IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S36 of 2000
B e t w e e n -
TEPKO PTY LIMITED, NEAL EARTHMOVING PTY LIMITED and JOHN HENRY NEAL
Appellants
and
WATER BOARD
Respondent
GLEESON CJ
GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 22 NOVEMBER 2000, AT 9.36 AM
(Continued from 21/11/00)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Downes.
MR DOWNES: Your Honours, overnight, in an effort to reduce the time taken in further submissions, we have produced a document which partly addresses factual references in the transcript to matters that I would have taken your Honours to and partly answers some issues that were raised yesterday by some of your Honours. I think that is being handed to your Honours now. We have also turned up the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act in the form it was at the relevant time and we have made a copy of that for your Honours, or the relevant parts of it.
Can I briefly take your Honours to that Act to see the structure relevantly so far as the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act was concerned. If one goes to section 26 of the Act, on page 24 of the print, one sees that:
an environmental planning instrument may make provision for or with respect to any of the following:–
(b) controlling…..development –
“Development” is defined in the definitions section at page 5 of the print in section 4 to include the subdivision of land. The general principles relating to environmental planning instruments appear in Part III which begins on page 23 of the print.
Local environmental plans, LEPs as they are called, are dealt with in Division 4 which begins on page 37 and there is then a series of sections setting out the steps that were necessary back in 1985 and thereabouts relating to the coming into effect of a local environmental plan including requirements for exhibition and so forth.
Your Honour Justice Kirby may remember something of this from a case called The Balmain Association v The Minister in which there was considerable reference to these provisions.
KIRBY J: Fortunately I do not.
MR DOWNES: Your Honours, and at page 70, which I think is the critical point for present purposes, after the – section 70, I am sorry, page 47, which is the relevant section, after the preliminary process is gone through under which the Minister ultimately makes a local environmental plan”.
CALLINAN J: Mr Downes, there is some mention in section 37 of planning policies. Now, I only refer to that because there is a reference in the letter and the memorandum to non-conflict, as it were, with policies. Were there any planning policies promulgated relevant to this area pursuant to section 37?
MR DOWNES: These are the things that in the vernacular are called SEPPs and they are formal policies. I am not aware…
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- Case
- [2000] HCATrans 697
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the compensation awarded for the compulsory acquisition of the land was just and equitable, specifically in relation to the valuation of the land. The central legal issue was how the refusal of a development application, prior to the acquisition, should be treated when assessing the market value of land under the relevant acquisition legislation. The appellants argued that the refusal was an irrelevant consideration for valuation purposes, while the respondent maintained that it was a material factor affecting the land's market value.
The Court ultimately held that the refusal of the development application was a relevant factor in determining the market value of the land at the time of acquisition. The reasoning was that market value is determined by what a willing but not anxious purchaser would pay for the land, taking into account all factors that would influence such a purchaser. The refusal of a development application, by significantly limiting the potential uses of the land, would undoubtedly affect a prudent purchaser's assessment of its value. Therefore, the compensation awarded, which reflected this diminished value, was considered just and equitable. The appeal was dismissed.
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