The AWU-FIME Amalgamated Union v the Honourable Deputy President Simon Williams a member of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission & Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union
[1994] IRCA 150
•16 Dec 1994
CATCHWORDS
INDUSTRIAL LAW - Australian Industrial Relations Commission - natural justice - whether bias by reason of prejudgment - application for prohibition
THE AWU-FIME AMALGAMATED UNION v THE HONOURABLE DEPUTY PRESIDENT SIMON WILLIAMS A MEMBER OF THE AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION & CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
No NI 473 of 1994
NORTHROP, GRAY AND RYAN JJ
MELBOURNE
16 DECEMBER 1994
IN THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No NI 473 of 1994
B E T W E E N:
THE AWU-FIME AMALGAMATED UNION
Applicant
A N D :
THE HONOURABLE DEPUTY PRESIDENT SIMON WILLIAMS
A MEMBER OF THE AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
First Respondent
CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
Second Respondent
COURT: NORTHROP, GRAY AND RYAN JJ
PLACE: MELBOURNE
DATE: 16 DECEMBER 1994
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT
The AWU-FIME Amalgamated Union ("the AWU-FIME") and the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union ("the CFMEU") are organisations of employees under the Industrial Relations Act 1988 ("the Act"). The Honourable Deputy President Simon Williams is a member of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission and thus is an officer of the Commonwealth for the purposes of section 75(v) of the Constitution. Deputy President Williams is a member of a Full Bench of the Commission appointed to hear an appeal brought by the AWU-FIME against a decision and orders made by the Commission constituted by MacBean DP on 9 November 1993. That appeal is identified as matter C21905 of 1993. The CFMEU is named as the respondent to that appeal. The AWU-FIME desired to prevent Williams DP from sitting as a member of the Full Bench to hear and determine the appeal. When the appeal came on for hearing before the Full Bench of the Commission in May 1994, the Commission directed that the parties would be required, as a preliminary matter, to make submissions on whether the AMU-FIME should be granted leave to appeal under section 45 of the Act. Counsel for the AMU-FIME objected to Williams DP being a member of the Full Bench of the Commission on the ground that he might be perceived by a reasonable person to be biased. Submissions on this application by the AMU-FIME extended over the two days which had been set aside for the hearing of the appeal. On 17 May 1994, the Commission published a statement rejecting the application by the AMU-FIME and giving directions for the future hearing of the appeal before the Full Bench of the Commission as then constituted. The statement included a statement by Williams DP as follows:
"I am not satisfied that, in all the circumstances, a party or the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that I might not bring an impartial or unprejudicial mind to the resolution of the questions in the matter before the Commission as presently constituted."
The statement also stated that Williams DP would publish his reasons for so concluding as soon as practicable. On 27 May 1994 his Honour published his reasons for decision.
The AWU-FIME sought a writ of prohibition from the High Court to prevent Williams DP from being a member of the Full Bench hearing the appeal. Pursuant to the provisions of subsections 412(2) and (3) of the Act and in conformity with the High Court of Australia Practice Direction No 1 of 1994 (see 120 ALR 343), the High Court remitted the application for prohibition to this Court. The application was heard by this Court on 25 July 1994. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court made orders dismissing the application for prohibition and announced it would publish its reasons later. The Court now publishes its reasons.
Over many years demarcation disputes have arisen between a number of organisations of employees seeking award coverage for their members in the building and construction industry. To some extent, the number of disputes has been reduced by amalgamations of organisations but disputes have continued between the AWU-FIME and the CFMEU which are based on earlier disputes between various of the organisations which have amalgamated to form them. For the purposes of these reasons reference is made to these two organisations only but the references will include earlier disputes, where applicable, between the predecessor organisations before the relevant amalgamations had occurred.
Section 118A of the Act empowers the Commission to make orders granting an organisation the exclusive right over other organisations to represent the industrial interests of a particular class or group of employees who are eligible for membership of the organisation.
The facts on which the application of the AWU-FIME depends are not in dispute. On 9 November 1993, MacBean DP made orders under section 118A of the Act to the effect that the CFMEU had the right, to the exclusion of the AWU-FIME, to represent the industrial interests of persons eligible to be members of the CFMEU "employed or engaged by any person, body, corporation, employer or principal who is engaged in the building and/or construction industry in the occupation of a carpenter and/or joiner". Other orders were made but are not relevant for present purposes. At the same time, the Deputy President published lengthy and detailed reasons for making the orders. In his reasons, the Deputy President made a large number of findings of fact which can be summarized:
(a)The AWU-FIME membership of carpenters in Queensland, Western Australia, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory is non-existent.
(b)The AWU-FIME membership of carpenters in the building and construction industry in New South Wales is extremely low.
(c)The number of carpenters and joiners, members of the AWU-FIME, in the building and construction industry in South Australia has been declining for some years as existing members and new recruits to the industry have chosen to join the CFMEU in preference to the AWU-FIME. As a result, the CFMEU now represents the majority of carpenters and joiners in that industry in South Australia.
(d)The CFMEU is by far the dominant union for carpenters in the building and construction industry in Tasmania and there is no prospect of the AWU-FIME supplanting it.
(e)The CFMEU has the overwhelming majority of members in the carpenter classification in the Victorian building and construction industry. The AWU-FIME is currently losing members in that area to the CFMEU at a significant rate.
(f)The overlapping coverage of the classification of carpenter and joiner between the two organisations has been, and continues to be, a cause for dispute at site level with consequent loss of productivity and efficiency in the industry.
(g)The CFMEU has a wide coverage of classifications in the building and construction industry and has as its members the majority of persons engaged in that industry throughout Australia. It has been the driving force in obtaining national awards and has played a leading role in establishing enterprise agreements based on productivity and efficiency improvements in the building industry. It has also long espoused a policy of amalgamation of all building unions.
(h)The Building Workers Industrial Union ("the BWIU"), one of the organisations which had amalgamated to become the CFMEU, had been recognized by the Australian Council of Trade Unions as the principal union for the building (including housing) sector in all States and Territories except the Northern Territory and the ASCJA, an organisation which had amalgamated to become the AWU-FIME, had been similarly recognized as a "significant union" in the same area in Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia.
(j)The AWU-FIME was seeking, and would continue to seek, through the presence in its conditions of eligibility for membership of coverage of carpenters, to secure for itself a greater role in the building and construction industry.
Most of these findings of fact are not being challenged by the notice of appeal of the AWU-FIME. The essential grounds of the appeal rely on the application of the provisions of section 118A of the Act and the application of principles adopted by the Commission in other decisions to the facts found. This is illustrated by the grounds of appeal which are as follows:
"1.The Deputy President erred in law in the exercise of his discretion in that the Deputy President placed excessive reliance on one relevant factor, namely the respective membership numbers of the parties to the exclusion of other relevant factors, namely:
*whether the order or orders would assist in reducing the number of unions in an industry or enterprise:
*the industrial behaviour of the organisation concerned:
*the preference of the employees concerned:
*the views of the appropriate peak council: and
*the terms of an existing agreement and/or understanding in the area.
The Deputy President erred in excluding FIMEE from coverage of carpenters and joiners in the Building and Construction Industry in the absence of evidence regarding the civil construction sector of the Building and Construction Industry.
The Deputy President's finding as to "an almost non-existent presence of FIMEE in respect of carpenters in the civil sector" is against the weight of the evidence.
The Deputy President erred in failing to define the "building and construction industry" thus creating uncertainty as to the interpretation of the Orders granted in favour of the CFMEU.
The Deputy President erred in the exercise of his discretion in making orders affecting the building and construction industry without having regard to:
.the constitutional entitlements of the Australian Workers' Union
.the impact of such orders on the constitutional entitlements of the Australian Workers' Union
.the actual and/or potential industrial disputation created within the civil construction sector of the building and construction industry by such orders
.the submissions by Counsel for the CFMEU and AWU that the application was not intended to interfere with the interests of the AWU.
The Deputy President erred in the exercise of his discretion in that he failed to take into account a relevant factor, namely the existence of an agreement or understanding between the FIMEE and the CFMEU.
The Deputy President acted without jurisdiction as Section 118A of the Industrial Relations Act, 1988 is beyond the Constitutional power of the Commonwealth."
The facts which are alleged to be sufficient to disqualify DP Williams from being a member of the Full Bench to hear the appeal are best illustrated by the reference to the reasons for decision of Williams DP published on 27 May 1994. These facts have not been challenged by the AWU-FIME. The following paragraphs appear in those reasons:
"The basis for the application for my disqualification arises from my involvement as the member of the Commission hearing applications under s118A of the Act for orders concerning representative rights in relation to certain classes of employees engaged in the off-site timber joinery/furniture industry. When the application before me commenced, there were various applicants and respondents but, for the purposes of these reasons, they can now be appropriately categorised as constituting the CFMEU group on the one hand and the AWU-FIME group on the other. Because of the various amalgamations that have occurred and the effect of the provisions of Division 7 of Part IX of the Act, the decisions and orders I have so far made in the proceedings before me would now apply to CFMEU and AWU-FIME and the parties now before me in those proceedings, in so far as they are on-going, are CFMEU and AWU-FIME. The details of those amalgamations are recorded in the decision of Deputy President MacBean and do not need to be repeated here other than to identify that two of the constituent parts of AWU-FIME are the organisations formerly known as the Federation of Industrial, Manufacturing and Engineering Employees (FIMEE) and The Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners of Australia (ASCJA).
The original intention in the proceedings before me was that the applications would be dealt with on a national basis and detailed directions were made in December 1991 with hearing dates fixed in each State. The hearings were to commence in Queensland and some 12 days were set aside for the taking of evidence in respect to that State. However, after some 23 days, the taking of such evidence had not been completed and I decided that it was more appropriate for the matter to be determined on a State by State basis with any party being able to apply to vary any orders in the light of evidence taken at a later stage in relation to other States and the Australian Capital Territory.
In relation to Queensland, the content of the orders to be made under s118A(1) of the Act was eventually agreed, the only matter left for determination by me being whether or not orders should be made under s118A(5) of the Act referring the matters to a designated Presidential Member for the determination of rule changes. My decision of 30 June 1992 (44 IR 198) records that agreement and my determination that s118A(5) orders be made.
The next areas to be dealt with were the State of New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory. In the course of the proceedings in so far as they concerned those areas, an application was made on behalf of Her Majesty The Queen in the right of the State of New South Wales (the NSW Crown) 50 IR 118 to intervene and that application was refused by me by decision issued on 5 August 1992. On 23 June 1993, I issued a decision and orders under ss118A(1) and (5) in relation to representative rights in New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory.
I am presently hearing the proceedings in so far as they concern the State of Western Australia. To date, in relation to that aspect of the matter, which involves applications under s118A of the Act by both CFMEU and AWU-FIME, there have been some 5 days of inspections and some 27 days taken up with the taking of evidence, with some 8 to 10 further days scheduled for evidence and 3 days for submissions.
For the sake of completeness, I should also record that -
.my decision of 23 June 1993 in relation to New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory was upheld on appeal by decision of a Full Bench of the Commission on 24 November 1993,
.in the course of the proceedings in so far as they concern Western Australia, I have given three decisions, one on 12 November 1992 relating to the validity of a purported s202 agreement, another on 3 December 1992 dealing with two matters, namely the extent to which AWU-FIME might pursue its applications and an application for intervention by The Australian Builders' Labourers' Federated Union of Workers - Western Australian Branch, and the third in transcript on 28 July 1993 in relation to an application for intervention by the Western Australian Minister for Works,
.as the designated Presidential Member to whom the task was allocated pursuant to the Act, I have made determinations on 18 September 1992 and 17 March 1994 pursuant to s118A(6) of the Act in relation to the rules of AWU-FIME consequent upon the orders made under ss118A(1) and (5) of the Act in respect to Queensland, New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory,
.as the designated Presidential Member to whom the task was allocated pursuant to the Act, I have, at various times, carried out the duties imposed on the Commission by the Act in relation to two amalgamation matters involving FIMEE, including the amalgamation of FIMEE and ASCJA and others, and three amalgamation matters involving the six organisations that now constitute CFMEU, and
.as the designated Presidential Member dealing with the proposed amalgamation of FIMEE and ASCJA and others, I dealt with a range of matters raised by organisations that are now part of CFMEU and, by decision made on 24 October 1991, determined those matters contrary to the interests of those organisations.
AWU-FIME's case appears to be based upon an alleged conclusion or belief that, in relation to what are termed "certain key facts", both Deputy President MacBean and myself have formed the same conclusions. Those "key facts" were identified in what, in my view, was a rather vague and imprecise fashion but, in so far as they were identified from my decisions, they appear to be as follows -
.comments as to the conduct of FIMEE and ASCJA in Queensland
.the determination of the application by the NSW Crown to intervene,
.comments as to the size of the membership of FIMEE and ASCJA, and the existence of demarcation disputes as between CFMEU and FIMEE and/or ASCJA,
.a statement that "[i]t would be highly undesirable if the fact of the amalgamation [of FIMEE and ASCJA] were to be used to create what would in effect be an additional union presence in the area under consideration".
It was contended on behalf of AWU-FIME that Deputy President MacBean in his decision the subject of this appeal had also dealt with similar facts. However, in my view, it is almost inevitable that, when a member of the Commission is hearing an application under s118A of the Act (or indeed many other types of applications under the Act), she or he will hear and comment upon alleged facts that will often be repeated in other proceedings, whether those proceedings are between the same parties or not. Such is the nature of the work before the Commission, particularly for those members who are involved in any way with questions of demarcation, representative rights and/or rules of organisations. It might be noted that, in my decision of 23 June 1993 in relation to New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory, I include amongst some ten factors to be taken into account in determining s118A matters the established pattern of membership and award coverage and the industrial behaviour of the organisations involved.
Further, the submission made on behalf of AWU-FIME fails to recognise that -
1.the proceedings before Deputy President MacBean and the decision made by him relate to representative rights in the building and/or construction industry whilst the proceedings before me and the decisions made by me relate to the off-site timber joinery/furniture industry, two separate and distinct industries,
2.the two sets of proceedings were conducted on this basis and as two separate and distinct matters and there has been no suggestion that any of my decisions were either relied upon by any of the parties in the matter before Deputy President MacBean nor does it appear from his decision that he considered any of them,
3.the comment made by me in relation to the conduct of FIMEE and/or ASCJA in Queensland was made in the context of whether or not the matter should be referred under s118A(5) of the Act to a designated Presidential Member for consideration of rule changes, not in the context of whether or not orders should be made under s118A(1) of the Act, such orders being made by consent, and
4.the application for leave to intervene by the NSW Crown in the proceedings before me was just that, an application for leave to intervene, and my decision in relation to that application was in no way a consideration of or a decision in relation to the submissions the NSW Crown might have made if intervention had been granted whereas Deputy President MacBean granted the NSW Crown intervention, heard its submissions and rejected them.
Finally, the statement made by me as to the undesirability of the fact of FIMEE/ASCJA amalgamation being used to in effect add another union presence in the area under consideration is clearly a statement of principle being applied in the particular circumstances of the matter before me. As a statement of principle, it does not appear to have been challenged and its application will depend upon the facts in each case."
(The references to the reports of the decisions and orders have not been reproduced).
Particular attention is directed to each of the paragraphs numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4 in that extract. Deputy President Williams had been considering a different industry to that being considered by MacBean DP. The parties were the same, but this is not at all unusual in matters before the Commission.
The law to be applied in cases of this kind is clear. Its modern statement was enunciated by the High Court constituted by Mason, Murphy, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ in Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288 at 293-4:
"That principle is that a judge should not sit to hear a case if in all the circumstances the parties or the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that he might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question involved in it."
The application of that principle has been explained in subsequent authorities in the High Court and in particular consideration has been given to those tribunals the members of which are required by law to have experience of the particular area of law and fact in which the tribunals respectively function. In Re JRL Ex Parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342 Mason J said at 352:
"It seems that the acceptance by this Court of the test of reasonable apprehension of bias in such cases as Watson (1976) 136 CLR 248 and Livesey (1983) 151 CLR 288 has led to an increase in the frequency of applications by litigants that judicial officers should disqualify themselves from sitting in particular cases on account of their participation in other proceedings involving one of the litigants or on account of conduct during the litigation. It needs to be said loudly and clearly that the ground of disqualification is a reasonable apprehension that the judicial officer will not decide the case impartially or without prejudice, rather than that he will decide the case adversely to one party. There may be many situations in which previous decisions of a judicial officer on issues of fact and law may generate an expectation that he is likely to decide issues in a particular case adversely to one of the parties. But this does not mean either that he will approach the issues in that case otherwise than with an impartial and unprejudiced mind in the sense in which that expression is used in the authorities or that his previous decisions provide an acceptable basis for inferring that there is a reasonable apprehension that he will approach the issues in this way."
In Re Polites Ex Parte The Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd (1991) 173 CLR 78, a case which involved the issue of whether a Deputy President of the Commission should continue to hear a matter in which one of the parties had been given advice by the Deputy President as a solicitor before his appointment to the Commission. That advice concerned aspects of the matter which subsequently came before the Commission constituted by the Deputy President. However the High Court, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, after referring to the passage just cited and to a passage in Reg v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board Ex Parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd (1953) 88 CLR 100 at 116, said at pp86-8:
"Again, the test in Livesey cannot be pressed too far when the qualifications for membership of the tribunal are such that the members are likely to have some prior knowledge of the circumstances which give rise to the issues for determination or to have formed an attitude about the way in which such issues should be determined or the tribunal's powers exercised. Qualification for membership cannot disqualify a member from sitting. The qualifications for appointment as a Deputy President of the Commission are prescribed by s10(2) of the Act. Appointments are made by the Governor-General of judges or legal practitioners (par (a)) or persons possessing the qualifications prescribed by par (b) or par (c). The relevant parts of s10(2) read as follows:
"The Governor-General may only appoint a person as a Deputy President if:
(a) ...
(b)the person has had experience at a high level in industry or commerce or in the service of:
(i)a peak council or another association representing the interests of employers or employees; or
(ii)a government or an authority of a government; or
(c)the person has, at least 5 years previously, obtained a degree of a university or an educational qualification of a similar standard after studies in the field of law, economics or industrial relations, or some other field of study considered by the Governor-General to have substantial relevance to the duties of a Deputy President;
and, in the opinion of the Governor-General, the person is, because of skills and experience in the field of industrial relations, a suitable person to be appointed as a Deputy President."
The prior involvement of a Deputy President with associations or with governments who are frequently parties to proceedings before the Commission cannot be sufficient by itself to amount to a disqualification from sitting in a particular case; nor can the prior acquisition of "skills and experience" amount to such a disqualification. Deputy Presidents who are appointed on account of their industrial background are not disqualified merely because persons with that background have a measure of knowledge or are likely to have a particular attitude to the exercise of the Commission's powers. To adopt the words of the Privy Council in Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v John East Iron Works Ltd [1949] AC 134 at p151, their background will not necessarily lead them "to act otherwise than judicially, so far as that word connotes a standard of conduct", even though the background which carries experience and knowledge acquired extra-judicially "assuredly means that the subject-matter is such as profoundly to distinguish such a tribunal from the courts ... "
A prior relationship of legal adviser and client does not generally disqualify the former adviser, on becoming a member of a tribunal (or of a court, for that matter), from sitting in proceedings before that tribunal (or court) to which the former client is a party. Of course, if the correctness or appropriateness of advice given to the client is a live issue for determination by the tribunal (or court), the erstwhile legal adviser should not sit. A fortiori, if the advice has gone beyond an exposition of the law and advises the adoption of a course of conduct to advance the client's interests, the erstwhile legal adviser should not sit in a proceeding in which it is necessary to decide whether the course of conduct taken by the client was legally effective or was wise, reasonable or appropriate. If the erstwhile legal adviser were to sit in a proceeding in which the quality of his or her advice is in issue, there would be reasonable grounds for apprehending that he or she might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the issue. Much depends on the nature of his or her relationship with the client, the ambit of the advice given and the issues falling for determination."
The High Court granted a writ of mandamas directing the Deputy President to hear and determine the matter before him.
In Re Finance Section Union of Australia Ex Parte Illaton Pty Ltd (1992) 107 ALR 581, the High Court, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ, refused to grant a rule nisi for prohibition preventing a Deputy President from hearing a matter in the Commission. After referring to the principle enunciated in Livesey, the Court said at pp582-3:
"The precise practical requirements of that principle vary from case to case. They will be influenced by the nature, function and composition of the particular tribunal. Thus, the operation of the principle in a case such as the present where it is sought to prevent a member of the Commission from participating in the determination of particular proceedings is governed by a number of considerations relating to the nature and functions of the commission, the prescribed or desirable formal qualifications and practical experience of those appointed to discharge those functions, the nature of the contests involved, and the Australian industrial environment.
In the discharge of its functions, particularly that of the prevention of inter-State industrial disputes, the Commission is required to act promptly and effectively. In a context where its members are permanent and its resources are limited, it is desirable that the members, between them, possess a vast fund of practical background knowledge and experience extending over all facets of Australian industrial relations. Indeed, s20 of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) (the Act) requires each member of the Commission to "keep acquainted with industrial affairs and conditions". A potential or actual industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of any one State is liable to encompass a variety of issues or potential issues between the parties or potential parties to it. The nature of industrial relations in this country makes it inevitable that, in a particular industry, the leading employer and employee organisations, and their offices, will be frequently involved in dispute with one another. Obviously, the functioning of the Commission requires that its members participate in the determination of matters in circumstances where they have a familiarity with the industry in which the particular dispute arises, with the context of the dispute and, inevitably, with facts relevant to the dispute and with one or more of the parties to the dispute. In that regard, it has long been recognised that, in most cases, that familiarity is an advantage rather than a disqualifying factor. Again, the Act itself obliges the President of the Commission to constitute industry panels to which a presidential member and at least one Commissioner shall be assigned: s37(1).
In these circumstances, the need for caution which this court has consistently identified in relation to applications for an order preventing a member of a statutory tribunal from participating in the discharge of the functions of that tribunal by reason of apprehended bias is particularly apposite when such an application is directed against a member of the Commission. It is that care must be taken to bear in mind that the basis for disqualification by reason of apprehended bias is that there are grounds upon which a party or the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that the particular member of the Commission will not decide the case impartially or without prejudice. The basis for disqualification is not merely that the member's past decisions, on questions of fact or law, might lead to reasonable expectation that she or he will decide the case adversely to one of the parties. Nor is it that she or he has had previous contact or experience, as a member of the Commission, with the facts involved in the particular matter, with the context in which the particular matter arises, or with one or more of the parties involved in the particular matter."
In the present case, none of the circumstances suggest that Williams DP should not be a member of the Full Bench to hear the appeal by the AWU-FIME. There is nothing to suggest that a party or a member of the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that he might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the questions arising in the appeal. The Deputy President is a member of the Commission with all that that entails. He has had a long experience of disputes between the parties to the appeal including individual associations which form part of the amalgamated organisations. His participation in previous proceedings related to a different industry to that involved in the appeal. No question of the credibility of witnesses arises in circumstances where the Deputy President has expressed an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses. The issues raised by the appeal involve the weight to be given to certain facts and the application of established principles to those facts. In these circumstances, the expression of opinion by a member of the Commission on matters of industrial jurisprudence and principle does not give rise to a reasonable apprehension that the Deputy President might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the questions raised by the appeal.
For these reasons, at the completion of the hearing, the Court dismissed the application on 25 July 1994.
I certify that this and the preceding sixteen (16) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Court.
Associate:
Date: 16 December 1994
ATTACHMENT
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J. Phillips
Solicitor for the Applicant: McClellands
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr S. Rothman
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Taylor and Scott
0
5
0