Tey v Valuer-General - [2015] WASCA 244

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION: TEY -v- VALUER-GENERAL [2015] WASCA 244

CORAM: BUSS JA
MURPHY JA

HEARD: 11 NOVEMBER 2015

DELIVERED : 3 DECEMBER 2015

FILE NO/S: CACV 156 of 2015

BETWEEN: KOK YONG TEY
Appellant
AND
VALUER-GENERAL
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction              :  STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram  :JUDGE PARRY (DEPUTY PRESIDENT)
File No  :DR 59 of 2015

Catchwords:

Appeal commenced or purportedly commenced against interlocutory decision of the State Administrative Tribunal - Appeal commenced after appellant had been prohibited from instituting proceedings under the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA) - Whether appeal competent - Whether appeal and application for leave to appeal should be dismissed as abuse of process

Application by appellant for a stay of interlocutory order of the State Administrative Tribunal - Appeal lacking merit - Application for stay dismissed

Legislation:

Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA), s 3, s 4, s 5, s 6

Result:

Application for leave to appeal dismissed
Appeal dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant: In person
Respondent: Mr A J Sefton

Solicitors:

Appellant: In person
Respondent: State Solicitor for Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Eastland Technology Australia Pty Ltd v Whisson [2003] WASCA 307; (2003) 28 WAR 308
Michael Mischin MLC, Attorney General for Western Australia v Tey [2015] WASC 146
Tradesman Technologies Pty Ltd v Ameduri [2012] WASCA 168

REASONS OF THE COURT: On 11 November 2015, the court heard the appellant's application for a stay, filed 3 November 2015, and a related application by the respondent to the effect that the appeal should be dismissed or struck out on the basis that it had been instituted in contravention of s 5(1) of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA) (Act).
The appeal (if competent) is in relation to an interlocutory decision dated 16 October 2015[1] of Deputy President, Judge Parry, made in proceedings in the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT). The interlocutory decision was to the effect that the SAT proceedings would be listed for final hearing on 12 November 2015.
[1] The decision was an extempore decision recorded in the transcript of proceedings before the Tribunal on 16 October 2015 (primary reasons).
At the conclusion of the hearing in this court on 11 November 2015, the court dismissed the appellant's application for a stay, and said that it would subsequently provide reasons. These are the reasons for dismissing the stay. The court also said on that occasion that it would reserve its decision in relation to the respondent's application to strike out the appeal. These reasons also deal with that application.
Also on 11 November 2015, the court granted the appellant leave to file and serve her affidavit sworn 10 November 2015 and her written submissions dated 10 November 2015. Also, costs were reserved.

The SAT proceedings

20 February 2015 - 15 October 2015[2]

[2] The chronology is taken from the primary reasons, with reference to transcript pages.

On 20 February 2015 the appellant filed in the SAT an application for review of the gross rental value of a residential property owned by Ms Tey.[3]
[3] ts 49.
After the commencement of proceedings the matter went to mediation, following which three directions hearings occurred.[4]
[4] ts 49.
On 28 August 2015, there was a directions hearing before Deputy President, Judge Parry, attended by the appellant. Deputy President, Judge Parry, listed the matter for final hearing to commence at 2.00 pm on 12 November 2015. Ancillary programming orders were also made on that date. The final hearing date was 'set to suit' the appellant.[5] The appellant made submissions concerning, and did not contest, the programming orders made.[6]
[5] ts 49.
[6] ts 49.
The programming orders were as follows:[7]
[7] Order of Deputy President, Judge Parry, 28/8/15.
1.By 18 September 2015 the respondent must file with the Tribunal and give to the applicant the following documents:
a.a statement of issues, facts and contentions it says arise in relation to the decision under review; and
b.an indexed and paginated bundle in chronological or other logical order of the documents it is required to file under s 24 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) namely:
(i)a statement of the reasons for the decision; and
(ii)documents and other material in its possession or under its control which are relevant to the Tribunal's review of the decision.
2.If the respondent proposes to give evidence or call any witness including any expert to give evidence at the hearing it must by 18 September 2015 file with the Tribunal a signed statement of the witness' evidence and give a copy of the statement to the other parties.
3.In its documents or witness statements filed in accordance with the preceding orders the respondent is to address the status and valuation consequences as at 1 August 2012 of the land and accommodation at 22 and 68 Davies Crescent, Kardinya and is to provide details of the internal building areas of each property in its schedule of gross rental values dated 14 May 2015 to the extent that it has that information or to the extent that it can obtain that information form [sic] records held by the City of Melville.
4.By 9 October 2015 the applicant must file with the Tribunal and give to the respondent its own statement of issues, facts and contentions setting out:
a.by reference to each paragraph number in the respondent's statement whether the applicant accepts or rejects the issue, fact or contention identified by the respondent; and
b.any other issues, facts and contentions it says are relevant to the decision under review.
5.The applicant must at the time it files and gives its statement of issues, facts and contentions file with the Tribunal and give to the respondent an indexed and paginated bundle in chronological or other logical order of the documents on which it proposes to rely in the proceeding not in the respondent's bundle.
6.If the applicant proposes to give evidence or call any witness including any expert to give evidence at the hearing it must by 9 October 2015 file with the Tribunal a signed statement of the witness' evidence and give a copy of the statement to the other parties.
7.If a party engages an expert to attend a mediation or compulsory conference or to give evidence in the proceeding the party must give the expert within seven days of this order or of the engagement (whichever is the later):
a.the Tribunal's pamphlet entitled 'A guide for experts giving evidence in the State Administrative Tribunal', unless the party has already given the expert a copy of the pamphlet; and
b.a copy of these orders.
8.An expert witness must acknowledge in his or her evidence that he or she has read the Tribunal's pamphlet entitled 'A guide for experts giving evidence in the State Administrative Tribunal' and agrees to be bound by the expert's obligations stated in that document.
9.The proceeding is adjourned to a further directions hearing at 10.00am on 16 October 2015 in order to review preparation for hearing.
10.The matter is listed for a final hearing to commence at 2.00 pm on 12 November 2015 for a duration of two hours.
On 18 September 2015, the respondent filed a statement of issues, facts and contentions and a valuer's statement of evidence pursuant to orders 1 and 2 of the programming orders.[8]
[8] ts 32.
On 9 October 2015, the appellant filed a responsive statement of issues, facts and contentions, and a witness statement pursuant to orders 4 and 6 of the programming orders.[9]
[9] ts 32.
Subsequently, the appellant filed two more documents and an affidavit in support. The first document dated 9 October 2015 sought the following seven orders from the SAT:
1.Leave to amend applicant's statement of issues, facts and contentions, file and serve on respondent the day prior to the final hearing of the matter.
2.Leave to amend applicant's statement of witness evidence, file and serve on the respondent day prior to the final hearing of the matter.
3.Order that the valuer-general to provide a certified copy of the valuer-general's valuation roll (date of valuation: 1 August 2012 with no update amendment) for all of the residential properties in the City of Melville, including the name and professional qualifications of the rating and taxing valuer involved in the valuation, for the purpose of contention in this Matter No. DR 59 of 2015.
4.In reference to the respondent's schedule of gross rental values with building areas dated 17 September 2015 and filed on 18 September 2015, order that the valuer-general to provide evidence where these building areas were obtained, and the name of the person who provide the information; that it be certified and signed by the person.
5.The valuer-general had failed to comply with order 3 made by Judge Parry on 28 August 2015.
…
6.Leave to extend service of documents ordered to serve to the respondent by 9 October 2015 in accordance with order 4 and order 6 made by his Honour Judge Parry on 28 August 2015.
7.Leave to comply order 5 be extended because respondent failed to comply order 1.
Secondly, on 15 October 2015, the appellant filed a document seeking a vacation of the final hearing date.[10]

Deputy President, Judge Parry's reasons of 16 October 2015

[10] ts 32.

Deputy President, Judge Parry, heard the appellant's applications on 16 October 2015. The transcript of the proceedings indicates that Deputy President, Judge Parry, heard oral submissions from the appellant over the course of approximately 30 minutes.
His Honour delivered extempore reasons in which he said:[11]
[11] ts 49 ‑ 53.
Both parties have substantially complied with the orders that I made in terms of preparation for hearing. In particular, the respondent has provided a statement of issues, facts and contentions by 18 September 2015 and although it did not provide an index and paginated bundle of the documents required by section 24 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 by that date has explained to me today, through its officers, that it understood that the set of initial papers filed on 27 February 2015, when taken together with the documents in and attached to the statement of issues, facts and contentions and its witness statement filed on 18 September 2015, satisfy, in substance, order 1(b) as made on 28 August 2015.
I accept, on the basis of what I'm told by Mr Gilbert and Mr Dumas of the Valuer General, that there is substantial compliance with that order. Ms Tey also has substantially complied with the orders for the filing of her statement of issues, facts and contentions in response and her witness statements. I'm not concerned by a short one or two day delay in compliance. There has been substantial compliance. And I also adjourned the matter to a directions hearing today in order - and I quote from order nine 'to review preparation for hearing', that is the final hearing scheduled for 12 November 2015.
I am satisfied that the matter is ready for hearing on 12 November 2015. In a document filed on 9 October 2015 Ms Tey sought seven orders from the Tribunal, and in a document filed yesterday she sought an addition with the vacation of the final hearing date essentially because of the matters set out in her first seven orders. The Tribunal's objectives - principal objectives are set out in section 9 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004, WA. The Tribunal's main objectives, in dealing with matters within its jurisdiction are - and I quote:
(a) To achieve the resolution of questions, complaints or disputes and to make or review decisions fairly and according to the substantial merits of the case; and (b) to act as speedily and with as little formality and technicality as is practicable and minimise the costs to parties; and (c) to make appropriate use of the knowledge and experience of Tribunal members.
In making case management decisions such as those made at the directions hearing on 28 August 2015 and in considering the orders sought by Ms Tey today I am guided by those principal objectives. Order 1 and order 2 sought by Ms Tey today are for leave to amend her statement of issues, facts and contentions and leave to amend her witness statement. In both cases she wishes to do so by - and I quote 'the day prior to the final hearing of the matter'.
The only matter that Ms Tey has articulated by way of amendment to either of those documents as she understands them currently relate to the possibility of including information as to encumbrances on her title. No other amendment was articulated. I reject the applications for leave to amend the statement of issues, facts and contentions and the witness statement. The applicant had three weeks in accordance with the orders that I made at the last directions hearing, after receiving the respondent's statement of issues, facts and contentions and witness statement, to file her own, and, in fact, she did so.
Three weeks was an adequate and reasonable period for that purpose. As I mentioned, she also did not clearly articulate the proposed amendments other than to refer to encumbrances on her own title. Furthermore, to grant leave to amend the documents and file them on the day prior to the final hearing of the matter would be grossly unfair to the respondent. In all those circumstances I'm not satisfied that I should grant leave to amend.
In relation to the third order sought which is for the Valuer General to provide a certified copy of the Valuer General's valuation roll as at 1 August 2012 which is the relevant date for the purposes of the valuation in question which relates to Ms Tey's question only Ms Tey has sought an order for that to be provided, a certified copy of that Valuer General's valuation role for that date - and I quote 'for all of the residential properties in the City of Melville including the name and professional qualifications of the rating and taxing valuer involved in the valuation.'
The order sought is entirely unreasonable, unnecessary and disproportionate to the issues for determination in this proceeding which relates to the gross rental value of a single residential property. The requirement to provide the name and professional qualifications, moreover, of the rating and taxing valuer involved is also completely unreasonable. I note that during the course of the argument today Ms Tey expressed a concern about whether valuers employed by the Valuer General have sufficient qualifications and experience insofar as she wishes to challenge the qualifications and experience of the valuer who will give evidence for the Valuer General in this proceeding.
She may do so at the final hearing; however, otherwise that is not in issue. So order 3, in my view, is entirely unreasonable, unnecessary and disproportionate to the issues in dispute in this proceeding. Order 4 refers to the respondent's - that is the Valuer General's schedule of gross rental values with building areas dated 17 September 2015 filed on 18 September 2015. That is a document provided in response to an order of the Tribunal at a request of Ms Tey. Ms Tey now seeks an order that the Valuer General provide evidence where these building areas were obtained, the name of the person who provided the information and it be certified by the person. This is a matter that Ms Tey may pursue in cross-examination at the hearing. I am satisfied that the order that I made for programming of the matter has been substantially complied with.
In relation to order 5 that's sought by Ms Tey which is premised on her view that the Valuer General has failed to comply with order 3 made by me on 28 August 2015 that order 3 made by me on that date required that in the documents and witness statements filed in accordance with my programming orders the respondent was to address the status and valuation consequences as at 1 August 2012 of the land and accommodation at 22 and 68 Davies Crescent, Kardinya and to provide details of the internal building areas of each property in the schedule of gross rental values dated 14 May 2015 to the extent that it has that information or to the extent that it can obtain that information from the records held by the City of Melville.
It is clear, on my review of the evidence filed by the Valuer General for the purposes of the final hearing, that the Valuer General has complied with order 3. That order was made at Ms Tey's request at that directions hearing. The premise by which - of order 5 sought by Ms Tey is therefore incorrect. The matters that she wishes to raise in the substance of order 5 - I will withdraw that. I add that Ms Tey, of course, is perfectly entitled to cross-examine and make submissions in relation to the information provided by the Valuer General in response to order 3 which, as I have said, has been substantially complied with. Order 6 sought by Mrs Tey is leave to extend service of documents ordered to serve on the respondent by 9 October and order 7 is leave to extend the requirement in order 5 that I made on 28 August on her to provide information to the respondent.
I am satisfied that she has substantially complied with the timetable that I imposed on 28 August 2015 and therefore there is no need to amend or to grant leave to extend service of documents. I am satisfied that the documents that the parties have filed to date in response to my orders of 28 August 2015 substantially comply with those orders on both sides. The final order sought by Mrs Tey today is for the adjournment of the final hearing in order, in particular, for her to have the opportunity to amend her statement of issues, facts and contentions and her witness statement.
In light of my earlier findings, there is, in fact, no need to adjourn the final hearing. More fundamentally, in my view, adjourning the final hearing in this case having regard to the history of the matter and the fact that the parties have been given an adequate and reasonable opportunity to provide their evidence for the purposes of final hearing would be manifestly inconsistent with the tribunal's objectives. In particular, those objectives which require the resolution of matters and the review of decisions purely and according to the substantial merits of the case at - for that to occur speedily and with little formality and technicality as is practicable.
This matter relates to the gross rental value of a single residential property which was valued by the Valuer General at about $19,600. The matter has been pending before the tribunal now since 20 February 2015. It has had the benefit of three directions hearings and a mediation. It requires final adjudication and that will occur at the final hearing. The order I make today is that the final hearing date commencing at 2 pm on 12 November 2015 is confirmed. Thank you.

Appeal background

On 23 October 2015, the appellant filed an appeal notice. Leave to appeal is necessary: s 105(1) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act). An appeal may only be brought on a question of law: s 105(2) of the SAT Act.
Also, on 23 October 2015, the appellant filed an application, supported by an affidavit, for leave to appeal.
An appellant's case was not filed. However, in her affidavit filed 23 October 2015, the appellant stated, in effect, that the proposed ground of appeal was that Deputy President, Judge Parry, erred in law by denying the appellant procedural fairness at the hearing on 16 October 2015 in that he refused to grant the orders sought by her.

On 3 November 2015, the appellant filed the application for a stay, and an affidavit of the same day, in support. The appellant's affidavit in support of her application for a stay deposes relevantly:
Grounds:
1.1The appeal to the Court of Appeal in the Supreme Court of Western Australia was brought on a question of law, denial of procedural fairness.
1.2An appeal notice, and leave to appeal were filed with the Court of Appeal in the Supreme Court of Western Australia on 23 October 2015, within time limit.
1.3If stay is not granted on or before the 12 November 2015, the appellant will lose her rights of appeal. Her appeal and leave to appeal filed on 23 October 2015 will be rendered nugatory. As an Australian citizen and resident she has a right to seek justice.
On 5 November 2015, the appellant filed service certificates in relation to service on the respondent.
On 6 November 2015, the appellant was ordered to file and serve any submissions in support of her application for a stay by 9 November 2015.
On 9 November 2015, the registrar ordered that the respondent file and serve any affidavits and submissions in response to the stay application by 10 November 2015.
The respondent filed and served submissions on 10 November 2015 in which he contended, in effect, that the appeal should be struck out as an abuse of process on the basis that it was incompetent, in that the appellant had instituted proceedings in contravention of the Act without first having applied for and obtained leave to institute proceedings in accordance with s 6 of the Act.

Disposition of the stay application

It is for the applicant for a stay to move the court to a favourable exercise of its discretion. Ordinarily, special circumstances need to be shown. The court will consider whether the right of appeal will be rendered nugatory if a stay is not granted. If it can be demonstrated that the right of appeal will be rendered nugatory if a stay is not granted, the stay will generally still be refused, unless it can be established that the appeal has ultimately reasonable prospects of success.[12]
[12] Eastland Technology Australia Pty Ltd v Whisson [2003] WASCA 307; (2003) 28 WAR 308 [9]; Tradesman Technologies Pty Ltd v Ameduri [2012] WASCA 168 [21] - [22].
In this matter, it may be accepted that if a stay were not granted, the appeal against the interlocutory decision would be rendered negatory. However, the proposed grounds of appeal have no arguable prospect of succeeding. It is evident that the primary judge heard the appellant in relation to her applications dated 9 and 15 October 2015, and dealt appropriately with the matters raised in them. There is no arguable basis for contending that the appellant was denied natural justice. Moreover, there is plainly no merit in the complaint that there was a denial of natural justice merely because the primary judge did not make the orders that the appellant had sought.
The appeal has no merit and for these reasons, it was appropriate to dismiss the stay application.

The application to dismiss the appeal

On 4 May 2015, Le Miere J made orders in Michael Mischin MLC, Attorney General for Western Australia v Tey.[13] His Honour ordered, relevantly (the vexatious proceedings order), that:
[Kok Yong Tey] is prohibited from instituting any proceedings, as defined in the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (Act), unless she first obtains the leave of a court or tribunal, as the case requires under s 6 of the Act.
[13] Michael Mischin MLC, Attorney General for Western Australia v Tey [2015] WASC 146.
The respondent contends, in effect, that whilst the primary proceedings were commenced prior to the vexatious proceedings order, the institution of an appeal from Deputy President, Judge Parry's interlocutory decision on 16 October 2015 was made after that order, and involved the institution of proceedings contrary to s 5(1) of the Act.

Disposition

Section 4(1) of the Act provides:
(1)If a Court is satisfied that -
(a)a person has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings (whether before or after the commencement of this Act); or
(b)it is likely that the person will institute or conduct vexatious proceedings,
the Court may make either or both of the following orders -
(c)an order staying any proceedings, either as to the whole or part of the proceedings, that have been instituted by that person;
(d)an order prohibiting that person from instituting proceedings, or proceedings of a particular class, without the leave of a court or tribunal, as the case requires under section 6(1).
The vexatious proceedings order was an order made pursuant to s 4(1)(d) of the Act.
Section 5 of the Act provides, relevantly:
(1)Proceedings are not to be instituted in contravention of an order under section 4(1)(d).
(2)If -
(a)despite subsection (1), proceedings are instituted in contravention of an order under section 4(1)(d); and
(b)those proceedings are struck out by a court or tribunal in the purported exercise of a power to strike out the proceedings,
the court or tribunal has the power to award costs to the same extent as if the proceedings had been brought and had been struck out by the court or tribunal.
Accordingly, as a result of the vexatious proceedings order, the appellant was prohibited from instituting proceedings without the leave of a court or tribunal as the case required under s 6(1) of the Act.
The term 'institute proceedings' is defined in s 3 of the Act to include, relevantly:
(d)in the case of … proceedings before a tribunal, the taking of a step or the making of an application which may be necessary to commence an appeal in relation to the proceedings or to a decision or determination made in the course of the proceedings. (emphasis added)
Section 3 defines 'proceedings' to include:
(a)any … proceeding …of any kind within the jurisdiction of any court … or a tribunal;
(b)any proceedings, including interlocutory proceedings, taken in connection with or incidental to proceedings pending before a court … or a tribunal; and
(c)an appeal from a decision or determination, whether or not a final decision or determination, of … a tribunal. (emphasis added)
The appellant's application for leave to appeal herein involved 'the taking of a step or the making of an application which may be necessary to commence an appeal' within the meaning of par (d) of the definition of the term 'institute proceedings' in s 3 of the Act. Also, the appeal itself involves the institution of proceedings insofar as it is the institution of an appeal from a decision or determination of a tribunal within the meaning of the term 'proceedings' as defined in s 3 of the Act. Accordingly, the appellant has instituted proceedings within the meaning of the Act.
The appellant has not applied for leave to institute the proceedings in accordance with s 6 of the Act. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal, and the appeal, have been instituted in contravention of an order under s 4(1)(d), contrary to s 5(1) of the Act.
The appellant did not debate the scheme of the Act in her application in the appeal for a stay or her application for leave to appeal. Rather, the appellant submitted, in effect, that on judgment delivery on 4 May 2015, Le Miere J had, in effect, advised her that she would not be prevented from continuing the primary proceedings and instituting any appeal in relation to the primary proceedings, and accordingly it could not be said that she had instituted proceedings contrary to s 5(1) of the Act. The appellant also said (as stated in her affidavits and written submissions of 10 November 2015) that at a directions hearing in the SAT on 8 May 2015, counsel for the respondent had informed Deputy President, Judge Parry, that the vexatious proceedings order did not affect the primary proceedings, and that consequently she was entitled to commence the appeal herein.
There are a number of reasons why the appellant's submissions should not be accepted.
First, the terms of the vexatious proceedings order are not qualified in a manner consistent with the appellant's submissions. Secondly, any view that may have been expressed by Le Miere J about the operation of the Act on future proceedings could not bind this court. Thirdly, as explained below, the transcript of the hearing before Le Miere J on 4 May 2015 does not, in any event, support the appellant's contentions.
At the hearing on 4 May 2015 at which his Honour delivered reasons for judgment and made final orders, the appellant attended and sought to argue that orders should not be made against her. In the course of that exchange, Le Miere J said:
The purpose of the hearing this morning is not to re‑argue the matter or to argue about the reasons that I have given. All that we're doing today is this: I have given my reasons for decision and the orders that should be made. The only question today is whether the orders, set out in the minute which [counsel for the Attorney General for Western Australia] has produced, reflect the reasons that I have given.
If you consider the decision that I have made and the reasons that I have given are wrong, what you may do is appeal against that decision. But we're not here today to re‑argue the matter.
…
You may appeal against this decision if you wish. But what I'm talking about today is simply the form of the order. If you wish to appeal against the decision, then that's … a matter for you.
This order will not stop you appealing against this decision, all right?
…
This order does not stay proceedings which have already been commenced. This order is referring only to any cases that you might commence in the future. It doesn't apply to cases which have already been commenced.
…
There should be an order in terms of paragraph 1 of the [Attorney General's] minute of 4 May 2015. That order accurately reflects the reasons for decision which I have delivered. In her submissions this morning, [Ms Tey] has stated, in effect, that she disagrees with the decision which I have delivered and considers it to be unjust. That is a matter for an appeal, if any, and it does not go to the form of the order. As I have said, paragraph 1 of the minute accurately reflects my reasons for decision, and there should be an order in those terms.
The effect of his Honour's observations was two‑fold. First, the vexatious proceedings order did not itself prevent the appellant from appealing against that order. Secondly, the order was referring only to 'cases' that may be 'commenced', or in the language of the Act, 'proceedings', that may be 'instituted' by the appellant in the future. The application for leave to appeal, the application in the appeal for a stay and the appeal itself herein, fall into that category, as they were proceedings instituted (or purportedly instituted) on 23 October 2015.
Finally, nothing that was said by counsel for the respondent at the directions hearing on 8 May 2015 could reasonably be said to support the appellant's contention. On that occasion, the following exchange occurred:[14]
Counsel: Yes, your Honour, Le Miere J made orders in court on 4 May to the effect that Mrs Tey is prohibited from instituting proceedings without the leave of the court - relevant court or tribunal as the case requires. However, no order was made staying existing proceedings. As a result, your Honour, the effect of the order is that Mrs Tey is effectively prohibited from instituting proceedings after 4 May … [b]ut any proceedings on foot are unaffected.
[14] ts 8 - 9, 08/05/15.
In that exchange, in substance counsel informed Deputy President, Judge Parry, that the existing SAT proceedings had not been stayed by the vexatious proceedings order, and in that regard, the SAT proceedings were not affected by the order. Counsel was not referring to any new proceedings instituted by way of an appeal from a decision in the SAT proceedings.

Conclusion

In the circumstances, the appropriate orders are that:
1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2.The appeal is dismissed.
The parties should be heard on the question of costs.