The Australian People Future Fund and Registrar of Personal Property Securities

[2021] AATA 3874

The Australian People Future Fund and Registrar of Personal Property Securities [2021] AATA 3874 (19 October 2021)

Division:TAXATION AND COMMERCIAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2020/2280

2020/3143

Re:The Australian People Future Fund

APPLICANT

AndRegistrar of Personal Property Securities

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Senior Member Dr N A Manetta

Date:19 October 2021

Place:Adelaide

The applications are dismissed for want of jurisdiction in light of the applicant’s intimation that it does not wish to pursue its application for an extension of time under s 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.

..............................[Sgnd]..........................................

Senior Member Dr N A Manetta

PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITIES – applications filed out of time – applicant refused to pursue its application for an extension of time – applicant contends Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review the applications and requests immediate transfer of them to Federal Court – applications dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in absence of the grant of an extension of time.

Legislation

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 29(1) and (7)

REASONS FOR DECISION

Senior Member Dr N A Manetta

19 October 2021

1. The Tribunal convened a preliminary interlocutory hearing to consider how to progress the applications made by the applicant in this matter.  The applicant in both matters is a trust.  Mr Garrett, who appeared on behalf of the applicant at the hearing before me, is, as I understand matters, the trustee, or alternatively one of the trustees, of the applicant.  Mr May appeared for the respondent.

2. I am satisfied that the applications before the Tribunal were filed out of time.  Accordingly, the applications may not proceed in this Tribunal as a matter of law before an extension of time is granted.

3. In this regard, I note that section 29 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (“the AAT Act”) provides in subsection (1)(d) that an application to the Tribunal must be made within a prescribed time. Subsection (7) then provides that the Tribunal may, upon application in writing by a person, extend the time for the making by that person of an application if the Tribunal is satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so.

4. The Tribunal convened to hear the applicant in respect of any submissions it might wish to make in support of the grant of an extension of time under subsection 29(7).  In both matters, the form filed with the AAT indicated that an application for an extension of time was in fact sought.  The reason for an extension was said to be: “Corruption of the Crown has interfered with proper processes.”

5. At the interlocutory hearing before me, Mr Garrett made lengthy submissions concerning this matter. He made it clear that the applicant did not wish to pursue its application for an extension of time. As I have noted, section 29(1) requires an application to be filed within time, and a timely application is in my opinion a jurisdictional criterion; that is, unless an application for an extension of time is made and granted, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in respect of the substantive application.

6. Mr Garrett’s submissions to me in respect of the matter may be summarised briefly as follows. He maintained that I do not have jurisdiction, sitting as a Senior Member, to determine the applications to the Tribunal.  He wished me simply to take what he called an “administrative step” (Tr at p.10) to “cross-vest” his applications immediately to the Federal Court.  Alternatively, the applicant would wish to withdraw the applications and file new applications in the Federal Court (Tr at p.29). No extension of time to allow the tribunal to consider the applications was in the event sought. 

7. To the extent Mr Garrett submits I have no jurisdiction to grant an extension of time, I note that there is nothing in the AAT Act or otherwise that would prevent me from determining an application for an extension of time. There is also no obstacle, in my opinion, to my addressing the question of the incompetence of the applicant’s applications to the Tribunal at the present time and making an appropriate order having heard both parties.

8. The fundamental and critical point in my opinion is that Mr Garrett was clear in his oral submissions that the applicant no longer wishes the Tribunal to grant it an extension of time.  In the absence of a grant of an extension of time, however, the applications filed in the Tribunal are simply incompetent and may not proceed.  In my opinion, it must follow that they should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction in the Tribunal to deal with them, given the applicant’s clear intimation, through Mr Garrett, that it no longer asks for an extension of time to permit them to proceed.  That seems to me to be the only appropriate order I could make.

9. I note that had the applicant pursued the grant of an extension of time, the question that would have arisen is whether this Tribunal should grant any extension under s 29(7). In my opinion, on the basis of the submissions that were made by Mr Garrett on the applicant’s behalf, no extension of time would in any event have been granted by me in the circumstances. I now turn to explain why I have formed this view.

10. Mr Garrett was afforded an opportunity to address the Tribunal in respect of the gravamen of the applicant’s concerns which have caused it to file its applications in the Tribunal.  I wish to say expressly that I have no doubt that Mr Garrett genuinely holds the views that he articulated.  They were articulated clearly enough, although Mr Garrett was frequently discursive.

11. The fundamental plank in Mr Garrett’s submissions to me was that he (or the applicant) has, in effect, taken over the administration of the entire Commonwealth of Australia. In that regard, he referred explicitly to section 61 of the Constitution, which vests executive power in the Queen. He confirmed to me that in his view he (or the applicant) is now in charge, so to speak, of federal governmental affairs and is responsible for appointing officers to run the country. He confirmed in his oral submissions that he (or the applicant) has permitted the Queen to continue her “business uninterrupted” (Tr. at p 9) and that she has been “licensed back” (Tr. at p 9) with all of her former powers. As I understand the submissions made by Mr Garrett, he also maintains that the Reserve Bank of Australia is liable to the applicant by virtue of the endorsement of a financial instrument in the sum of AU$1.5 trillion. Mr Garrett has seized all the Reserve Bank’s assets and undertakings and he referred to himself as the liquidator of the Commonwealth (Tr. at p.13). The “sole point of the [AAT] proceedings”, he said, was to force the Reserve Bank to create and credit an account in the name of the applicant in the sum of AU$1.5 trillion (Tr at p.28).

12. I note the explicit purpose of the proceedings as acknowledged by Mr Garrett. As I say, there is no doubt in my mind that Mr Garrett genuinely holds his views. I also have no doubt, however, that although these views are genuinely held, if the applications were to proceed to a hearing, the Tribunal would inevitably hold that they “lack substance” or “have no reasonable prospect of success” (cf s 42B(1)(a) and (b) of the AAT Act) resulting in their dismissal. Mr Garrett’s submissions presuppose the Tribunal would proceed on a legal basis that is completely inconsistent with the recognised constitutional regime of this country, and the submissions also call for facts to be found in the applicant’s favour concerning the seizure of the Reserve Bank’s assets and a debt owed to the applicant of some AU$1.5 trillion. Given the tenor of these submissions, I am satisfied that any application for an extension of time would be properly dismissed in any event on the basis that the substantive applications would enjoy no prospect of success.

13. As I have noted, Mr Garrett pressed me with a submission that I should immediately transfer the applicant’s applications to the Federal Court. As I have already indicated, the applications are not properly before the Tribunal at the present time because they have been lodged out of time and the only basis for the Tribunal assuming jurisdiction is a written application for an extension of time which has been granted by the Tribunal under section 29(7) of the AAT Act. In light of Mr Garrett’s submissions that the applicant does not desire an extension of time, I am, I believe, without jurisdiction (except to dismiss the applications for want of jurisdiction). But I would note that I see no basis in any event for referring the applications to the Federal Court under s 45 (with the President’s agreement). I note for the record that I have not sought the President’s view.

14. In all the circumstances, I believe the appropriate decision in this case is to dismiss both applications before the Tribunal for want of jurisdiction in the Tribunal to deal with them in light of the applicant’s intimation that it does not wish to pursue its application for an extension of time under s 29(7) of the AAT Act.

15. I shall make a formal decision accordingly.

16.     I certify that the preceding 15 (fifteen) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member Dr N A Manetta.

..................[Sgnd]............................
Administrative Assistant Legal

Dated:  19 October 2021

Date of hearing:	10 November 2020
Advocates for the Applicant:	Andrew Garrett, AUSTRALIAN PEOPLE FUTURE FUND
Advocate for the Respondent:	Ben May, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SOLICITOR