Temwell Pty Ltd v DKGR Holdings Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Temwell Pty Ltd v DKGR Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1296

TEMWELL PTY LTD (ACN 082 656 157)  -v-  DKGR HOLDINGS PTY LTD (formerly known as DYNAMIC DATA SYSTEMS PTY LTD) (In Liquidation) (ACN 062 778 616),  mCOM SOLUTIONS INC, DRAGON VENTURES. COM INC, mCOM SOLUTIONS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (In Liquidation) (ACN 091 375 950), DAVID HAINS, ROBERT VAN ZANTEN, DRAGONVENTURES.COM LTD, RICHARD HAINS  and  IAN MORRIS KIEFEL

AND

mCOM SOLUTIONS INC. and mCOM SOLUTIONS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (In Liquidation) (ACN 091 375 950) v  TEMWELL PTY LTD (ACN 082 656 157), SLADEMERE PTY LTD (ACN 082 656 139), SHEPRIDGE PTY LTD (ACN 082 696 077), GEOFFREY MICHAEL TAUBER, MORRY FRAID, ROGER ENRIQUEZ

V 663 of 2000

RYAN J

13 NOVEMBER 2003
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY V 663 of 2000
BETWEEN: TEMWELL PTY LTD (ACN 082 656 157)
Applicant
AND: DKGR HOLDINGS PTY LTD (formerly known as DYNAMIC DATA SYSTEMS PTY LTD) (In Liquidation) (ACN 062 778 616)
First Respondent
mCOM SOLUTIONS INC.
Second Respondent
DRAGON VENTURES. COM INC
Third Respondent
mCOM SOLUTIONS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (In Liquidation) (ACN 091 375 950)
Fourth Respondent
DAVID HAINS
Fifth Respondent
ROBERT VAN ZANTEN
Sixth Respondent
DRAGONVENTURES.COM LTD
Seventh Respondent
RICHARD HAINS
Eighth Respondent
IAN MORRIS KIEFEL
Ninth Respondent
AND BETWEEN:
mCOM SOLUTIONS INC. and mCOM SOLUTIONS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (In Liquidation) (ACN 091 375 950)
Cross-Claimants
AND:
TEMWELL PTY LTD (ACN 082 656 157)
SLADEMERE PTY LTD (ACN 082 656 139)
SHEPRIDGE PTY LTD (ACN 082 696 077)
GEOFFREY MICHAEL TAUBER
MORRY FRAID
ROGER ENRIQUEZ
Cross-Respondents

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE:

13 NOVEMBER 2003

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR RULING (NO 12) ON APPLICANT’S CALL FOR PRODUCTION OF COMPLETE ARNOLD BLOCH LEIBLER FILE

  1. Counsel for the applicant (“Temwell”) has sought orders for production by the mCom respondents of four categories of documents.  Those categories have been described in a letter dated 3 November 2003 from Temwell’s solicitors to the solicitors for the mCom respondents.  In the interests of avoiding further delay to the substantive hearing this ruling is confined to Category 1 described as follows:

    ‘1.The file maintained by Arnold Bloch Leibler ("ABL") for the period from 1 January 2000 to 31 May 2000 (inclusive) for the Respondents and/or the Portland House. Group concerning in any way the purchase or possible purchase of either DDS or the business and assets of DDS, including its rights under the Transaction Documents, and/or the acquisition from our client of ownership of the Application Software and/or the obtaining of its consent to the transaction proposed between the Second and/or Fourth Respondent and DDS, including all matters referred to in the accounts of ABL dated 8 March 2000 (CB21:7253), 31 March 2000 (CB21:7344), and 28 April 2000 (CB21:7349) and all documents produced pursuant to the subpoena dated 18 March 2003 (CB19:6633) but in an unredacted form ("ABL file document").’

  2. As I understand it, Counsel for Temwell accept that, on their face, all documents in that category attract legal…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 1296
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Temwell Pty Ltd v DKGR Holdings Pty Ltd, the court was tasked with determining the extent of solicitor-client privilege in the context of legal advice given by one law firm to a client and whether there had been an implied waiver of this privilege. The dispute primarily revolved around the disclosure of documents and communications between the law firm and its client, which the opposing party sought to access in the course of litigation. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the judge had to navigate the complexities of legal privilege and the circumstances under which such privilege might be waived.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the actions of a solicitor, who had been involved in negotiations and meetings, constituted a waiver of the client's right to privilege over communications and documents. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the broad scope of documents claimed to be subject to an implied waiver of privilege was justified and whether the client had indeed waived privilege by putting its state of mind in issue. The court also needed to address the principle established in Telstra Corporation Ltd v BT Australasia Pty Ltd, which suggests that a party may consent to the use of privileged material by putting their state of mind in issue, and how this principle interacts with the broader scope of legal professional privilege.

The court found that the actions of the solicitor, while potentially going beyond the typical scope of a retainer, did not amount to a waiver of privilege for all communications and documents between the law firm and its client. The court emphasised that merely being involved in negotiations or meetings does not automatically lead to a waiver of privilege. Furthermore, the court determined that the breadth of documents claimed to be subject to an implied waiver was too wide, and there was insufficient evidence to suggest that any specific documents were based on advice from the law firm in question. Consequently, the court ruled that no waiver of privilege had occurred, and the requested documents remained protected by legal professional privilege.

The final orders of the court were that the documents in question were not to be disclosed, and the claim for an implied waiver of privilege was dismissed. The court's decision underscored the importance of the precise scope of privilege and the need for clear evidence of a waiver, highlighting the continued relevance and protection afforded by legal professional privilege in litigation.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

It is not to the point that Wenig, as Counsel for Temwell have contended, “was a personal actor in the key events bearing on whether or not consent was given, or if given withdrawn. His involvement was more than just that of a legal advisor.” Illustrations of Wenig’s acting in that different role are said to be his participation in discussions concerning the Application Software licence and in the abortive settlement meeting of 22 March 2000. As suggested at [34] of these reasons, a solicitor’s retainer not infrequently contemplates that he or she will undertake negotiations, or attend settlements or other meetings on behalf of the client. Whether or not what Wenig did in this case was within or outside the purview of a normal retainer, the mere adducing of evidence of what he said, did or heard when so acting cannot have the consequence that all confidential communications to or by ABL for the purpose of that firm’s giving advice in the course of its retainer should be opened up to Temwell.Conclusion It will be apparent from my review of the specific passages from the evidence of David Hains, Richard Hains, Kiefel and Wenig that a substantial obstacle to Temwell’s successfully contending that there has been an implied waiver of privilege has been the width of Category 1 documents to which the contention has been directed. In my ruling of 12 September 2003 I inferred that Mr Elbaum’s “understanding” of the effect of the 1998 assignment to Temwell was based on advice from Deacons. Accordingly, I ruled at [14]:‘To the extent that the understanding there referred to was based on advice from Deacons, I consider that privilege in any document by which the advice was sought by DDS or conveyed to it has been waived, and such document should be made available to the legal advisers to the mCom respondents. I have been unable to identify any such document from among those described in the schedule. However, if there is a dispute about whether a particular document answers the description just given, I shall resolve it by inspecting the document for myself.’ In the present case, I have been unable to draw the necessary inference that any passage of evidence relied on was based on advice from ABL. Accordingly, it has been unnecessary to undertake the task of inspecting for myself documents in the ABL file. Moreover, Counsel for Temwell, although armed with the redacted version of the ABL file and a full copy of the detailed bill of costs rendered by ABL to the mCom respondents, have not sought to identify any document which might be inspected for the purpose of applying the “fairness test” to the claim for disclosure of allegedly relevant advice or other information. I acknowledge that a Full Court of this Court in Telstra Corporation Ltd v BT Australasia Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 152 has held by majority that a party, by putting in issue his or her state of mind, as for example by pleading reliance on some conduct of the other party, is to be taken as having consented to the use of relevant privileged material. That material may include “relevant legal advice, if any” received by the party asserting reliance; see per Branson and Lehane JJ at 166-167. I share the reservations about that proposition in its full width which have been expressed by Allsop J in DSE (Holdings) Pty Limited v InterFan Inc [2003] FCA 384. Nevertheless I agree with his Honour that a single Judge of this Court is bound, as another Full Court of this Court held in Perpetual Trustees (WA) Ltd v Equuscorp Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 925, to apply the principle expressed by the majority in Telstra v BT. That obligation is qualified only to the extent that subsequent High Court authority has precluded or limited the application of the principle in a particular case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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