Tessaro and Tessaro
[2018] FCCA 3329
•21 November 2018
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| TESSARO & TESSARO | [2018] FCCA 3329 |
| Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – Overseas travel application – applicant’s mother in deleterious state of health – applicant wishing to visit mother in [country omitted] for two months – applicant seeks that parties’ child accompany her on trip to meet and spend time with extended family – [country omitted] a Hague Convention country – parties unable to agree at all upon travel or arrangements for the child – final parenting orders assign sole parental responsibility to the applicant – child spending two days per fortnight with respondent – applicable principles – issues which were agreed – question of risk – quantum of security – orders permitting travel. |
| Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s.144 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.60B, 60CA, 60CC |
| Cases cited: Atuk & Atuk [2017] FamCA 441 Deiter & Deiter [2011] FamCAFC 82 Eaby & Speelman (2015) FamCAFC 104 Kuebler & Kuebler (1978) FLC 90-434 Line & Line (1997) FLC 92-729 R & K [2005] FMCAfam 325 Smallwood & Smallwood [2018] FamCA 58 Thomason & Malhotra [2010] FamCAFC 85 Vaughton & Randle [2018] FamCA 382 |
| Applicant: | MS TESSARO |
| Respondent: | MR TESSARO |
| File Number: | MLC 8992 of 2009 |
| Judgment of: | Judge A Kelly |
| Hearing date: | 13 November 2018 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 13 November 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Orders pronounced: | 13 November 2018 |
| Delivered on: | 21 November 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Easteal |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Mirabellas Solicitors |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms Dwyer |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Buller McLeod Pty |
ORDERS
UPON APPLICATION MADE TO THE COURT by Mr Easteal appearing on behalf of the Applicant and Ms Dwyer appearing on behalf of the Respondent.
AND UPON THE APPLICANT, MS TESSARO, UNDERTAKING ON OATH TO THE COURT that she will perform and observe her obligations pursuant to this Order to travel with the child [X] born on 2007 (the Child) to [country omitted] with his travel time to not exceed the period commencing on 4 December 2018 until 2 February 2019 and to return the Child to Australia no later than 2 February 2019.
AND UPON MS N, second cousin of the Applicant, UNDERTAKING TO THE COURT that she will lodge with the Registrar of the Court the sum of $10,000 as security for performance of the Applicant’s obligation to return the Child to Australia on or before 2 February 2019.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
Subject to compliance with paragraph 5(d) of this Order, paragraph 12 of the Order made on 3 September 2012 is discharged.
Subject to paragraphs 4-5 of this Order, the Child [X] born 2007 be permitted to leave the Commonwealth of Australia AND IT IS DIRECTED THAT the Australian Federal Police do remove the name of the said Child from the Airport Watch List at all points of international arrival and departure in Australia.
To the extent that the following orders are inconsistent with paragraph 3 of the Order made on 3 September 2012 (that is, for the time the Child may spend with the father), the operation of paragraph 3 of that Order be suspended until 2 February 2019.
The Applicant be permitted to remove the Child from the Commonwealth of Australia only for the purposes of travelling to [country omitted] for the period of 4 December 2018 to 2 February 2019 (the travel period) and only on the following conditions.
The Applicant’s departure from Australia with the Child is subject to the following conditions:
(a)the Applicant will return the Child to Australia no later than 2 February 2019;
(b)the Applicant will only travel with the Child for the purposes of spending time with the Applicant’s relatives in [country omitted];
(c)the Applicant will otherwise comply with this Order regarding facilitating telephone communication between the Respondent and the Child during the travel period and during make-up time between the Respondent and the Child;
(d)by no later than 4:00pm on Friday, 23 November 2018, the Applicant will lodge with the Registrar of the Court, the sum of $10,000 (Security Funds) as security for performance of the obligation to return the Child to Australia on or before 2 February 2019, such sum to be lodged with the Registrar of this Court:
(i)by bank cheque; or
(ii)by clear funds;
(e)upon lodgement of the said Security Funds pursuant to paragraph 5(d) of this Order, the Applicant shall forthwith inform the Respondent of such lodgement in writing;
(f)upon the Child’s return to Australia on or before 2 February 2019, the Security Funds lodged in accordance with paragraph 5(d) of this Order shall be released forthwith; and
(g)pending lodgement of the said Security Funds pursuant to paragraph 5(d) of this Order, the Applicant shall lodge with the Registrar of the Court the original airlines tickets being exhibit T-1 to the Applicant’s affidavit made on 22 October 2018.
The Respondent have liberty to apply on short notice and ex parte to make an urgent application for:
(a)the name of the Child to be restored to the Airport Watch List should the Applicant be in default of her obligations pursuant to paragraphs 5(d) or 5(g) of this Order;
(b)the release of the Security Funds, if the Applicant has not returned the Child to Australia within 24 hours of the Child’s scheduled return on 2 February 2019 so as to meet the reasonable costs and expenses of and incidental to the recovery and return of the Child to Australia.
The Respondent has liberty to apply on short notice for the cancellation or suspension of the Applicant’s Newstart Allowance if the Applicant has not returned the Child to Australia within 24 hours of the Child’s scheduled return on 2 February 2019.
Notwithstanding that the Applicant has sole parental responsibility of the Child, for the avoidance of doubt the Applicant is authorised and permitted to apply for and receive an Australian passport for the Child without first obtaining the written consent of the Respondent.
For the purposes of telephone contact between the Respondent and the Child during the travel period:
(a)the Applicant will facilitate at least one phone call each week by agreement between the parties and failing agreement each Wednesday at 7.00 pm Australian Eastern Daylight Savings Time; and
(b)the Respondent is at liberty to telephone the Child at additional reasonable times on the telephone numbers [omitted] (the landline of the maternal grandmother’s residence) and [omitted] (the mobile phone of the maternal aunt).
Upon the Applicant returning to Australia with the Child, she shall immediately:
(a)advise the Respondent of her return with the Child; and
(b)lodge the Child’s passport with the Registrar of the Court to be held until further Order save that it may be released with the written consent of the parties.
Make-up Time
In lieu of the time the Child would otherwise have spent with the Respondent during the travel period, the Child shall spend 24 nights with the Respondent in addition to his time pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Order made on 3 September 2012 as may be agreed between the parties, and failing agreement from:
(a)the conclusion of school 23 November 2018 – 4.00 pm 25 November 2018 (2 nights);
(b)the conclusion of school 15 February 2019 – 4.00 pm 17 February 2019 (2 nights);
(c)the conclusion of school 15 March 2019 – 4.00 pm 17 March 2019 (2 nights);
(d)4.00 pm on 13 April 2019 – 4.00 pm 20 April 2019 (7 nights);
(e)the conclusion of school 3 May 2019 – 4.00 pm 5 May 2019 (2 nights);
(f)the conclusion of school 31 May 2019 – 4.00 pm 2 June 2019 (2 nights); and
(g)4.00 pm on 6 July 2019 – 4.00 pm 13 July 2019 (7 nights).
Paragraph 4 of the Order made on 3 September 2012 regarding the supervision of the Respondent’s time with the Child applies to the Respondent’s time pursuant to paragraph 11 of this Order.
Additional matters
The Applicant may provide a copy of this Order to the Australian Passports Office and the Australian Federal Police.
Liberty to apply at short notice is reserved in relation to the implementation of this Order.
The parties may inspect only and the parties’ legal representatives and the Independent Children’s Lawyer (if appointed) may inspect and photocopy the document produced by the Department for Health and Human Services in response to the Notice of Risk filed 9 October 2018 in this proceeding.
The parties and their legal representatives are restrained from providing a copy of the document or disclosing its contents to any other person without an order of the Court.
Pursuant to Rule 21.15 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, the Court certifies that it was reasonable for the parties to employ an Advocate for this application.
AND THE COURT NOTES THAT:
A.Upon lodgement of the said Security Funds pursuant to paragraph 5(d) of this Order, the Registrar of the Court shall return to the Applicant the original airlines tickets being exhibit T-1 to the Applicant’s affidavit made on 22 October 2018.
B.The Applicant and Ms N concede it would be appropriate for the Respondent to immediately apply for the release of the said sum of $10,000 referred to in paragraph 5(d) of this Order, as part of the reasonable costs of and incidental to such arrangements as may be necessary for the purposes of travel to recover the Child and associated legal expenses, should the Applicant not return the Child to Australia by 2 February 2019.
C.Pursuant to sections 65DA(2) and 62B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the particulars of the obligations these Orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these Orders are set out in Annexure A and these particulars are included in these Orders.
D.The information produced is confidential and cannot be disclosed to any other person or entity without an Order of this Court.
E.Penalties may apply pursuant to ss 112AD and 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 if the information is disseminated other than as ordered in these proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Tessaro & Tessaro is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLC 8992 of 2009
| MS TESSARO |
Applicant
And
| MR TESSARO |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
In this proceeding, the applicant mother sought orders that would facilitate her travelling with the parties’ only son, [X] aged 11 years, to [country omitted], a Hague Convention country, for two months. These reasons for judgment explain why I made orders to allow her to do so.
The parties are of [nationality] descent. The applicant who is aged 43 years is in receipt of a NewStart Allowance. The respondent who is aged 46 years is in receipt of a Disability Pension. The respondent was born in Australia and the applicant in [country omitted]. The parties were married in [country omitted] in 2004. The applicant then came to Australia in 2006 after her immigration papers had been finalised.
Although the matter has had a most protracted history, I do not recount it as the parties did not do so. Suffice to say that their litigation commenced in 2009 and resulted, relevantly, in final parenting orders made by consent on 3 September 2012. To achieve those final orders it had been necessary to appoint an Independent Children’s Lawyer in order that the interests of [X] might be considered. One aspect of the early history of the matter to which passing reference was made was that the applicant had made application in July 2010 that she and the child (then aged 3 years) be permitted to live in [country omitted]. No further detail was provided as to the result of that proposal.
The consent orders prescribed in some detail the manner of the parties’ parenting arrangements including that the applicant would have sole parental responsibility for the child who would live with the applicant and spend 2 nights in 14 with the respondent and one night after school. Apart from dealing with holidays and special days, the parties were also agreed on changeover arrangements together with interstate travel. However, their consent orders provided for the child’s name to be placed on the Airport Watch List.
By an initiating application filed on 10 March 2016, the applicant sought orders to permit her to travel overseas with the child for three months for the purposes of her visiting her family in [country omitted]. The applicant’s affidavit deposed to the respondent suffering an autism spectrum disorder and to the child being in the care of the respondent’s parents when he spent time with the respondent. She deposed that the purpose of her intended visit was on account of her mother then being aged 75 years and to her having had surgery for her hip, a heart condition and to being in a generally bad state of health. In addition, the applicant deposed that she wanted to visit her sister who had undergone surgery to her brain. The applicant deposed that she had no intention of remaining in [country omitted] and to having made many friends in Australia. She further deposed that she would not be eligible for any pension or government assistance in [country omitted]. She exhibited a letter of request that her lawyers had made of the respondent and his reply refusing her request to travel to [country omitted] as described above.
The respondent’s answering affidavit was somewhat remarkable for its brevity. Apart from setting out the history of the matter, the respondent addressed particular aspects of the applicant’s affidavit including that he was concerned the applicant could provide no security by way of assurance for her returning with the child to Australia. He deposed that he was then living with his parents and to having a cognitive disability. The respondent pointed up concerns respecting the applicant’s psychiatric health and deposed that he was fully capable of caring for the child during the applicant’s three month period of absence.
On 6 April 2016 an order was made dismissing the application to permit the applicant and child to travel to [country omitted]. No reasons for that decision were given.
The present application was filed on 11 September 2018 and listed for hearing in a duty list on 16 October 2018. The respondent filed a response opposing the relief sought by the applicant.
The parties have each filed affidavits, notices of risk and other documents relating to the question which falls for decision. When the matter first arose in a duty list, I made orders which afforded the parties the opportunity to file further evidence which might bear upon the exercise of discretion whether to grant the application. Each party took the opportunity to file further affidavits. The court directed attention to the question of security and the exhibiting of return tickets which might support a conclusion respecting the applicant’s stated intention that she would return the child to Australia in early 2019.
Neither party sought to cross-examine the other upon their affidavits. However, for the purposes of giving consideration to the application, the applicant was required to give evidence as was her second cousin who had offered to furnish financial security for the applicant’s undertaking to return the child to Australia in February 2019.
The applicant’s affidavits rehearsed much of the history recounted above adding that the child was now older, had made many friends at his school, was in regular contact with his [country omitted] grandmother and was anxious to meet with his extended family in that country. She deposed that after the parties’ marriage they had travelled with the child back to [country omitted] in 2009 for a six week holiday. She deposed that each of her two sisters were unmarried, had no children and that her mother’s health was now in a serious state. The applicant reaffirmed her stated intention to live in Australia and provided reasons for that contention. She deposed to having completed a training course in [course omitted] and that she wished to return to the workforce after visiting her mother and sisters in [country omitted]. She offered to adjust make up time in favour of the respondent.
The respondent’s affidavit was likewise repetitious of his affidavit sworn in opposition to the earlier application to travel. The respondent continues to live in his parent’s home (although his father has now passed). He accepted that the child now speaks some [language omitted]. He eschewed knowledge of any regular contact between the child and his [country omitted] relatives. He initially denied the mother’s ill health but maintained that, irrespective of her health, this would not lessen the risk posed to the applicant not returning to Australia. The respondent accepted that the applicant is now a permanent resident of Australia. He also accepted that in 2009 the parties and their child had travelled to [country omitted] for a six week holiday to visit the applicant’s family.
The respondent agreed that the applicant’s family lived in a small village in [country omitted] – he could not recall its name or location but deposed that it was very small and very remote. He restated his belief that the applicant wanted to return to live in [country omitted] and complained that the applicant had not disclosed any phone numbers by which the applicant could be contacted. He objected that the applicant had not offered any security by way of bond for the child’s return.
Objection was taken by the respondent’s counsel to the production of a medical report proving the medical condition of the applicant’s mother. As the application was fundamentally one governed by Part VII of the Act, greater consideration might have been given to the principles for conducting child-related proceedings, including the need to assist in the determination of the real issues in dispute and to focus on the issues which truly warranted investigation. Nonetheless, the applicant was put to the expense of procuring a further translation of a medical report which confirmed that her mother’s condition is severe and includes periods of unconsciousness. The report concludes as follows:
The patient has been admitted in severely bad health state, [medical conditions] and that is why right after the admission d treatment had been given to the patient . . . Because of hypotension/state of shock and disorder of consciousness the patient has been returned to the Intensive Care. . . The patient is referred to prolonged hospital treatment in the [Hospital], with a recommendation for further treatment . . .
In addition, the applicant exhibited several photographs of her mother which were confirmatory of her present condition.
Having put the applicant to proof on this issue, the respondent ultimately accepted the applicant’s mother was in a poor state of health.
The applicant’s further affidavit addressed the issues to which the respondent had taken objection. She exhibited return airline tickets. She provided contact telephone numbers and, when required to give evidence in the course of the hearing, confirmed that those numbers were accurate. The applicant gave the court an undertaking on oath that she would return the child to Australia by 2 February 2019. By her counsel she conceded that it would be appropriate to provide security and that it would be reasonable for the respondent to immediately make application to utilise that security to seek the return of the child to Australia. By her counsel she agreed that the airline tickets should be held in the custody of the court until the proffered security had been lodged with the court. She made significant concessions for the child to spend additional spend time with the respondent to address the fact that the child would be absent from Australia for a period of two months if the application was granted. In giving her evidence she agreed that she would only be travelling in [country omitted] to her home village, the nearby village where her sister lived, and to the city where her mother was hospitalised. She gave evidence that [capital city] was perhaps two hours’ drive from [village] and that she proposed to travel there one or two times per week.
The respondent filed a further affidavit which maintained his opposition to the application. His opening objection focussed upon the loss of his spend time with the child over the Christmas holiday period. He challenged whether the airline tickets were refundable. The respondent reiterated his concerns that the applicant would not return to Australia and identified that the applicant had no property in Australia, that she had no family here and no employment. He maintained that the child would have greater opportunities in Australia than he would in [country omitted]. The respondent challenged the efficacy of the security offered by the applicant’s second cousin. He maintained that the applicant’s family would press her to remain in [country omitted] so as to render assistance during the mother’s illness or afterwards.
The respondent requested that if the application was granted the child’s passport should be surrendered once he had returned from overseas.
Consideration
Save for brief reference to an authority, I was not directed to any part of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (the Act) or to any decision which might have been considered to be of particular assistance. This may be explained on the basis that the parties did not appear to be in dispute upon the applicable principles.
Part VII of the Act concerns the subject Children and is arranged in 15 Divisions and comprises ss 60 – 70Q. By Sub-div BA of Part VII, the best interests of the child are addressed in the context of court proceedings. Section 60B identifies the objects and principles of Part VII. Section 60CA provides that, in deciding whether to make a particular parenting order in relation to a child, a court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration. Implicit in the parties’ submissions was that the ‘best interests’ requirement operated in relation to the determination of the present application. Section 60CC concerns the subject of how a court determines what is in a child’s best interests. Subsections 60CC(2)-(3), respectively, concern the primary and additional considerations which the court should take into account when addressing a parenting application, whether it be on an interim or final basis.
Where the court is dealing with an interim application in a parenting matter, the court must make its assessment of the evidence notwithstanding that there are disputed questions of fact which cannot be determined until trial.
Subsection 60CC(3) identifies a wide range of additional considerations which ought to be taken into account, including any other fact or circumstance that the court may think relevant.
The parties were agreed that the principles enunciated in Kuebler & Kuebler (1978) FLC 90-434 should be applied in the present case. There, the Full Court identified a non-exhaustive list of factors:
(a) the length of the proposed stay out of the jurisdiction;
(b) the bona fides of the application;
(c) the effect on the child of any deprivation of access;
(d) any threats to the welfare of the child by the circumstances of the proposed environment;
(e)the degree of satisfaction in which the court based its assessment of the parties that a promise of a return to the jurisdiction would be honoured.
See also R & K [2005] FMCAfam 325 (Emmett FM); Line & Line (1997) FLC 92-729 (Murray, Lindenmayer and Kay JJ).
The parties were agreed, or agreed they were in contest, on each of those issues as follows:
a)Length of stay: it was agreed that the period of absence from Australia was not excessively long.
b)Bona fides: it was agreed that the bona fides application was established upon applicant’s mother’s parlous state of health;
c)Effect of deprivation: it was agreed that the child’s absence for school was of relatively minor significance. Further, it would be appropriate for the child to have additional spend time with the respondent over and above that provided by the consent parenting orders in recognition of the time which he would not have with his father over the 2018 Christmas school holidays. Moreover, it would also be appropriate for the child to be able to have regular telephone contact with the child while he was overseas;
d)Risk; this was the central issue in contest (see below);
e)Satisfaction of promise to return being honoured: (see below).
While the principles stated in Kuebler were expressed to be non-exhaustive, no additional issues were identified in this case.
Although the respondent had initially maintained that the risk attending the non-return of the child was heightened by reason that [country omitted] was, it was submitted, a non-Hague Convention country, when the hearing of the application resumed on 13 November 2018 that submission was expressly withdrawn. It was however, replaced by a submission that [country omitted] was adjacent to non-Hague Convention countries and that the risk of thus non-return remained. This submission was not supported by evidence and having regard to the breadth of the proposition it was not a matter about which I was prepared to take judicial notice: cf s 144, Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).
Despite the submissions made in opposition to the application and the opportunity taken to challenge the applicant in cross-examination in relation to the matters upon which I required that she provide evidence when giving a sworn undertaking to the court that the child would be returned to Australia by 2 February 2019, the applicant was not otherwise challenged upon her evidence. In my view this was a fundamental defect in the respondent’s objection to the application: cf Thomason & Malhotra [2010] FamCAFC 85, [57] (Thackray, Strickland and Murphy JJ).
In addition, quite apart from the concession made that [country omitted] is a Hague Convention country, there was no evidence to support the submission that [country omitted] does not have legal mechanisms or institutions in place for the return of the child: Thomason, [60].
Insofar as the respondent submitted that the application must be refused if there was any risk that the child might not be returned to Australia, I reject that submission. When I asked for authority to support it, counsel quite properly accepted that there was none to support such a broad proposition.
In Deiter & Deiter [2011] FamCAFC, [82], the Full Court considered the issue of risk and observed that:
Risk assessment comprises two elements - the first requires prediction of the likelihood of the occurrence of harmful events, and the second requires consideration of the severity of the impact caused by those events. In our view, the assessment of risk in cases involving the welfare of children cannot be postponed until the last piece of evidence is given and tested, and the last submission is made. . . it is always a question of degree depending on the evidence that is before the Court.
See also Eaby & Speelman (2015) FamCAFC 104, [14].
This is not a case in which there was evidence from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade indicating that travel to the suggested place of travel posed a high risk: cf Atuk & Atuk [2017] FamCA 441, [44] (Foster J). Nor is this a case in which it is suggested that the applicant has failed to comply with previous orders: Atuk [63].
I am not satisfied on the whole of the evidence that there is a high likelihood of the occurrence of harmful events to the child and, save for the risk of non-return, no specific events were suggested. Likewise, the severity of the impact of such events falls for consideration in the context that the child is to return to his mother’s village and to spend time with his maternal family before the passing of his grandmother.
In my opinion, due weight should be given to the child benefitting from a meaningful relationship with his extended family and from an overseas cultural holiday with his mother: cf s 60B(1)(a), 60B(2)(e); Smallwood & Smallwood [2018] FamCA 58, [59] (Berman J).
When the matter was first listed before me, I drew attention to, and made orders addressing, the need for security to be considered.
Security of $10,000 was offered. While complaint was made in general terms as to the quantum of the security offered, there was no evidence or more detailed complaint as to the reasons why that sum was not satisfactory: Thomason, [99]. It was open for that issue to be pressed but it was not. In my opinion, the fact that [country omitted] is a Hague Convention country is of direct relevance to an assessment of this issue. I do not find that the sum offered would be adequate to cover all costs associated with recovery if that became necessary; however, I do not think that this is the criterion upon which security must be assessed: Line & Line (1997) FLC 90-729, [4.47]-[4.51].
While it is accepted that the setting of security is a delicate matter, it is settled that the twofold purpose of security is to require a sum to be lodged which will entice the applicant to comply with the obligation to return the child to Australia and to provide a sum which will be adequate to enable the respondent to take action to endeavour to obtain the return of the child. No evidence was adduced as to why the sum proposed would be inadequate. Contrastingly, it is clear that the quantum of security should not be fixed in a sum that would impose hardship upon the applicant. To do so would have the potential to stultify an application of the present kind. I also accept that a matter for assessment of security is the risk of the child’s non-return to Australia. I have identified those factors above and recognised that they were very much under consideration in this application.
Further, as stated in Line, the fact that [country omitted] is a Hague Convention country is a factor which militates in favour of the level of security being at a lower level than might otherwise be appropriate. There is no suggestion that the applicant has any intention of travelling to a non-convention country. The burden of her evidence, which I accept, is that she wishes to travel to [country omitted] exclusively and to confine her travels to her home village, the adjoining village of her sister and to the city where her mother is an inpatient: cf Vaughton & Randle [2018] FamCA 382, [32] (Berman J). Insofar as hardship to the party being required to provide the security is concerned, I do not consider that this issue is directly engaged in the present case. I reach that conclusion because the applicant’s second cousin is the person who has proffered the security and in that sense the question of hardship is more remote. The applicant will remain subject to an obligation to repay the amount being offered as security on her behalf.
The exercise of discretion in a case such as the present calls for close attention to the underlying facts. I have examined the materials relied upon by the parties and addressed each of the issues to which they drew attention. In addition, I have considered issues that were identified in the authorities referred to above. In my judgment, the orders made in granting the application establish a regime which addressed as far as may be done, the risks and issues that were raised by the parties and which I identified as warranting consideration.
I certify that the preceding thirty-eight (38) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge A Kelly
Date: 21 November 2018
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