seek to recover all costs incurred in respect of these proceedings, including costs relating to the historical material. In the event that this position prevails historical material costs could not, of course, be claimed again in the Justice Lee proceedings."
As a result of the rejection of its proposal by the Land Council, but still believing that it had an acceptance from the WA Service, the Territory filed a Notice of Motion on 26 October 1995 seeking orders that:-
"1.The proceeding in respect of the remaining claims for relief made in the application dated 19 August 1994 be discontinued.
2.Costs incurred in the proceeding subsequent to 29 March 1995 become costs in matter number WAG 6001 of 1995.
3.The Fifth Respondents pay the costs of the Notice of Motion."
A copy of the Notice of Motion was served on the WA Service. This was to be expected as it was a litigant and the issue of costs had yet to be resolved with the fifth respondent. By letter dated 27 October, it acknowledged service of the Notice of Motion and proceeded to say:-
"We note that you have rejected the proposal pushed in our letter of 26 September 1995. We will therefore argue to the Court that the appropriate order is for the entire costs incurred by the Fourth Respondents in these proceedings to be paid, including the costs of our appearance on 6 November 1995."
As a result of the stand taken by the WA Service, the applicant filed an amended Notice of Motion on 7 March 1996 seeking the same orders as before save that costs of the motion were now sought against the fourth respondents as well as the fifth respondents.
In the ADJR proceedings the issue with respect to pastoral leases to be considered related to the responsibilities of the Registrar at the time of the lodgment of the application for determination of native title. The question was; should the Registrar, at that time, inquire into the existence of pastoral leases and their effect, if any, on native title? It is now clear, as a result of the decision of the High Court in North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation v Queensland (unreported, 21 March 1996, High Court) that it is arguable that a pastoral lease does not extinguish native title. If, therefore, any inquiry into the effect of pastoral leases on native title is to be undertaken, it can only be determined as a result of a full evidentiary inquiry before the Federal Court.
Both the fourth and the fifth respondents have asserted that a section of the work with respect to pastoral leases that was performed by them subsequent to 29 March 1995 will not now be of value in the related proceedings. Even if that be correct (and the proposition has not been tested) it would not influence the outcome of the present application. If that work was reasonably prepared for the purposes of these proceedings (ie DG 6001 of 1994) and if, ultimately, the fourth or the fifth respondents or both of them are successful in the substantive litigation in the related proceedings, they will be entitled to an appropriate costs order. Furthermore, and as an added protection, the question of those costs could stand reserved in these present proceedings in case, for some reason, the trial judge in the related proceedings felt unable to determine the question. In those circumstances, such rights as the fourth and fifth respondents may have on the subject of all costs will be preserved in these proceedings even if they are the losers in the substantive proceedings.
The right of an applicant to discontinue proceedings is governed by the provisions of O 22 r 2 of the rules of the Federal Court. That rule, so far as is relevant to these proceedings, provides as follows:-
"2(1)Subject to sub-rules (2) and (3) a party making a claim for relief may discontinue a proceeding so far as concerns the whole or any part of any claim for relief made by him-
(a)at any time before the directions hearing appointed in the application - without the leave of the Court or the consent of any other party;
(b)where after the directions hearing the proceeding continues on pleadings but the pleadings are not closed - without the leave of the Court or the consent of any other party;
(c)where judgment has not been entered - with the consent of all the parties; and
(d)at any time - with the leave of the Court.
Order 22 r 3 states that a "party who discontinues pursuant to paragraph 2(1)(a) or (b) shall be liable to pay the costs of the other party or parties occasioned by the whole or the relevant part of the proceedings." Neither par 2(1)(a) or 2(1)(b) apply to the facts of this case. All parties seem to have proceeded upon the premise that par 2(1)(c) was the provision that was to be followed. They assumed that notwithstanding the publication of my reasons on 24 August 1995, judgment had not been entered and thus the Northern Territory was at liberty, so long as it obtained the consent of all the parties, to file a notice of discontinuance. In my opinion this does not reflect the true position. I said in my reasons:-
" ... by consent, the court ordered in each action, pursuant to O 29 r 2(a) of the Federal Court Rules, that certain questions be determined separately."
As was pointed out by the Full Court in "Landsal Pty Ltd (In liquidation) v REI Building Society (1993) 41 FCR 421 at 425, Order 29 requires the court on determining a separate question or issue to embody the determination in an order and grant consequential relief. If a judge can be seen to have dealt with a question as a separate question under O 29, an appeal will lie from such a determination even though no formal order reflecting that determination has been taken out. I have no doubt that, as a result of the publication of my reasons on 24 August 1995, a judgment has been "entered" and that the provisions of par 2(1)(c) of O 22 were not an available avenue to the parties. In any event, the question of filing a notice of discontinuance is academic. The issue of consequence is the question of costs flowing from the discontinuance of the ADJR proceedings. In my opinion it would therefore be appropriate for the court to grant leave to the applicant to discontinue with effect from 17 November 1995, the date appearing on the relevant notice, but subject to a determination of the question of costs.
Order 62 r 26 deals with discontinuance without leave and costs. Although I am disposed to grant leave it is useful to set out par 1 of the rule as it establishes that there is a residual discretionary power in the court with respect to costs. In my opinion that discretionary power would also exist where discontinuance with leave occurs. I am aided in coming to that conclusion by the use of the words of limitation contained in the phrase "occasioned by the discontinued claim".
"26(1)Where pursuant to Order 22, rule 2 a party to any proceeding discontinues the proceeding without leave as to the whole or any part of the relief claimed by him against any other party, the discontinuing party shall, unless the Court otherwise orders, pay the costs of the party against whom the discontinued claim is made occasioned by the discontinued claim and incurred before service of the notice of the discontinuance."
The parties advanced opposing arguments about the likely outcome of the pastoral lease issue. That, unfortunately, was of no assistance to me in the resolution of this issue. For example, in R v Liverpool City Council; ex parte Newman [1993] C.O.D. 65 it was posited that there was a general rule that when an applicant filed a notice of discontinuance the respondent would recover its costs but that the general rule should only apply "when the discontinuance could safely be equated with defeat or an acknowledgment of likely defeat". There were positive assertions from the fourth and fifth respondents that such a description fitted the Territory's position and an equally positive rejection from counsel for the Territory. Quite obviously, the answer to this issue must await the ultimate disposition of the related proceedings.
In my opinion the proposition advanced by the Territory in its notice of motion is the more reasonable. The fourth respondent's suggestion that it receive the benefit of an order for one-half of its costs was not an available compromise: it was advanced on the premise that Western Australia was expected to pay the other half in the separate proceedings, that is, WAG 112 of 1994. That, of course, could not be entertained as a possibility; no one had thought to bring Western Australia into this present application.
I do not accept the assertion that the decision of the Territory to discontinue was an acknowledgment of likely defeat. Rather, I assess it as a practical solution to avoid a possible duplication of costs. At this stage I need go no further save to note that I consider that my discretionary power should be used to avoid the application of the so-called general rule. Departure from this rule is not unknown. Indeed there are authorities that show that in some cases the discontinuing party, far from paying costs, may even be entitled to an order for costs in its favour. Garwolin Nominees P/L v Statewide Building Society [1984] VR 469 was one such case.
Lockhart J, sitting as a member of a Full Court in SCI Operations Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1984) 2 FCR 113 at 161-162, on appeal from a judgment of Woodward J emphasised the importance of the retention of the Court's discretion in cases of discontinuance. His Honour noted that Woodward J referred to the judgment of Graham J in Covell Matthews and Partners v French Wools Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 876 and in particular to the following passage at 879:-
"The principles to be culled from these cases are, in my judgment, that the court will, normally, at any rate, allow a plaintiff to discontinue if he wants to, provided no injustice will be caused to the defendant. It is not desirable that a plaintiff should be compelled to litigate against his will. The court should therefore grant leave, if it can, without injustice to the defendant, but in doing so should be careful to see that the defendant is not deprived of some advantage which he has already gained in the litigation and should be ready to grant him adequate protection to ensure that any advantage he has gained is preserved."
The principles to which Graham J referred were approved on appeal by the Court of Appeal Attorney-General v British
Broadcasting Corporation [1978] 1 WLR 477. After citing this passage from the judgment of Graham J, Woodward J said:-
"I would respectfully adopt Graham J.'s formulation of principles so far as it goes, but it leaves open the question as to what should be done in a case where leave cannot be granted without some injustice to the respondent, or in which it may not be possible or appropriate to ensure that every advantage which the respondent may have gained in the course of litigation is preserved.
In my view the matter must remain one for the exercise of the Court's discretion in each case, even if the interests of the respondent cannot be fully protected. I do not believe that Graham J. was suggesting that, unless the respondent's rights can be completely protected, an application for discontinuance must be refused. If he was implying that, then I must respectfully decline to follow his Honour to that extent."
Lockhart J agreed with those observations and, with respect, so do I. I am satisfied that no injustice will be caused to either the fourth or the fifth respondents by the course that I propose to adopt. Such rights as they presently have to claim costs against the applicant or to resist the applicant's claim for costs against them will be preserved. The respondents have complained that this means delay; but that complaint assumes they will ultimately be the recipient of a costs order in their favour. That may not be the case.
It is not possible to predicate how the pastoral lease issue will eventuate. Therefore it is not possible to assess, at this stage, how much of the work already performed by the parties with respect to the issue of pastoral leases in these proceedings will prove to be unnecessary for the ultimate disposition of the related proceedings. It can be said however, that there is a probability that some of it, at least will be capable of use. That in my opinion is sufficient to negate the proposition that the Territory, in filing the notice of discontinuance, was conceding defeat. I have come to the conclusion that the interests of justice warrant orders giving leave to the Territory to discontinue upon the premise that it pay costs to the 29 March 1995. In addition it should also pay the costs of the parties for attending to take judgment. Subsequent costs should be in the cause. If they are not accommodated in the related proceedings any party will be at liberty to bring the issue of costs on for hearing in these proceedings. As the Territory was substantially successful on its application, the fourth and fifth respondents should pay its costs, but those costs should be set off against the costs order in favour of those respondents. There will be orders accordingly.
I certify that this and the preceding pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice O'Loughlin.
Associate:
Dated:
Counsel for the Applicant : Ms J Kelly
Solicitors for the Applicant : Solicitor for the Northern Territory
Counsel for the Fourth Respondents : Mr A Young
Solicitors for the Fourth Respondents: The Aboriginal Legal Service of Western Australia (Inc)
Counsel for the Fifth Respondents : Mr R Levy
Solicitors for the Fifth Respondents : Northern Land Council
Hearing Dates : 20-21 May 1996
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