The Maritime Union of Australia v Patrick Stevedores Holdings Pty Limited

[2015] FWC 2990

[2015] FWC 2990 [Note: An appeal pursuant to s.604 (C2015/4158) was lodged against this decision - refer to Full Bench decision dated 23 July 2015 [[2015] FWCFB 4994] for result of appeal.]

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.739 - Application to deal with a dispute

The Maritime Union of Australia
v
Patrick Stevedores Holdings Pty Limited
(C2014/6816)

VICE PRESIDENT WATSON MELBOURNE, 14 MAY 2015

Dispute concerning superannuation contributions - Provisions of Patrick Terminal Enterprise Agreement 2012 - whether agreed increases subsume statutory increases - Fair Work Act 2009, s.739.

Introduction

[1] This decision concerns an application for the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) to deal with a dispute. The application is made by the Maritime Union of Australia (the MUA) under s.739 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) and concerns employees employed at Patrick Stevedores Holdings Pty Limited’s (Patrick) Container Terminals. The application is made in relation to the superannuation contribution provisions of the Patrick Terminal Enterprise Agreement 2012 (the Agreement). The issue in dispute concerns the interaction between additional superannuation contributions payable as part of the enterprise agreement and additional superannuation contributions payable under the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (the SG Act).

[2] The matter was listed for a conference in December 2014 but the parties were unable to reach a resolution and requested that the matter be listed for arbitration. At the hearing, Mr A. Slevin of counsel appeared for the MUA and Mr Y. Shariff of counsel appeared for Patrick.

Jurisdiction

[3] The dispute comes to the Commission by way of the dispute settlement procedure, paragraph 1.1(e) of Schedule 1 in the Agreement. This provision relevantly provides:

“(e) Where the dispute has not been resolved within 7 days of the issue giving rise to the dispute being raised despite the forgoing procedures being followed and subject to there being no industrial action occurring or having occurred in relation to the issue at hand, then subject to Clause 1.3 either party may refer the matter to FWA for arbitration if necessary in which case the decision will be accepted by the parties subject to any appeal rights.”

[4] Clause 1.3 provides that:

“Unless agreed by the parties, FWA shall not have the power to arbitrate in relation to any dispute involving a Company Policy, other than in relation to a dispute over whether or not a Party has complied with a Company Policy, as required by this Agreement.”

[5] I am satisfied that the parties have conferred a power of private arbitration on the Commission in relation to this dispute.

Background

[6] The dispute arises from Clause 28 and Schedule 5 of the Agreement which relate to the superannuation contribution provisions. Clause 28 relevantly provides that:

“28.1 The Company will make superannuation contributions on behalf of its employees to the Maritime Super where the employee is eligible to join, and joins the Maritime Super, and has not made an election to join another complying superannuation fund.

28.2 The Company agrees to pay contributions for those employees who are members of the Maritime Super at the rate contained in the Maritime Super Trust Deed and Rules unless otherwise agreed between the parties. In this regard, it is agreed that employees who are on workers compensation shall have their normal employee contributions deducted from any workers compensation payments and / or suitable duties earnings during a period of workers compensation, unless the Company is otherwise advised by the employee. Where such contributions are deducted and paid to Maritime Super on behalf of the employee, the Company will also make the normal employer contribution as required by the Maritime Super Trust Deed.

28.3 For employees who are eligible to join the Maritime Super but elect not to do so, the Company will pay the Employees nominated Fund the minimum benefit payment in accordance with the Superannuation Guarantee legislation.

28.4 Employees may designate a portion of their salary (excluding past accrued entitlements), which shall be paid directly into their superannuation scheme as a voluntary contribution, in accordance with relevant legislative arrangements.

28.5 Additional contributions to Maritime Super and/or an Employee nominated Fund for all employees will be as per set out in Schedule 5 of this Agreement.”

[7] Schedule 5 provides that:

“1. Description and Definition of the scheme

1.1 An additional component of superannuation will be paid to the workforce, which is contingent on productivity and customer targets being achieved.

1.2 The "at-risk" component is 0.75% additional superannuation per year over 4 years, which equates to a total potential increase in the superannuation rate of 3% at the end of 4 years.

1.3 Achievement of the "at risk" component is contingent on overall business targets being met relating to adjusted gross crane lifts per shift, and vessels worked within contracted hours.

...

4. Assessment and Payment

4.1 The assessment of the achievement of the targets for average adjusted gross crane lifts per shift and vessels worked within contract hours will occur annually in November each year.

4.2 The assessment will be performed overall for the business, and also for each individual terminal.

4.3 The assessment will be performed by the National Operations Centre Manager, and approved by the General Manager of Operations for Container Terminals.

4.4 Both targets for productivity and customer performance need to be achieved in order to receive the additional payment of superannuation - there will be no part payment or pro-rata payment provided for partial achievement of the targets.

4.5 If the overall productivity and customer targets are met, all Patrick employees will receive the additional 0.75% superannuation payment, and this increase will be added and compounded to the superannuation rate.

4.6 If an individual terminal achieves their target (but the target is not achieved overall), then all employees of that terminal will receive the 0.75% superannuation payment, and that rate will be compounded to the superannuation rate for that Terminal only.

4.7 The increased payment, if eligible, will take effect from each November, even if the assessment period extends beyond the life of the EA.

4.8 The performance target must be achieved in the relevant year to receive the 0.75% superannuation increase - it cannot be achieved retrospectively.

...”

[8] Clause 28 requires that superannuation contributions be made by Patrick on behalf of employees who are members of Maritime Super in accordance with the rules of the Maritime Super Trust Deed and Rules (the Rules). The contributions are made on behalf of employees who are members of other funds in accordance with the SG Act. There is currently no distinction between the levels of contributions made to the employees under this clause as the Rules also require that contributions are made in accordance with the SG Act.

[9] The additional component required to be paid under Schedule 5 of the Agreement relates to workforce business performance and was due to be paid in November in each year of the Agreement.

[10] The contributions required under the SG Act increased from 9% to 9.25% on 1 July 2013 and from 9.25% to 9.5% on 1 July 2014.

[11] Patrick has paid four increases in superannuation contributions since the enterprise agreement was made—0.75% with effect from November 2011 (back paid in May 2012), 0.375% from August 2013, 0.375% in November 2013 and 0.75% from November 2014. As a result of these increases the contribution level has increased from 9% prior to the making of the agreement to 11.25% from November 2014. Patrick did not increase the superannuation contributions further on account of the increased legislative obligations.

[12] The parties disagree on the proper interpretation of the combined operation of Clause 28 and Schedule 5 of the Agreement. Patrick contends that the Schedule 5 payments were formulated in contemplation of increases in the legislative obligations and provided for quicker access to the increased contribution rate but not the legislative increase on top of the agreement increase. It submits that the legislative obligation was always intended to be subsumed into the agreement increases.

[13] The MUA contends that the obligations arising from the different clauses of the Agreement and legislative changes are separate and severable. It submits that employees covered by the Agreement are entitled to the statutory minimum contribution required by legislation (9.5%) plus up to an additional 3% subject to certain productivity hurdles being attained. This means that the total maximum amount payable would be an amount of 12.5% and higher as the legislative minima is increased. At the current time the MUA contends that the superannuation amount payable for employees is 11.75% as it accepts that productivity hurdles were not satisfied with respect to the 2012 increase. The MUA submits that both the increases in the statutory rate as well as the increases for passing the productivity hurdle are payable under the Agreement separately and cumulatively.

Principles of Interpretation

[14] It is important to note the principles for interpreting an enterprise agreement arising from various High Court and Federal Court decisions. These are conveniently summarised in a recent Full Bench decision as follows: 1

“1. The AI Act does not apply to the construction of an enterprise agreement made under the Act.

2. In construing an enterprise agreement it is first necessary to determine whether an agreement has a plain meaning or contains an ambiguity.

3. Regard may be had to evidence of surrounding circumstances to assist in determining whether an ambiguity exists.

4. If the agreement has a plain meaning, evidence of the surrounding circumstances will not be admitted to contradict the plain language of the agreement.

5. If the language of the agreement is ambiguous or susceptible to more than one meaning then evidence of the surrounding circumstance will be admissible to aide the interpretation of the agreement.

6. Admissible evidence of the surrounding circumstances is evidence of the objective framework of fact and will include:

(a) evidence of prior negotiations to the extent that the negotiations tend to establish objective background facts known to all parties and the subject matter of the agreement;

(b) notorious facts of which knowledge is to be presumed;

(c) evidence of matters in common contemplation and constituting a common assumption.

7. The resolution of a disputed construction of an agreement will turn on the language of the Agreement understood having regard to its context and purpose.

8. Context might appear from:

(a) the text of the agreement viewed as a whole;

(b) the disputed provision’s place and arrangement in the agreement;

(c) the legislative context under which the agreement was made and in which it operates.

9. Where the common intention of the parties is sought to be identified, regard is not to be had to the subjective intentions or expectations of the parties. A common intention is identified objectively, that is by reference to that which a reasonable person would understand by the language the parties have used to express their agreement.

10. The task of interpreting an agreement does not involve rewriting the agreement to achieve what might be regarded as a fair or just outcome. The task is always one of interpreting the agreement produced by parties.”

[15] I propose to apply these principles to the construction of the Agreement.

Evidence of Surrounding Circumstances

[16] Evidence was given by Mr Mick Doleman and Mr Trevor Munday, officials of the MUA, and Mr Michael O’Leary and Ms Jayn Sharrock, Managers employed by Patrick. I do not propose to summarise their evidence in full. Each gave evidence about the negotiations leading to the Agreement. Key aspects of the chronology and evidence are as follows:

● In May 2010 the Federal Government announced an intention to increase compulsory superannuation contributions from the then figure of 9% to 9.25% in July 2013 and 9.5% in July 2014 and subsequent increases to 12% by 2019-20. The Joint media release expressed the then government’s intention as:

“A 12 per cent Superannuation Guarantee (SG) - commencing with a 0.25 increase in 2013-14 and 2014-15, followed by 0.5 increments until the SG reaches 12 per cent by 2019-20. The three year lead time recognises that employers and employees need to factor this into future wage negotiations.”

● In around June 2010 negotiations commenced between Patrick and the MUA for a new enterprise agreement.

● On 7 July 2011 the CEO of Asciano, Mr John Mullen and the Federal Secretary of the MUA, Mr Paddy Crumlin made what was termed a “Headline non-binding Agreement” concerning the framework of negotiations and major elements of the agreement. Under the heading “3. Financial” the agreement stated:

“The company is offering an annual 4.75% increase in base salary over the three years of the agreement plus 0.25% salary on the base and 3.0% of superannuation both of which would be at risk, based upon agreed performance and safety criteria. The 3% super would be paid over four years from contract date effectively meaning that the at risk superannuation increase would be 0.75% each year going forward.

The 0.25% salary increase and the superannuation increase of 0.75% would be paid in good faith for the first year, but if the performance hurdles are not met then no payment will be made in the second year and so on.

The MUA’s preferred position is a 5.0% increase per annum on the base and superannuation as per the above company position.”

● A subsequent email later that evening from Mr Mullen to Mr Crumlin included the following statement:

“Thanks again mate and I look forward to our two teams taking this through to a conclusion as soon as we can.”

● In or around November 2011, and agreement was reached in principle on the content of the agreement and the parties began the task of drafting the formal document.

● On 11 November 2011 the MUA issued a media release which relevantly included the following statement:

“The Maritime Union of Australia has reached in-principle agreement for a new enterprise agreement with Patrick Stevedores container terminals that delivers a wage deal alongside improvements in safety and training for about 1200 workers.

The MUA and Patrick are now in the final stages of drafting the agreed terms for a 5 year agreement.

The deal includes a pay rise backdated to October last year when the last agreement expired.

Under the agreement, employees will receive close to 5 per cent annual increases in November this year and in 2012 and 2013, with the final 5 per cent paid in July 2014.

“It has been a long and difficult process of negotiation and we welcome the outcome," MUA National Secretary Paddy Crumlin said.

“This is a clear example that agreements which are acceptable to both workers and employers can be reached under the Fair Work Act.

“This is in clear rebuttal of the hysterical posturing of the Federal Opposition, some right wing commentators, their mates at the right wing think tanks such as the HR Nicholls Society and other doomsayers trying to give the waterfront a bad name.

“We expect that negotiations with Australia's other major terminal operator, DP World, will be concluded in the near future."

The agreement also increases super contributions over its life from 9 per cent to 12 per cent in four increments of 0.75 per cent, linked to performance and outcomes in line with general national trends.

“The MUA strongly believes in the positive benefits of increased superannuation for all workers, particularly in an industry such as stevedoring which is notorious for its physical demands,” Mr Crumlin said.

“The new super arrangements help to allow workers to retire with financial independence before workplace injuries force them to retire - that's a plus for both workers and their employers.”

MUA Deputy National Secretary Mick Doleman said the parties have agreed to establish committees to address productivity and safety issues, the work of which will be run by the branches and reviewed by senior officials at the end of each year.

Safety facilitators will have a higher profile and greater responsibility. On training, new employees will receive additional upskilling.

“The MUA will always make the safety of its members its top priority. Working on the waterfront poses inherent safety risks and the MUA does not apologise for implementing measures aimed at curtailing that risk,” Mr Doleman said.

● On or about 6 February 2012 Mr Doleman wrote to Mr O’Leary expressing “deep concerns” about several aspects of the draft agreement that had been discussed at previous meetings. In relation to Superannuation that letter said:

“Super at Risk

MUA position is that super at risk needs to be included as a schedule of this agreement. Refer to clause 26.6.

The method of payment has not been discussed with the MUA previously. The MUA position is that all .75% payments are compoundable and paid at time of reaching the levels in each terminal as set out in the schedule.

Further we have identified concerns within the document in respect to contract hours and the relationship of “Labour on” to “Labour off” as listed below.

• The MUA position is that it is based on the first revenue lift for the shift.



• In circumstances where vessels' non-compliance with MO32 or stoppages associated with safety related matters then the time should be discounted.



• If the Company decides to transfer labour from a vessel and leave that vessel idle the time should be discounted.”

Review and re-setting of targets

The MUA has concerns that the Patrick position is that there is no review and or re-setting of targets. The MUA consider that targets, should be reviewed to take into account changed circumstances due to outages of Cranes/Straddles or situations that lead to major capital works in a terminal.

There also needs to be a clear understanding with regard to the convening of meetings to review the data associated with at risk super.”

● Mr O’Leary gave evidence of attending the MUA office in the days following receipt of the 6 February letter. He says that he hand delivered Patrick’s responses in a document which was tendered in evidence. The response to the MUA concern expressed above was as follows:

“I need to confirm what you mean by the 0.75% Super at Risk means

The agreement as the Company has viewed it from day 1 is that subject to the "at risk components being met then the rates will increase as follows:

1st increase	not at risk	Super rate moves to 9.75% (I have ignored the 0.45% Insurance contribution for the purposes of this calc.)
2nd increase	at risk and delivered	Super rate moves to 10.50%
3rd increase	at risk and delivered	Super rate moves to 11.25%
4th increase	at risk and delivered	Super rate moves to 12.00%

Once at 12.00% (or less if at risk not delivered) then the Company has met the requirements of the Superannuation Guarantee Levy (SGL) and unless further increases are agreed in future EA's then the 12% rate will apply up until the SGL moves to 12% in 2019.

Please confirm the above.

It is the intent to have a schedule in the EA setting out the dates and application of the at risk Super payments.

The three issues you raise in respect of the concerns on the method of calculation of the at risk Super will be responded to. I make the point that the Union has had that document since October 2011 and the questions were first put to us at the meeting on the 2nd of February.

On the review and setting of targets the Company has clearly outlined the targets for the at risk Super to be delivered (you would be aware we have not increased targets to take into account the introduction of continuous operations which is a leg up to ensure the at risk component is achievable) and the Company agrees that there will need to process on how the data is reviewed, I believe the Parties had discussed providing that information to coincide with ERC meetings in each site.”

● Mr O’Leary gave evidence that at the meeting he said words to the following effect:

“The “at risk” scheme works so an employee can get a maximum 3% increase to their superannuation rate, from 9% to 12%, during the Agreement if all targets are met. If employees meet the targets the rate will then be above the requirements of the super legislation. If 12% is reached then that rate will apply up until the superannuation rate in the legislation moves to 12% in 2019.”

● Ms Sharrock gave evidence that she attended a meeting in Sydney in February 2012 at the MUA head office attended by Mr Doleman and approximately 10 MUA representatives. She said:

“11. During the meeting I recall that Mr O'Leary explained the operation of the Scheme in words to the following effect:

“The Superannuation Guarantee Contribution delivers 12% by 2019. It is agreed that subject to productivity Patrick will increase employee superannuation from 9% to 12% by the end of the Agreement. Provided the rate is ahead of the SGC, as a result of employees meeting their targets, then the Company has met the requirements of the superannuation legislation. If 12% is reached then that rate will apply up until the SGC moves to 12% in 2019.”

12. I recall that in response to this explanation one of the MUA's representatives, although I do not recall who, said words to the following effect:

“Ok so this scheme will just bring us forward of what the Federal Government will do. Increase from 9% to 12% over time. However, the scheme will get us to that rate quicker than the Federal Government's plan?”

13. In response to this query Mr O'Leary replied in words to the following effect:

“Yes. The aim is to allow employees to achieve a 3% increase from 9% to 12% quicker than under the Government's plan if they meet all the targets.”

● Mr Doleman disputes this evidence. He acknowledges that there was every likelihood of some meetings occurring at this time but could not confirm the dates of the meetings. He stated that he had never seen the document allegedly handed to him by Mr O’Leary and had never been to a meeting where Mr O’Leary described the ‘at risk’ super bonus in such terms.

● Mr Munday also professed no knowledge of the document or any description of the arrangement in the terms described by Mr O’Leary.

● All four witnesses were cross-examined in relation to the discussions at a meeting in February and stood by their evidence.

● In early March agreement was reached on the terms of the Agreement and presentations arranged for employees. It appears that while there were discussions about the performance targets there were no other discussions about the interaction between the increased contributions under the Agreement and the increases in the statutory minimum payments.

● The first 0.75% increase was applied in May 2012 backdated to November 2011. The contribution level was then 9.75%.

● No productivity increase was paid in November 2012 because the productivity targets were not met.

● No increase in superannuation contributions was applied in July 2013 when the statutory minimum increased from 9% to 9.25%. Administratively the company adjusted the recording of the contribution level from 9% plus 0.75% to 9.25% plus 0.5% in pay advices to employees. In response to employee and MUA queries Mr O’Leary explained the notion of subsuming legislative increases into productivity based increases which had been applied by the Company.

● A dispute about the contribution level arose in August 2013 at which time the MUA sought to revisit the decision of the company to withhold the November 2012 increase. Mr O’Leary stated that as a gesture of goodwill, as the employees were on track to achieve the November 2013 targets, the Company agreed to pay half of the due increase in advance.

● The dispute over subsuming of increases led to the filing of a dispute notification in this Commission on 16 October 2014.

Does the Agreement have a plain meaning?

[17] The wording of Schedule 5 leaves a lot to be desired. It talks about an additional component of superannuation being payable depending on the achievement of productivity and customer targets. It mentions the potential increase of 3% over the four years of the agreement. The legislative increase is not mentioned. In my view there is an arguable basis for reading this provision as a comprehensive prescription for superannuation entitlements. It is also arguable that it can be interpreted as a discrete payment scheme for an amount to be paid independently of other obligations such as the prevailing statutory minimum.

[18] Recourse to the surrounding circumstances supports the existence of an ambiguity. The planned increases in statutory compulsory contributions were common knowledge at the time. Providing conditional early access to the increases was a logical position to adopt. Indeed it could be said that if the increases were to be applied on top of legislative increases this would have been made very clear, as it would have potentially given rise to a combined increase of 3.5% over the life of the agreement and a resultant total contribution rate of 12.5%. On the other hand, there is no clear accepted evidence that the issue was raised and expressly agreed as the evidence is in conflict.

[19] I therefore conclude that the relevant provisions of the agreement are ambiguous and recourse will need to be made to accepted means of resolving the ambiguity in determining the proper meaning of the provisions.

The mutual intention of the parties

[20] It is common in an industrial system which involves minimum entitlements in awards and legislation and more beneficial entitlements in enterprise agreements for the terms of the enterprise agreement to be seen as the ultimate source, or code, of actual terms and conditions. For example, an entitlement to annual leave in an enterprise agreement would usually be viewed as a complete statement of annual leave entitlements unless it is expressed to be in addition to an amount in an award or legislation.

[21] However superannuation is not dealt with in a single clause in the agreement. The pre-existing clause 28 remained intact and effectively required payment of the statutory minimum. This was 9% at the time, but was known to be subject to variation during the period of the agreement. The negotiations for increased superannuation contributions occurred in the full knowledge of impending increases in the statutory minima. The result was a separate clause providing for what was described as an additional component of superannuation contributions. As I have noted, the wording is ambiguous as to whether the increased component was intended, objectively, to subsume the impending statutory increases or be in addition to them.

[22] The objective intention of the parties in this matter is effectively determining the nature of the agreement that the parties struck. In terms of the language of the document I have noted that the words are capable of more than one interpretation. However the argument that the wording of clause 1.2 of Schedule 5 is a cap on increases under the agreement is a strong one, especially as the notion of the at-risk scheme was to apply an additional “component” of superannuation. This suggests that the total superannuation contribution rate was in contemplation and that the cap in clause 1.2 implied subsuming legislative changes. The alternative argument is also arguable and relies on a more literal reading of the clauses. Effectively the components are separate and each operates on its terms to produce a potential of 3% above the prevailing legislative obligation.

[23] The differences in possible outcomes are not insignificant. A package which enabled superannuation contributions to move to 12.5% over the life of the agreement is clearly more advantageous to employees compared to a potential 12%, when the government’s intention was to reach 12% by 2019-20. If there was a mutual intention to reach 12.5% over the life of the agreement I would expect both parties to have referred to it and indeed emphasise it. No such emphasis or “crowing” occurred.

[24] The initial breakthrough in the protracted negotiations that commenced in 2010 leading to the ultimate agreement was a heads of agreement document expressed in an email from Mr Mullen to Mr Crumlin. The offer in that document was for a 3% increase in superannuation which was at risk in the way described.

[25] The MUA press release of 11 November 2012 referred to an increase in superannuation contributions from 9% to 12%. It was not stated that the increase would be greater than that when changes in the legislative obligation were increased. There was no suggestion that the outcome would be better than the government’s 12% legislative target and continue to be above as the legislative minima continued to increase. Significantly, the 12% total is derived from an additional component when the existing clause required payment in accordance with the statutory minima - not fixed at 9%.

[26] Despite the substantial agreement reached in the heads of agreement document, further negotiations about the wording of the agreement and substantive matters occurred. There is contested evidence on the extent of further discussions about this matter. The MUA witnesses contend that the discussions are effectively confined to the matters dealt with in correspondence by Mr Doleman and the final agreed wording and that there was no discussion of the issue of subsuming legislative increases. The Patrick witnesses state that additional discussions occurred over the very subject and that Patrick made it clear in writing and in discussions that legislative increases would be subsumed.

[27] From the conflicting accounts of these events by Mr Doleman and Mr Munday on the one hand and Mr O’Leary and Ms Sharrock on the other, I prefer the accounts of the company witnesses. They presented as honest witnesses with contemporaneous notes and documentation. The evidence of the MUA witnesses was more ambivalent and subject to imperfect recollection. It seems likely to me that the matter in dispute was not seen to be significant at the time, and not subject to any express claim - but since then has assumed greater importance in the minds of the MUA witnesses and become an express claim. The MUA witnesses hesitated to assert that the parties agreed that the potential rate under the agreement was 12.5%. There is certainly no written note to suggest that the agreement was of that nature.

[28] It is significant in my view that nowhere in any bargaining or communication material is there any reference to a potential increase in contribution level to 12.5% and higher as would be inevitable if the mutual intention was 3% above the increasing legislative minimum. The only references appear to be to a potential increase to 12% or a potential increase of 3%. Where no express claim was made to apply the 3% on top of the increasing legislative base, and such an eventuality was never expressly documented, it is likely in my view that the mutual intention of the parties was that the legislative increases were to be subsumed by the productivity based increases.

[29] Recourse to the surrounding circumstances and an analysis of the mutual intention of the parties suggests that the interpretation adopted by Patrick is the correct interpretation of the Agreement. The productivity based increases subsume any increases in the legislative minimum level that has increased from 9% to 9.5% during the course of the agreement.

Determination

[30] For the above reasons I determine that the current superannuation contribution level of 11.25% paid by the company is in accordance with the Agreement.

VICE PRESIDENT

Appearances:

Mr A. Slevin, of counsel, for the MUA.

Mr Y. Shariff, of counsel, for Patrick.

Hearing details:

2015.

Sydney.

21 April.

Final written submissions:

The MUA on 13 March 2015.

Patrick on 13 April 2015.

 1   [2014] FWCFB 7447

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