The Adoption of Daisy (a pseudonym)
[2025] NSWSC 1013
•5 September 2025
|
New South Wales |
Case Name: | The Adoption of Daisy (a pseudonym) |
Medium Neutral Citation: | [2025] NSWSC 1013 |
Hearing Date(s): | On the papers |
Date of Orders: | To be made |
Decision Date: | 5 September 2025 |
Jurisdiction: | Equity - Adoptions List |
Before: | Brereton J |
Decision: | Adoption orders to be made |
Catchwords: | CHILD WELFARE – adoption – whether adoption order is clearly preferable in best interests of the child – whether change of name should be approved – whether consent dispensation orders should be made against the birth parents – where birth mother seeks restoration of the child to her care – where birth father cannot be identified after reasonable inquiry – where child has consented to their own adoption but resided with the proposed adoptive parents for a period of less than two years – where it is appropriate to dispense with the requirement for the birth parents’ consent – change of name to be approved – adoption orders to be made |
Legislation Cited: | Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) |
Cases Cited: | Adoption of JLK and CRK [2017] NSWSC 7 |
Texts Cited: | N.A. |
Category: | Principal judgment |
Parties: | Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice by his delegate, Principal Officer, Adoptions, Barnardos Australia (plaintiff) |
Representation: | Barnados Australia (plaintiff) |
File Number(s): | 2025/142735 |
Publication Restriction: | This judgment has been anonymised pursuant to s 180 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW). |
JUDGMENT
These reasons concern an application for the adoption of a child who I will call “Daisy”, aged 13 years old, in favour of “Lola” and “Max”.[1]
[1] In this judgment, all names are pseudonyms so that the persons affected by the adoption application are not identified – see s 180 of the Adoption Act. This version of the judgment may be published.
By amended summons filed on 14 August 2025, the Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice (‘Secretary’) by his delegate, the Principal Officer, Adoptions, Barnardos Australia (‘Barnardos’) seeks the following orders:
(1)that pursuant to s 67(1)(d) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), the Court dispense with the consent of Daisy’s birth mother, “Georgia”;
(2)that pursuant to s 67(1)(a) of the Adoption Act, the Court dispense with the consent of Daisy’s birth father;
(3)that pursuant to s 88(4) of the Adoption Act, the Court dispense with the requirement for the giving of notice of this application to Daisy’s birth father;
(4)that pursuant to s 23 of the Adoption Act, an order be made for the adoption of Daisy in favour of the adopting parents, Lola and Max;
(5)that pursuant to s 101(1) of the Adoption Act, an order approving the proposed names for the child; and
(6)that pursuant to s 50(1) and 50(3) of the Adoption Act, the adoption plan signed by Lola, Max, Georgia and Daisy on 11 March 2025 and the Principal Officer, Adoptions at Barnardos Australia on 13 March 2025, be registered.
For the reasons set out below, I propose to grant the relief sought by the amended summons.
The circumstances of this case
Daisy was born in early February 2012. Daisy’s birth mother, as registered on her birth certificate, is Georgia. No father is identified on her birth certificate. The identity of the father is unknown.
The Department received 9 risk of harm reports in relation to unborn Daisy arising from concerns about her mother’s significant history of substance abuse, intellectual disability and concerns relating to the putative father.
On the day she was born, the Department assessed that Daisy was at risk of serious harm and that it was in her best interests to remain at the hospital. This was due to her mother’s transience, limited cognitive functioning and inability to articulate Daisy’s needs. Georgia had self-disclosed substance abuse. The Department assumed Daisy into care. She has never been returned to Georgia’s care.
The Department filed an application and report initiating care proceedings in the Children’s Court in relation to Daisy on 21 February 2012.
Daisy was discharged from hospital on 22 February 2012 and was placed in a short-term Catholic Care placement until a suitable long-term placement could be secured.
On 23 February 2012, the Children’s Court made interim orders allocating parental responsibility for Daisy to the Minister. The Children’s Court made final orders on 24 October 2012, allocating parental responsibility for Daisy to the Minister until she attains the age of 18 years old pursuant to the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW). Barnardos has delegated parental responsibility for Daisy.
Daisy has been in many care arrangements across her life. In various placements, she has experienced challenges and tragedies beyond her control, including the separation of carers, the death of a foster mother and a placement with a view to adoption that failed. Daisy has demonstrated resilience. She deserves permanency in her life.
Daisy was placed into the care of the proposed adoptive parents, Lola and Max, on 14 September 2023. She was 11 years old at the time. She has lived with the proposed adoptive family continuously since the placement.
Max is 52 years old, and Lola is 41 years old. They have been married for almost 20 years. They have a large family with four biological children. They have adopted two children, “Rory” (now aged 9) and “Lucia” (now aged 5), who are Daisy’s maternal siblings. Rory was adopted in 2018 and Lucia was adopted in 2024. Alongside Daisy, Lola and Max are currently caring for another child, Peter. They are seeking adoption orders in respect of Peter in separate proceedings.
The formal requirements for adoption
The formal requirements of the Adoption Act have been satisfied, namely:
(1)Georgia has been served with sufficient notice of the application for adoption orders (s 88(1)(a));
(2)Daisy was present in New South Wales when the proceedings were commenced (s 23(2)(a));
(3)Lola and Max were resident and domiciled in New South Wales when the proceedings were commenced (s 28(1)(a));
(4)a report regarding Lola and Max has been provided to the Court (s 91(1));
(5)Lola and Max are of good repute and are fit and proper persons to fulfil the responsibilities of parents (s 28(1)(b));
(6)Lola and Max have been selected in accordance with the Adoption Act (s 90(1)(c)); and
(7)Lola and Max satisfy the age and length of relationship requirements (s 28(3)-(4)).
Whether adoption is in the best interests of the child
In making my decision, I must have regard (as far as practicable and appropriate) to the principles set out in s 8(1) of the Adoption Act, including that adoption must be regarded as a service for the child, and not as a right of the adults with whom they are placed. The paramount consideration in any decision concerning the adoption of a child is what is in the best interests of the child, both during childhood and later in life.
An adoption order for Daisy cannot be made unless I am satisfied that her best interests will be promoted through her adoption to Lola and Max, and that, as far as practicable and having regard to Daisy’s age and understanding, her wishes and feelings have been fully ascertained and proper attention has been given to them: s 90(1) of the Adoption Act.
In considering what is in Daisy’s best interests, I have had regard to the matters outlined in s 8(2) of the Adoption Act, relevantly:
(1)any wishes expressed by Daisy in relation to her proposed adoption;
(2)Daisy’s age, maturity, level of understanding, gender, background, family relationships and any other characteristics that I considered relevant;
(3)the physical, emotional and educational needs of Daisy, including her sense of personal, familial and cultural identity;
(4)any wishes expressed by Georgia in relation to Daisy;
(5)the relationship that Daisy has with Georgia, her maternal siblings, and significant other people in her life including her psychological grandmother, “Violet”;
(6)Lola and Max’s attitude towards Daisy and the responsibilities that are associated with parenthood;
(7)the nature of the relationship that Daisy has formed with Lola and Max;
(8)the suitability and capacity of Lola and Max to provide for Daisy’s needs, including her emotional and intellectual needs; and
(9)the need to protect Daisy from physical or psychological harm caused, or that may be caused, by being subjected or exposed to abuse, ill-treatment, violence or other behaviour, or being present while a third person is subjected or exposed to abuse, ill-treatment, violence or other behaviour.
A judicial evaluation is required in the assessment of Daisy’s best interests, balancing a variety of relevant factors from which an overall conclusion must be reached. For the reasons given in more detail below, the evaluation in this case points strongly in favour of the adoption.
Daisy has consistently expressed a clear desire to be adopted by Lola and Max. She has also explicitly expressed her wish to have the same surname as her maternal siblings, Rory and Lucia, and the rest of her adoptive family. Daisy has consented to her adoption to Lola and Max by signing the instrument of consent to adoption on 13 March 2025. Before signing that instrument she received the mandatory counselling required by s 63 of the Adoption Act from Ms Smith, a qualified counsellor. Ms Smith certified that Daisy understands the effect of signing the instrument of consent. Daisy has not withdrawn her consent.
I am confident that both Lola and Max will provide Daisy with the love, attention and care that she undoubtedly deserves. The evidence demonstrates Lola and Max’s ability to provide a high level of care to Daisy, addressing her physical, emotional and educational needs in a consistent and thoughtful manner. Daisy is clearly thriving in Lola and Max’s family as an outgoing, kind and enthusiastic child with the traits of a born leader. Daisy commenced high school this year and she recently received an award for ‘sticking to tasks’. The evidence demonstrates Daisy has a keen interest in AFL, beach nippers, Oz Tag and dance, including hip hop and acrobatics. Daisy is also a Taylor Swift fan, and she recently attended the Eras Tour as a gift with Lola and Max.
Daisy is healthy. Lola and Max have demonstrated a proactive approach to maintaining Daisy’s overall health. Daisy was diagnosed with ADHD, which is being well-managed with medication. Daisy has an authorised Behaviour Support Plan due to her ADHD and she attends monthly in-person appointments with a psychologist. The evidence indicates Daisy has strong communication and language skills and that she can effectively articulate her needs. Lola and Max have consistently demonstrated an attentiveness to Daisy’s needs.
Both Lola and Max have demonstrated a positive attitude in relation to the responsibilities associated with parenthood and their commitment to Daisy. They have developed a consistent routine with Daisy, including a no-phones at bedtime rule. Daisy has responded well to the routine. Lola and Max set clear boundaries whilst also adopting a child-focused and trauma-informed approach to parenting, acknowledging the challenges Daisy has faced over her lifetime.
Daisy has developed a strong relationship with each of Lola and Max and she has become comfortable referring to them as ‘Mum’ and ‘Dad’. The evidence shows that Daisy enjoys cooking with Max and getting her nails painted with Lola. As Daisy begins to navigate her teenage years, Lola and Max have clearly provided her with a safe space to have challenging conversations and to approach them gently and with humour where appropriate.
Lola and Max have demonstrated a strong desire for Daisy to be a part of their family on a permanent basis. They want Daisy to be confident in what her future looks like and to protect her from the uncertainty she experienced prior to being placed with their family.
For a time early in Daisy’s life, she was placed with carers who had previously adopted another of Daisy’s maternal siblings (Nick), being Mr Arnold and Ms Owen. However, those carers soon separated and Daisy lived with Ms Owen. During that time, Ms Owen’s mother, Violet, lived with them for extended periods. Ms Owen died, following which Daisy spent periods in Violet’s care. Daisy and Violet formed a strong bond, which continues. Violet is referred to as Daisy’s psychological grandmother. Violet has clearly expressed her support for Daisy’s adoption and she believes it is in her best interests.
I am also confident that Lola and Max will assist Daisy in further understanding her birth family history and what open adoption means through Life Story work. Daisy has embarked on this journey already, collecting photographs and important information from Violet. There is evidence that Violet has assisted Daisy in understanding her birth family background, conducting online ancestry searches and creating a family tree for Daisy to include in her Life Story work.
The evidence shows that Lola and Max have consistently arranged and facilitated family time visits between Daisy and her birth family since she was placed in their care. They place Daisy’s needs at the forefront when arranging family time visits, basing them on her requests and preferences. Lola and Max have demonstrated a strong desire to ensure Daisy has face-to-face visits with her siblings. They have also facilitated family time visits with Georgia, although Georgia’s inconsistency has impacted these visits. Lola and Max have also arranged visits between Daisy and Violet, who resides in Victoria. Lola and Max understand the crucial importance of Daisy maintaining authentic relationships with her birth family and I am confident that they will continue to do so in the event an adoption order is made.
In relation to cultural heritage, Daisy’s maternal family are Polish and Australian. Daisy has indicated that she is not interested in learning about Polish culture at present. Lola and Max have indicated that they will support Daisy’s understanding in the future should she change her mind. They have supported Daisy’s cultural connections by celebrating birthdays, Christmas and organising other social events which allow her to navigate her cultural connections. Lola and the adoptive parents of Daisy’s other maternal siblings share resources and ideas on how to immerse the children in their culture, including through books, cooking and arts and crafts activities. Although Georgia has stated that she does not adhere to any religion, Lola and Max are raising Daisy in the Catholic tradition.
The adoption is supported by an adoption report prepared by a Case Manager, Adoptions at Barnardos. Strong referee certificates in support of Lola and Max have been filed.
The siblings
Daisy has fostered positive relationships with her seven siblings.
In accordance with Daisy’s wishes and best interests, Lola and Max have demonstrated their commitment to helping Daisy develop strong relationships with each of her siblings. They clearly recognise the pivotal importance of maintaining the unique sibling bond that Daisy has with her siblings.
The birth parents
When considering Daisy’s best interests, I must have regard to the relationship that Georgia has formed with Daisy and any wishes she, as Daisy’s birth mother, has expressed regarding her adoption.
Georgia has not signed any instrument of consent for Daisy’s adoption in these proceedings and she has consistently stated that she opposes the adoption.
The relationship between Daisy and Georgia is complex. Daisy has lived in out-of-home-care since birth but she has maintained a connection with Georgia throughout her life. There have been challenges in their relationship, including because at times the contact has been irregular because of some lack of consistency on Georgia’s part. Georgia has acknowledged that she is content that Daisy is residing with her siblings, Rory and Lucia, and that she is grateful they can remain together with Lola and Max. Nevertheless, Georgia has expressed a desire for Daisy to be restored to her care.
As has been stated above, the identity of Daisy’s birth father remains unknown.
Whether adoption clearly preferable in the best interests of the child
An order for adoption cannot be made unless I am satisfied that the making of such an order is clearly preferable in the best interests of Daisy than any other action which could be taken by law in relation to Daisy’s care: s 90(3) of the Adoption Act.
I must be satisfied that there is more than a “slight preponderance” of considerations in favour of Daisy’s adoption over the other available alternatives: Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813 at [14]. I must achieve the degree of conviction in favour of this adoption commensurate with the gravity of the decision that is being made: Application of A - re D [2006] NSWSC 1056; 36 Fam LR 142 at [53]. In determining whether an adoption order would promote Daisy’s best interests and whether it is clearly preferable to any other order, I must identify the likely impacts of an adoption order and examine the benefits and detriments associated with each alternative: Adoption of NG [2014] NSWSC 680 at [74].
The Secretary identified the following alternatives to making an adoption order:
(a)an order allocating parental responsibility to one or both birth parents pursuant to s 92 of the Adoption Act;
(b)no order and maintain the status quo, which is that Daisy remains under the parental responsibility of the Minister until she is 18 years of age; or
(c)an order allocating parental responsibility to Lola and Max pursuant to s 92 of the Adoption Act.
Alternative (a) is not realistic or plausible in these circumstances. The evidence falls significantly short of supporting such an order. Georgia has a history of chronic transience, substance abuse and an intellectual disability which impacts upon her parenting capacity. Despite the support services offered to Georgia over the years, no significant change appears to have materialised to render restoration of Daisy to Georgia’s care a realistic possibility. As the identity of Daisy’s birth father remains unknown, an order allocating parental responsibility to his care is not possible.
An order for adoption is clearly preferable and in the best interests of Daisy compared with alternative (b) above. If I were to make no order, Daisy would continue as a ward of the State until she reaches the age of 18. This would also mean that Lola and Max would not be able to make any significant decisions regarding Daisy without the approval of the Minister’s delegate. It would also mean that Daisy would not be recognised as part of her psychological family in the eyes of the law.
An order allocating parental responsibility for Daisy to Lola and Max (alternative (c)) would address some of the disadvantages associated with taking no steps at all, but this would be a temporary order that would expire when Daisy reaches the age of 18. In the meantime, the Minister and relevant caseworkers would continue their involvement in the decision-making process for Daisy. Similarly to alternative (b) above, Daisy would lose her legal connection to her psychological family when she reaches 18 years of age.
Making no order or an order allocating parental responsibility to Lola and Max would lack the certainty and permanency of an adoption order. This would also potentially expose Daisy to being stigmatised from the fact that she would continue to be a “foster child”, rather than living in a family that is legally recognised as her own.
In this case, an adoption order would deliver clear benefits over the alternative options, including the provision of a secure, stable and reliable lifetime placement for Daisy with Lola and Max’s family: In re W (A Child) (Adoption: Grandparents’ Competing Claim) [2017] 1 WLR 889; [2016] EWCA Civ 793 at [64]. An order for adoption would also serve Daisy’s identity needs, in circumstances where she is emotionally, psychologically and residentially already a beloved member of her proposed adoptive family, bringing her legal status into conformity with reality and perfecting her sense of permanent belonging in the family which she identifies with as her own, not only during childhood but for life: Adoption of Taylor-Clay [2019] NSWSC 27 at [58]. This would also enable Daisy to formalise her legal relationship with 2 of her maternal siblings, Rory and Lucia, reinforcing her sense of connection to her birth family.
The evidence clearly indicates that Daisy is eager to become a permanent and legally recognised member of Lola and Max’s family. Daisy has undergone immense change over her short life, experiencing several successive placement disruptions, and it is in her best interests to have a stable home environment. An adoption order would provide Daisy with a sense of permanency and belonging that would not be achieved through continued out-of-home-care.
While the adoption order is likely to strengthen Daisy’s connection and relationship with 2 of her siblings (Rory and Lucia), I am satisfied that an adoption order is unlikely to have a negative impact on Daisy’s future relationships with her other siblings. In the context of open adoption, the sibling bond can be fostered in the absence of a legal relationship, and the adoption plan plays a crucial role in maximising the opportunities for these relationships to remain intact: Adoption of JLK and CRK [2017] NSWSC 7 at [92]. The adoption plan contemplates consistent contact arrangements between Daisy and her maternal siblings.
I am satisfied that, when compared to the available alternatives, an adoption order is firmly in Daisy’s best interests and is the clearly preferable option.
Dispensing with the birth parents’ consent
Pursuant to s 54(2) of the Adoption Act, a child who is over 12 years old and of sufficient maturity to understand the effect of providing consent may provide sole consent to their adoption, but only if they have resided with the proposed adoptive parents for a period of at least two years. Daisy has lived with Lola and Max for 23 months, and so this provision is not engaged.
Unless the Court dispenses with the requirement, the consent of Daisy’s birth mother and father to the adoption is required: s 52 of the Adoption Act. The plaintiff seeks orders dispensing with the requirement for consent by Daisy’s birth parents. The circumstances which give the Court power to dispense with consent are addressed in s 67 of the Adoption Act.
I deal first with Daisy’s birth father. I must be satisfied that, after reasonable inquiry, Daisy’s birth father cannot be found or identified: s 67(1)(a). I must also be satisfied that dispensing with Daisy’s birth fathers’ consent is in her best interests: s 67(2). In Re K and the Adoption Act 2000 [2005] NSWSC 858, White J stated at [22] that “reasonable inquiry” in relation to s 67(1)(a) of the Adoption Act must be evaluated from the perspective of the applicant and also the person whose consent would otherwise be required. In Re DYK and the Adoption Act 2000 [2005] NSWSC 1045, Brereton J made orders that dispensed with the consent of the child’s birth parents due to the limited capacity of the applicant to make any further inquiries regarding the child’s birth parents.
Five men were identified as person’s who may be Daisy’s father. Three have been excluded on the basis of DNA evidence. A fourth man has been excluded because Georgia denies he is the father and he suffers from a severe brain injury and is prone to violence, making him an unsuitable person from whom to seek a DNA test. The fifth man denies ever having slept with Georgia and refuses to have a DNA test.
I am satisfied that all reasonable inquiries to identify Daisy’s birth father have been undertaken. Without any further information, Barnardos is restricted in its capacity to conduct any further testing. In my view, there is nothing further that can reasonably be done at present to identify Daisy’s birth father.
I am satisfied that:
(a)it is not necessary for notice of the consent dispense order to be given to the birth father (see s 72(1) and s 72(2)(a) of the Adoption Act);
(b)it is appropriate to dispense with the requirement to give the birth father notice of the application: s 88(4) of the Adoption Act; and
(c)the Court can and should dispense with the need for consent of Daisy’s birth father to the adoption.
Georgia was given notice of the application for the order and related materials on 11 August 2025 and so has been given 14 days’ notice of the application (see s 88(1)). At the time she was served, Georgia indicated to the case manager who effected service that she proposed to contest the order. She was informed (orally and in writing) that she would need to take formal action to do so within 14 days. Georgia has not taken any steps with the Court to oppose the application.
I cannot make a consent dispense order under s 67(1)(d) of the Adoption Act unless I am satisfied that Georgia has established a stable relationship with Lola and Max, and that the adoption by Lola and Max will promote Georgia’s welfare. I must also be satisfied that to dispense with Georgia’s consent would be in Daisy’s best interests: s 67(2).
It is by no means a straightforward decision for the Court to dispense with the consent of the birth parents to the adoption of their child by the proposed adoptive parents where the adoption is opposed. This is a serious step and it is not to be taken lightly: see for example, Adoption of RCC and RZA at [17]. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that I should dispense with the requirement for Georgia’s consent in relation to Daisy’s adoption.
Daisy has clearly formed a strong and stable relationship with Lola and Max and her adoption by them will clearly promote her welfare in both the short and long term. I am also satisfied that the making of consent dispense orders is in Daisy’s best interests. Georgia has had notice of the application for adoption and the application to dispense with her consent. Georgia has consistently expressed her opposition to the making of an adoption order in relation to Daisy. However, no application has been made to attempt to restore Daisy to her care and no formal opposition to the adoption has been made. I conclude that while Georgia harbours a desire for Daisy to live with her as her daughter and to care for her as her parent, that is not realistic. I am satisfied that it is not a prospect that is in Daisy’s interests. Her interests are overwhelmingly supported by the proposed adoption.
Consent by person with parental responsibility
On 3 April 2025, the Principal Officer, Adoption, Barnardos Out-of-Home-Care NSW provided consent to Daisy’s adoption by Lola and Max. Therefore, as the delegate of the Minister, the appropriate consent has been provided from the person who has parental responsibility for Daisy. This means that s 52(a)(ii) is satisfied.
The child’s consent
The Court cannot make an adoption order in relation to a child who is over 12 years old but under 18 years old who can provide consent unless certain conditions have been satisfied – see s 55.
On 14 February 2025, Daisy was provided with a copy of the Mandatory Written Information on Adoption by a case manager at Barnardos.
On 24 February 2025, Daisy attended a meeting with Ms Smith, a registered counsellor, in accordance with s 63 of the Adoption Act to assess her capacity to understand the effect of providing consent to her proposed adoption to Lola and Max, satisfying s 55(1)(a). As I have already noted, Ms Smith has certified that Daisy understands the effect of signing the instrument of consent (as required by s 55), satisfying s 55(1)(b). On 13 March 2025, in accordance with s 61 of the Adoption Act and cl 80 of the Adoption Regulation 2015 (NSW), Daisy signed the instrument of consent to her adoption by Lola and Max, satisfying s 55(1)(c).
I consider that Daisy’s consent, given her apparent maturity, and given that she has been residing with Lola and Max for just shy of 2 years, to be a particularly powerful factor in favour of the adoption. Her interests are paramount and my assessment of those interests can and should pay close heed to what she wants (noting that she has received appropriate counselling).
The Adoption Plan
The Secretary has prepared an adoption plan pursuant to s 46 of the Adoption Act which includes provisions for the means and nature of contact between Daisy and her birth and psychological family. The contact arrangements concern Georgia, Violet, Nick, Billy, Marshall, Alex and Sam.
The question that I must address is whether the proposed adoption plan is in Daisy’s best interests and is proper in the circumstances: s 90(2). The Secretary seeks an order that this adoption plan be registered.
Although Georgia has not provided her consent to Daisy’s proposed adoption to Lola and Max, she has signed the proposed adoption plan. The Secretary provided Georgia with the opportunity to participate in the development of, and agree to, the adoption plan: s 46(2A).
There is no evidence before me to indicate that Georgia, or any other person, is challenging the proposed contact arrangements in the adoption plan.
The adoption plan proposes 4 face-to-face visits annually for a minimum duration of 2 hours between Georgia and Daisy. Each of the visits between Georgia and Daisy will be a joint visit with the maternal siblings’ visits. Due to Georgia’s history of inconsistency with visits, if she fails to attend one of the scheduled contact visits, that visit will be forfeited. Provision is also made for Lola and Max to provide Georgia with photographs of Daisy prior to these scheduled visits, on the condition that Georgia is not to publish any of these photographs to any social media sites due to privacy concerns.
The adoption plan also contemplates 4 face-to-face visits annually between Daisy, Nick and Violet. As Nick resides with Violet in Victoria, the dates and venues for the visits are to be scheduled in advance at the beginning of each year. Video calls between Daisy, Nick and Violet are provided for on or around special events, as facilitated by Lola and Max.
Moreover, the adoption plan provides for 4 face-to-face contact visits annually between Daisy and Marshall, Alex and Sam. In relation to contact arrangements between Daisy and Billy, the adoption plan accounts for the facilitation of at least 4 online communications annually. Due to a relationship breakdown with Daisy and Billy’s adoptive parents, Daisy does not wish to meet them in person and Billy’s adoptive parents are refusing to allow him to attend visits with Daisy alone due to his diagnosis with a variety of conditions including autism spectrum disorder. The adoption plan has in-built flexibility, noting that in-person contact arrangements can occur if a mutual desire is expressed by Daisy and Billy.
The adoption plan also makes provision for contact with Daisy’s birth father, should paternity be confirmed at a future date. It is a requirement that the putative father undergoes DNA testing prior to any contact occurring. There is provision made for Lola and Max to first meet the putative father prior to arranging any contact with Daisy, should she wish for such contact to occur.
All of the relevant individuals have signed the proposed adoption plan.
In considering Daisy’s relationship with her birth and psychological family (s 8(2)(f)), alongside her emotional needs and sense of personal, familial and cultural identity (s 8(2)(c)), I am satisfied that the proposed adoption plan is in her best interests and proper in the circumstances. The adoption plan places Daisy’s needs at the forefront and provides for continued contact between Daisy and her birth and psychological family.
I am confident that Lola and Max will encourage and arrange contact between Daisy and her birth and psychological family members. They have demonstrated a deep understanding of the important role that these relationships play in Daisy’s sense of self and wellbeing. Cooperation will be required from all parties to the adoption plan to ensure family time visits are a positive experience for Daisy and her siblings.
If the adoption plan is registered, this will have the effect, on the making of an adoption order, as if the adoption plan was part of the order: s 50(4). Therefore, a party to an adoption plan, once registered, can seek to enforce it as an order of the Court.
The Court can review the adoption plan on the application of one or more parties to the plan and make such changes, if any, to the provisions of the adoption plan as it considers appropriate: s 51(1) and 51(3).
Proposed name change
The Secretary seeks an order, pursuant to s 101 of the Adoption Act, that the Court approves the proposed name as the name of the child.
Before altering Daisy’s name, I must consider any wishes expressed by her and any factors relevant to the weight that should be given to those wishes: s 101(2). The Court cannot approve a change of name for a child over 12 years old unless the child has, in a consent given under s 55, consented to the change. In her written instrument of consent to her adoption, Daisy has requested her name to be changed.
In relation to the altered surname, I am satisfied that this change is in Daisy’s best interests: s 101(5). This proposed change will reflect Daisy’s legal membership to Lola and Max’s family, solidifying her sense of belonging and security. This change will also allow Daisy to share a surname with her maternal siblings, Rory and Lucia. The evidence shows that Daisy has already started using this surname at her school to identify herself.
In relation to the altered middle name, I am also satisfied that the proposed change is in Daisy’s best interests: s 101(5). The evidence indicates that this name change is personally significant to Daisy as it reflects the name of her previous carer and psychological grandmother, Violet, and also honours another previous carer of Daisy’s, Ms Owen, who passed away when Daisy was 4 years old. This name change is important to Daisy and she seeks to acknowledge the important role these women have played in her life to date.
There is no evidence that indicates Daisy wishes to alter her first name. She has identified as “Daisy” from birth, and it is important that she retains this name as it is a crucial part of her identity. Daisy’s name will honour and preserve her ongoing connection to her birth family which can never be erased, regardless of whether adoption orders are made.
Conclusion
The adoption orders sought by the Secretary are in Daisy’s best interests.
I understand that Daisy, Lola and Max would like an adoption ceremony. A ceremony will provide an opportunity for Daisy and her family to recognise the significance of the occasion and to celebrate it. I will make orders on that occasion. The legal representatives for the plaintiff should liaise with my Associate to fix a suitable date.
Once the orders are made, an Integrated Birth Certificate will be issued which will include the details of Daisy’s birth mother, Georgia. It will serve as an important aspect of Daisy’s life story. Lola has requested the Integrated Birth Certificate to reflect her occupation as ‘Home Duties’. This will be accommodated.
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