The Adoption of Ava (a pseudonym)

[2024] NSWSC 1448

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

The Adoption of Ava (a pseudonym) [2024] NSWSC 1448

Hearing dates:

18 November 2024

Date of orders:

18 November 2024

Decision date:

18 November 2024

Jurisdiction:

Equity - Adoptions List

Before:

Nixon J

Decision:

(1)   An order for the adoption of the child, Ava Westley, in favour of the proposed adoptive parent, Penny Nicola Hedley.

(2)   An order approving the name "Westley" as the surname and "Ava Caroline" as the given names of the child.

(3) A declaration pursuant to s 21(2) of the Status of Children Act 1996 (NSW) that Travis Pottinger is the father of Ava Westley.

(4) An order pursuant to s 19(2) of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) for the inclusion of Travis Pottinger as the father of Ava Westley in the Register of Births, Deaths and Marriages.

Catchwords:

CHILD WELFARE – adoption – whether in child’s best interest that adoption order be made – whether adoption order clearly preferable – whether child is of sufficient maturity to understand effect of giving consent to adoption – whether declaration of parentage should be made – where sole adoptive parent seeks orders - whether change of name should be approved

Legislation Cited:

Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), ss 8, 27, 52, 54, 67, 72, 88, 90, 91, 92, 101, 180

Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW), s 19

Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW)

Status of Children Act1996 (NSW), s 21, 23

Cases Cited:

Adoption of Ashleigh (a pseudonym) [2024] NSWSC 763

Adoption of BL [2018] NSWSC 391

Adoption of NG (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 680

Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813

Adoption of Taylor-Clay [2019] NSWSC 27

Application of A - re D [2006] NSWSC 1056

Farnell v Penhalluriack (No 2) [2008] VSC 214

In re W (A Child) (Adoption: Grandparents’Competing Claim) [2017] 1 WLR 889; [2016] EWCA Civ 793

Re the Adoption of AJH [2017] NSWSC 1751

Re ASK and the Adoption Act 2000 [2017] NSWSC 521

Re B (A Minor) [2001] UKHL 70; [2002] 1 All ER 241

Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS [2019] NSWSC 71

Director General Department of Human Services; Re M [2011] NSWSC 369

Re: “M” [2002] NSWSC 158

Secretary, New South Wales Department of Family and Community Services by his delegate, Principal Officer, Barnardos Australia v MB and JW [2017] NSWSC 1087

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Secretary, NSW Department of Communities and Justice (Plaintiff)

Representation:

Solicitors:
NSW Department of Communities and Justice (Plaintiff)

File Number(s):

2024/00264716

Publication restriction:

This judgment has been anonymised pursuant to s 180 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW)

JUDGMENT

1. These proceedings concern the proposed adoption of a child, Ava Westley, who is now twelve years of age, by the proposed adoptive parent, Penny Nicola Hedley. For convenience, and without intending any disrespect, I will refer to each of the individuals involved in this matter by his or her first name, noting that they have been assigned pseudonyms in keeping with s 180 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) (the Act).

2. By Summons filed 15 July 2024, the Secretary, NSW Department of Communities and Justice (DCJ) seeks the following orders:

1. an order for the adoption of Ava Westley in favour of the proposed adoptive parent, Penny Nicola Hedley;

2. an order approving the name "Westley" as the surname and "Ava Caroline" as the given names of Ava.

3. a declaration pursuant to s 21(2) of the Status of Children Act1996 (NSW) that Travis Pottinger is the father of Ava Westley; and

4. an order pursuant to s 19(2) of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) for the inclusion of Travis Pottinger as the father of Ava Westley in the Register of Births, Deaths and Marriages.

The circumstances of the case

3. On 6 February 2012, Ava was born at X Hospital. The next day, she was assumed into care at X Hospital. She remained in hospital until 9 March 2012, when she was discharged into an authorised foster care placement with Penny and Clifton Hedley. Ava’s brother, Ken Westley (now aged seventeen), was also placed into foster care with Penny and Clifton at that time.

4. Ava has lived with Penny continuously since 9 March 2012.

5. On 5 May 2012, the Children’s Court made Final Orders allocating parental responsibility for Ava and Ken to the Minister for Families, Communities and Disability Services until they attain the age of eighteen years, pursuant to the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW).

6. At the time that Ava was placed into their care, Penny and Clifton were married and living together. They have a biological son, Neal Hedley, who was also a member of the household. Penny and Clifton separated in 2013, but have not divorced.

7. Ava’s mother, as registered on her birth certificate, is Sarah Westley. There is no father recorded on Ava’s birth certificate. Sarah has identified Travis Pottinger as Ava’s father. Travis is also known as “Travis Trott.”

8. In addition to her full sibling Ken, Ava has four maternal half-siblings, as well as four paternal half-siblings.

9. On 21 March 2024, Ava signed an instrument of consent to her own adoption by Penny. Ava has not revoked her consent to her adoption.

10. On 31 July 2024, Travis was served with notice of the adoption application. As Travis is listed as the Defendant in this proceeding, he was also served a copy of the Summons for Adoption.

11. On 5 August 2024, Sarah was served notice of the adoption application.

Declaration of parentage

12. Ava’s birth certificate does not name her father. The Secretary seeks a declaration under s 21(2) of the Status of Children Act that Travis is Ava’s father.

13. Section 21 of the Status of Children Act relevantly provides as follows:

Applications for declarations in the Supreme Court

(1)    Any of the following persons may make an application to the Supreme Court for a declaration of parentage under this section:

…

(d)    the Director-General when seeking a determination that the relationship of parent and child exists between a named person and another named or identified person, or

…

(2)    On any such application, the Supreme Court may make a declaration that a named or identified person is a child’s parent.

…

(4)    If a declaration of parentage is made, the Registrar of the Division of the Court in which the order was made must immediately cause a copy of the declaration to be transmitted to the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages to be dealt with under the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995.

14. Section 23(2) of the Status of Children Act provides as follows:

(2)    In any proceedings in which the parentage of a child is in issue, the court before which the proceedings are taken may admit any evidence that tends to establish that a person is or is not a parent of the child ….

15. The power of the Court to make a declaration of parentage under s 21 of the Status of Children Act is “not confined to any particular evidentiary basis”: Re: “M” [2002] NSWSC 158 at [7] (Campbell J).

16. In Re ASK and the Adoption Act 2000 [2017] NSWSC 521 at [54], Hallen J quoted with approval the following observations by Bell J in Farnell v Penhalluriack (No 2) [2008] VSC 214 at [4]:

“Serious though the issue of paternity is, an application for a declaration of paternity is a civil application, and the standard of proof applicable in such proceedings is the ordinary civil standard, namely the balance of probabilities. As the High Court held in G v H in reference to the essentially beneficial nature of the paternity provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), it was not necessary, in applications under those provisions, to prove paternity according to the higher civil standard that applies when the question involves a grave allegation. I think the paternity provisions of the Status of Children Act are analogous in this respect. Therefore, in an application for a declaration of paternity, it is sufficient to prove the facts according to the ordinary civil standard. The applicant does not have to achieve the higher civil standard discussed in Briginshaw v Briginshaw. The decision in G v H has overtaken the authority of earlier decisions that the higher standard was applicable.”

17. As noted above, Travis was served with a copy of the Summons for Adoption which sought a declaration that he is Ava’s father. He has chosen not to appear in this matter.

18. Having regard to the evidence before the Court, I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that Travis is the father of Ava. In particular:

1. Sarah has consistently described Travis as Ava’s father, and has stated that she and Travis were “together” for seven years;

2. Travis has also acknowledged his relationship with Sarah. For example:

1. on 23 December 2011 (three months prior to Ava’s birth), he told DCJ caseworkers that he had been with Sarah for five to six years, and usually stayed with her for half of the week, and sometimes longer; and

2. on 8 February 2012 (two days after Ava’s birth), he told DCJ caseworkers that he was in love with Sarah and that they had been together for five years;

3. Travis has also previously acknowledged that he is Ava’s father. For example:

1. on 23 December 2011, when Sarah was pregnant with Ava, Travis confirmed to DCJ caseworkers that he was the baby’s father;

2. on 15 December 2016, Travis posted a message addressed to Ava and Ken, referring to himself as “Dad”;

3. on 20 August 2020, in response to a message from a DCJ caseworker about Ken and Ava, Travis wrote that he loved to know about his “kids”; and

4. Travis was recorded on the Children’s Court Care Plan for Ava as being her father.

19. For those reasons, I will make a declaration pursuant to s 21(2) of the Status of Children Act that Travis is the father of Ava.

20. Further, I will make an order, pursuant to s 19(2) of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act, for the inclusion of Travis as the father of Ava in the Register of Births, Deaths and Marriages.

The formal requirements for adoption

21. I am satisfied that the formal requirements of the Act have been satisfied.

Adoption orders generally and the “best interests” principles under the Act

22. The principles regarding the making of an adoption order are well established. I have adopted the following summary of those principles from my recent decision in The Adoption of Ashleigh (a pseudonym) [2024] NSWSC 763.

23. The determination of applications for adoption is arguably the most important work of the Equity Division of this Court: Secretary, New South Wales Department of Family and Community Services by his delegate, Principal Officer, Barnardos Australia v MB and JW [2017] NSWSC 1087 at [9] (Sackar J). An order for adoption is one of the most significant, and in human terms, far reaching of all orders the Court has power to make: Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS [2019] NSWSC 71 at [157] (Hallen J).

24. In Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS at [150], Hallen J described the far-reaching nature of an adoption order as follows:

“An adoption order is status changing. It severs, in law, but not in fact, the existing relationship of blood, and creates an adoptive relationship in place of the natural relationship, which in fact, although not in law, continues, unchanged. New family ties are created which approximate blood ties. The child becomes part of his, or her, adoptive parents’ family, solely through operation of law, and there is no necessity for any actual blood relationship to exist between them. He, or she, thereafter, is regarded, in law, as the child of the adoptive parents, and the adoptive parents are regarded in law as the parents of the adopted child: s 95(2)(c) of the Act. The adopted child also ceases to be regarded, in law, as the child of the birth parents and the birth parents cease to be regarded in law as the parents of the adopted child: s 95(2)(d) of the Act. The effect of an adoption order is to extinguish any parental responsibility of the birth parents. They no longer qualify as parents for the purpose of taking part in any future proceedings about the child. Thus, the adoption order directly affects three parties, namely the child, the birth parents and the adoptive parents.”

25. When making a decision about the adoption of a child, the paramount consideration to which I must have regard is the best interests of the child, both in childhood and later life: s 8(1)(a) of the Act. I must also have regard to the principles that adoption is to be regarded as a service for the child; that no adult has a right to adopt the child; that, if the child is able to form her own views on a matter concerning her adoption, she must be given an opportunity to express those views freely and such views are to be given due weight; and that the child’s given names, identity, language and cultural and religious ties should, as far as possible, be identified and preserved: s 8(1)(b)-(e) of the Act.

26. I must not make an adoption order unless I am satisfied that the best interests of Ava will be promoted by the adoption and that, as far as practicable and having regard to Ava’s age and understanding, her wishes and feelings have been ascertained and due consideration given to them: s 90(1)(a)-(b) of the Act.

27. The question of what is in a child’s best interests involves the making of a judicial evaluation and the balancing of many factors from which an overall conclusion must be reached which will be inherently imprecise: Director General Department of Human Services; Re M [2011] NSWSC 369 at [90] per Hallen J, citing Re B (A Minor) [2001] UKHL 70; [2002] 1 All ER 241 at [16] (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead).

28. In determining the best interests of Ava, I must have regard to the matters set out in s 8(2) of the Act including, relevantly:

• any wishes expressed by Ava;

• Ava’s age, maturity and level of understanding;

• Ava’s physical, emotional and educational needs, including her sense of personal, family and cultural identity;

• any wishes expressed by either or both of Travis and Sarah;

• the nature of the relationship that Ava has with Travis, Sarah and any siblings or significant other people;

• the attitude of Penny to Ava and to the responsibilities of parenthood;

• the nature of Ava’s relationship with Penny;

• the suitability and capacity of Penny, or any other person, to provide for Ava’s needs, including her emotional and intellectual needs; and

• the alternatives to the making of an adoption order and the likely effect on Ava in both the short and longer term of changes in her circumstances caused by an adoption, so that adoption is determined among all alternative forms of care to best meet the needs of Ava.

29. I am satisfied that Ava has a reasonable understanding of the legal, emotional and psychological effects of adoption. For example, Ava understands that, following adoption, all decisions for her would be made by Penny rather than the adoption agency, CareSouth. Ava has stated that this would make her feel “safer” and “more connected” to Penny. She has also acknowledged that adoption is a “final and forever” procedure.

30. I am also satisfied that Penny is capable of providing for Ava’s physical, emotional and intellectual needs, as she has been doing for the past twelve years.

31. Ava is a generally healthy child. On 7 June 2023, Ava attended a medical review which recorded no significant areas of concern.

32. Ava has demonstrated good progress in her education. She consistently meets the standards of her age group and receives high effort grades for her attitude towards learning.

33. I am also satisfied that Ava’s cultural needs are being met. Ava is of Serbian descent. Penny identifies as being English (of Indian descent). Penny is encouraging Ava to explore Eastern European culture through watching television shows that explore Serbia and areas nearby, and is keen to travel to Serbia with Ava. Penny identifies with the Church of England religion and has stated that she and her children live a “broadly Christian life”.

34. All reports of the interactions between Penny and Ava confirm the closeness of their relationship.

35. Based on her observations, the Independent Assessor has concluded that there is a strong parent-child relationship between Penny and Ava. A senior clinician with CareSouth has reported, based on interviews with Penny, that Penny’s “clear attachment” to Ava is “synonymous” with that of a birth parent. The Delegate has concluded in her affidavit that Ava is “thriving in the care” of Penny.

36. In 2017, Penny was diagnosed with breast cancer, leading to surgery, chemotherapy and radiation treatment. Following this treatment, Penny has been cancer-free for the past six years. She has regular follow-up appointments with her surgeon and radiation oncologist. No ongoing health concerns or issues have been identified in her recent appointments. In those circumstances, I do not have concerns about Penny’s ability to continue to provide for Ava’s needs into the future.

37. As regards the attitude of Ava’s birth parents to the proposed adoption, Sarah sent a message in March 2024 stating that the Independent Assessor could “do whatever [she] need[ed] to do for the adoption”; and Travis’s son, Henry Pottinger, sent a message in July 2023 to the Independent Assessor stating as follows: “look I can speak for us all and say you have our blessings. We are very grateful this beautiful woman [Penny] has raised Ava in a safe and stable environment and would not want to break that bond”.

Is adoption clearly preferable in the best interests of Ava?

38. I may not make an order for adoption unless I am satisfied that the making of such an order would be “clearly preferable” in the best interests of Ava than any other action that could be taken by law in relation to her care: s 90(3) of the Act.

39. I must be satisfied that there is more than a slight preponderance of considerations in favour of adoption over other alternatives. The making of an adoption order must be obviously, plainly or manifestly preferable to any other action that could be taken by law: Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813 at [14] (Brereton J). I must feel a degree of conviction in favour of adoption which is commensurate with the gravity of the decision: Application of A - re D [2006] NSWSC 1056 at [53] (Palmer J); Adoption of BL [2018] NSWSC 391 at [13] (Sackar J).

40. Consideration of whether adoption would promote the best interests of the child and whether it is clearly preferable to any other order involves the identification of the likely effects of adoption and examining the benefits and detriments of each alternative from the perspective of the best interests of the child: Adoption of NG (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 680 at [74] (Brereton J).

41. The alternatives to making an adoption order would appear to be as follows:

1. to make no order and to maintain the status quo (namely, that Ava is in the parental responsibility of the Minister until she attains the age of 18);

2. to make an order under s 92 of the Act allocating parental responsibility to Penny; or

3. to make an order under s 92 of the Act allocating parental responsibility to one or both of Travis and Sarah.

42. The Independent Assessor, Ms Sarah Collett, has expressed the view that restoration of Ava to Travis or Sarah is not realistic and is not in her best interests. She has never been in the care of Travis or Sarah, and restoration to the care of either of them is described as being “highly unlikely”. I accept that view.

43. If I were to make no order and were to maintain the status quo, Penny would be unable to make significant decisions concerning Ava, as those decisions would require the approval of the Minister by his delegate. An order allocating parental responsibility for Ava to Penny would alleviate some of the disadvantages of maintaining the status quo. However, this would remain a temporary order that would expire when Ava attains 18 years of age. It therefore lacks the permanency of an adoption order and would result in Ava losing her legal connection to her psychological family when she attains adulthood.

42. One of the principal benefits of adoption is to achieve a secure, stable, reliable, permanent, lifetime placement for the child in the adoptive family as the adoptive son or daughter of the adopters: In re W (A Child) (Adoption: Grandparents’ Competing Claim) [2017] 1 WLR 889; [2016] EWCA Civ 793 at [64] (McFarlane LJ; Jackson and Lindblom LJJ agreeing). Adoption serves the identity needs of the child in question, in circumstances where the child is emotionally, psychologically and residentially already a member of the proposed adoptive family, by bringing the child’s legal status into conformity with reality, and by perfecting the child’s sense of permanent belonging in the family with which he or she identifies, not only during childhood but for life: Adoption of Taylor-Clay [2019] NSWSC 27 at [58] (Brereton J).

43. In Re the Adoption of AJH [2017] NSWSC 1751 at [297], Hallen J observed that:

“It is often referred to in the literature that a child placed with foster carers has an abiding need for a sense of security and identity and that she, or he, will feel most secure when she, or he, is assured that no one can take her, or him, away from the family of which she, or he, is a legal member. It is recognised that the sooner a child can feel this sense of security, the better for her, or his, development in the future: see Re Peter [2009] NSWSC 697, per Palmer J, at [35].”

46. The Independent Assessor has recommended that an adoption order be made, based on the length of time that Ava has lived with Penny as well as the strong psychological bonds and attachments that she shares with Penny. The Independent Assessor has concluded that adoption “will provide legal certainty now and in the future” in circumstances where Ava has “expressed her desire to be adopted by Penny.”

47. I am satisfied that the making of an adoption order would serve the best interests of Ava now, ensuring she is legally a part of her psychological family; and would also serve Ava’s best interests in the future, including after she has attained the age of 18. Ava clearly identifies Penny as her family and Penny has demonstrated an ongoing ability to meet all of Ava’s needs.

48. For those reasons, I am satisfied that the making of the proposed adoption order would be clearly preferable in the best interests of Ava than any other action that could be taken by law in relation to her care.

Determining Ava’s consent to her adoption application

49. On 21 March 2024, Ava signed an instrument of consent to her own adoption by the proposed adoptive parent. Ava has not revoked her consent to the adoption.

50. Section 52(a)(i) of the Act provides that the Court “must not make an adoption order in relation to a child who is less than 18 years of age unless consent has been given… by each parent of the child.”

51. However, s 54 of the Act provides as follows:

(2)     A child who is 12 or more years of age and of sufficient maturity to understand the effect of giving consent may give sole consent to his or her adoption by a proposed adoptive parent or parents if the child has been cared for by the proposed adoptive parent or parents for at least 2 years.

52. Section 54(2) is subject to s 54(3), which provides that the Court must not make an adoption order in relation to a child who is less than 18 years old and who gives sole consent to his or her adoption, unless:

(a)     the Court is satisfied that at least 14 days’ notice of the application for the adoption order has been given by the Secretary or appropriate principal officer to the parent or person who has parental responsibility whose consent would otherwise be required, or

(b)     the Court dispenses with the giving of notice.

53. Each of Travis and Sarah has been given at least 14 days’ notice of the application for the adoption order (having been provided with notice of the adoption application on, respectively, 31 July and 5 August 2024).

54. Ava is twelve years old, and has been cared for by Penny for twelve years.

55. By reason of the above matters, Ava may give sole consent to her adoption pursuant to s 54(2) of the Act, provided that she is of sufficient maturity to understand the effect of giving consent.

56. The Independent Assessor has met with Ava a number of times and has talked through the proposed adoption, with particular regard to the legal, emotional and psychological changes in the event that Ava is adopted. I am satisfied, based on the Independent Assessor’s evidence of her interactions with Ava about those matters, that Ava is of sufficient maturity to understand the effect of giving consent to her adoption by Penny.

57. It follows that I may make an adoption order in relation to Ava in circumstances where she has given sole consent to her adoption.

Adoption by one person

58. An order is sought for Ava’s adoption in favour of Penny alone.

59. Section 27(3) of the Act provides as follows (emphasis added):

The Court must not make an adoption order in favour of one person who is living with a spouse unless the person’s spouse consents in writing to the application for the adoption order.

60. Although Penny remains married to Clifton, they have been separated since 2013. It follows that s 27(3) has no application in the circumstances of this case.

The Adoption Plans

61. Draft maternal and paternal adoption plans have been served upon Sarah and Travis respectively.

62. Penny is currently in direct contact with all maternal family members including Sarah, who is supportive of the adoption. Penny has exchanged mobile phone numbers with each family member for the purposes of maintaining contact between them and Ava.

63. The maternal adoption plan includes provision for face-to-face family time to occur between Ava and Sarah twice per year in Sydney. Penny additionally agrees to send SMS or email updates about Ava's progress to Sarah four times per year.

64. In circumstances where three of Ava’s maternal half-siblings have expressed reluctance to have face-to-face contact with Ava, provision has been made in the maternal adoption plan to provide quarterly SMS or email updates on Ava’s progress to her half-siblings. Penny has also agreed to facilitate face-to-face contact in the future should it be mutually desired.

65. The paternal adoption plan proposes indirect (email) contact between Ava, Travis and two of her paternal half-siblings (Henry Pottinger and Corey Elliston) twice per year. As Travis and Henry have not yet provided any contact details to Penny, these emails will be sent via Ava’s paternal aunt. Penny has Corey’s mobile phone number and is able to send him SMS updates about Ava's progress twice per year. The DCJ has also obtained funding to support face-to-face meetings should they be desired in the future.

66. I am satisfied that the proposed maternal and paternal adoption plans are appropriate in the circumstances.

Proposed name change

67. It is proposed that, on the making of the adoption order, Ava is to have the name Ava Caroline Westley. This reflects her current legal name “Ava Westley” as well as the addition of “Caroline” as a middle name. Penny understands that it was intended that Ava be given the middle name “Caroline” at birth, but that this was omitted by the social worker who completed the relevant paperwork.

68. Before changing the name of Ava, I must consider any wishes expressed by her and any factors relevant to the weight that should be given to those wishes: section 101(2) of the Act.

69. On 15 June 2023, the Independent Assessor asked Ava about her views in relation to her future name. Ava stated that the name “Ava Caroline” was “pretty” and that she would like to choose this as her post-adoption name.

70. Initially, Ava showed interest in taking Penny’s surname, Hedley. However, she subsequently expressed the view that she would prefer to keep her current surname, explaining that she “would be closer to Ken” if she kept the name “Westley”, which she has “always liked”.

71. When Ava signed the Instrument of Consent on 21 March 2024, she confirmed her wish for her post adoption name to be “Ava Caroline Westley.”

72. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make an order approving “Ava Caroline Westley” as her post-adoption name.

Conclusion

73. For the reasons given above, I make the following orders:

1. An order for the adoption of the child, Ava Westley, in favour of the proposed adoptive parent, Penny Nicola Hedley.

2. An order approving the name "Westley" as the surname and "Ava Caroline" as the given names of the child.

3. A declaration pursuant to s 21(2) of the Status of Children Act1996 (NSW) that Travis Pottinger is the father of Ava Westley.

4. An order pursuant to s 19(2) of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) for the inclusion of Travis Pottinger as the father of Ava Westley in the Register of Births, Deaths and Marriages.

Notation:

1. Note that the Court is satisfied that the arrangements proposed in the maternal adoption plan are in the child’s best interests and are proper in the circumstances.

2. Note that the Court is satisfied that the arrangements proposed in the paternal adoption plan are in the child’s best interests and are proper in the circumstances.

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Decision last updated: 18 November 2024