The Application of the Director General re Adoption of JMS and LJS

The case involves the Director General seeking the court's approval to adopt two children, JMS and LJS, under the provisions of the Adoption Act. The court was asked to consider the legality of the adoption application, specifically whether the court could change the child's name in the adoption order without their consent. The children, aged over 18 and 12 respectively, had provided consent to the adoption, but the Director General sought to change their names as part of the adoption process. The court needed to determine if the consent of the child over 18 years old was necessary for the name change and whether the court had the power to alter the child's name in the adoption order.

The court examined the relevant sections of the Adoption Act, including sections 101(1)(a) and 55. It considered whether the consent of the child over 18 years old was required for the adoption to proceed and if the court had the authority to change the child's name as part of the adoption order. The court also explored the criteria for exceptional circumstances under which the court might grant an adoption order for a child who is 12 or more but less than 18 and incapable of giving consent. The primary legal issue was whether the court could make an order changing the name of the child over 18 years old despite their consent to the adoption, and if the court could do so in exceptional circumstances.

In reaching its decision, the court held that while the consent of the child over 18 years old was not strictly necessary for the adoption to proceed, the court did not have the power to alter the child's name in the adoption order. The court emphasised that the Adoption Act required the court to respect the child's existing name unless exceptional circumstances justified a name change. The court concluded that exceptional circumstances had not been demonstrated in this case, and therefore, the court could not change the child's name as part of the adoption order. The court's reasoning was grounded in the statutory provisions and the need to protect the child's identity and personal rights.

The court ultimately determined that the adoption application could proceed without the name change, as the court lacked the authority to alter the child's name without exceptional circumstances. The court's decision respected the statutory framework and the child's right to maintain their existing name, barring exceptional circumstances. The court's final order allowed the adoption to proceed with the children's existing names, underscoring the importance of statutory compliance and the protection of the child's rights.