The Adoption of Christopher (a pseudonym)
[2025] NSWSC 49
•13 February 2025
Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: The Adoption of Christopher (a pseudonym) [2025] NSWSC 49 Hearing dates: On the papers Date of orders: 13 February 2025 Decision date: 13 February 2025 Jurisdiction: Equity - Adoptions List Before: McGrath J Decision: Consent dispense order made
Catchwords: CHILD WELFARE – adoption – consent dispense order – where consent dispense order sought before application for adoption order – where father not identified – where reasonable enquiries made to identify and locate the father
Legislation Cited: Adoption Act 2000 (NSW)
Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW)
Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Adoption of A [2022] NSWSC 567
Application of MSC and CJC; re HES [2011] NSWSC 1071
Re DYK and The Adoption Act 2000 [2005] NSWSC 1045
Re K and The Adoption Act 2000 [2005] NSWSC 858
Re KN and The Adoption Act 2000 [2005] NSWSC 896
Category: Procedural rulings Parties: Secretary, New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice (Plaintiff) Representation: Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
File Number(s): 2025/00044499 Publication restriction: This judgment has been anonymised pursuant to s 180 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW)
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
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These proceedings concern the adoption of a child who I will call “Christopher” (not the child’s real name).
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By notice of motion filed 4 February 2025, the Secretary of the New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice seeks an order, pursuant to s 67(1)(a) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) (the Act), dispensing with the requirement for the consent of Christopher’s father to Christopher’s adoption.
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All persons referred to have been assigned pseudonyms in keeping with s 180 of the Act.
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I have been greatly assisted by the submissions I received from Ms Pancia for the Secretary. Much of what follows is taken, with gratitude, from those submissions.
RELEVANT EVENTS
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Christopher was born on 21 August 2024 and is now 5 months of age.
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Christopher’s mother, who I will call “Winnie” (not her real name), has consistently expressed a wish for Christopher to be placed into care and adopted. Winnie has stated that she cannot care for Christopher. Winnie consents to Christopher’s adoption.
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On 23 August 2024, Winnie signed a Temporary Care Arrangement in respect of Christopher, pursuant to s 151 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW).
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From 23 August 2024 onwards, Christopher was under the care responsibility of the Secretary.
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On 3 September 2024, Christopher was placed in short term care with an authorised carer. This placement was not intended to be Christopher’s long-term placement.
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On 23 November 2024, Winnie agreed to extend the Temporary Care Arrangement in respect of Christopher. The extended Temporary Care Arrangement commenced on 23 November 2024, and remains in force, expiring on 23 February 2025. It cannot be extended. [1]
1. s 152(1)(c)(ii), Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act.
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On 16 December 2024, Winnie gave her formal consent to the adoption of Christopher.
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Winnie has been served with the notice of revocation, and the revocation period expired on 15 January 2025. Winnie has not revoked her consent.
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Christopher has not yet been placed for adoption. No application has yet been made for Christopher’s adoption. Christopher is a child “awaiting adoption”. [2]
2. See the heading to s 75 of the Act; that heading is taken not to be a part of the Act, see s 35(2)(a) of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), but is a useful expression to adopt.
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Unless I make an order dispensing with Christopher’s father’s consent prior to 23 February 2025, when the Temporary Care Arrangement is to end, the Secretary will cease to have care responsibility under the Temporary Care Arrangement, and care responsibility will revert to Winnie.
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That is because of the expiration of the Temporary Care Arrangement, and because the Secretary could only acquire parental responsibility for Christopher under s 75 of the Act if consent to Christopher’s adoption was given by all requisite persons (which is not the case here, as Christopher’s father, whoever he is, has not given consent) or if such consent had been dispensed with. Hence, the Secretary has made the application to dispense with the father’s consent.
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If otherwise satisfied that a consent dispense order should be made, the court may do so before an application for adoption has been made. [3]
3. s 70(1)(a) of the Act.
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The court may dispense with the consent of a child’s parent to the child’s adoption if, relevantly, that person, after reasonable inquiry, cannot be found or identified,[4] and if satisfied that to do so would be in the child’s best interests. [5]
EFFORTS TO LOCATE AND IDENTIFY CHRISTOPHER’S FATHER
4. s 67(1)(a) of the Act.
5. s 67(2) of the Act.
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I conclude that Christopher’s father cannot be identified for the reasons stated below.
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There is no father recorded on Christopher’s birth certificate.
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Winnie has been unable to provide information which would enable the father to be identified. Winnie has advised that Christopher was likely conceived following an isolated encounter with a man who I will call “Alan”, whom Winnie met on Snapchat. Winnie has provided the following information as to the father’s identity:
Winnie is unaware of the putative father’s surname or contact details;
after informing the putative father of her pregnancy, the father challenged her credibility, and then blocked Winnie on social media. As such, Winnie has no further means to contact the putative father; and
Winnie believes with a high degree of certainty that Alan is the father of Christopher, as she had no sexual partner for several months prior to the isolated encounter, and none since.
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Winnie is unaware of any details other than the father’s first name and general appearance.
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The Secretary submits that it is unable to undertake further searches for the putative father due to the limited information available about him. [6]
6. The Secretary relied on Re K and The Adoption Act 2000 [2005] NSWSC 858 at [21] (White J); Re DYK and The Adoption Act 2000 [2005] NSWSC 1045 at [16]-[17] (Brereton J); Re KN and The Adoption Act 2000 [2005] NSWSC 896 at [14] (Campbell J); Application of MSC and CJC; re HES [2011] NSWSC 1071 at [18] (Brereton J).
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In the circumstances, I accept that the Secretary has made reasonable efforts to locate and identify Christopher’s father. For the same reasons, I accept that the Secretary is not required to serve notice of the application for a consent dispense order on Christopher’s father. [7]
7. s 72(2)(a) of the Act.
CONCLUSION
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Most importantly, I am satisfied that it is in Christopher’s best interests to make the consent dispense order, since it enables the child to be placed in a secure adoptive placement as soon as possible. [8]
8. See the reasons of Stevenson J in Adoption of A [2022] NSWSC 567 at [14].
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The making of the order will have the effect that the Secretary acquires parental responsibility for Christopher, which prevents such responsibility remaining with Winnie; an outcome Winnie does not want, and which would not be in Christopher’s best interests.
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For the reasons set out above, I propose to make the following order:
Pursuant to s 67(1)(a) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), the court dispenses with the requirement for the consent of the birth father of Christopher.
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Endnotes
Decision last updated: 13 February 2025
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