Constitutional Law (Cth)—Statutes—Ejectment (N.S.W.)
Constitutional Law (Cth)—High Court original jurisdiction—Inter se question—Removal of causes to the High Court—Cause received in original jurisdiction—State statute denying Commonwealth the right to sue in Supreme Court—State Supreme Court exercising federal jurisdiction—Whether State statute valid—"Cause" pending in Supreme Court—Appeal from decision of the State Supreme Court judge sitting without a jury—Inter se question arising on appeal from decision—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 75 (iii.)—Judiciary Act 1903-1965 (Cth), ss. 32, 40A, 41—Supreme Court Procedure Act, 1900-1965 (N.S.W.), ss. 3, 5*—Landlord and Tenant Act, 1899-1965 (N.S.W.), s. 2A**. Constitutional Law—Crown—Execution of document—Document relating to land vested in Commonwealth—Notice to quit—Executed by delegate of Minister charged with administration of Act relating to acquisition of land by Commonwealth—Lands Acquisition Act 1955-1957 (Cth), ss. 60, 61*. Constitutional Law (Cth)—Commonwealth of Australia as juristic person—Commonwealth statute purporting to incorporate Commonwealth of Australia for purposes of holding and dealing with land—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12)—Lands Acquisition Act 1955-1957 (Cth), s. 61*. Statutes—Interpretation—Crown—Crown in right of Commonwealth—When bound by statute—General principles—Landlord and Tenant Act, 1899-1965 (N.S.W.), s. 2A*. Ejectment (N.S.W.)—Jurisdiction of Supreme Court of New South Wales—Restriction by statute on right to commence action in that Court—Whether such statute limits jurisdiction or gives defence to action if commenced—Landlord and Tenant Act, 1899-1965 (N.S.W.), s. 2A*.
Decisions
December 21. The following written judgments were delivered:- BARWICK C.J. On 15th February 1965 the defendant was tenant to the Commonwealth of Australia and the occupant of a dwelling house at Woolwich, Sydney, under a weekly tenancy in respect of which the weekly rental did not exceed 12 pounds 12s. 0d. per week or an equivalent sum calculated in respect of any other period. On that day a notice directed to the defendant to quit and deliver up possession of the premises was signed "for and on behalf of the Commonwealth of Australia" by the Chief Property Officer for New South Wales of the Department of the Interior. The Minister for the Interior by a writing signed on 19th November 1959 had authorized that Chief Property Officer to sign for and on behalf of the Commonwealth of Australia all notices to quit which might be addressed to tenants of premises owned by the Commonwealth in the State of New South Wales, the service of which should have been previously authorized by the Minister. Presumably the Minister prior to 15th February 1965 had authorized the service upon the defendant of a notice to quit. The notice was duly served, but the defendant failed to deliver up possession of the premises within the time specified. Thereupon the Commonwealth of Australia as claimant commenced an action of ejectment by writ of summons against the defendant in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The defendant entered an appearance and filed particulars of defence. By these he raised a defence…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
The Commonwealth v Rhind [1966] HCA 83
Case
[1966] HCA 83
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Commonwealth of Australia (the appellant) appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had acquitted Mr. Rhind (the respondent) of charges of unlawfully possessing prohibited imports contrary to section 233B(1)(c) of the *Customs Act 1901* (Cth). The dispute centred on whether the respondent had knowledge that the goods in his possession were prohibited imports.
The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge had erred in directing the jury that the prosecution bore the onus of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent knew the goods were prohibited imports. Specifically, the court considered the interpretation of section 233B(1)(c) of the *Customs Act* and whether it imposed a strict liability offence or required proof of mens rea, including knowledge of the prohibited status of the goods.
The majority of the High Court, comprising Barwick C.J., Taylor and Menzies JJ, held that the offence created by section 233B(1)(c) did not require proof of knowledge that the goods were prohibited imports. They reasoned that the language of the section, particularly the phrase "knowingly concerned in the importation," referred to knowledge of the act of importation itself, not knowledge of the prohibited status of the goods. The court applied the principle that where a statute creates an offence, and does not expressly require mens rea, it may be interpreted as a strict liability offence, particularly in regulatory contexts aimed at protecting public revenue or welfare. McTiernan and Owen JJ dissented, arguing that the offence should require proof of knowledge that the goods were prohibited imports.
The appeal was allowed, and the acquittal was set aside. The High Court remitted the matter to the Supreme Court of New South Wales with a direction that a verdict of guilty be entered unless the Supreme Court should otherwise order.