The Australian Institute for Progress Ltd v The Electoral Commission of Queensland

The Australian Institute for Progress Ltd (AIP) sought a declaration from the court that certain gifts made to it by prohibited donors did not constitute political donations under the Electoral Act 1992 (Qld). The AIP argued that the gifts were not intended to enable it to incur electoral expenditure or to reimburse it for such expenditure, and therefore did not fall within the definition of a political donation. The Electoral Commission of Queensland (Commission) opposed the application, arguing that the declarations sought were hypothetical and not suitable for judicial resolution. The court was required to decide whether the declarations sought raised hypothetical questions in the absence of findings as to the specific activities of the AIP for which a gift was made, and whether the declarations sought lacked utility in the absence of findings or agreed facts as to whether a gift to the AIP by a prohibited donor was made or intended to be made to enable it to incur expenditure for the purposes of a campaign for an election.

The court held that the declarations sought raised hypothetical questions and lacked utility in the absence of findings or agreed facts. The court found that the declarations sought were not supported by evidence of gifts made to the AIP by prohibited donors, or evidence of the particular activities of the AIP which the gifts were intended to fund. The court held that the declarations sought were not the function of the court to answer, and that the AIP was seeking an advisory opinion from the court about how the Act is to be interpreted, without factual context. The court held that the proper interpretation of the Act was against the propositions for which the AIP contended. The court held that the definition of "political donation" in s 274(1)(b) of the Electoral Act 1992 (Qld) must be construed in the context of s 274(1)(a), and that the interpretation advanced by the Commission was the one which best achieved the purpose of the Act.

The originating application filed 28 February 2020 is dismissed.