The Adoption of Cameron (a pseudonym)

[2023] NSWSC 1518

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

The Adoption of Cameron (a pseudonym) [2023] NSWSC 1518

Hearing dates:

17 October and 23 November 2023

Date of orders:

11 December 2023

Decision date:

11 December 2023

Jurisdiction:

Equity - Adoptions List

Before:

Stevenson J

Decision:

Order for adoption to be made

Catchwords:

CHILD WELFARE – adoption – best interests – where child does not satisfy definition of “Aboriginal child”

Legislation Cited:

Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW)

Adoption Act 2000 (NSW)

Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

Adoption of BL [2018] NSWSC 391

Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813

Adoption of Taylor-Clay [2019] NSWSC 27

Application of A - re D [2006] NSWSC 1056

Hackett (a pseudonym) v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2020] NSWCA 83

In re B (Adoption: Jurisdiction to Set Aside) [1995] Fam 239

In re W (A Child) (Adoption: Grandparents’ Competing Claim) [2017] 1 WLR 889; [2016] EWCA Civ 793

Re B (A Minor) [2001] UKHL 70; [2002] 1 All ER 241

Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS [2019] NSWSC 71

Secretary, New South Wales Department of Family and Community Services by his delegate, Principal Officer, Barnardos Australia v MB and JW [2017] NSWSC 1087

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Secretary, New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice (Plaintiff)
“Julianne” (a pseudonym) (Defendant)

Representation:

Counsel:
R D Turnbull (Plaintiff)

Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
Defendant (self-represented)

File Number(s):

2022/379787

Publication restriction:

This judgment has been anonymised pursuant to s 180 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW)

JUDGMENT

1. The Secretary, New South Wales Department of Communities and Justice (“the Secretary”) seeks an order that a child who I will call “Cameron” (not his real name), now four years of age, be adopted by a married couple, to whom I will refer as “Jennifer” and “Lindsay” (not their real names) or the “Proposed Adoptive Parents” as appropriate.

2. Cameron was taken into care in April 2019, when he was three days old. Cameron has lived with the Proposed Adoptive Parents since he was a little over one week old.

3. The Proposed Adoptive Parents have been married since 2008. They have no children. Jennifer, who is now 36, is a primary school teacher. Lindsay, who is now 39, is a pastor at a local Christian church.

4. Cameron’s mother is a person who I will call “Julianne” (not her real name). Cameron’s father is not known. Julianne has two other children; “Alice” (not her real name), aged 10, who lives with her father, and “James” (not his real name), who is 16 months old, who lives with Julianne.

5. Julianne opposes the adoption.

6. On 16 September 2019 the Children’s Court of New South Wales made final orders providing for Cameron to be placed under the parental responsibility of the relevant Minister until he attains the age of 18 years, pursuant to the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) (“the Care Act”). These orders remain in effect.

The circumstances of this case

7. Cameron has lived with the Proposed Adoptive Parents for all but eight days of his life.

8. There is no dispute about the nature of the care given to Cameron by the Proposed Adoptive Parents.

9. That care is summarised in this passage from the report of Ms Diane Edwards prepared pursuant to s 91 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) (“the Act”):

“[Jennifer] and [Lindsay’s] parenting confidence and competence with [Cameron] is evident. From information contained in the files and from observations during this adoption assessment, it is evident that [Jennifer] and [Lindsay] have dealt with all of [Cameron’s] needs extremely well and [Cameron] has made very sound progress in all areas of his health and development since being placed with them. [Jennifer] and [Lindsay]’s close relationships with [Cameron] and their capacity to identify and meet his needs, including the special needs of a child in out of home care, is evident. [Jennifer] and [Lindsay] display individual positive qualities and attributes, in addition to the strengths in their relationship, their experience with children, their strong bonding and commitment to [Cameron], their close family ties and their strong network of support. These are all positive indicators of [Jennifer] and [Lindsay’s] ability to provide a stable, nurturing, loving family for [Cameron] to grow up in and belong to permanently. [Jennifer] and [Lindsay] demonstrate the ability to meet [Cameron’s] immediate and longer term medical, psychological, educational and developmental needs, without the involvement of [the Department of Communities and Justice] or CASPA. I believe that [Jennifer] and [Lindsay] have the capacity to assume full parental responsibility for [Cameron], including the additional parenting knowledge, insight, resources and skills required to parent an adopted child.”

10. Julianne accepts that Cameron’s best interests require that he remain with the Proposed Adoptive Parents “at this point and time, as they are all he has known since birth”.

11. However, Julianne has said:

“My main and ultimate goal is to have [Cameron] home with his biological family (myself his mother, his baby brother, his great Aunty, his uncle …, poppy …and his Aunties (my 4 sisters))

…

As [Cameron’s] biological mother, I feel it would be in [Cameron’s] very best interest to be growing up with his biological family in the near future. I love my son [Cameron] with all that I am as his mother. My wish is to have him back in my arms and to provide full care via myself and our large family.

Our family owns 140 acres with 3 houses and only 7 mins to our local school and amenities.

Our family will be complete once [Cameron] is returned home.”

12. I will return to this.

The formal requirements for adoption

13. The formal requirements of the Act have been satisfied.

Aboriginal child

14. In her affidavit, Julianne said:

“Our family are recognised with [a named] Aboriginal community nation as [the named nation]. We don’t claim with Australian gov[ernment] as Aboriginal.

Our family attends every indigenous functions, celebrations, gatherings, organisations and ceremonies.

Our bloodline is connected to my very elderly grandmother’s side and is still tracing and gathering information within this subject as it has always been silenced in the past.”

15. Jennifer and Lindsay informed me that they learned of Julianne’s belief that her family is of Aboriginal descent within months of Cameron being placed into their care.

16. In the Act “Aboriginal” has the same meaning as “Aboriginal person” in the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW). ^[1] In that legislation there is a tripartite test for Aboriginality, namely that the person is:

1. a member of the Aboriginal race of Australia;

2. identifies as an Aboriginal person; and

3. is accepted by the Aboriginal community as an Aboriginal person. ^[2]

   1. Section 4(1) of the Act.

   2. Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW), s 4(1).

17. Under the Act, and despite that definition, the Court may determine that a child is Aboriginal for the purpose of the Act if the Court is satisfied that the child is of Aboriginal descent. ^[3] This permits a child’s descent to be traced from an Aboriginal person who does not meet the tripartite test. ^[4] There is no requirement that an Aboriginal child have “a specified proportion of genetic inheritance”. ^[5]

    3. Section 4(2) of the Act.

    4. Hackett (a pseudonym) v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2020] NSWCA 83 at [61] (Leeming JA).

    5. Ibid at [53] (Leeming JA).

18. As Mr Turnbull, who appeared for the Secretary, pointed out, the genesis of the proposition that Cameron is of Aboriginal descent was evidence received in the proceedings before the Children’s Court. Julianne’s father initially stated that Cameron’s family identified as Aboriginal although, ultimately, he did not maintain that position.

19. Julianne’s father expressed the view that Cameron’s Aboriginal descent was from his mother; that is, Cameron’s paternal great grandmother.

20. The paternal great grandmother is reported as stating, in August 2019, shortly after Cameron was placed into the care of the Proposed Adoptive Parents, that so far as she knew there was no Aboriginality in her family. A caseworker with the Department of Communities and Justice reported that:

“[Julianne’s grandmother] stated that her parents were born in New Zealand … [She] stated that all her aunties and uncles were born in New Zealand and that she knew them all. [She] stated that she knew her grandmother and she never mentioned anything about being Aboriginal … [S]he was the only person from Australia [and that Julianne’s father] and his siblings were born in New Zealand. I asked [Julianne’s grandmother] did [Julianne’s father] identify as Aboriginal. [She] stated that [Julianne’s father] identified as Kiwi but he always had an affinity with Aboriginal people.”

21. Julianne said that I should place no weight on this material as her grandmother was then aged and suffering from Alzheimer’s disease. However, the grandmother’s recollection appears from the extract at [20] to be very specific, and her son, Julianne’s father, is reported to have said of his mother that she “forgets certain things but also remembers different events in life” including the date the family migrated from New Zealand.

22. In those circumstances the Department has embarked on an extensive search to establish whether Cameron is of Aboriginal descent. It engaged Mr Timothy Dauth, senior family history researcher employed at the Crown Solicitor’s Office, to research Cameron’s ancestry. Mr Dauth has had over 25 years’ experience in this field and was highly qualified to carry out this exercise.

23. Mr Dauth has produced a detailed report and prepared an “Ancestor Chart” for Cameron which shows that, ultimately, each of his ancestors on Julianne’s side of the family can be traced back to someone who was born outside Australia; in England, Scotland, Germany or India. Those ancestors were born between 1820 and 1844.

24. Mr Dauth’s ultimate conclusion was:

“We have searched [Cameron’s] maternal ancestry and have been unable to confirm Aboriginal ancestry or any connection in past generations to the [Aboriginal nation with whom Julianne identifies].”

25. However, Mr Dauth acknowledged that:

“… there are limitations in family history research when reliance is placed on genealogical and other written records. Uncertainties and gaps in the genealogical record make it very difficult to reach certain conclusions, and there is always a possibility of an unrecorded relationship that may be of relevance.”

26. I think Mr Turnbull was in these circumstances correct to submit that:

“In circumstances where all of the relevant ancestors were born outside the Australian continent within 56 years of the arrival of the First Fleet, it is unlikely in the extreme that any of those ancestors would have any Aboriginal ancestry. … [W]ithout knowing the identity of [Cameron’s] birth father, [Cameron’s] descent for that line cannot be investigated. In any event there is no evidence that [Cameron’s] birth father is of Aboriginal descent.”

27. That evidence points to the conclusion that Cameron is unlikely to be of Aboriginal descent.

28. The steps that have been taken satisfy me that reasonable inquiries have been made, for the purpose of s 34 of the Act, as to whether Cameron is an Aboriginal child.

29. What I have set out here should not be read as an affirmative finding that Cameron is not an Aboriginal child. Rather, my finding is that I am not persuaded, on the evidence that has been adduced before me, that Cameron is an Aboriginal child for the purposes of the Act, and these proceedings. As Mr Dauth’s cautionary comments make clear, the possibility exists that the records he has consulted are not all accurate or complete. It is also possible that Cameron’s ancestors beyond those identified by Mr Dauth, notwithstanding their birth outside of Australia, were themselves of Aboriginal descent.

30. In any event, the wider point is that both Jennifer and Lindsay are willing to cooperate with Julianne in exposing Cameron to such Aboriginal heritage as Julianne and her family believe may be relevant to Cameron’s position.

31. Thus, Lindsay gave this evidence:

“Q. And are you aware that [Julianne] and [Julianne’s father] identify as Aboriginal?

A. Yes.

Q. People?

A. Yes.

Q. And therefore they say that [Cameron] is an Aboriginal child?

A. Correct, yeah.

Q. If [Julianne] wanted to facilitate [Cameron’s] membership of an Aboriginal community, what would you do in response to that request?

A. We would wholeheartedly support that. So, if that was teaching him about culture, we would embrace that. Currently he is, at the preschool he attends he is learning [the named nation’s] language and does acknowledgement of country every day.

HIS HONOUR

Q. Is that something all the children do?

A. That’s correct.

Q. It isn’t just because he might be a First Nations child himself, it is because all the children do that?

A. Yes, all children do that, they do an acknowledgement of country, and, so, we would, any request that [Julianne’s aunty] and [Julianne] want of us to further his Aboriginal Torres Strait Islander education, we would embrace and have no hesitation of that.

TURNBULL

Q. So, for example, if he wanted to learn language, would you be supportive of that?

A. Yes, we would and he already is.

Q. And, if there are any Aboriginal cultural events that [Julianne] wanted [Cameron] to attend, what would your attitude to that be?

A. We would 100 per cent agree to attending that at the school. I also help coordinate NAIDOC celebrations and events like that.”

32. And:

“Q. At the moment we don’t know whether [Cameron] has an Aboriginal ancestor, but it may be the case that he does have an Aboriginal ancestor. If you were to find out that [Cameron] did have an Aboriginal ancestor what would your response to that be?

A. If there was a relative of his that had Aboriginal heritage, we would support contact as often as needed, and, as [Cameron] grew up and requested that, we would facilitate that at his request, obviously when he is old enough to do that.

Q. If that Aboriginal ancestor were on his birth father’s side--

A. Yes.

Q. --what would your view of that be? What would your approach to that be?

A. We would support his heritage as an Aboriginal Torres Strait Islander and support that in whatever was needed.”

33. Jennifer gave evidence to the same effect.

34. Julianne can thus be assured that whatever may be the genealogical facts concerning Cameron’s heritage, he will be exposed to and will learn to understand the traditions of the Aboriginal nation with whom Julianne identifies.

Adoptions generally and the “best interests” principles under the Act

35. Applications for adoption constitute a vitally important component of the Court’s work. ^[6] An order for adoption is one of the most significant, and in human terms, far-reaching of all orders the Court has the power to make. ^[7]

    6. Secretary, New South Wales Department of Family and Community Services by his delegate, Principal Officer, Barnardos Australia v MB and JW [2017] NSWSC 1087 at [9] (Sackar J).

    7. Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS [2019] NSWSC 71 at [157] (Hallen J).

36. Adoption orders possess a “peculiar finality”. ^[8]

    8. Re B (Adoption: Jurisdiction to Set Aside) [1995] Fam 239 at 251G-H (Sir Thomas Bingham).

37. The far-reaching nature of an adoption order has been described this way:

“An adoption order is status changing. It severs, in law, but not in fact, the existing relationship of blood, and creates an adoptive relationship in place of the natural relationship, which in fact, although not in law, continues, unchanged. New family ties are created which approximate blood ties. The child becomes part of his, or her, adoptive parents’ family, solely through operation of law, and there is no necessity for any actual blood relationship to exist between them. He, or she, thereafter, is regarded, in law, as the child of the adoptive parents, and the adoptive parents are regarded in law as the parents of the adopted child: s 95(2)(c) of the Act. The adopted child also ceases to be regarded, in law, as the child of the birth parents and the birth parents cease to be regarded in law as the parents of the adopted child: s 95(2)(d) of the Act. The effect of an adoption order is to extinguish any parental responsibility of the birth parents. They no longer qualify as parents for the purpose of taking part in any future proceedings about the child. Thus, the adoption order directly affects three parties, namely the child, the birth parents and the adoptive parents.” ^[9]

9. Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS (supra) at [150] (Hallen J).

38. I must not make an adoption order in this case unless satisfied that the best interests of Cameron will be promoted by the adoption and that, as far as practicable and having regard to Cameron’s age and understanding, his wishes and feelings have been ascertained and due consideration has been given to them. ^[10]

    10. Sections 90(1)(a) and (b) of the Act.

39. When considering making a decision about the adoption of a child, I must have regard to the best interests of the child, both in childhood and later life (this being the paramount consideration). ^[11] I must also have regard to the principles stated in the Act that adoption is to be regarded as a service for the child^[12] and that no adult has a right to adopt a child. ^[13]

    11. Section 8(1)(a) of the Act.

    12. Section 8(1)(b) of the Act.

    13. Section 8(1)(c) of the Act.

40. In determining the best interests of a child, I must have regard to the matters set forth in s 8(2) of the Act including, relevantly:

• any wishes expressed by the child;

• the child’s age, maturity and level of understanding;

• the child’s physical, emotional and educational needs;

• the wishes expressed by the parent;

• the nature of the relationship that the child has with their parents and any siblings or significant other people;

• the attitude of the proposed adoptive parents to the responsibilities of parenthood; and

• the nature of the relationship of the child with each proposed adoptive parent or parents.

41. The question of what is in a child’s best interests involves the making of a judicial evaluation and the balancing of many factors from which an overall conclusion must be reached which will be inherently imprecise. ^[14]

    14. Re B (A Minor) [2001] UKHL 70; [2002] 1 All ER 241 at [16] (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead), cited with approval in Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS (supra) at [164] (Hallen J).

42. Cameron is four years of age and cannot fully understand the adoption process, or what it involves. However, he has lived with Jennifer and Lindsay since almost the beginning of his life and they are the only consistent parental figures he has known.

43. In this regard, Jennifer has given this evidence:

“[Cameron] is currently too young to be asking questions about his adoption; however, through the process I feel I have been well supported and equipped to answer his future questions. I openly show him pictures of his birth Mummy, [Julianne] and let him know she loves him and wants him to be safe.”

44. Lindsay has deposed:

“I have been open with [Cameron] about this adoption and will continue this openness about adoption issues throughout his childhood and later life. [Cameron] does not currently ask about his adoption as he is too young to understand adoption, but when he does, I will answer any questions age appropriately and to the best of my ability. I continue to read adoption books about foster care and adoption. I allow [Cameron] to read his life story and encourage him to ask questions. I also support and encourage birth family contact so that as he gets older he can feel comfortable enough to ask them any questions as well.”

45. Cameron has had some health issues but, as Mr Turnbull submitted, he is developing along the lines expected of a boy his age and appears to be flourishing in the care of the Proposed Adoptive Parents, who are attending to his social, psychological, physical, spiritual and medical needs in an appropriate manner.

45. Further, as Mr Turnbull has submitted:

“[The Proposed Adoptive Parents] have demonstrated over the past 4 years a consistent ability to care for and meet the needs of [Cameron]. They have expressed their continued willingness to care for him over the course of his childhood and into adulthood. The Court can take significant comfort from [Cameron’s] experience in the [Proposed Adoptive Parents’] care over the past four years, which provides convincing evidence of their positive attitude to their responsibility as parents to [Cameron].

As summarised above, [Cameron] has a strong and close bond with each of [the Proposed Adoptive Parents].

They have both demonstrated an ability to meet [Cameron’s] intellectual and emotional needs. That was recently demonstrated by their response to the [regional] flooding in 2022. They moved out of their house with less than an hour’s warning, prioritising the rescue of [Cameron’s] life story book and associated documents, recognising that those things are irreplaceable and essential to [Cameron’s] welfare and sense of identity.”

47. As I have said, Julianne opposes the adoption of Cameron by Jennifer and Lindsay and, as I have set out, harbours the hope that Cameron could at some point be cared for by her and her family.

48. However, as hard as it will be for Julianne to read this, I do not see that as a realistic possibility. Cameron was removed from Julianne’s care almost at birth in circumstances that are not necessary for me to set out here. For a period of three years between shortly after his birth until last year, Julianne had no contact with Cameron. Julianne has not foreshadowed any intention to make an application for restoration of Cameron to her care under the Care Act.

Is adoption the clearly preferable course to take?

49. I may not make an order for adoption unless satisfied that the making of such an order is “clearly preferable” in the best interests of Cameron than any other action that could be taken by law in relation to his care. ^[15]

    15. Section 90(3) of the Act.

50. I must therefore be satisfied that there is more than a slight preponderance of considerations in favour of adoption over other alternatives. The making of an adoption order must be obviously, plainly or manifestly preferable to any other action that could be taken by law. ^[16] I must achieve the degree of conviction in favour of adoption commensurate with the gravity of the decision. ^[17]

    16. Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813 at [14] (Brereton J, as his Honour then was).

    17. Application of A - re D [2006] NSWSC 1056 at [53] (Palmer J); Adoption of BL [2018] NSWSC 391 at [13] (Sackar J).

51. The benefit of making an adoption order is that it will achieve a secure, stable, reliable permanent and lifetime placement for the child in the adoptive family. ^[18] Adoption serves the identity needs of the child in question, in circumstances where they are emotionally, psychologically and residentially already members of the proposed adoptive family, bringing their legal status into conformity with reality, and by perfecting their sense of permanent belonging in the family with which they identify as their own, not only during childhood but for life. ^[19]

    18. In re W (A Child) (Adoption: Grandparents’ Competing Claim) [2017] 1 WLR 889; [2016] EWCA Civ 793 at [64] (McFarlane LJ; Jackson and Lindblom LJJ agreeing).

    19. Adoption of Taylor-Clay [2019] NSWSC 27 at [58] (Brereton J, as his Honour then was).

52. If I were to make no order, Cameron would remain as a ward of the State until attaining 18 years of age. This would mean that Jennifer and Lindsay would be unable to make significant decisions concerning Cameron, which decisions would require the approval of the Minister by his delegate.

53. An order allocating parental responsibility for Cameron to Jennifer and Lindsay would alleviate some of the disadvantages of taking no step, but would remain a temporary order that would expire when Cameron attains 18 years of age. In the meantime, the Minister and relevant caseworkers would continue to be involved in decision making in relation to Cameron.

54. Thus, making no order, or making an order for parental responsibility, would lack the certainty and permanency of an adoption order and would also give rise to a risk that Cameron may experience stigma arising from the fact that he would continue to be a “foster child”, rather than living in a family that is recognised at law as his own.

55. Ms Edwards has expressed this opinion:

“[Cameron] has remained in the continuous care of [Jennifer] and [Lindsay] for three years and six months, since being placed with them when he was one week old. [Cameron] has strong and secure attachments to [Jennifer] and [Lindsay] and views them as his parents and himself as a member of [Jennifer] and [Lindsay’s] extended family. [Jennifer] and [Lindsay] meet the legislative requirements in the Adoption Act for prospective adoptive applicants. They have the suitability and capacity to meet all of [Cameron’s] needs now and into the future. They are able to attend to the specific needs of an adopted child, including an appreciation of the importance of, and capacity to facilitate and support birth family contact, currently and throughout [Cameron’s] life. [Jennifer] and [Lindsay] are strongly bonded with [Cameron] and they have made a lifetime commitment to him. They have a strong desire to provide [Cameron] with a permanent legal place in their family that will continue beyond the age of eighteen years. The quality of attachment and bonding within the family and the applicants’ parenting qualities and capacity, indicate full legal parental responsibility for [Cameron] is appropriate. Therefore, in my professional opinion, adoption is clearly preferable to any other action that could be taken by law and an adoption order will meet [Cameron’s] needs and best interest and provide significant benefits for him, both now and later in life.”

56. I am persuaded by that opinion, and the evidence in the case generally, that the making of an adoption order is the clearly preferable course for the Court to take.

Dispensing with the consent of the birth parents

57. Julianne’s consent to the proposed adoption is required pursuant to s 52 of the Act unless I dispense with her consent. ^[20]

    20. Section 54 of the Act.

58. Dispensing with the consent of a parent to the adoption of their child by proposed adoptive parents is a grave step, not lightly to be taken. ^[21]

    21. See for example, Adoption of RCC and RZA (supra) at [17] (Brereton J, as his Honour then was).

59. I may not make a consent dispense order under s 67(1) unless, here, I am satisfied that Cameron relevantly has established a stable relationship with Jennifer and Lindsay and that the adoption by them will promote Cameron’s welfare. ^[22]

    22. Sections 67(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

60. Before making a consent dispense order, I must also be satisfied that to do so will be in Cameron’s best interests. ^[23]

    23. Section 67(2) of the Act.

61. For the reasons I have set out above, I am comfortably satisfied about these matters.

62. I propose to dispense with Julianne’s consent, and also that of Cameron’s unidentified father.

The Adoption Plan

63. I may not make an adoption order if the parties to the adoption have agreed to an adoption plan, unless I am satisfied that the arrangements proposed in the plan are in Cameron’s best interests and are proper in the circumstances. ^[24]

    24. Section 90(2) of the Act.

64. If the adoption plan is registered, it has the effect, on the making of an adoption order, as if the adoption plan were part of the order. ^[25]

    25. Section 50(4) of the Act.

65. Thus, a party to an adoption plan, once registered, can seek to enforce it as an order of the Court.

66. Further, the Court can review an adoption plan on the application of one or more parties to the plan and make such changes, if any, to the provisions of the adoption plan as it considers appropriate. ^[26]

    26. Section 51(1) and (3) of the Act.

67. The Adoption Plan for Cameron originally contemplated in person contact as follows:

1. four times a year with Julianne and her baby;

2. with Cameron’s birth father if he is identified;

3. monthly with Cameron’s half-sister;

4. monthly with Julianne’s mother and her partner;

5. four times a year with Julianne’s father;

6. four times a year with Julianne’s aunty; and

7. with any future half-siblings.

68. I was concerned whether this proposal represented sufficient contact between Cameron and Julianne and suggested that, following the hearing on 17 October 2023, the parties engage in a facilitated meeting or mediation to endeavour to agree on a regime involving more frequent contact between Julianne and Cameron.

69. The parties engaged in a facilitated meeting on 7 November 2023. The facilitator was an independent consultant and assessor.

70. The outcome of the meeting is reflected in a revised adoption plan which provides for Julianne to have contact with Cameron at least seven times a year, with a possibility of an eighth visit if it can be shared with Julianne’s mother. Julianne and her mother have what her mother has described as a “complicated relationship” and have had little contact for the last seven years.

71. Julianne wishes to have at least monthly contact with Cameron and told me that she did not think it was fair that her mother would have more contact with Cameron than her as the proposed adoption plan contemplates. However, as Mr Turnbull submitted, Julianne’s mother, and her partner, had regular contact with Cameron for the last three years whereas Julianne has seen Cameron only three times since shortly after his birth.

72. I must also take into account the frequency of birth family contact that the adoption plan proposes, being monthly with Julianne’s mother and her partner and, as now proposed, at least seven times a year with Julianne. Contact with Julianne will involve Jennifer and Lindsay, and more particularly Cameron, in a three hour round trip. Contact with Julianne’s mother and her partner involves a one hour round trip. This is a lot of travel for a person of Cameron’s age.

73. Overall, and acknowledging Julianne’s strongly expressed desire for more frequent contact, I am satisfied that the contact contemplated by the amended adoption plan is appropriate and in Cameron’s best interests.

Proposed name change

74. No middle names are recorded on Cameron’s birth certificate. However, Julianne refers to Cameron using middle names corresponding with those of her father and her grandfather.

75. It is proposed that, on the making of an adoption order, Cameron continue to have those middle names but that his surname be that of Jennifer and Lindsay.

76. Julianne accepted that it was desirable and in Cameron’s best interests for his surname to include that of Jennifer and Lindsay, but contended that it was important that he retain his existing surname and suggested that he have a hyphenated surname incorporating both names.

77. I am persuaded that the name that the Secretary proposes is that which is appropriate and most likely to promote Cameron’s best interests. It reflects his maternal ancestry and maternal family connections, while recognising that Jennifer and Lindsay are to become his adoptive parents who have parental responsibility for him. The change is supported by Ms Edwards, which she views to be in Cameron’s best interests.

78. It is important that Julianne understands that, once the adoption order is made, an Integrated Birth Certificate will be created which will include details of Julianne’s place as his birth mother. It will form an important part of Cameron’s life story.

Conclusion

79. I propose to make the orders sought by the Secretary, including an order that Cameron be adopted by Jennifer and Lindsay, an order dispensing with Julianne’s and Cameron’s father’s consent, an order approving the adoption plan, and an order approving Cameron’s name change.

80. The Secretary should bring in short minutes to give effect to these reasons.

**********

Endnotes

Decision last updated: 11 December 2023