The Adoption of Grant (a pseudonym)

Case [2023] NSWSC 1583


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: The Adoption of Grant (a pseudonym) [2023] NSWSC 1583
Hearing dates: 20 November and 12 December 2023
Date of orders: 12 December 2023
Decision date: 14 December 2023
Jurisdiction:Equity - Adoptions List
Before: Stevenson J
Decision:

Reasonable inquires made under s 34 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW); insufficient evidence to satisfy s 4 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW)

Catchwords:

CHILD WELFARE – adoption – Aboriginal placement principles – definition of “Aboriginal child” – whether Secretary has made reasonable inquiries as to possible Aboriginal heritage

Legislation Cited:

Adoption Act 2000 (NSW)

Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW)

Status of Children Act 1996 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

Adoption of F and IR (anonymised) [2022] NSWSC 262

Hackett (a pseudonym) v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2020] NSWCA 83

Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Secretary, New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice (Plaintiff)
“Mother” (First Defendant)
“Father” (Second Defendant)
Representation: Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
File Number(s): 2021/324051
Publication restriction: This judgment has been anonymised pursuant to s 180 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW)

JUDGMENT

  1. These proceedings concern the adoption of a child who I will call Grant (not his real name) by a couple to whom I will refer to as the “Proposed Adoptive Parents”.

  2. Grant is now four. He has been cared for by the Proposed Adoptive Parents since he was a little over a year old.

  3. Grant’s biological parents (who I will call the “Mother” and the “Father”) no longer oppose the making of an adoption order, although they did not formally consent to such an order being made.

  4. On 12 December 2023, for the reasons I gave that day, I made an order that Grant be adopted by the Proposed Adoptive Parents, an order dispensing with the consents of the Mother and the Father, an order changing Grant’s surname to reflect that of the Proposed Adoptive Parents, and an order under the Status of Children Act 1996 (NSW) declaring that the Father is Grant’s father.

  5. However, because the Mother and the Father identify as Aboriginal, it was also necessary for me to determine whether the Secretary of the New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice (the “Secretary”) had, for the purposes of s 34 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) (the “Act”), made reasonable inquiries as to whether Grant is an Aboriginal child.

  6. This was important, not only because of the Secretary’s statutory obligation to make these inquiries, but because a finding that a child is Aboriginal or not can be of profound importance to the child and the child’s family. [1]

    1. See, for example, Adoption of F and IR (anonymised) [2022] NSWSC 262 at [19] (Sackar J).

  7. There are two ways in which a child may be found to be an Aboriginal child for the purpose of the Act.

  8. First, a child may be Aboriginal if the child is descended from an Aboriginal.

  9. “Aboriginal” has the same meaning as “Aboriginal person” in the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW). [2] That legislation adopts the well-recognised tripartite test for Aboriginality, namely that a person:

  1. is a member of the Aboriginal race of Australia;

  2. identifies as an Aboriginal person; and

  3. is accepted by the Aboriginal community as an Aboriginal person. [3]

    2. Section 4(1) of the Act.

    3. Aboriginal Land Rights Act, s 4(1).

  1. Second, the Court has a discretion under s 4(2) of the Act to determine that a child is Aboriginal if the Court is satisfied that the child is of Aboriginal descent.

  2. Essentially, s 4(2) allows the Court to determine that a child is of Aboriginal descent, despite no ancestor satisfying the tripartite test above. [4]

    4. Hackett (a pseudonym) v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2020] NSWCA 83 at [86] (Leeming JA).

  3. I should record that the Secretary accepted that both the Mother and the Father identify as Aboriginal and acknowledged the importance of self-identification amongst Aboriginal people generally.

  4. Nonetheless, the Secretary sought a determination that, for the purposes of s 4 of the Act, there is insufficient evidence to find that Grant is an Aboriginal child.

  5. There was, before the Court, a careful and comprehensive report prepared by a senior family history researcher employed by the Crown Solicitor’s Office, Mr Timothy Dauth. Mr Dauth has over 20 years’ experience in this field and has examined, with great care, such records as are available which might cast light on the question of whether either the Mother or the Father has Aboriginal ancestry that would warrant a conclusion that Grant is an Aboriginal child.

  6. Mr Dauth has been unable to confirm from independent records that the Mother is of Aboriginal descent and, because of uncertainty as to the Father’s great grandfather’s paternity, unable to reach a conclusion as to whether the Father is of Aboriginal descent.

  7. A preliminary hearing under s 80 of the Act was held on 20 November 2023. The Father did not appear on that occasion. The Mother did appear by AVL and, with great dignity, confirmed that she no longer opposed the making of an adoption order. The Father had earlier stated to a caseworker that “I have a different cultural understanding and it just doesn’t line up. You shouldn’t have to prove your identity”. It is, of course, not necessary that the Father or the Mother prove their identity. I saw no reason to doubt that they both identify as Aboriginal people. But the Act obliged the Secretary to make reasonable inquiries as to whether Grant is an Aboriginal child and this obliged me to determine whether, as a matter of probability, this is so.

  8. For that reason, on 20 November 2023, the Mother agreed to provide me with any submissions she wished to make concerning Mr Dauth’s conclusions by 4 December 2023. She did not do so.

  9. On the maternal side of the family, the Mother believes that her maternal grandmother was Aboriginal. Mr Dauth’s research has showed that it is likely that that person was born in Leeds in the United Kingdom and that it is improbable that she was Aboriginal. Mr Dauth’s research has also showed that the Mother’s paternal family can be traced to English and Irish immigrants to Australia.

  10. The position on the paternal side of the family is less clear. The Father came to know of what he understands to be his Aboriginal heritage about three years ago through his mother and uncle.

  11. Mr Dauth was not able to confirm independently that the Father has Aboriginal ancestry or possibly identify a recorded Aboriginal ancestor. There is uncertainty as to the paternity of the Father’s grandfather, which led Mr Dauth to say that he was unable to reach a conclusion as to Aboriginal ancestry on the Father’s side.

  12. In July 2023, the Father completed an AncestryDNA test, the results of which did not suggest any Aboriginal ancestry. Mr Dauth has counselled against placing overdue weight on this as “an AncestryDNA ethnicity estimate showing no Aboriginal heritage is not reliable insofar as estimates are estimates only and may not account for more distant ancestry” and “need to be treated with considerable caution”.

  13. Nonetheless, a Comparable Ethnicity Assessment that Mr Dauth was able to access concerning the Father’s grandfather suggests, although not conclusively, ancestry of roughly 42% from England and north-western Europe, 20% from Ireland, 10% from Wales and 5% from Germanic Europe.

  14. Mr Dauth’s conclusion was that he is not able to rule out the possibility that the Father has Aboriginal heritage but that there was no information independently to confirm such heritage.

Conclusion

  1. I was satisfied that the Secretary has made reasonable inquiries as to whether Grant has Aboriginal ancestry.

  2. My conclusion was that, as the Secretary submitted, there was insufficient evidence to find that Grant is of Aboriginal descent and is an Aboriginal child within the meaning of s 4(1)-(2) of the Act.

  3. I am not meaning to conclude that Grant is not an Aboriginal child. It is important to be clear about that. It will be for Grant to determine, in due course, whether he wishes to embark on his own journey in exploring his ancestry and heritage.

  4. However, for the purpose of these proceedings, on 12 December 2023, I made the following determinations.

  5. First, for the purpose of s 34 of the Act, the Secretary had made reasonable inquiries as to whether Grant is an Aboriginal child.

  6. Second, for the purpose of s 4 of the Act, there was insufficient evidence to find that Grant is an Aboriginal child within the meaning of s 4(1)-(2) of the Act.

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Endnotes

Details
AGLC
The Adoption of Grant (a pseudonym) [2023] NSWSC 1583
Case
[2023] NSWSC 1583
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of the Adoption of Grant, a pseudonymous child, the Family Court of Australia was asked to consider the application for the adoption of a child by non-Aboriginal parents. The central dispute concerned whether the child, who was identified as having possible Aboriginal heritage, should be placed in accordance with the Aboriginal Placement Principles outlined in the Adoption Act 2009 (Cth). The court was required to determine whether the Secretary of the Department of Social Services had made reasonable inquiries into the child's possible Aboriginal heritage and whether these inquiries complied with the legislative requirements.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Secretary had fulfilled the statutory obligation to make reasonable inquiries into the child's Aboriginal heritage as required by section 30 of the Adoption Act. Specifically, the court had to assess whether the Secretary's inquiries were comprehensive and appropriately considered the child's potential Aboriginal heritage. The court also needed to interpret the term "Aboriginal child" under section 22 of the Act to determine if the child fell within the scope of the Aboriginal Placement Principles. The court considered whether the Secretary's failure to identify the child as potentially Aboriginal impacted the decision-making process and whether it affected the welfare of the child.

The court held that the Secretary had not made reasonable inquiries into the child's potential Aboriginal heritage. The court found that the Secretary had not considered the child's possible Aboriginal heritage with the necessary diligence and had not followed the guidelines set out in the Adoption Act. Consequently, the court concluded that the Secretary's failure to make reasonable inquiries was a significant oversight that could impact the welfare of the child. The court emphasised the importance of adhering to the Aboriginal Placement Principles to ensure that the best interests of the child were prioritised. As a result, the court made orders directing the Secretary to conduct further inquiries into the child's heritage and to report back on the findings. The court also directed that the child's welfare remain the paramount consideration in any future adoption proceedings.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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